Gian Singh v Baldeep Singh & Anor [2026] UKFTT 767 (PC)

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER

LAND REGISTRATION

[2026] UKFTT 00767 (PC)

Case No REF 2024/0534

B E T W E E N:

Between

MR. GIAN SINGHApplicant

MR. BALDEEP SINGHRespondent

MRS. JASWINDER KAURRespondent

Title Number: MM153010 & SF11086

Property: Garages Lying To The South West Of 92 Dilloways Lane, Willenhall (WV13 3HJ) (‘The Three Garages’)

Before Judge Ewan Paton, sitting at Birmingham Civil and Family Justice Centre, Bull Street, Birmingham

On 8 th to 10 th April 2026 (site visit 7 th April)

Mr. Graeme Wood (counsel, instructed by BLC Solicitors, Birmingham) for Applicant

Mr. Mantishbar Singh (their son) for Respondents

DECISION

Date 2026-04-17

[1]This is a dispute over three small garages near Wolverhampton. It is a case, to use HM Land Registry’s own phrase, of “double registration”. Both the Applicant and Respondents currently have a registered title to those garages. The issue in these proceedings is whether the Respondents should keep the title which they recently acquired, or whether it should be cancelled and the Applicant restored as the sole proprietor.

[2]The dispute contains many of the usual features of such disputes, including allegations of criminal damage and other wrongs, and also disputes on other issues which have been the subject of now-compromised County Court proceedings.

[3]The only “matter” referred to this Tribunal to decide, however, is the Applicant’s application under Schedule 4 Land Registration 2002 for alteration of the register, by way of cancellation of the Respondents’ currently held title to the garages. To explain how this has come about, it is necessary first to consider the background in more detail.Background and titlesi) the Applicant’s title

[4]The registered title numbered SF 11086 was the subject of first registration as long ago as 20th July 1967. That date is taken from the Property Register of the title to “land and garages lying to the West of Dilloways Lane, Willenhall”. The title comprises three distinct and physically separate parcels of land in the vicinity of Dilloways Lane and Five Oaks Road. An extract from the title filed plan showing those areas is attached below. These proceedings are concerned with the parcel at the top of the page, furthest north.Applicant’s title SF 11086

[5]Some former parts of that title are noted by the Land Registry as having been removed from it, and are shown edged green on the plan with their new title numbers alongside. These include a block of five of the garages towards the northern end of the row (WM 945560) which the Applicant himself purchased from the then registered proprietor in about 2008. The garage at the very bottom of that row (number 1) was purchased by the Respondents (title WM34418) in 2020, having previously been sold off from the main title to another person. Alongside the garages is a large unsurfaced yard.

[6]It is clear that the three garages immediately to the north of the Respondents’ garage 1 – numbers 2, 3 and 4 – form part of this registered freehold title, being wholly situated within the red edging and between the other garages which have been sold off and removed.

[7]It is equally clear and beyond dispute that the Applicant acquired this registered freehold title SF 11086 on 17th August 2018, for a stated consideration of £20,000, as recorded on the Proprietorship Register. He was registered as the new proprietor with effect from 20th August 2018.

[8]The Applicant could only have been registered as proprietor upon the Land Registry being satisfied that he had taken a valid transfer of the title from the previous proprietor. His evidence was that this was a company known as Redark Limited, controlled by an elderly couple who have since died. Nothing further is known about it or them, including when they first acquired this title themselves.ii) The Respondents’ application and resulting title

[9]Between about 2021 and 6th July 2023 – the latter being the date of a “Tomlin” order in County Court proceedings H00WV245 – these parties and others were in dispute principally over access to the yard or forecourt area in which the garages are situated. The Tomlin order recites that there were also issues as to boundaries, alleged trespass and drainage rights. Although I have not seen the Statements of Case, it was common ground that title to the three garages now in dispute was not one of the issues in those proceedings.

[10]During the currency of those those court proceedings, the Respondents made an application to HM Land Registry for title to those three garages, on the basis of alleged adverse possession. According to information later provided by the Land Registry, the application was made on 24th May 2022, supported by a statutory declaration sworn by the First Respondent Baldeep Singh dated 14th April 2021.It is what then happened to that application which has led to this dispute and these proceedings.

[11]The application was made on form FR1 and on the basis that the three garages were unregistered land. I was eventually provided with a full copy of the statutory declaration in support dated 14th April 2021. This referred to a “separate unregistered strip of unclaimed empty garages” which the First Respondent said that he began to “occupy” for “storage” from 2007. He claimed to have “occupied” and been in “open undisturbed possession” of them since then. The application and declaration, which were clearly drafted by the Respondents’ then solicitor, therefore proceeded on the footing that this was unregistered land to which title could be barred under the Limitation Act 1980 simply by adverse possession for 12 years or more.

[12]It should be clear from the above summary of the Applicant’s title that this was not correct. Title to these garages was already registered within title SF 11086, of which the Applicant was by then the proprietor.

[13]As such, the only way in which the Applicant’s registered title to those garages could be taken away by adverse possession was under section 96 and Schedule 6 Land Registration 2002. The 2002 Act changed the law on adverse possession, to make it more difficult to defeat and acquire part of a registered title by this method.

[14]Section 96 abolished the automatic limitation-barring of registered titles (or any part of them) by adverse possession. Under Schedule 6 paragraph 1 of the 2002 Act, a period of adverse possession of 10 years or more only entitles an applicant to apply for title on form ADV1. The registered proprietor must then be given notice of the application. On being notified, the registered proprietor is entitled to serve form NAP in response, objecting to the application and requiring it to be dealt with under Schedule 6 paragraph 5. This operates as a sort of presumed ‘veto’ of the application by the registered proprietor. If that is done, the application must then be dismissed unless the Applicant can bring himself within one of the three exceptional ‘conditions’ in paragraph 5, namely (in broad summary):-- 5(2): that it would be “unconscionable because of an equity by estoppel” for the registered proprietor to dispossess the Applicants, and the “circumstances are such that the applicant ought to be registered” as proprietor.- 5(3) – that there is “some other reason” why the applicant is entitled to be registered as proprietor; or-5(4): - what is sometimes called the ‘boundary’ condition, of which the most important elements are that the land is adjacent to existing land of the applicant, and that for a period of 10 years or more the applicant “reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him”.

