Barbara Ainsley v Susan Flannigan & Ors [2026] UKFTT 769 (PC)
[2026] UKFTT 00769 (PC)REF/2025/0056PROPERTY CHAMBER, LAND REGISTRATION DIVISIONFIRST-TIER TRIBUNALIN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE FROM HM LAND REGISTRY
Between
BARBARA AINSLEYApplicantSUSAN FLANNIGANRespondentSUZETTE SCHARSCHMIDTRespondentELEANOR SEEDRespondent(as trustees of the Quebec and District Village Hall Association)RespondentProperty Address: Garage to the rear of Quebec Village HallTitle Number: DU393354Before: Judge Laura D’CruzSitting at: Darlington County CourtOn: 4 th March 2026Representation: Vilma Vodanovic of Counsel for Applicant, instructed by Swinburne Maddison LLP; the Second Respondent on behalf of all the Respondents in personKey words: first registration–adverse possessionCases referred to:Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham[2003] UKHL 30DECISIONDate 2026-04-23
[1]The matter that has been referred to the Tribunal is the Applicant’s application for first registration of a small parcel of land upon which is built a garage (“the Disputed Land”), based on adverse possession. Garage[2]The lie of the land is as follows. Quebec Village Hall (“the Village Hall”) is located on Front Steet, Quebec. Located behind the Village Hall, running perpendicular to Front Street, is a row of houses called Church View. The Disputed Land is located just behind the Village Hall, marked by the pin on the MapSearch Snapshot below. MapSearch Snapshot[3]As per the MapSearch Snapshot, and as I saw at the site visit, there are four garages in the area to the north of the Village Hall – one that was erected by Mr Young of 2 Church View to the west; the Garage; the wooden garage next to it, as can be seen on the photograph above; and a further garage to the east.[4]The Applicant resides at 7 Church View. Her case is very straightforward – she avers that, in 1994, she obtained the necessary planning permission and erected a garage on the Disputed Land (“the Garage”) that she has used ever since.[5]The Respondents are trustees of the Quebec and District Village Hall Association (“the Association”). Their case is less straightforward.[6]Their initial statement of case raised the following issues:(a) the Disputed Land is owned by the Association and is not common land;(b) the Applicant was a trustee of the Association at the relevant time and her actions constitute an abuse of power;(c) a garage was erected the following year with the Association’s permission;(d) the Garage is built close to the Village Hall and is causing damp issues.[7]By an order issued on 3rd April 2025, the Tribunal directed the Respondents to provide further information in response to three specific issues: whether they admit the Applicant erected the Garage, having obtained planning permission; whether they admit she has had sole and exclusive possession; and whether it is their case that the Garage was erected with the permission of the Association.[8]In their further information, the Respondents explained that they were not involved in the Association in 1994 (they were appointed as trustees in 2022), but have reviewed the records available. Without direct knowledge or specific records, they are unable to admit the Applicant erected the Garage with planning permission or that she has had sole and exclusive possession. They confirmed they do not aver that the Garage was erected with the permission of the Association.[9]As explained in the order of 30th July 2025, the Respondents’ case is limited to putting the Applicant to proof; they do not put forward a positive case to the contrary.[10]In any event, of the four issues outlined above, three are not relevant to the question of adverse possession. It does not matter who holds the paper title to the Disputed Land as adverse possession works on the basis of extinguishing the paper title. Allegations of abuse of power and damp issues do not affect the question of whether the Applicant can demonstrate adverse possession, although they may give rise to other matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. As to the fourth – the reference to the grant of permission – the Respondents have confirmed they do not aver that the Garage was erected with the Association’s permission.
Principles
[11]The Disputed Land is unregistered land. This means that Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002, which applies to registered land and is mentioned in the Respondents’ skeleton argument, is not relevant.[12]To succeed, the Applicant must demonstrate on the balance of probability that she has been in adverse possession of the Disputed Land for a continuous period of 12 years. To demonstrate adverse possession, she must show both factual possession of the Disputed Land and an intention to possess it.[13]Factual possession “signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and [exclusive] possession… The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances… Everything must depend on the particular circumstance, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so" [Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 at 470-1, cited with approval in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] UKHL 30].[14]An intention to possess is “an intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title… so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow” [Slade J in Powell at 471-2, cited with approval in Pye].
