“… where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person entitlement to the right to deduct.”
“Interest in respect of the loan facility will also be payable by the Company to the Lender in an amount equal to 50% of the Company’s Gross Profit.”
“Kay Rowham was a personal friend. Her investment came about because, in 2005, her partner’s travel agency was struggling. I told them that I would not lend them money but, if they were willing to invest in Procomm, I would try and turn it into a profit for them. Ms Rowham originally invested£50,000 and made a return of£58,000 in interest. Nevertheless, Ms Rowham now wants her original£50,000 back with further interest. Clearly, she did very well from me and I am now saddened that she wants so much back.”
“May deal 8 did not complete. I recall that the reason it did not complete was because GSM were unable to pay Procomm and so Procomm was unable to pay Broadcast. I had to tell Broadcast that I could not take the stock and I pulled out of the deal.”
“I should have corrected it and I always assumed there would be a reconciliation of all this mess and we would sit down and work it out.”
“From an analysis of the timing of the Eurotunnel tickets in March Deals 1 and 3, I see that – unusually – the goods were shipped on the same day as the invoice and inspection date. I note that the check-in time in both cases is the early hours. I believe the apparent oddity is down to the fact that these deals must have come together the evening before and the documents dated the next day.”
“… looking at the documents, I am sure that the deals came together late in the afternoon and, as Crotek and France Affaires were both trusted trading partners … I agreed to provide oral instructions to AFI Logistics …”
“Other traders called me to thank me for taking a stand and giving the public the other side of the story. Much had been made in the Press of how fraud was rife and that the mobile phone trade was at the heart of the problem. Having been trading mobile phones since 1992 I knew that this was not true. The truth of the matter was that genuine trade was sometimes being used by individuals to facilitate VAT fraud.”
“Fraud has been rife in the industry since 1995 and the company had to be extremely careful on how it dealt in this market. The company would only deal with suppliers and customers after an extensive investigation had been carried out into the people behind the business. An ex-VAT inspector was employed on a part-time basis to carry out investigations into new suppliers and customers, to put in stringent procedures, which meant that every time the company dealt with a customer or supplier, for every transaction, a check was made to ensure that both the supplier and the purchaser were VAT registered and that the registration had not been suspended. The serial numbers from all phones were kept to ensure that the same phones were not being re-sold.”
“The VAT validation was by at least two of the following three alternatives for each transaction –
“This was done on every deal, every time that the company dealt with the supplier or a customer.”
“Procomm also ran these checks every single time it dealt with a company, not just once a month or so – I did not think that was enough.”
“It is my belief that the credit reports have been fraudulently prepared to satisfy the requirements of HMRC and give the appearance that they were produced before the deals were carried out. In reality they must have been produced after12 June 2006 , when the31 July 2005 accounts were filed.”
“Caution – Credit at your discretion”, it also states: “Good Credit Worthiness”, which, according to the document itself would indicate a Credit Worthiness of 51-70, not zero. The accounts are in abbreviated format but show that during year ended31 July 2004 Crotek was dormant and in the year ended31 July 2005 a loss of£469 was made. The accounts for Crotek for year ended31 July 2006 show a turnover of nil for the year ended31 July 2005 , but a turnover of£161,470,435 in year ended31 July 2006 with a net loss of£332,595 which appears to be caused by an item of£966,879 shown as “cost of sales – irrecoverable VAT”
“At paragraph 430 (and elsewhere) Mr Chambers suggests that Procomm’s credit checks for Crotek may have been fraudulently prepared. I strongly deny that Procomm may have fraudulently prepared the report and I do not believe ACP would have fraudulently prepared the report.
“Mr Chambers also seems to suggest that negative indicators on credit checks should have caused Procomm great concern. The fact was that Procomm did not grant credit to its customers so this was not a real problem. The way in which I insisted deals took place meant that Procomm was generally protected from bad debts.”
“I firmly believed they had been provided to HMRC, however, I now think that they had been lost and that copies were requested by me from ACP. I believe that ACP supplied the copies with the print dates on them and they were given to HMRC on15 November 2006 . I did not review the copies before giving them to HMRC. Had I done so I would have ensured that they went with a clear note stating that they were copies. This is an unfortunate but innocent oversight.
“In any event, Procomm does not grant credit so the content of the report is less relevant than might appear. Credit reports are a layer to Procomm’s due diligence that provide a mechanism to check company details and status (e.g. any winding up petitions, proposals to strike off).”
“As with any new company I checked Crotek’s VAT number before first considering whether or not to trade with them.”
“I verified the VAT registration details with HMRC and although the files do not show it I am confident I would have obtained a Company’s House report as I did with all new suppliers and customers.”
“Once we were sure that a deal was going to happen we would engage the services of an inspection company to inspect the goods at their location. … the inspection company would check and inspect 100% of the stock on Procomm’s behalf.
“The inspection report should confirm the following: that the make and model is as described in the inspection report, that the correct number of phones are present, that the inner packaging, retail carton is original, new and saleable, that the boxes contain one handset, charger, battery, user manual, warranty information, and the phones are not SIM locked in any way, and that the software version, language pack, charger configuration and packaging were all correct … A particular model of mobile phone manufactured in China for the Asia Pacific Rim market is not the same as the same model manufactured for the Central European market. Central European package phones have the best resale value and language packs. They command the most money within Europe. Procomm predominantly sold this type of package. It is important to note that Central European specification phones are perfectly suitable for the UK market given that plugs are interchangeable, adaptors easily available, and languages selectable.”
“… the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard of proof, and that is that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not.”
“The [European] Court must have intended the phrase “knew or should have known” which it employs in paras 59 and 61 of Kittel to have the same meaning as the phrase “knowing or having any means of knowing” which it used in Optigen (para 55).”
“If a taxpayer has the means at his disposal of knowing that by his purchase he is participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT he loses his right to deduct, not as a penalty for negligence, but because the objective criteria for the scope of that right are not met.”
“If it is established that a trader should have known that by his purchase there was no reasonable explanation for the circumstances in which the transaction was undertaken other than it was connected with fraud then such a trader was directly and knowingly involved in fraudulent evasion of VAT.”
“… there was no reasonable possibility other than that it was connected with fraud.”
“109 Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context.