[15]No such application was made in this case. The registered proprietor of the subject land, the Applicant, was not therefore even given any notice of the application; let alone the opportunity to serve a counter-notice invoking Schedule 6 paragraph 5. The Land Registry accepted and treated the application as one for first registration of unregistered land, unopposed by any known objector. Some time in 2022 or 2023, they therefore gave effect to the application, and registered the three garages under a new title MM 153010, with the Respondents as proprietors. The priority date given to the registration was 21st April 2021. This appears to have been the date of the Respondents’ first approach to the Land Registry (not the date, 24th May 2022, of their subsequent form FR1), and approximates to the date of the statutory declaration relied upon. I shall return below, in a different context, to the Registry’s apparent practice in dating applications for priority purposes.iii) the Applicant’s discovery of the title and subsequent application

[16]It is clear, and I am satisfied, that the Applicant and his solicitors knew nothing of this registration of a title to these garages by the Respondents until July 2023. The background to this was, as stated, that there had been County Court proceedings between the parties on a number of other issues relating to the land in this vicinity, but not the garages themselves. Those proceedings had very recently been compromised by the ‘Tomlin order’ referred to above.

[17]On 17th July 2023, the Applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Land Registry as follows:

“….Our client went abroad recently and upon his return he found that his neighbours have taken possession of 3 garages. Upon requesting the latest title deeds, we note that a separate title (MM153010) was created out of our client’s title – SF11086 – on 21st April 2021 and registered in the names of our client’s neighbours – BALDEEP SINGH and JASWINDER KAUR.Our client has never sold these three garages and request the Land Registry to investigate this matter as a matter of urgency.Please also send us a copy of the transfer under which three garages were transferred and the new title (MM153010) was created out of our client’s title – SF11086.”

[18]The Land Registry responded on 17th August 2023. They referred to having received the Respondents’ application described above, supported by the 2021 statutory declaration. They also referred to a survey having been conducted on 6th June 2022, on the basis of which (and “suitable requisition replies”) they had granted the application and created title MM153010. They continued as follows:-“It has now become apparent that HM Land Registry made a mistake when granting possessory title MM153010 based upon the application as lodged…The application for first registration ought to have been rejected on the basis that the land sought to be registered (the three garages) was already registered in your client’s title, SF11086. This is our error for which we apologise.The application should have been submitted in accordance with our published guidance, Practice guide 4: adverse possession of registered land, using a form ADV1 and notice ought to have been served upon your client, the registered proprietor. Again, we can only apologise for this oversight.”

[19]They then summarised the provisions on alteration of the register for the purposes of correcting a mistake, under Schedule 4 LRA 2002. This included noting that if alteration affects the title of a registered proprietor of a registered estate in land, no order for alteration may be made without the proprietor’s consent in relation to land in his possession unless:-“(a) he has by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake; or(b) it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made.”This was a quotation from Schedule 4 paragraph 6(2) [and the like provisions for alteration by court order in paragraph 2(2) ], to which I shall return in more detail below.They then observed that:

“This means that we are unable to alter a title whereby the proprietor is in possession (except in the above mentioned circumstances) and we understand from your correspondence that Baldeep Singh and Jaswinder Kaur are currently in possession of the three garages.”

[20]The remaining part of the letter therefore invited the Applicant to apply for alteration if he so wished, “using form AP1 together with a covering letter setting out your grounds”, for which application they would waive the usual fee. They would “hold the matter in abeyance for 20 days” while the Applicant considered his position. Some further correspondence then ensued, including a response from the Land Registry on 2nd October 2023, in which the writer awaited the Applicant’s AP1, and observed that:

“In the meantime, unfortunately, I am unable to provide a definitive answer as to how this error initially occurred; I can only assume that this was an error on the part of the individual initially dealing with the adverse possession application or alternatively an error with our mapping system that resulted in the garages appearing to be unregistered.”

[21]The Applicant, through his solicitors, then filed a form AP1 and statutory declaration dated 9th October 2023. The Land Registry logged receipt of this in their electronic records by a “Reply to Requisition confirmation” timed at 13:21 on 9th October 2023.

[22]In the statutory declaration, which I note was written in English without any certification of translation, the Applicant deposed to (amongst other matters) the following:-i) that while he had been abroad in India between 18th January and 8th February 2003, his wife had informed him that their neighbours had removed items from, and put new locks on, the three garages.ii) on his return “I took the possession back of the garages by removing the locks and putting new locks to all the garages, thinking this will be the end of the matter.”iii) “to my great surprise” the Respondents “once again broke into the said three garages by removing my locks and putting their locks once again”, which he described colourfully as “This cat and mouse play”.iv) once he discovered, to his “shock and disbelief”, the registration of the Respondents as proprietors of the garages:

“..as a law abiding citizen, I stop changing the locks of the garages and instead instructed my solicitors to contact the Land Registry.”

He then referred to their letter of 17th July 2023, and an earlier letter (which I have not seen) of 21st March 2023.v) he then referred to the further correspondence with the Land Registry, and to his having just returned from another trip India on 4th October 2023, following which:

“Having now the full knowledge of what actually have happened, I have taken the possession of the three garages once again peacefully and I am in full physical possession of the said three garages along with the rest of my Lands and garages.”

