“13… I think that the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard of proof and that is proof that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not. … 15. Common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had, to whatever extent appropriate, to inherent probabilities.”
“49. It is the obligation of domestic courts to interpret the VATA 1994 in the light of the wording and purpose of the Sixth Directive as understood by the ECJ ( Marleasing SA 1990 ECR 1-4135[1992] 1 CMLR 305 ) (see, for a full discussion of this obligation, the judgement of Arden LJ in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v IDT Card Services Ireland Ltd[2006] EWCA Civ 29 [2006 ] STC 1252, ŝ ŝ 69-83). Arden LJ acknowledges, as the ECJ has itself recognised, that the application of the Marleasing principle may result in the imposition of a civil liability where such a liability would not otherwise have been imposed under domestic law (See IDT ŝ 111). The denial of the right to deduct in this case stems from principles which apply throughout the Community in respect of what is said to be reliance on Community law for fraudulent ends. It can be no objection to that approach to community law that in purely domestic circumstances a trader might not be regarded as an accessory to fraud. In a sense, the dichotomy between domestic and Community law, in the circumstances of these appeals, is false. In relation to the right to deduct input tax, Community and domestic law are one and the same.”
“…in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals affected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
“At times [counsel] came close to suggesting that fraud can only be established where there is direct evidence. If that were the case, few allegations of fraud would ever come to trial. Fraudsters rarely sit down and reduce their dishonest agreement to writing. Frauds are commonly proved on the basis of inviting the fact-finder to draw proper inferences from the primary facts.”
“If the circumstances of the purchase are such that a person knows or should have known that his purchase is or will be connected with fraudulent evasion, it cannot matter a jot that the evasion precedes or follows that purchase. The trader’s knowledge brings him within the category of participant. He is a participant whatever the stage at which the evasion occurs.”
“37. In my judgment, there are likely to be many cases in which a participant in a sophisticated fraud is shown to have actual or blind-eye knowledge that the transaction in which he is participating is connected with that fraud, without knowing, for example, whether his chain is a clean chain or dirty chain, whether contra-trading is necessarily involved at all, or whether the fraud has at its heart merely a dishonest intention to abscond without paying tax, or that intention plus one or more multifarious means of achieving a cover-up whilst the absconding takes place. 38. Similarly, I consider that there are likely to be many cases in which facts about the transaction known to the broker are sufficient to enable it to be said that the broker ought to have known that his transaction was connected with a tax fraud, without it having to be, or even being possible to be, demonstrated precisely which aspects of a sophisticated multifaceted fraud he would have discovered, had he made reasonable enquiries…”
“57. This is because in such a situation the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice.”
“55. In my view, it is an inescapable consequence of contra-trading that for HMRC to refuse a reclaim by E [the exporter in the clean chain] it must be in a position to prove that C [the contra-trader] was party to a conspiracy also involving A [the defaulting trader]. Although the fact that C is party to both the clean chain with E and dirty chain with A constitutes a sufficient connection it is not enough to show that E ought to have known of the fraudulent evasion of VAT involved in the subsequent dirty chain. At the time he entered into the clean chain there was no such dirty chain of which he could have known, nor was the occurrence of such dirty chain inevitable in the sense of being pre-planned.”