“Value added tax ('VAT') fraud is a serious problem for national taxing authorities throughout the European Union. VAT fraud can take a number of forms. The particular form of fraud with which these appeals are concerned is known generically as missing trader intracommunity fraud or MTIC fraud. This is a description coined by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs ('HMRC'), but is generally used by those who specialise in this area. Even this generic type of fraud can itself take different forms: (i) In its simplest form it is known as an acquisition fraud. A trader imports goods from another member state. No VAT is payable on the import. He then sells on those goods to a domestic buyer and charges VAT. He dishonestly fails to account for the VAT to HMRC and disappears. The importer is labelled a 'missing trader' or 'defaulter'. (ii) The next level of sophistication involves both an import and an export. A trader once again imports goods from another member state. No VAT is payable on the import. Typically the goods are high value low volume goods, such as computer chips or mobile phones. He then sells on those goods to a domestic buyer and charges VAT. He dishonestly fails to account for the VAT to HMRC and disappears. The domestic buyer sells on to an exporter at a price which includes VAT. The exporter exports the goods to another member state. The export is zero-rated. So the exporter is, in theory, entitled to deduct the VAT that he paid from what would otherwise be his liability to account to HMRC for VAT on his turnover. If he has no output tax to offset against his entitlement to deduct, he is, in theory, entitled to a payment from HMRC. Thus HMRC directly parts with money. Sometimes the exported goods are re-imported and the process begins again. In this variant the fraud is known as a carousel fraud. There may be many intermediaries between the original importer and the ultimate exporter. These intermediaries are known as 'buffers'. The ultimate exporter is labelled a 'broker'. A chain of transactions in which one or more of the transactions is dishonest has conveniently been labelled a 'dirty chain'. Where HMRC investigate and find a dirty chain they refuse to repay the amount reclaimed by the ultimate exporter.”
“… where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of value added tax, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person entitlement to the right to deduct.”
“A contra-trader, a broker in one chain of transactions - again adopting the commonly used jargon, a “dirty” chain - in which a default has occurred, buys goods from a supplier in another member State, and sells them to a UK customer; after one or more further sales and purchases they are sold to a customer in another member State. The contra-trader and, usually, all the other traders in this chain account correctly for their VAT liabilities; taken by itself it is a “clean” chain. The acquirer in the clean chain has incurred a liability for output tax which (because the values are engineered to achieve this result) matches the input tax credit due to him (or ostensibly due to him) as the broker in the dirty chain. He does not need to make a large repayment claim, attracting the Commissioners’ attention, but instead makes a modest payment, or a minimal repayment claim. The same result may be achieved by undertaking a number of transactions generating an aggregate input tax credit matching the broker’s output tax liability for the relevant accounting period. It is then the broker in the clean chain who has an input tax claim which, unless they can establish a link between the clean and dirty chains, the Commissioners must meet since the goods in the clean chain have not themselves been used for fraudulent purposes.”
“[19] There is therefore, in my view, nothing in Mahagében that can disturb the weight of authority that fraud conducted through contra-trading can be connected with a taxable person’s transactions such that, if the taxable person knew or should have known of the fraud, the right to deduct VAT may be denied. That much is clear from Mobilx , as noted in the Upper Tribunal by Roth J in POWA (Jersey) Ltd[2012] STC 1476 at [53]: “... it is clear from the Court of Appeal judgment in Mobilx , where one of the cases under appeal was Blue Sphere Global , that no special approach is required in a case involving contra-trading. The correct test as regards knowledge is always the same. It is the test derived from Kittel as set out in para [59] of Moses L J’s judgment.” [20] Application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in POWA (Jersey) was refused by Moses LJ[2013] EWCA Civ 225 .”
“11. Of course the question of connection or involvement must be judged transaction by transaction. The question must be asked whether a particular transaction was connected with fraud at an earlier stage in the chain of supply or whether that transaction was involved with, to use Mr Patchett-Joyce's [counsel for taxpayer’s] translation, an earlier transaction in the chain of supply. But it seems to me quite clear that, whilst it is true that from to time the court [ie the ECJ in Mahagében ] referred to another trader at an earlier stage in the transaction, it was accepting the principle that, so far as participation in the fraud was concerned, if a person had knowledge or the means of knowledge that fraud was being carried out at an earlier stage in the chain of supply, that would denote that he was a participant in the fraud and thereby loses his right to deduct. That is plain from Optigen ; it is plain from Kittel ; and the court in Mahageben was saying nothing different. Indeed those references on which Mr Patchett-Joyce relies at paragraph 45 and at paragraph 59 must be read in the context of what it clearly says in paragraph 49. If the court intended to cut down the principle it had identified in the case-law exemplified in Kittel and was changing the law, it would have said so. On the contrary it was not. It was merely applying it.”
“[109] Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature eg that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and 'similar fact' evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. [110] To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. [111] Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
“[10] As we have indicated, the deals giving rise to the disputed decisions were undertaken by Pexum in accounting periods 07/04, 09/04 and 10/04. In them Pexum claims to have bought goods either from ITW [IT Wholesale Limited] or Kwik Move Limited ("Kwik Move"), both UK VAT registered traders, and in all cases sold and purportedly exported those goods to Best Concord Technology Limited (“Best Concord”), of Hong Kong. The goods involved in all the deals were purportedly P4 2.8GHz 800 CPUs manufactured by Intel Corporation ("Intel"), the world's largest manufacturer of CPUs.”