[23]The Respondents, upon being given notice of the application for alteration, objected. The matter was eventually referred to this Tribunal on 29th August 2024, from which time it progressed via Statements of Case and other directions to the final hearing before me in Birmingham on the dates stated above.The evidence

[24]At the hearing I heard oral evidence from the following witnesses:For the Applicant:- the Applicant himself, Mr. Gian Singh.- the Applicant’s brother Mr. Atma Singh (Uppal)- Mr. Harinder Singh Purewal, a friend of the Applicant- Mr. Gurdip Virdi, another friend.For the Respondent:- both Respondents (Mr. Baldeep Singh and Mrs. Jaswinder Kaur)- Mr. Harnek Singh, a friend and neighbour who lives at number 88 Willenhall Lane (the Applicant lives at number 86, and the Respondents at number 92).Other witnesses for both parties had filed witness statements but did not attend to be cross-examined on them. As I explained at the hearing, I have read these statements but can place relatively little weight on them.

[25]Despite the number of statements and witnesses, and the time consumed by the oral evidence at the hearing, it became apparent to me that very little of the evidence they gave (in their statements and under cross-examination) was directly relevant to the issues I have to decide. Many of the statements on the Respondents’ side went into irrelevant matters such as the wider dispute with the Applicant about access to the yard outside the garages, or else sought somehow to question or cast doubt on the Applicant’s acquisition of title SF 11086 in 2018, which is a matter of fact and public record.

[26]I was also dissatisfied with the manner in which the evidence of the Applicant and his brother had been prepared and submitted by the Applicant’s solicitors. As first became apparent when a Punjabi interpreter was requested for the hearing, neither the Applicant nor his brother are fluent or wholly confident in either spoken or written English. At the hearing, they confirmed as much, when I asked this (through the interpreter). When Mr. Wood, counsel for the Applicant, sought in the usual way to ask each of them to confirm the contents of their witness statements as true, each of them confirmed to me that they could not actually read and understand the English language statement in their name. Neither statement bore any proper certification that it had been translated into their native language by a qualified interpreter, or that they had read a Punjabi version and confirmed it as true. Each of these witnesses said, through the interpreter, that a family member had translated and read the statement out to them.

[27]It should not be necessary to point out to legal professionals that this is wholly unacceptable and unprofessional practice. Witness statements provided in English must be accompanied by a certification of translation of an original statement in the witness’s own language, translated by a qualified interpreter. By analogy with CPR Part 32 Practice Direction paragraph 18.2:

“The witness statement must, if practicable, be in the intended witness’s own words and must in any event be drafted in their own language..”and should also state, amongst other things:“the process by which it has been prepared, for example, face-to-face, over the telephone, and/or through an interpreter.”

[28]I would have been entitled to refuse to admit either of these witnesses’ evidence as a result. In the event, however, and in the exercise of the Tribunal’s power under rule 18(1)(g) to direct the manner in which evidence is to be given, I directed that the interpreter present in court should translate each statement for the witness there and then, paragraph by paragraph, as read out by me. The interpreter did so in each case, and I was thereby eventually satisfied that each witness could properly confirm the contents of their statements to be true.Issues on which evidence was relevant

[29]Much of the evidence related to who had done what, and when, to or in the three garages. As I pointed out at the hearing, however, this was not directly a trial of the substance of the Respondents’ alleged adverse possession of them. What they had or had not done with the garages might, however, be relevant to the issues I had to decide in the Applicant’s alteration application.

[30]The Applicant himself was asked what he had done with the garages since his purchase in 2018, from the company Redark Limited which he said was owned by an elderly couple called Mark and Hilary. He could give no direct evidence of the position before 2018 when Redark was the owner. Although all he said in his statement was that he had been in “full and exclusive control” of all of the land, inclduing the garages since then, he added that he had kept fence posts and other building materials in the garages. He said that no-one else had used them, until the events in 2023 when the Respondents (he said) broke into them and changed the locks.

[31]As to the events in 2023, and what he had previously described as the “cat and mouse” situation of he and the Respondents successively changing the locks, his previous statutory declaration (quoted above) had appeared to suggest that he only changed the locks once. He then said in oral evidence that, by the time of that 9th October 2023 declaration, he had – in addition to placing a skip in front of the three garages – also changed the locks, and inserted extra screws to make his stored items more secure.

[32]I add here that when I inspected the garages on the site visit, none of them were locked, although the skip was still in place. The Applicant and his brother lifted up the shutter doors of each garage, which revealed that various building materials (including some blocks and roof tiles) were stored inside.

[33]The Applicant’s brother, Atma Singh, was asked questions chiefly about a CCTV video of 30th January 2023, recorded by the Respondents’ witness Harnek Singh, which appeared to show him (Atma Singh) and a number of other men forcing open one of the garages in the evening. An earlier part of video from the morning showed Atma Singh walking up to the garages alone and appearing to photograph them with his phone. He admitted that it was him in the video, but claimed that he did not know the men who were with him. He then appeared to say that he believed that these were men sent by the Respondents, who had “forced” him to go with them to the garages. I recorded him as saying that these men came to his “own home” to force him to come with them, giving no reason, but simply saying “Come.”

[34]Neither Harinder Singh Purewal nor Gurdip Singh Virdi had much to add to their brief witness statements. Their evidence was to the effect that they had known that the Applicant had owned these garages since 2018, and that “building materials” had always been stored in these and the Applicant’s other garages.

[35]For the Respondents, Mr. Harnek Singh said that since 2011, he had witnessed the Respondents using these three garages. He had seen them opening the garage doors, taking things in and out. In his long statement, which dealt mostly with other and irrelevant matters relating to the rest of the land in this area, he said only that the Respondents had “taken care” of the garages. When asked what this meant, he said that he meant cleaning, painting and occasional repairs.

