“[1] This is yet a further case of so-called missing trader or “MTIC” fraud on the system of VAT. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) conveniently describes the nature of a typical MTIC fraud as follows: “5 … goods (almost always small but valuable items such as mobile phones and computer chips) are acquired by a registered trader in the United Kingdom from a trader in another member State, and sold to a second UK-registered trader. The goods then usually change hands several times within the UK before they are sold to an overseas trader which, if it is located in a member State of the European Union, is registered for VAT in that member State. Commonly the transactions all occur within a few days of the entry of the goods into the UK, sometimes even on the same day, so that goods enter the UK in the morning, pass through the hands of several UK traders during the day, and are exported again in the afternoon. 6. The first UK vendor, the acquirer from overseas, charges VAT on the consideration paid by his purchaser, but fails to account to the respondent Commissioners for that tax, and disappears. Such documentation as he may have had—if any—relating to his acquisition is never produced to the Commissioners. For the scheme to work he must be a VAT-registered trader who provides the purchaser with a genuine VAT invoice, on the strength of which the purchaser claims an input tax credit. The purchaser’s own sale, and those of the other UK traders save the last in the sequence, usually generate a small profit and, consequently, a small net VAT liability, for which those traders account. The last trader, selling overseas, claims credit for the input tax he has incurred, but has no output tax liability since the sale is zero-rated. Usually this trader makes a significant profit, though that is not invariably the case; occasionally one of the antecedent traders can be shown to have made the greatest profit of all those in the chain. All of these sales and purchases, including the sale to the overseas buyer, are almost always properly documented. [2] In the jargon that has developed to describe the various participants in such chains, the initial importer of the goods who fails to account for the output tax he has charged to his purchaser and disappears, is known as the “defaulter” or “missing trader.”
“9 A contra-trader, a broker in one chain of transactions—again adopting the commonly used jargon, a “dirty” chain—in which a default has occurred, buys goods from a supplier in another member State, and sells them to a UK customer; after one or more further sales and purchases they are sold to a customer in another member State. The contra-trader and, usually, all the other traders in this chain account correctly for their VAT liabilities; taken by itself it is a “clean” chain. The acquirer in the clean chain has incurred a liability for output tax which (because the values are engineered to achieve this result) matches the input tax credit due to him (or ostensibly due to him) as the broker in the dirty chain. He does not need to make a large repayment claim, attracting the Commissioners’ attention, but instead makes a modest payment, or a minimal repayment claim. The same result may be achieved by undertaking a number of transactions generating an aggregate input tax credit matching the broker’s output tax liability for the relevant accounting period. It is then the broker in the clean chain who has an input tax claim which, unless they can establish a link between the clean and dirty chains, the Commissioners must meet since the goods in the clean chain have not themselves been used for fraudulent purposes.””
“[51] … traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected with fraud, be it the fraudulent evasion of VAT or other fraud, must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of losing the right to deduct the input VAT. [52] It follows that, where a recipient of a supply of goods is a taxable person who did not and could not know that the transaction concerned was connected with a fraud committed by the seller, Article 17 of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a rule of national law under which the fact that the contract of sale is void, by reason of a civil law provision which renders that contract incurably void as contrary to public policy for unlawful basis of the contract attributable to the seller, causes that taxable person to lose the right to deduct the VAT he has paid. It is irrelevant in this respect whether the fact that the contract is void is due to fraudulent evasion of VAT or to other fraud.” … [56]. … a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT must, for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, be regarded as a participant in that fraud, irrespective of whether or not he profited by the resale of the goods. [57] That is because in such a situation the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice. [58] In addition such an interpretation, by making it more difficult to carry out fraudulent transactions, is apt to prevent them. [59] Therefore, it is for the referring court to refuse entitlement to the right to deduct where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, and do so even where the transaction in question meets the objective criteria which form the basis of the concept of “supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such” and “economic activity”. … [61] … where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person entitlement to the right to deduct.”
“[59] The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined. It embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who “should have known”
“… I can do no better than repeat the words of Christopher Clarke J in Red12 v HMRC[2009] EWHC 2563 :- [109] “Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and "similar fact" evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. [110] To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. [111] Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them."”
“… was accepting the principle that, so far as participation in the fraud was concerned, if a person had knowledge or the means of knowledge that fraud was being carried out at an earlier stage in the chain of supply, that would denote that he was a participant in the fraud and thereby lose his right to deduct. That is plain from Optigen ; it is plain from Kittel ; and the court in Mahageben was saying nothing different.”