“[18] When Pexum first commenced trading with ITW, on the instructions of ITW it used a company called Hawk as freight forwarder. Pexum was unhappy with that choice as Hawk was unable to carry out open box tests and chip tests. (A chip test involves a chip being inserted into a CPU tester to ensure that it is fully functioning). Consequently, Mr Auletta suggested that Allways be substituted for Hawk. He said he did so because he knew Allways' directors; it had a secure bonded warehouse; and ITW's suppliers' stock was always held by Allways. Pexum agreed, and we find that all the transactions the subject of this appeal involved Allways as freight forwarder. We also find that throughout Pexum's “ownership” of goods purchased from ITW for onward sale to Best Concord they were held by Allways; Pexum never inspected the goods, nor did ITW.”
“[28] We find that Allways had no “secure bonded warehouse”; indeed it had no warehouse. We were provided with a number of documents, including photographs said to have been the results of checks by Allways of goods the subject of Pexum's deals with ITW and Kwik Move. Against the background of facts we have found about Allways, we are unable to accept any of them as the true results of checks carried out by Allways, if indeed any checks were carried out by that company. We agree with Mr Anderson [counsel for HMRC] that Allways' inspection reports to Pexum were “entirely fictitious”, so that we place no reliance whatever on any of them. Nor are we prepared to rely on any other documents prepared or completed by ITW for Pexum. We consider the facts we have found about Allways to speak for themselves. None of the documents prepared by Allways can be relied upon to establish the true nature of the goods supplied by Pexum.”
“… tribunals should not unduly focus on the question whether a trader has acted with due diligence. Even if a trader has asked appropriate questions, he is not entitled to ignore the circumstances in which his transactions take place if the only reasonable explanation for them is that his transactions have been or will be connected to fraud. The danger in focussing on the question of due diligence is that it may deflect a tribunal from asking the essential question posed in Kittel , namely, whether the trader should have known that by his purchase he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT. The circumstances may well establish that he was.”
“[Mr Ahmed] invited [Ms Walkerdine] to comment on the PGT and Pelix due diligence procedures. [Ms Walkerdine] declined to comment on the due diligence stating that, “It would be more than my jobs worth”. [Mr Ahmed] sympathised with [Ms Walkerdine’s] position, but stated that some VAT Officers had elected to comment on due diligence procedures. [Ms Walkerdine] elected to maintain her original position.”
“No guarantee can be given that the contents are as stated on the outside of the box.” (2) On Deal 4: (a) The inspection report was not received by Pelix until three days after the goods had already left the UK – obviously, Pelix had no comfort before selling the goods that it held the correct stock. (b) The inspection report listed the CPUs as having a 1MB cache, whereas the specification ordered by Pelix was for 2MB CPUs – so the goods were of a different (and inferior) specification. Further, Dr Findlay’s evidence was that Intel never manufactured a 1MB SL7Z9 chip – so the goods as described could not have existed. We also note that Pelix’s customer (Allcom APS) was apparently unconcerned by any of this. (c) The inspection report stated that the CPUs had not been subject to any form of testing – contrary to Mr Brown’s understanding that at least one CPU from each tray would be electronically tested. (3) On Deal 9 Pelix instructed (by a fax dated1 June 2006 ) the freight forwarder (1 st Freight) to conduct an open box inspection, electronically test one chip per tray, and take photographs of the boxes. From the inspection report it appears that no photographs were taken, despite Pelix’s express instruction. HMRC also submitted that the testing purported to be done by 1 st Freight was impossible, given the timing of the movement of the goods; we do not feel we have sufficient evidence on that matter to reach a conclusion on that point. (4) On Deal 3 the inspection report was not received by Pelix until several hours after Pelix had already instructed the freight forwarder to ship out the goods – although the time gap was not as extreme as in Deal 4 (above), again Pelix had no comfort before selling the goods that it held the correct stock. (5) There was no evidence of electronic testing on several of the deals involving trays of CPUs (as opposed to retail boxed CPUs) which, given the Pexum experience, was something Mr Brown should have identified and challenged with the freight forwarders. (6) The inspection reports for several of the deals (Deals 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8) clearly reported damaged trays. On Deals 6 & 7 Admicro’s purchase orders stated as a term, “Product must be original package, full label, unmarked and undamaged.”
“A trader in a legitimate market trading in goods worth millions of pounds would not deal with others without first satisfying himself that his suppliers could supply what they contracted to supply, and that his purchasers could pay for what they had agreed to purchase. It is not enough, in our judgment, to contend that goods would not be paid for until they had been inspected, nor handed over until paid for. In a genuine market, traders dependent, as the Appellants were, on payment by their purchasers in order that they could themselves pay their suppliers would not commit themselves to a purchase without near certainty that the purchaser would pay, and would not commit themselves to a sale without near certainty that their own supplier was in a position to deliver. Here, neither their due diligence nor their contractual conditions provided the Appellants with any true assurance that, assuming they were genuine, arm's length deals, they would be honoured by their counterparties. Instead, they were exposed to the risk that they would be left with goods for which their purchasers could not pay, or that they would be unable to fulfil orders from their customers.”