[36]The Respondents provided a joint statement, and it was the First Respondent Baldeep Singh who was cross-examined on its contents by Mr. Wood. It was put to him that he had said different things in various statements and declarations as to what he had actually done with the garages. A full copy of his 2021 statutory declaration was only provided at the hearing when I requested one, as it was not in the hearing bundle. In this he had given very little detail of what he had actually done by way of alleged possession, simply saying that “I started to occupy the same empty garages as storage in 2007”. This had, however, now been expanded to include such phrases (in his statement of case and witness statement) as “factual possession” and “longstanding use and control”. He denied that these differences were significant, and said that he had stored items in the garages, including at one time a motorbike. He had also maintained, cleaned and repaired them as and when required.

[37]He accepted that he had not used the garages since October 2023 when the Applicant placed the skip in front of them, and that none of his materials were now stored in them. He said that after the Applicant’s brother and others had broken his locks on the garage on 30th January 2023, he replaced them with new ones, which were never replaced by the Applicant, and only removed much later.

[38]I did not require Mr. Wood to put all the same questions and points to the Second Respondent Mrs. Kaur. She had little to add to their joint statement, but did say under cross-examination that when they had purchased their main property (number 88) in 2007, the seller (whose name she could not remember) had given them a key to these garages and said “you can carry on using them” as they had done previously. She said that they moved out some of the remaining items of the seller, moved their own items in, then used the garages for their own storage. They also fitted their own locks.Findings of fact

[39]Despite the general background of conflict, and the appearance of a dispute over the evidence, I find that most of the relevant facts in this matter are either not seriously disputed, or else reasonably clear.

[40]First, I accept the Respondents’ evidence, particularly that of the Second Respondent, that after they purchased number 88 in 2007, they began to make some use of garages 2, 3 and 4 for storage, with the encouragement of their seller. I accept that they removed what was left in the garages and stored their own items in them, and fitted locks.

[41]There is no evidence at all from the Applicant’s side on what if anything the then ‘paper’ owners of these garages, Redark Limited (in the person of “Mark” and “Hilary”) were doing with them at this time. I find, on the balance of probabilities and the absence of evidence, that the answer is probably very little or nothing. The Applicant said in evidence that they were elderly, and that the last of them died during the Covid pandemic. It is therefore quite probable that the then owner of number 88, then the Respondents, had been using them instead.

[42]I find that such use, as described by the Respondents in evidence, continued between 2007 and 2018, up to the point when the Applicant purchased the title. I understand the criticism that their evidence was vague and brief, but in oral evidence they confirmed that they used these small garages for storage. They also maintained and cleaned them. They did not make extravagant (or any) claims to have spent significant sums of money in doing so. They simply cleaned and kept them tidy, and fixed a shutter or anything else when needed.

[43]From the date of the Applicant’s purchase of the whole title for £20,000 (17th August 2018), I find that he did not immediately turn his attention to these three garages, which comprised only a very small part of a much larger title spread over three parcels. He was therefore probably not aware of the Respondents’ use of them.

[44]The Applicant’s first engagement with this parcel of land, and with the local residents, came later, on 24th June 2020, when he sent the letter (drafted by solicitors) giving notice that he was changing the locks to the gates at the entrance to this land as a whole, terminating all residents’ rights of access to it, and requiring that they entered into licence agreements if they wish to have a key and continue accessing it. That is what precipitated the County Court proceedings later compromised by the 2023 Tomlin order. Neither that letter nor those proceedings specifically concerned these three garages, although a denial of access to the land as a whole would have prevented the Respondents from accessing even their own previously purchased garage number 1, as well as numbers 2 to 4.

[45]I find that as a result of this dispute and prevention of access to the whole of the land, the use previously made by the Respondents of garages 2 to 4 would largely have ceased, althought it is likely that they still had items stored in them. The general denial of access, and dispute that they had a right of access even to their own garage, amounted to an act of exclusion and control over the whole land – including, therefore, these three garages.

[46]I find that by 30th January 2023, while the court proceedings were still ongoing, the Applicant had become aware of the Respondents’ use of the garages, but not their title to them. Whether or not the Applicant himself was in India on that date, I find – as shown in the CCTV video clip provided by the Respondents – that on that evening the Applicant’s brother Atma Singh, and a number of his associates, broke into the garages with the aim of retaking possession of them. I reject Atma Singh’s implausible evidence that these were in fact associates of the Respondents, who “forced” him to come with them to break into the garages on the Respondents’ behalf. I also reject the Applicant’s evidence, so far as given in in October 2023 statutory declaration accompanying his application, that this was a ‘break in’ by the Respondents against garages previously locked by him. It was the other way around.

[47]I do find, however – although the evidence of both sides was somewhat hazy and unclear on this – that there then followed something of a “tit for tat” or (as the Applicant called it) “cat and mouse” phase, in which the Respondents then re-took possession of the garages and placed their own locks on them.

[48]I further find that the Applicant’s own solicitors’ letter of 17th July 2023, which I must take to have been written on his clear instructions, is the best contemporaneous evidence of the position on the ground by that date. As the Applicant later said in his statutory declaration, he had by then decided to “stop changing the locks of the garages and instead instructed my solicitors to contact the Land Registry.” By this time the court proceedings had been settled by the Tomlin order. As set out above, the solicitors said that:

“Our client went abroad recently and upon his return he found that his neighbours have taken possession of 3 garages.”

So at that point in time, I find that the Respondents had re-taken possession of the garages, and had their own locks on them.

[49]I next find that shortly before the AP1 application was made to HM Land Registry, some time between 4th and 9th October 2023, the Applicant caused the skip and other materials to be placed in front of the three garages (see below), so denying the Respondents easy access to them; although I find that some of their items were probably still stored inside them at that date. I further find that some time after that – after the application had been made – the Applicant removed the remaining locks on the garages, and over time has removed any items of the Respondents which were in them. I am satisfied that all the materials now in the garages belong to the Applicant.The law applied to the facts

[50]Schedule 4 paragraph 1 of the Land Registration Act 2002 provides that:

“In this Schedule, references to rectification, in relation to alteration of the register, are to alteration which –(a) involves the correction of a mistake, and(b) prejudicially affects the title of a registered proprietor.”