“It is plain that if HMRC wishes to assert that a trader's state of knowledge was such that his purchase is outwith the scope of the right to deduct it must prove that assertion.”
“From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case: (1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action. (2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. (3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. (4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.”
“… is not a matter of fact but a matter of opinion. It is merely a view of a witness on a matter on which the tribunal itself must reach its own conclusion, and as such is of no value as evidence. Such evidence may rightly be excluded on that basis. In most cases, however, we would not see it as necessary, or indeed proportionate, for a forensic exercise to be undertaken, either by the parties or by the tribunal, to identify any such matters in each witness statement and for the tribunal formally to direct that they be excluded. Generally speaking, we think that the parties can rely upon the good sense of the tribunal to disregard purported evidence that represents conclusions that the tribunal itself must reach. That can usually conveniently be the matter of submission at the substantive hearing, rather than a formal application to exclude.”
“Allegations relating to actual knowledge were not admissible, in the light of the basis on which Mr Wallace had, following a preliminary hearing, directed that the appeal should proceed.”
“… the [BSG] appeal is unusual in that the only allegation levelled against [BSG] is that its due diligence was insufficient, and as a result it is said by the Commissioners it ought to have been aware of the alleged fraudulent background There is no allegation that [BSG] itself operated fraudulently, and indeed there is a procedural background to that. The issues thus are first, HMRC must demonstrate that there has been a VAT loss, and that is not admitted by [BSG]. If there was a loss, [BSG] was very remote from the loss, knows nothing of it and HMRC is put to proof of the loss. Second, and again this is citing a lengthy line of authorities, if the Commissioners succeed in demonstrating a loss that the loss resulted from a fraudulent evasion by some party or other. If the Commissioners surmount those two hurdles they must demonstrate that the fraudulent evasion was connected with the [BSG] transaction, the subject of this appeal, and to all intents and purposes there are only two [BSG] transactions. Indeed, one could say that there is only one, because there are two purchases from a UK supplier, Infinity – there are purchases from a UK supplier, Infinity, which is one aspect of the transactions, and then onward sales to two separate customers who throughout are referred in shorthand as Universal and a different company, Allimpex. So the Commissioners must demonstrate that any fraudulent evasion that they can show was connected with those transactions. And then the fourth issue to which the meat of the evidence will go, if the Commissioners surmount those four hurdles, they must show that [BSG] ought to have known that its purchases were connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT”
“We consider that the due diligence exercise relating to Universal was inadequate, as was the failure to follow up outstanding questions where matters did not appear to be in satisfactory order. The exercise was not sufficient to protect BSG from the risk of involvement in transactions which might turn out to have undesirable associations.”
“8. … Judge Mosedale dealt with the application [for the direction of Judge Demack to be set aside and that of Judge Cornwell-Kelly be restored] without a hearing, in accordance with rule 29 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. She refused the request that Judge Cornwell-Kelly should deal with the matter on the ground that by virtue of para 14 of Sch 4 to theTribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 the determination of the panel to hear any matter is the responsibility of the Senior President of Tribunals. He has in fact delegated that responsibility to Chamber Presidents, and it is not within Judge Mosedale’s power to make such a determination. Moreover, had I been asked to nominate Judge Cornwell-Kelly to deal with the application I would not have done so since it seems clear to me that the motive for the application is the hope that he would prefer his own direction to that of Judge Demack. 9. Judge Mosedale made various observations about the scope of the powers to set directions aside, but went on to conclude that there was no obvious error of law in Judge Demack’s directions, sufficient to enable her to set it aside under any of the rules – 6, 38 or 41 – which provide for the setting aside of decisions and directions, but instead gave permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against those of the directions which set aside para 3 of Judge Cornwell-Kelly’s direction [that no evidence may be served in relation to dealings with or at the First Curacao International Bank] and admitted Mr Birchfield’s evidence [in relation to the FCIB]. The appellant did not however, pursue such an appeal”
“... evidence like any other in the case; it is not as the application suggests in a different category. Specifically, it is no longer “late”, because it has been adduced in accordance with a direction of the tribunal. Whether the time limit is extended or the evidence is admitted notwithstanding its expiry is immaterial; all that matters is that the evidence has been admitted. He continued, at [15]: “The appellant may, of course, recover its costs of considering and dealing with it [the evidence] if, at the conclusion of the case, the tribunal thinks it appropriate to make a direction to that effect, either because the appellant succeeds and the tribunal considers it should have its costs of the appeal as a whole, or because the tribunal perceives a reason to make a direction specifically relating to this evidence.”
“… these are matters to be determined after the hearing.”