"[1] Mr. Ebsworth, the Appellant, was and is respectively the majority shareholder and managing director of Business Systems Applications and Solutions Limited ("
"What has to be shown is that the Appellant received in non-taxable form a consideration which is or represents the value of assets which were, or apart from anything done by the company in question would have been, available for distribution by way of dividend. This exactly fits the present case. The Appellant's argument that the liquidation - resulting in the tax free distribution - was not something "done by the company" but only something "done by the shareholders" does not accord with the conception in the Companies Act that liquidation is decided by a resolution of the company or with the fact of distribution by the company. I pass then, to the second point: whether the tax advantage was obtained "in consequence of a transaction in securities or of the combined effect of two or more such transactions" (s. 460(1) (b)). This provision may be applicable either by itself or as expanded by s. 460(2), which provides that a tax advantage shall be deemed to be obtained in consequence of a transaction in securities or of the combined effect of two or more such transactions "if it is obtained. In consequence of the combined effect of the transaction to or transactions and of the liquidation of a company"
"It seems to me, however, that the commissioners, in reaching their conclusion, did misdirect themselves as to the law. They state (in para 3(b) of their decision) that to satisfy the escape clause in s 460 'the commercial reason must be connected with the vendor's interests in companies concerned in or affected by the transaction'. That seems to me to be altogether too narrow an approach. Section [703], in my view, contains no such qualification. The section merely requires that the transaction must be 'carried out for bona fide commercial reasons'. That language is entirely at large. If the taxpayer can prove that the transaction was carried out for bona fide commercial reasons, he satisfies the requirement of the section. And 'carried out', l think, means carried out by the taxpayer…"
"That provision, it will be observed, contains two limbs and places on the taxpayer the onus of establishing both. The relevant findings of the commissioners are as follows. [His Lordship read paras 6(h) and 10(2) of the case stated and continued:] The fact that neither the taxpayer nor his wife took any part in the operation of the business of Oldco, Construction or Newco and neither had been involved in taking the decision to liquidate Oldco, is in my judgment irrelevant, because what has to be applied is a subjective test of the intention of those in control: see per Lord Pearce in IRC. v Brebner[1967] 1 All ER 779 at 781,[1967] 2 AC 18 at 27, 43 Tax Case 705 at 715, where he said: 'The "object" which has to be considered is a subjective matter of intention. It cannot be narrowed down to a mere object of a company divorced from the directors who govern its policy or the shareholders who are concerned in and vote in favour of the resolutions for the increase and reduction of capital. For the company, as such, and apart from these, cannot form an intention. Thus the object is a subjective matter to be derived in this case from the intentions and acts of the various members of the group; and it would be quite unrealistic, and not in accordance with the subsection, to suppose that their object has to be ascertained in isolation at each step in the arrangements.'"