[51]Paragraph 5 provides the registrar’s powers to direct alteration, which this Tribunal may by rule 40 of the Tribunal rules direct the registrar to exercise.“The registrar may alter the register for the purpose of—(a) correcting a mistake(b) bringing the register up to date..”[(c) and (d) are not material for present purposes]….”

[52]Paragraph 6 is of some importance, generally and to this case. It provides as follows:-“6(1) This paragraph applies to the power under paragraph 5, so far as relating to rectification.(2) No alteration affecting the title of the proprietor of a registered estate in land may be made under paragraph 5 without the proprietor’s consent in relation to land in his possession unless—(a) he has by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or(b) it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made.(3) If on an application for alteration under paragraph 5 the registrar has power to make the alteration, the application must be approved, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration.”

[53]Although Mr. Wood in his skeleton argument referred to the possibility in this case of paragraph 5(b) being relied upon as a basis for alteration– “bringing the register up to date” – in substance that is not what this case is about. The Applicant’s case is squarely one of “mistake” - in the registration of the Respondents as proprietors of a new title, to land which was already within the Applicant’s registered title.

[54]As to the meaning of “mistake” in this context, the definition in the 8th edition of Megarry & Wade’s The Law of Real Property was quoted with approval by Kitchin LJ (with whom David Richards and Henderson LJJ agreed) in NRAM Ltd v Evans

[2017] EWCA Civ 1013

. The 10th edition of the same work summarises the position as follows:“whenever the registrar would have done something different had he or she known the true facts at the time at which the relevant entry in the register was made or deleted.” (paragraph 6-133).

[55]The inquiry is not, however, into the particular Registrar’s subjective state of knowledge at the date of making the entry: the test is an objective one (see e.g. Antoine v. Barclays Bank

[2018] EWCA Civ. 2846

). Ruoff & Roper (in Registered Conveyancing, paragraph 46-009) suggest that :- “ a modified description of the meaning of “mistake” might be to suggest that there will be a mistake whenever the circumstances are such that, on the facts and law appertaining at the time:(i) an entry is made in the register that should not have been made;

(ii) an entry is made in the register that should not have been made in the form in which it was made;

(iii) an entry is not made in the register which should have been made; or(iv) an entry is deleted which should not have been deleted.”

[56]This can include both factual and legal “mistakes”. If, on the true facts and correct law at the time of the application, an entry “should not have been made”, then it was, with hindsight, a “mistake”. A common example is that of someone who acquires a registered title to formerly unregistered land, unopposed, based on alleged adverse possession, only for it to be found later that they were not in such (or sufficient) possession at all. In some cases this might be because this Tribunal or a Court later makes a finding to that effect, on the matter being properly litigated and argued, but in others (see e.g. Baxter v. Mannion

[2011] 1 WLR 594

) it may be found that the evidence in the statutory declaration which supported the first registration was false.

[57]I consider this to be the most straightforward aspect of this matter. Even without the Land Registry’s own admissions of mistake in correspondence in this regard (which, strictly speaking, are not determinative or binding on me), this is almost as clear a case of legal “mistake” in the above sense as it is possible to envisage. Indeed, by the time of closing submissions, the Respondents did not (through their representative) dispute this.

[58]This case goes some way beyond even Baxter v. Mannion as summarised above. In that case, the application was at least correctly made against unregistered land. The resulting title was later cancelled by alteration because the underlying evidential basis of the application was found to be false. In the present case, it was simply not possible, legally, for the Respondents to acquire the title as they did. Even if they had filed compelling evidence of adverse possession of the garages, title to those garages was registered. It could not be barred simply by adverse possession alone. The only means of acquiring a title to those garages was to go through the Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 procedure. This was not just a question of filling in the correct form (ADV1). It is of the essence of Schedule 6 that the registered proprietor is entitled to receive notice of the application, and then has the right to serve a counter-notice (on form NAP) invoking the provisions of Schedule 6 paragraph 5.

[59]As it happens, and as Mr. Wood submitted, there would have been no question in this case of the Respondents being able to establish any of the Schedule 6 paragraph 5 conditions, had the application been properly made and had that issue then arisen. There was no suggestion of any representation or “estoppel”. Both Respondents accepted in evidence, as was in any event apparent from their previous statements and declarations, that they did not have any belief (reasonable or otherwise) that these garages already belonged to them. Nor did they have any independent or pre-existing right to be registered as their proprietors.

[60]In any event, there was a clear “mistake” in the fielding and processing of this application, which resulted in the Respondents obtaining a new registered title. The land was treated as unregistered, when it was in fact registered. Regardless of the substantive content of the application as made, it should have been rejected forthwith, and the Respondents told to apply under Schedule 6 LRA 2002 on form ADV1 if they wanted to obtain title to the garages.

[61]That did not happen. The FR1 application went through unopposed, with no notice being given to the Applicant. The precise reason for the mistake is unknown, even (it seems) to the Land Registry itself. That is, however, immaterial.

[62]This is confirmed, and compounded, by the fact that the Land Registry did not notice, when completing registration of the Respondents’ new title, that it was to land already comprised within the Applicant’s title. The result is, as they have described it, a “double registration”. The garages have never actually been removed from the Applicant’s title. He is therefore, on one view, still their registered proprietor. The problem, for the time being, is that the Respondents are too.

[63]There is, therefore, a “mistake” in the Respondents having been granted the new title MM153010 and registered as its proprietors. That is “an entry..made in the register that should not have been made.”

