“(1) A tribunal may direct that a party or applicant shall pay to the other party to the appeal or application— (a) within such period as it may specify such sum as it may determine on account of the costs of such other party of and incidental to and consequent upon the appeal or application; or (b) the costs of such other party of and incidental to and consequent upon the appeal or application to be assessed … by way of detailed assessment ….”
“(1) The Tribunal may only make an order in respect of costs (or, in Scotland, expenses)— (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if the Tribunal considers that a party or their representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings; (c) if— (i) the proceedings have been allocated as a Complex case under rule 23 (allocation of cases to categories); and (ii) the taxpayer (or, where more than one party is a taxpayer, one of them) has not sent or delivered a written request to the Tribunal, within 28 days of receiving notice that the case had been allocated as a Complex case, that the proceedings be excluded from potential liability for costs or expenses under this sub-paragraph; ….”
“The tribunal may give any direction to ensure that proceedings are dealt with fairly and justly and, in particular, may— (a) apply any provision in procedural rules which applied to the proceedings before the commencement date; or (b) disapply any provision of Tribunal Procedure Rules.”
“[25] There has been some debate before me about what has been referred to as the default position, namely that the 2009 Rules should apply with the result that a no costs shifting regime applies. That is said to be the default position because the 2009 Rules apply unless they are disapplied. Linked with this is the suggestion that a taxpayer in current proceedings had a ‘legitimate expectation’ both before and after1 April 2009 that costs would be dealt with in accordance with Rule 10. I place those words in quotation marks because the phrase is used in the Decision [of the First-tier Tribunal] but not in the sense in which it is understood in public law cases nor in the sense of the EU law principle of legitimate expectations. [26] It is important to treat with some care both what is said to be the default position and what rules the parties to an appeal might reasonably have expected would apply to an appeal. No doubt one party might, by their actions or inactions and by what they say or do not say, lead the other party to believe that the first party would seek to apply one set of rules rather than the other, giving rise to some sort of reasonable expectation on the part of the second party that he could rely on the first party’s representation. Matters of that sort can certainly be taken into account by the tribunal when it comes to exercising its discretion in relation to costs.”
“[37] … I have expressed the view that it would be odd in the first example if there were radically different results depending on whether the appeal was started just before or just after1 April 2009 . It is important here to identify what does, and what does not, fall within the policy of the 2009 Rules. One policy is to give the taxpayer in a Complex case a choice as to the applicable costs regime, a choice which a taxpayer must make at an early stage of the proceedings. If he does not elect to opt out, the appeal falls, by default, within a costs shifting regime. The tribunal is not, it is to be noted, left with a power, at the end of the proceedings, to decide whether to apply a costs shifting regime or not. So, it seems to me, there is a second policy which is to provide certainty about the applicable costs regime at an early stage of the proceedings. There is, of course, a reason for this second policy apart from merely putting the parties into a position so that they know where they are. If a taxpayer was able to exercise his right of election at a late stage, or even [wait] until the result of the appeal was known, he would be able to elect for the regime which he knew was the more favourable to him; this would amount, effectively, to one-way costs shifting which was obviously never intended…. [38] The first of those two policies has been given effect to in the 2009 Rules as a matter of drafting by linking the taxpayer’s right of election to the actual allocation of the appeal as a Complex case. The second policy has been given effect to by providing costs shifting as the default regime. Those policies would have been given equal effect if the default position had been a no costs shifting regime with the right for the taxpayer to opt into a costs shifting regime. I rather doubt, therefore, that it can be said that the default regime under the 2009 Rules reflects a policy which goes beyond giving the taxpayer a choice and providing for certainty. But if there is a policy which goes beyond that, it must surely be that cases which are in their nature complex should attract a costs shifting regime. The 2009 Rules themselves are formulated in the context of cases which commence in the Tax Tribunal where all cases will fall within one of the four categories and will be allocated accordingly. As I have said, the fact that current proceedings cannot be allocated at all, if Surestone Ltd is correct, does not mean that those proceedings are not complex but only that they cannot be allocated as a Complex case. It is, therefore, the nature of the case as complex, rather than its categorisation as a Complex case, which is relevant to the exercise of the paragraph 7(3) discretion either to displace or to fix in place the default regime in current proceedings under Rule 10 ( ie no costs shifting).”
