“it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT”
“It is the obligation of domestic courts to interpret the VATA 1994 in the light of the wording and purpose of the Sixth Directive as understood by the ECJ ( Marleasing SA 1990 ECR 1-4135[1992] 1 CMLR 305 ) (see, for a full discussion of this obligation, the judgment of Arden LJ in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v IDT Card Services Ireland Limited[2006] EWCA Civ 29 [2006] STC 1252 , §§ 69-83). Arden LJ acknowledges, as the ECJ has itself recognised, that the application of the Marleasing principle may result in the imposition of a civil liability where such a liability would not otherwise have been imposed under domestic law (see IDT § 111). The denial of the right to deduct in this case stems from principles which apply throughout the Community in respect of what is said to be reliance on Community law for fraudulent ends. It can be no objection to that approach to Community law that in purely domestic circumstances a trader might not be regarded as an accessory to fraud. In a sense, the dichotomy between domestic and Community law, in the circumstances of these appeals, is false. In relation to the right to deduct input tax, Community and domestic law are one and the same.”
“currently responsible for setting the activity up and for drawing up contact lists using phone/trade directories and internet.... He [i.e. Mr Bapu] said this aspect has only recently started, since changing the company name and address, and is still very much in the development stage. There are no deals or potential deals at the moment, they are merely in a research period.”
“Please find attached with this full inspection report and specification of Motorola V3i’s and Nokia 9300i’s together with the packing list.”
“109 Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and “similar fact” evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later [emphasis added] transactions but to discern it. 110 To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. 111 Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
“From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case: (1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action. (2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. (3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. (4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.”
“at no time did the respondents request the attendance of any other person nor did they seek a witness statement or even an interview.... Dalal is neither silent nor unexpectedly absent. He simply had not been asked about any matters at any time by the respondents. Neither was he asked to be in present [sic] by the respondents. His attendance was offered in Court by Bapu, but this was declined by silence from the respondents. In light of this, we submit that the Tribunal should not draw any adverse inferences from the absence of Dalal in this or any other way.”
“... many of the transaction chains in which Euro Quest have been involved in [sic] have been traced back to traders who have failed to meet their VAT liabilities. On no occasion was I able to trace the transactions back to either a manufacturer or recognised distributor.”