[64]“Correction” of that mistake would require the complete cancellation of that title. Although Mr. Wood sought to submit otherwise, complete cancellation of a registered title to correct a mistake clearly “prejudicially affects the title of a registered proprietor”. If their title is cancelled, they no longer have one. What is sought in this case is therefore “rectification” within the meaning of Schedule 4 paragraph 2.Registered proprietor “in possession”?

[65]This being a “rectification” case for the purposes of paragraph 6(1), the next question is whether the application falls within Schedule 4 paragraph 6(2) of the Act. This gives rise to two issues:-i) is the rectification being sought against the Respondents as registered proprietors “in possession” of the subject land?ii) on which date is the question of such possession to be determined?

[66]These questions can be challenging where there is something of a “tussle” for possession between parties. On the findings I have made above, there was such a tussle, or back-and-forth, in this case. The implications of these issues are, however, significant. If the registered proprietor is found to have been in possession at the relevant date, then the applicant must satisfy one or both of the conditions (a) and (b) in paragraph 6(2) before rectification can be ordered. If there was no such possession, then the Tribunal proceeds straight to paragraph 6(3), by which the application “..must be approved, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration.”

[67]It is clear from the decision of Newey J. (as he then was) in Fitzwilliam v. Richall Holdings Services Limited

[2013] EWHC 86

(Ch.) that where an alteration application is made to the registrar (i.e the Land Registry), the relevant time for determining the “in possession” question is the date when the application was made, in particular: (paragraph 99)“what will matter will be whether the proprietor was in possession when the application was entered in the day list kept in accordance with rule 12 of the Land Registration Rules 2003.”

[68]Newey J. approved of the decision of Mr. Colin Green (sitting as a Deputy Adjudicator in the predecessor body to this Tribunal) in Ghaus v Gateway Homes UK Ltd (12th December 2011, unreported) that, as regards an application made to the Registrar, “the relevant time is the date of the application to alter the register”. Rule 20 of the Land Registration Rules 2003 provides that:

“Any entry in, removal of an entry from or alteration of the register pursuant to an application under the Act or these rules has effect from the time of the making of the application”

Newey J. shared Mr. Green’s view that this:“..provides a compelling reason for assessing possession as at the date an application is made to the Registrar. That, after all, will also be the date on which any alteration takes effect.” (paragraph 101)The “date of the application”?

[69]So what was the relevant date of the application here? If one looks at the Land Registry case summary, the “date of application” is given as “20 July 2023”. Yet the summary then goes on to record that the Applicant’s AP1 application was submitted on 9th October 2023.

[70]On notice to the parties, during the hearing I requested a Registrar of this Tribunal to seek further information from the Land Registry on these dates and the reason for them, pursuant to the Tribunal’s power under rule 6(3)(d) to request information. With commendable speed, the Registry replied later the same day (9th April 2026), as follows:-“..I have looked into the matter and it appears that upon receipt of the correspondence from BLC Solicitors dated 17 July 2023 (on title SF11086) a dealing was captured on this title on the 20 July 2023 (MM153010). The correspondence was referred to HMLR lawyers to review and the response dated 17 August 2023 was sent after investigating this instance of what appeared to be double registration as a result of a HMLR error. Within this correspondence, we advised the customer that they may wish to consider lodging an AP1 for alteration. We invited a response within 20 working days in order for the customer to consider the content of the correspondence. No response was received and a chaser was sent on the 19 September 2023, inviting a response by 10 October 2023. The AP1 was then lodged as you have appropriately indicated on the 9 October 2023.”

[71]My understanding of this, and of Land Registry practice, is as follows. The Land Registration Rules 2003 do not make the use of prescribed forms mandatory for applications. The Registry is therefore entitled, in its discretion, to treat a relatively informal request or approach as an effective application or potential “dealing” from the time and date when it is received, and enter it in the “Day List” accordingly from that time.

[72]That is, I infer, what the Registry did here, and what they mean by saying that a “dealing was captured on this title on 20 July 2023”. They treated the Applicant’s solicitors’ letter of 17th July 2023, quoted above, as a form of application; even though it did not say this on its face. All the solicitors actually requested was that the Registry “..investigate this matter as a matter of urgency”, and send them a copy of a “transfer” which they then wrongly believed to have been executed.

[73]So even though:-i) the Registry then advised the Applicant that he could, if he so wished, make an alteration application on form AP1 supported by evidence (17th August 2023); andii) he then did so, on 9th October 2023;, the Registry treated receipt of that subsequent application and its supporting documents effectively as a “reply to requisition”, as their receipt notice states. They treated it as a continuation of an application already made by the initial letter of 17th July 2023, which then led to their investigation and suggestion of a formal AP1 being lodged.That is why they have retained “20th July 2023” as the application date for priority purposes, being (quoting from Newey J. in Fitzwilliam) “the date on which any alteration takes effect”.

[74]This gives rise to an interesting and unusual problem, on my findings of fact above. I have found that – as the Applicant’s own solicitors stated in the 17th July 2023 letter – that the Respondents were “in possession” of the garages at that date, and so on receipt of that letter by the Land Registry on 20th July 2023. They were storing their possessions in them, and had secured them with their own locks.

[75]By the time, however, of the Applicant’s actual AP1 application on 9th October 2023, I consider that he had done enough to disturb and interrupt that possession of the Respondents. While it is not clear that he had removed all of their possessions or their locks by that time, he had removed their means of access to and use of the garages by placing the skip in front of them. The Respondents had, effectively, lost exclusive control of the garages by that point; even if the Applicant had not yet established total control. Another interpretation of the position may be that neither party was in possession, and there was something of an impasse.So by the date of that AP1 application, the Respondents were no longer a registered proprietor “in possession” of the garages.

[76]The Land Registry’s treatment of the effective application date as receipt of the initial letter of 17th July 2023 is therefore potentially to the detriment of the Applicant, in that it would fix the “possession” position at that date and force the Applicant to establish one or both of the conditions in Schedule 4 paragraph 6(2). If, however, the later date of 9th October 2023 were taken as the date of the application, the Applicant would have put himself in a better position by disturbing the Respondents’ previous possession, opening the way to his alteration application proceeding via paragraph 6(3) alone. Which should therefore be the “date of the application” in this case?

