“With respect to Mr Poole, it does not seem to me that this passage supports his argument; on the contrary, I regard it as consistent with the view expressed by the Court of Justice in CSC Financial Services and by Etherton J in BAA plc that these provisions are not to be given a restricted meaning, unwarranted by the words used. The Sixth Directive allows for the exemption of "negotiation, concerning debts", and Group 5 for the exemption of "intermediary services in relation to" "the granting of any credit". I see no need to read into the last of those phrases a requirement that "new" credit must be granted - that is, an entirely new relationship of debtor and creditor. The creditor who grants his debtor some indulgence is, in my view, granting him credit, even if it is additional credit. I have concluded that there is in fact no incompatibility between the Directive and the United Kingdom legislation; the incompatibility is between the Directive and the Commissioners' interpretation of the 1994 Act, as it was advanced by Mr Poole. In my judgment, the Commissioners have made the same error as the Advocate General in the CSC case , of concluding that art 13B(d) is to be construed restrictively whereas, as the Court of Justice pointed out in paragraph 38 of its judgment in the CSC case , the reference to negotiation is intended to extend the scope of the exemption; all of the other cases cited to me support that view. I find no support in art 13B for Mr Poole's contention that negotiations, if they are to come within paragraph (d)(3) or, in the domestic legislation, within item 5, must lead, if successful, to a contract; and with the greatest of respect to the Advocate General in the CSC case , I can find nothing in art 13B which justifies paragraph 25 of his opinion. I also do not accept Mr Poole's argument that Note (5) is to be read as if the bringing together of the parties and the conclusion of a contract are cumulative conditions. On the contrary, it seems to me that the words "together with" imply, not a conjunction of the kind for which Mr Poole argued, but an expansion of the scope of the exemption to include "work preparatory to the conclusion of contracts", in distinction to market research and the other descriptions of work which follow, which are excluded. Article 13B(d)(3) refers to "negotiation, concerning . debts" while the words "debt" and "debts" do not feature at all in Group 5; it refers to "the granting of any credit". Debt and credit are, of course, merely opposite sides of the same coin, and it does not seem to me that there is any difference of substance between the two provisions by reason of the use of dissimilar words. I am satisfied that, whether one considers the European or the domestic legislation, rejecting the restrictive approach advanced by Mr Poole, that the appellant's negotiation service is an exempt supply. Since the Commissioners accept that the payment handling service is also an exempt supply, it follows that the whole service is exempt. If so, it is immaterial whether there is one supply or two, but it seems to me that I should consider that point, and also the question, if there is only one supply, which element predominates, in case I am found elsewhere to have fallen into error in my first conclusion”
“Nevertheless, even though, as I accept, it was unlikely that a client would take one part of the service without the other, the fact that he could do so seems to me to point to the conclusion that there are two supplies. The fact that two fees are charged supports that view, though it is not conclusive, just as the Court of Justice has determined that the charging of a single price does not point conclusively in favour of there being a single supply: see paragraph 31 of its judgment in Card Protection Plan. It is certainly, and to my mind obviously, unrealistic to say that the negotiation service is no more than "a means of better enjoying" the payment handling service. Though it is perhaps less obvious, I think the reverse is also true. While the negotiation may be an essential precursor to the making of a single monthly payment, less than the client's contractual liability to his creditors, it seems to me that the payment handling service is capable of standing alone, and that its value is more than "marginal", the test suggested by the Advocate General in the Madgett & Baldwin case, ." I am satisfied that the appellant makes two discrete supplies, even though almost all its clients take both. If, however, there is only one supply, which element is dominant? Mr McGinty told me, as I have mentioned, that the appellant's clients' aim was to achieve a manageable monthly payment, and that in his view it was the payment handling rather than the negotiation which represented the principal part of the supply. That was the conclusion to which Mr Mainprice urged me, should I find that there was only one supply. It was suggested that the payment handling was dominant because the consideration received by the appellant for that service was so much greater - in the first eight months of 2002 the appellant earned over 17 times as much from payment handling as it did from negotiation. Despite that disparity and for much the same reasons as I have given for my conclusion that there are two supplies, I am satisfied that Mr McGinty is wrong in his view. It seems to me clear that, without the negotiation - and successful negotiation at that - the making, and therefore the handling, of monthly payments cannot begin. The reverse is plainly not the case; as I have already said, it is impossible to view the negotiation as a means of "better enjoying" the payment handling service. On this point, I agree with the respondents (paragraphs 31 – 33)”
“transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques, and other negotiable instruments, but excluding debt collection and factoring”