Evidence & analysis
[15]The Applicant relies on the evidence set out in her statement of case, and gave oral evidence at the final hearing. She also relies on documentary evidence relating to the planning permission, including: the notice to be published in a local newspaper or served on an owner; the application; the plan (reproduced below); a certificate certifying that she has been unable to find out the names of the owners of the land and that she has published the notice in a newspaper; a letter from the council to “The Occupier” of the Village Hall giving notice of the application; and the decision itself. Plan to planning application[16]The Applicant’s evidence is that the Disputed Land did not fall within the land owned by the Association, and she applied for planning permission accordingly. The plan includes a line marked “Boundary Village Hall Property”. The plan is not a document of title and cannot be taken as proof of the boundary, but it does tend to suggest that the plan was produced in the belief that this is where the boundary was.[17]In cross-examination, the Applicant confirmed that she was a trustee of the Association in the early 1990s, continuing until 2016, albeit with a short break in the middle. She said no-one ever questioned the Garage.[18]She also gave evidence that Mr Glover, the chairman, “did the plans” for her, and that Mr Wilson, the secretary, used the wooden garage next to hers; and confirmed that she used the Garage for parking her car, keeping it locked. None of this is expressly mentioned in her statement of case, though the lock is shown in the photographs and was visible at the site visit.[19]The Respondents did not give evidence, having no direct knowledge of the matters in question. They do however rely on some documentary evidence, which was put to the Applicant in cross-examination. I note for completeness that it is arguable some of these points go beyond the Respondents’ case as outlined above, but it is nonetheless helpful to record the evidence and explain its relevance or otherwise, particularly bearing in mind the Respondents are acting in person.[20]The Respondents rely on correspondence from 1995 between Mr Young and the Association, in which he asks for and is granted permission to erect a garage on land behind the Village Hall; and the subsequent rental agreement, which was signed by the Applicant as treasurer on behalf of the Association. The Applicant’s explanation was that Mr Young’s garage was erected on land owned by the Association, being located to the west of the escape ramp, the east of the escape ramp being where she believes the boundary of the Village Hall land to be.[21]In closing, the Second Respondent averred that the Applicant’s actions were with the knowledge and permission of the Association, noting that permission can be oral or can be implied from conduct. The Respondents’ pleaded case, as confirmed in their further information and reiterated by an order of the Tribunal, does not include an allegation that the erection of the Garage was with permission, and they should not be permitted to introduce one at this late stage. In any event, knowledge of the actions of itself does not mean the actions were not adverse, and I am not satisfied that permission can be implied from conduct, given that the circumstances of the erection and use of the two garages (the Applicant’s and Mr Young’s) are so different.[22]The Respondents also rely on the minutes of various Association meetings as showing their “governance” of an area including the Disputed Land, describing it as a “managed community asset”. As I understand it, this is relied upon to show that the Applicant was not in adverse possession of the Disputed Land as the Association was still dealing with it.[23]The only express mention of garages is in the minutes of a meeting on 18th April 2000, in which there is reference to a need to view the Village Hall deeds, followed by a note that “Boundaries need to be established as the village hall land is being used for garages”. Minutes of subsequent meetings state the deeds have not yet been acquired.[24]This was put to the Applicant in cross-examination. She explained that she was not present at those meetings as they took place during her short break. The minutes themselves show that she resigned on 27th March 2000, but was back in her role as treasurer as at 2nd April 2001.[25]It is arguable that this line of argument should also not be permitted, as it a positive case that the Association was dealing with the Disputed Land.[26]In any event, the argument is not a good one. At their highest, the minutes suggest there was a belief that garages were located on land belonging to the Association. I accept this likely includes the Garage, as it says “garages”, plural, and it would be an unusual situation if two or more of the other garages were thought to be on Village Hall land but the Garage was not. However, I cannot see that this is evidence that calls into question whether the Applicant was in adverse possession of the Disputed Land.[27]Indeed, if anything, this reference supports the Applicant’s case, as it confirms the Garage was being used, it being implicit that such use was not for the benefit of the Association. The fact no further action was taken might even be said to suggest that the Association reviewed the deeds and decided that the Disputed Land was not within their ownership, but this is supposition only and I make no such finding.[28]There is no reason for me to doubt the Applicant’s evidence that she erected the Garage on receiving the necessary planning permission, or that she has used the Garage exclusively since, and I accept that she has done so.[29]In closing, the Second Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s actions did not amount to dispossession, that the Applicant had not made any declaration of ownership or communicated her intention to the Association. I do not accept this. I am satisfied that, in erecting and then using the Garage, the Applicant has shown a sufficient degree of physical control of the Disputed Land and an intention to exclude the world at large. The actions speak for themselves; no further communication is required.[30]There was some discussion during the hearing of the extent of the Disputed Land. The Disputed Land will be registered in the Applicant’s name, but the parties are reminded that HM Land Registry’s title plan will show the general boundaries only. The findings I make in this decision, however, will inform the extent of the parcel, should this become an issue.[31]I note that, in erecting the Garage, the Applicant installed a concrete base and a ramp to the front, as can be seen on the photograph below (taken from HM Land Registry’s survey). I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated adverse possession of the footprint of the Garage, that is, the concrete base and the ramp. Base and ramp[32]Finally, in closing, the Second Respondent introduced an entirely new legal argument, one that had not been prefaced at all, in any of the statement of case documents or even in the skeleton argument.[33]Essentially, she argues that possession of the Garage cannot have been adverse whilst the Applicant was a trustee of the Association, and so the Applicant, who resigned 7 years prior to the application in 2016, cannot show 12 years’ adverse possession. This is based on:(a) a comment in the Supreme Court judgment in Rittson-Thomas v Oxfordshire County Council [2021] UKSC 13, quoting a Law Commission paper, that “it is trite law that a trustee cannot obtain a title by long possession against his own beneficiaries”; and/or(b)section 21(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980, which provides that no period of limitation shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust to recover from the trustee trust property.[34]This is potentially a complex point. However, I do not have to deal with it, for two reasons. Firstly, the Respondents should not be permitted to introduce an entirely new argument so late in the day. Secondly, and in any event, it depends upon the Disputed Land being within the ownership of the Association. The Respondents have not adduced evidence of ownership. No deeds or title documents have been disclosed. The evidence that is available suggests that the Disputed Land was not owned by the Association. The argument therefore does not get off the ground.
Conclusion
[35]For the reasons given above, I will direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the Applicant’s original application dated 17th April 2023 as if the objection of the Respondents had not been made.[36]I turn to consider costs. Ordinarily, the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party: see rule 13(1)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and paragraph 9.1(b) of the Practice Direction. Here, that would be an order that the Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs, unless there is some good reason to make a different order. Costs are recoverable from the date the application was referred to the Tribunal, that is, 29th January 2025.[37]Any application for costs should be sent to the Tribunal and the other side by 5pm on 21st May 2026, and should include an estimate of the amount of costs sought. Further directions will then be given as appropriate. Dated this Thursday 23rd April 2026 Laura D’Cruz By Order of The Tribunal