[77]I consider that the Land Registry’s chosen priority date of 20th July 2023 is correct, and should be treated as the “date of the application” for these purposes. First, the selection of that date, and the administration of the “Day List” generally, is a matter within the Registry’s administrative discretion. It is far from clear to me that, absent an application for judicial review, this could be disregarded or quashed by this Tribunal or a court.

[78]Second, even if it were possible to question such a matter of dating, I do not consider that it was obviously wrong of the Registry to treat the initial letter as triggering a potential alteration of the register, and so treat and date it accordingly. The letter raised the issue of the new title, and therefore the apparent double registration. It called upon the Registry to “investigate” the matter, which it then did. The alteration of the register as a consequence of this request was therefore clearly a possibility. It seems to me that the Registry were therefore entitled to treat this as such an application from the outset, and only to require confirmation (and fleshing out of its details) by the filing of a form AP1 and supporting documents, for which they waived the fee. Had they not done so, they could have been open to criticism, and a possible indemnity claim, if some other dealing with the Respondents’ title had been entered in the intervening period.

[79]Third, there is substantive merit and justice in doing so in this or any similar case – i.e. treating the very earliest enquiry as the effective date of the alteration application. This prevents an applicant potentially manipulating the position on the ground to improve the prospects of such an application. Although Newey J. in Fitzwilliam, at paragraph 102, did not seem to accept this argument (when holding that for court applications for rectification, the relevant date to assess possession is the hearing date), I consider it has some force in a case such as the present. The Registry, by their letter of 17th August 2023, specifically alerted the Applicant to the hurdles potentially posed by paragraph 6(2), given their apparent acceptance that the Respondents were then in possession. I consider it would be odd, and unjust, if having been thus alerted, the Applicant could then push those hurdles aside by dispossessing the Respondents.

[80]I therefore conclude that the effective “date of the application” in this case is 20th July 2023, and that at that date, the Respondents were in possession of the garages.

[81]It is therefore necessary for the Applicant to satisfy one or other, or both, of Schedule 4 paragraph 6(2) (a) and (b) before I can direct alteration in this case.Paragraph 6(2)(a) (whether the proprietor in possession “..has by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake”)

[82]There is no question, or allegation made, of fraud by the Respondents in this case. As for “lack of proper care”, I have little information and no disclosure relating to the Respondents’ application for title. It was, however, made via solicitors. Some suggestion was made that a competent solicitor would have obtained an index map search at the outset, and so discovered that the land in question was already registered. I have no information either way as to whether the solicitors in this case did so. Even if I did, however, the admitted mistake made by the Land Registry suggests that any such omission by the solicitors would not have “caused or substantially contributed” to that mistake. If the Land Registry themselves, from their own index map searches and internal processes, failed to discover that the land was already registered, that rather suggests that a request for such searches made by a solicitor would have yielded the same result.Paragraph 6(2)(b) (whether “it would for any other reason be unjust for the alteration not to be made”)

[83]I consider this to be the key issue in the case, and the least straightforward. “Just” and “unjust” are normative words, but their specific content and meaning in individual cases is a matter of judgement. Appeals to the “justice” or otherwise of an outcome are frequently rhetorical. Every party, in every case, considers “justice” to lie on their side.

[84]The discretion provided in Schedule 6 paragraph 6(2)(b) is nevertheless a structured one, drafted in a particular way – using a “double negative”. The Law Commission, in their 2018 Report on the Land Registration Act 2002, observed of this provision that:

“In order to rectify against an innocent proprietor in possession, usually by taking something from him, it must be “unjust not to rectify”: not exceptional, but positively unjust not to rectify. So it is a high hurdle in order to do something which would not otherwise be done.” (Updating the Land Registration Act 2002 (Law Com. No.380) at Ch.13, para.13.49.)Ruoff & Roper summarise the position as follows (at 46-016):-“In the absence of fraud or lack of proper care for the purposes of the exception under para.3(2)(a), it should require some very particular circumstance under the exception in para.3(2)(b) to warrant the court exercising its discretion to rectify the register against a registered proprietor in possession of land who did not give his consent. The scope of exception (b) is much broader than that of exception (a) and involves the question of what may be considered just—or, more precisely, unjust—in particular circumstances. However, the wording of the relevant test as a double negative indicates the general policy of the 2002 Act that there is a strong presumption against rectification without the consent of a registered proprietor who is in possession of the land. That presumption will only be rebutted (in the absence of fraud or lack of proper care) if it would otherwise be unjust not to do so and thereby refuse rectification.”

They add, however, that the discretion allows:-“..a much broader flexibility to apply principles of fairness to the particular circumstances, even where there has been no fault on the part of the proprietor. It may therefore make an order for rectification so as to avoid an unjust outcome which would otherwise arise were the presumption against rectification not to be rebutted.”

[85]I take from these summaries, and the various examples from the case law on widely varying facts, that while there is a “high hurdle” or “strong presumption” against disturbing the title of a registered proprietor in possession, the Court or Tribunal may nevertheless consider all the circumstances of the case, and consider the relative justice and injustice on each side of the equation. This can include the conduct of the parties, the benefits and detriments they have received or incurred in relation to the land, potentially the availability of financial remedies (including indemnity from the Land Registry under Schedule 8 LRA 2002), and the practical outcomes if rectification (e.g. by cancellation of a title) is either granted or refused.Discussion and conclusion

[86]Having regard to all of the circumstances of this case, my conclusion is that it would be “unjust for the alteration not to be made”. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons.

