"… Parliament gave the Commissioners only 30 days in which to process repayment claims. In limited circumstances the period is extended; but any extension must be within the spirit of section 79 which demands expedition on the Commissioners' part."
It is important also to bear in mind both the purpose of section 79, and the words actually used. The section allows the Commissioners 30 days in order to process repayment claims, before any penalty (in the shape of a supplement) becomes due. The suspension of the running of time afforded by subsection (4) relates to the raising and answering of an inquiry; the section states clearly that the suspension ends when the Commissioners have received a complete answer to the inquiry, and not when they are satisfied that the return is correct. I echo the comment of Auld J in Rowland & Co that an inquiry is a "question or questions put to the taxpayer for him to answer" and does not warrant any wider construction. Thus the suspension does not extend to the consideration of the material provided in answer to the inquiry—that is to be accomplished within the 30 day period.”[63]The Tribunal then considered whether the period for stopping the clock was justified to the extent that the Commissioners were dealing with the raising and answering of reasonable enquiry relating to the requisite return for the Period 02/06. The Tribunal interpreted the word “reasonable” to mean reasonably necessary for the making of a decision, proportionate and not prompted by any other motive.[64]The Tribunal accepted the Rowland interpretation that “inquiry” means inquiry in the sense of a question or questions and not an enquiry in the sense of an investigation concluded by a report.[65]The aim of Section 79 is to allow the Commissioners 30 days in order to process repayment claims before any penalty in the form of a supplement becomes due.[66]A distinction must be drawn between the inquiry itself, the raising and answering of a question or questions, and an examination of the answer or answers.[67]The Tribunal were provided with no written evidence that questions were made or answers had been received by Mr Skirving in respect of the return for Period 02/06 during the period in which the Commissioners claim the clock was stopped.[68]No records were offered of any specific questions raised by the Commissioners on specific issues in respect of the return. Indeed given the particular importance of the repayment supplement clock and the sums often involved, the Tribunal might have expected to see a standard procedure within the Department whereby specific inquiries and questions are made in writing and are logged as being tied to the stopping of the clock. The Tribunal agree with Chairman Avery Jones in Cellular Solutions (T Wells) Ltd at para 9 that s79(4) strongly suggests that an “inquiry” is generally made to a specific “person or body”, and it might likewise be expected that this person or body, whether internal or external, would also be clearly identified and logged. It was understood from Mr Skirving that revised and tighter departmental procedures in this area were subsequently introduced.[69]Mr Skirving submitted in evidence that he was making enquiries and there is reference to this in the notes of his telephone conversations and in his letter of 10 April. Mr Skirving had in February 2006 been attached to the MTIC section of the Commissioners for less than one month when he had started to deal with this case and the processes in relation to repayment claims may have been new to him at that stage.[70]The Tribunal found that no inquiries concerning the 02/06 return were made of Raptor in the period from 16 March 2006 to 8 May 2006.[71]The Tribunal accepted, however, that on the basis of the oral evidence and the letter of 10 April that enquiries within HMRC were being made of other offices and accepted the Commissioners’ review decision that the clock stopped on 11 April 2006 when Raptor is deemed to have received the letter of 10 April 2006. However no evidence in the form of e-mails or letters or notes of telephone communications with other offices was exhibited to the Tribunal.[72]The Tribunal noted that whereas the relevant period comes to an end when a written instruction directing the making a payment or refund is issued by the Commissioners, they did not accept the Commissioners’ contention that the period to be left out of account terminated on 10 May, although it could extend no further.[73]Section 79(4) states that “the period referable to raising and answering of …. an enquiry shall, at Section 79(4)(b), end on the date on which the Commissioners(i) satisfy themselves that they have received a complete answer to the inquiry or(ii) determine not to make the enquiry or, if they have made it, not to pursue it further”.[74]The letter of 8 May when read with the letter of 20 April does none of these things. It states that the repayment is being authorised and released without prejudice to any action the Commissioners may take under the VAT Act 1994 or any other enactment. It does not and cannot claim to evidence that the Commissioners have satisfied themselves they have received a complete answer to the enquiry (whether any inquiry has been made of the taxpayer or any other person) nor does it determine not to make the inquiry nor to pursue it further. It simply states that “at this point in time enquiries are still continuing with aspects of the claim” and post dates the letter of 20 April.[75]Instead the Tribunal consider that the letter of 20 April does bring the period out of account to an end in terms of Section 79(4)(b)(i) to the extent enquiries have been made and answered by the use of the words “as a result of our enquiries”.[76]The Oxford English Dictionary defines “result” as meaning “the outcome” and, accordingly, means that “a process has been completed”. The 20 April letter goes on to state that “we now know that of the nine transactions selected for verification, five have commenced with defaulting traders”. The Tribunal interpret this meaning as a result of their enquiries, they know information that was not known before and is indicative that the Commissioners had received an answer to their inquiries.[77]The Tribunal’s view, therefore, is that the period to be taken out of account ended on the receipt of the letter of 20 April on 21 April.[78]The decision log refers to a request for information, on deals relating to further cases, received on 12 May, after the issue of the repayment and so it was clear that a further investigation was being carried out but no evidence was shown that this related to Period 02/06.[79]Section 79 means that the Commissioners are given no more than sufficient time to ensure that what is being provided is what was requested. The Tribunal endorse the comments of Chairman Bishopp in Alliance & Leicester PLC, VAT and Duties Tribunal, 2007, Decision 20094, at paragraph 23 – “It would be wholly contrary to the spirit of Section 79 if the Commissioners were allowed the entire period from deciding it would be desirable to ask a question through the putting of the question perhaps a week later, the receipt of the answer and the consideration of the answer at leisure some time later”.[80]The Tribunal are not persuaded the mere selection of a return for repayment verification in itself amounts to an “enquiry” in the sense meant by Section 79.[81]The Tribunal find that reasonable enquiries were made and that they were intimated to Raptor on 11 April.[82]The Tribunal do not accept that the clock stopped on the period to be left out of account on 8 May 2006 in terms of Section 79(4). Instead in terms of that section the letter of 20 April was the time at which the Commissioners received a complete answer to their reasonable inquiries. At that time, they had identified and were, thereafter, at most examining the results of their enquiries.[83]According to the decision log any further communication with Raptor was in relation to the paperwork for March and April which did not relate to the Period 02/06.[84]The Tribunal find that the correct period to be left out of account was from 11 April 2006 to 21 April 2006 a period of 11 days which when deducted from 55 days results in the repayment being made over a period of 44 days which is in excess of the relevant 30 day period.[85]The Appeal is accordingly allowed. W RUTHVEN GEMMELL TRIBUNAL JUDGE RELEASE DATE: 14 July 2010