“[39] Consider, then, an application (whether to fix a costs shifting regime or a no costs shifting regime) made by the taxpayer in the first example within a reasonable time after1 April 2009 . The two policies of the 2009 Rules which I have identified would be properly reflected by the making of the direction sought by the taxpayer. Save in the most exceptional circumstances (which it is not easy to envisage), I would expect the tribunal to make a prospective direction reflecting the taxpayer’s choice.”
“[40] Suppose, however, that the taxpayer does not make an application within a reasonable time and thereby fails to make an election within a reasonable time. What, then, is the position if either party thereafter seeks a prospective determination or, if no application is made, what is the position at the end of the appeal? The question, in essence, is whether the policy of the 2009 Rules is best reflected by (i) applying the actual default position under Rule 10 as applied to current proceedings or (ii) applying the default position applicable to a Complex case, on the footing that the case is one which is complex in nature or (iii) adopting some other position. [41] In my view, the tribunal in the first example ought, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to reflect the two policies which I have identified. Once a reasonable time has passed, there is no longer a policy imperative to give the taxpayer a choice; on the contrary, the second policy, to achieve certainty, suggests strongly that he should no longer have a choice. If he is to have no choice, it is in my judgment the default regime under Rule 10 which should apply. He could not, seeing the wind blowing strongly in his favour, after the passage of time, successfully seek a prospective costs order applying Rule 29 or seek an order for costs when he actually wins his appeal.”
“[44] When one comes to the third example, one question facing the tribunal dealing with an application for a prospective direction will be whether to make one at all. There are good arguments for doing so, although it will always be a matter of discretion. In particular, both the 1986 Rules and the 2009 Rules satisfy the second policy which I have identified, that of providing certainty. The 1986 Rules provide certainty in that it is known that a costs shifting regime will apply; the 2009 Rules provide certainty in that the costs regime will be identified at an early stage depending on whether the taxpayer elects to opt out of costs shifting. If either party seeks to depart from the default regime, they ought, for reasons I will explain, to make an application at an early stage for a prospective direction. [45] Another question facing the tribunal will be whether to make a prospective direction applying different costs regimes in respect of different periods. The first and second examples display the tension between the policy of the 2009 Rules applicable in a ‘new’ case and the fairness and justice of maintaining the old regime in what is essentially an ‘old’ case. It is, quite simply, impossible to resolve that tension by appeals to policy in the third example which straddles1 April 2009 .”
“[46] It is, however, a tension which it is possible to avoid by the adoption of different costs regimes for the periods before and after1 April 2009 . In relation to the earlier period, Rule 29 can be applied; in relation to the later period, Rule 10 can be applied. At least that could be a starting point from which to arrive at a direction best designed to achieve fairness and justice in the context of the proceedings as a whole. [47] But if a single regime is to be imposed, a major factor in the exercise of discretion will surely be the relative amount of time and money spent on the proceedings before and after that date. The actual length of time during which the proceedings continued before and after that date may be a factor, I accept, but it should carry very little weight compared with the actual work done in the two periods, although ordinarily, it might be expected that the relative length of the two periods would reflect, broadly, the relative amount of work undertaken and expense incurred. [48] Having identified all the relevant factors, the question for the tribunal is how the interests of fairness and justice will best be served. It is an easy question to ask, but almost intractable difficulties are met in answering it. For instance, focusing only on work done and expense incurred, does the appropriate costs regime depend simply on whether more than half the time and effort and expense falls one side of that date or the other? Or is there some other test? It cannot, I suggest, be right to say that the matter is one for the discretion of the tribunal without laying down some principles by which that discretion is to be exercised. Nor can it be right simply to leave matters to the whim of the judge. It would certainly be quite inappropriate for a judge to adopt one approach or the other because of his own perception that costs shifting represents a ‘better’ or ‘worse’ policy than the other or because he considers that tribunals should behave more like courts or vice versa . That would be arbitrary and unacceptable. Of course, as is the case with nearly all discretions, there will be a range within which the discretion under paragraph 7(3) can properly be exercised but there have to be boundaries. And if there are to be boundaries, there need to be principles by which they are to be ascertained.”