[87]First, on any view the Applicant is the victim of a serious and unexplained mistake made by HM Land Registry. One of the central purposes of the Land Registration Act 2002 was to strengthen the protection of registered titles against adverse possession, on the basis that “..the doctrine of adverse possession runs counter to the fundamental concept of indefeasibility of title that is a feature of registered title” (paragraph 14.3, Land Registration for the 21st Century, Law Comm. 271 Report, accompanying the draft Bill which became the 2002 Act). The Act therefore builds in a series of protections and safeguards for proprietors. Chief amongst these are i) the principle enacted by section 96 of the Act that long adverse possession and the operation of the Limitation Act can no longer by itself automatically bar a registered title and ii) the detailed provisions of Schedule 6, in particular the rights of the proprietor to receive notice of an application and to serve a counter-notice in response to it.

[88]In this case, the Land Registry’s mistake meant that these provisions and protections were wholly bypassed. While the Applicant’s own registered title to the garages has not yet been altered or cancelled, someone else has been given one. As this dispute has shown, this has caused him considerable difficulty and conflict. In general, a registered proprietor of a title first registered in 1967 should not expect to have to litigate against someone else also given a title to that land in 2022.

[89]Second, as already stated, the Respondents’ title thus acquired was – but for the bare fact of its registration, which by section 58 LRA 2002 confers a title and owner’s powers – without any proper legal foundation. It is not a Baxter v. Mannion case of a legally legitimate application whose evidential foundation is later found to have been insufficient. It was simply not legally possible for the Respondents automatically to acquire a title by adverse possession of registered land from 2007 onwards, without going through the Schedule 6 LRA 2002 procedure.

[90]Third, although the Respondents have never made a Schedule 6 application - and so that is not an application before me – it seems clear from the evidence and my findings above that they could not have established any of the Schedule 6 paragraph 5 conditions in this case. Further, the Respondents have now been out of possession of the garages for well over six months, so the prospects of them ever making such an application would appear to have now gone forever, by reason of Schedule 6 paragraph 1(2).

[91]Fourth, there is no evidence of any detriment incurred by the Respondents following the registration of their title, or indeed prior to that. The stated basis of the application for title, in the 2021 statutory declaration, was use of the garages for “storage”. That rent-free use was a benefit, not a detriment. There is no evidence that the Respondents have incurred any significant expenditure on, or carried out significant works to, the garages. Their oral evidence of cleaning and maintenance was of, at best, occasional and minor acts; for their own benefit and utility in their storage use.

[92]Fifth, the grant of the new title in 2022/2023, by reason of the Land Registry’s clear mistake, was in effect an unjustified “windfall” for the Respondents. Now that the mistake has been exposed, I see no good reason why they should retain that windfall, at the expense of the Applicant. They have not changed their position, or engaged in any substantial acts of reliance, following the grant of that title. They have not, for example, knocked the garages down and built something new in their place; or disposed of them to a third party.

[93]Sixth, and finally, I consider that the Respondents’ application for and acquisition of this title was somewhat covert and displayed a lack of frankness. It is technically correct that, as an apparent application for first registration of unregistered land, they were not legally obliged to give notice of it to the Applicant or anyone else. The reality was, however, that the application was made when they were embroiled in acriminious litigation with the Applicant on other issues directly concerned with the land within which these garages stood.

[94]The Respondents were, or must have been, well aware that the Applicant claimed to be owner of the whole of this parcel of land, hence his purported exclusion of the Respondents and others from access to it by locking the external gate. Both parties were represented in the County Court proceedings. I would be surprised if, as part of those proceedings, the Applicant’s registered title SF 11086 had not just been disclosed, but been ‘front and centre’ of his case. In any event that title was available for inspection at all times as a public record.

[95]Despite this, and while represented by solicitors and counsel, the Respondents entered into a Tomlin order on 6th July 2023 compromising a whole range of issues, in quite detailed terms. It is clear from the Applicant’s solicitor’s letter of 17th July 2023 that the Respondents had not, when negotiating and agreeing the Tomlin order, seen fit to mention that they had in the meantime acquired a title to three more garages adjacent to their existing one; to which any rights of access agreed in the Tomlin order might potentially have been highly relevant. It was left to the Applicant’s solicitors to discover the position very shortly after the proceedings had been compromised. Had these three garages been mentioned while the Court proceedings were still ongoing, the Applicant would have been immediately alerted to the situation. It would then have been unlikely that the proceedings would have been compromised, either without this issue also being addressed, or at all.

[96]I add that the potential availability of an Land Registry indemnity under Schedule 8 is not a sufficient reason to refuse alteration in this case. Where the mistake is clear, and paragraph 6(2) is otherwise satisfied, the Tribunal should direct alteration as the correct outcome in principle, rather than leaving the Land Registry to pick up the bill.

[97]For all these reasons, I consider it would be positively “unjust for the alteration not to be made”, by cancelling the Respondents’ mistakenly registered title MM 153010, leaving the Applicant as the sole registered proprietor of the garages as part of his pre-existing title SF 11086.

[98]To the extent that it is necessary to consider this as a further step in the exercise of discretion, having found for the above reasons that the Applicant satisfies Schedule 6 paragraph 6(2)(b), there are no “exceptional circumstances” for the purpose of paragraph 6(3) which militate against alteration being granted. The reasons and circumstances set out above all point one way, in favour of alteration.Disposal

[99]I will therefore direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the Applicant’s alteration application, and so cancel the Respondents’ title.

[100]The order accompanying this decision gives directions for any representations on liability for the costs of these proceedings. The Applicant has been the successful party, so the starting point would usually be that the Respondents ought to pay some portion of his costs of these proceedings. The Tribunal may, however, make a different order in this or any case. All representations should be made by the date stated in the order. After that date, if any costs order is made, directions will be given for the assessment of any costs ordered to be paid. Judge Ewan Paton Dated this 17th day of April 2026 By Order of The Tribunal