“For many years, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) have attempted to combat “missing trader intra-Community”
“2. The classic way in which the fraud works is as follows. Trader A imports goods, commonly computer chips and mobile telephones, into the United Kingdom from the European Union (“EU”). Such an importation does not require the importer to pay any VAT on the goods. A then sells the goods to B, charging VAT on the transaction. B pays the VAT to A, for which A is bound to account to HMRC. There are then a series of sales from B to C to D to E (or more). These sales are accounted for in the ordinary way. Thus C will pay B an amount which includes VAT. B will account to HMRC for the VAT it has received from C, but will claim to deduct (as an input tax) the output tax that A has charged to B. The same will happen, mutatis mutandis, as between C and D. The company at the end of the chain – E – will then export the goods to a purchaser in the EU. Exports are zero-rated for tax purposes, so Trader E will receive no VAT. He will have paid input tax but because the goods have been exported he is entitled to claim it back from HMRC. The chains in question may be quite long. The deals giving rise to them may be effected within a single day. Often none of the traders themselves take delivery of the goods which are held by freight forwarders. 3. The way that the fraud works is that A, the importer, goes missing. It does not account to HMRC for the tax paid to it by B. When HMRC tries to obtain the tax from A it can neither find A nor any of A’s documents. In an alternative version of the fraud (which can take several forms) the fraudster uses the VAT registration details of a genuine and innocent trader, who never sees the tax on the sale to B, with which the fraudster makes off. The effect of A not accounting for the tax to HMRC means that HMRC does not receive the tax that it should. The effect of the exportation at the end of the chain is that HMRC pays out a sum, which represents the total sum of the VAT payable down the chain, without having received the major part of the overall VAT due, namely the amount due on the first intra-UK transaction between A and B. This amount is a profit to the fraudsters and a loss to the Revenue.... 5. A jargon has developed to describe the participants in the fraud. The importer is known as “the defaulter”
“the usual, Redhill Checks, VRN (VAT registration number) checks online, credit searches and inspection reports”
“Following our telephone conversation earlier this week I have managed to source some semi-conductors that you might be interested in purchasing. The specification of the semi-conductors is as follows: Astra-Semiconductors – part number – AS/124775 – BGA Enhanced DMA (channels) 64 – Timers 3 Operating voltage (V) core 1.4V – 1/0 3.3 – MIPS 4800 Frequency 600 MHZ – Full device power 1.06W I have eight boxes (400 pcs) per box available today if you are interested. Please call me on my mobile to discuss costs”. (2) E mail dated14 July 2006 15:39 from Mr Seher to Dr Williams: “ Perfect I had a request exactly on this mentioned items during the week, I was reading your mail before and passed on these specs as well to the requester from last week. They were in first sight a bit different but it showed up that it was follow up spec on the same basis. So everything is looking fine. Only disadvantage is that I had a request on 9500 units of this and 4800 units of a lower spec of this ASTRA brand ……………. I will get a final confirmation in a few minutes. In case the deal is up, what price would u offer them to us? Is the condition new? Which warehouse are they stored in the moment or are they in your office? …… (3) E mail dated17 July 2006 08:17 from Mr Seher to Dr Williams: “Goods are on the way to our office in Austria now after the Saturday in Netherlands. We expect them to be in around 1200. From this time on I will update you on the payment situation but it looks like the money will hit your account by tomorrow regarding the cut off time in GBP …….”
“109 Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and “similar fact” evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. 110 To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. 111 Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
“In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected with fraud, be it the fraudulent evasion of VAT or other fraud, must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of losing their right to deduct the input VAT ….”
“59. The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined. It embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who “should have known”