Rotapoint Limited v Jason Paul Taylor [2026] UKFTT 299 (PC)

[2026] UKFTT 00299 (PC)

PROPERTY CHAMBER, LAND REGISTRATION

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

Between

ROTAPOINT LIMITEDApplicant

JASON PAUL TAYLORRespondent

WILLIAM WHITERespondent

REF: 2024/0417

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE FROM HM LAND REGISTRY

LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002

Property Address: Land to the rear of 49 and 49a High Street, Ryde,

Isle of Wight PO33 2RE

Provisional Title Number: IW94283

Before: Judge Tozer K.C.

sitting at The Law Courts, Newport, Isle of Wight on 15 and 16 January 2026

___________________________________________________________________________

DECISION

Date 2026-02-11

Cases referred to

[1]On 2 October 2023, the Applicant applied on form FR1 for first registration as proprietor of the unregistered land adjoining 49 High Street, Ryde, Isle of Wight, shown edged red on the plan attached to that accompanying ST1 (“the Disputed Land”). The basis for the application was adverse possession since 1 March 2000.

[2]The dispute referred to me, and the only dispute I have power to determine, is whether the Applicant is entitled to be registered as proprietor of the Disputed Land by virtue of adverse possession.

[3]The Applicant owns 49 High Street, Ryde, which is a restaurant premises with a flat (49a) above (“the Applicant’s Property”). The Disputed Land is to the rear of the Applicant’s Property. There is a garage door on the back face of the Applicant’s Property, which opens directly onto the Disputed Land.

[4]The First Respondent owns and lives in a terraced house to the south of the Disputed Land known as 9 Warwick Place.

[5]The Second Respondent owns the property at 45-48 High Street, which is let to Iceland and trades as a supermarket (“the Iceland Property”). The building extends to the immediate north of the Disputed Land. There is a decent-sized car park behind the Iceland store as well.

[6]The Second Respondent lives in Australia. He was represented by a barrister, Mr Geary, to whom I am grateful for the assistance that he gave. The Second Respondent joined the proceedings and gave evidence via video-link.

The Law

[7]The basic requirements for an adverse possession claim were not put in issue. In order to succeed in an adverse possession claim, the Applicant would have to show botha. a sufficient degree of physical custody and control; and

b. an intention to exercise such custody and control on his own behalf and for his own benefit: J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham

[2002] UKHL 30

at [40]. That possession cannot have been with the consent of the true owner, and must have lasted for at least 12 years.

[8]What is a sufficient degree of custody and control varies with the type of land. Enclosure is not essential, and, where it is not possible to do so, the fact that neighbours and others may pass over open land does not preclude factual possession from being established: Thorpe v Frank

[2019] EWCA Civ 150

at [42]. The question is simply whether the applicant has acted as an occupying owner would do, and in this regard, re-surfacing an open area could be sufficient if done in such a way that the area then appeared to be an adjunct to other land belonging to the applicant: ibid.

[9]The requisite intention is an intention to exclude all others, including the true owner, in so far as the processes of the law would allow.

[10]The main issues were:a. Whether the Applicant had in fact been in possession for the requisite period; and

b. To the extent that the First Respondent had been in possession / using the land, was his use use upon which the Applicant could rely?

[11]As regards the second issue, the law in relation to encroachments is summarised as follows in the leading text, Megarry and Wade on the Law of Real Property (10th edn), at 7-042:

“any encroachments by the tenant on land belonging to third parties will, anomalously, enure for the landlord’s benefit, provided that:(i) The land “is very close to the demised land and occupied by the tenant together with the demised land”: see Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett [2005] EWCA Civ 923 at [31]; and(ii) No different intention is shown by the conduct of the landlord or the tenant within the 12 years of adverse possession.”

There is a presumption that any encroachment by a tenant is by way of annexation to the land let to him, unless the tenant makes it clear to the landlord that he is acting for his own benefit: Kingsmill v Millard (1885) 11 Exch. 313. The weight of the presumption may vary depending on whether the land would be of use to the tenant separately from the premises let to him by the landlord: ibid.

[12]Further, if a person grants a tenancy or a licence over land to which he does not have title, the acts of the tenant or licensee on the land are attributable to the person granting the tenancy or licence: Sze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1232 at 1235.

The Evidence

[13]I heard evidence from Mr Wood-Robinson, the director of the Applicant, and from each of the Respondents. Mr Wood-Robinson told me that he had had a stroke and had memory problems and I have taken that into account whilst assessing his evidence, in particular his difficulties with remembering the details of historic events. I offered additional breaks in an attempt to assist Mr Wood-Robinson to give the best evidence he was able to give. I have considerable sympathy for Mr Wood-Robinson, but I can only direct that his application should succeed if I am satisfied that he has proved his case in relation to the historic use of the land. In these circumstances, corroborating evidence from other witnesses or documents would have been most helpful, but unfortunately the Applicant called no witnesses and the documentary evidence was limited.

[14]I also conducted a site visit the day before the hearing began. Whilst waiting for the parties to attend, a member of the public, who had no connection to any of the parties as far as I am aware, walked across the Disputed Land twice, it being the most natural route for her to take between the Iceland car park (in which I infer she had parked her car because I saw her engaging with the ticket machine) and the High Street. I consider that it is likely that this was not an isolated incident. I think members of the public would have reason to, and would, walk across the Disputed Land from time to time. There was nothing on the Disputed Land to suggest that it was private property and walking across it was not permitted (though there was signage indicating that parking was not allowed and that CCTV was in use), and no chain or other impediment to stop members of the public from taking this route if they wanted to. Indeed, Mr Wood-Robinson told me in his evidence that he would also cut through the Iceland car park if going between no 49 and a block of flats that he owned on George Street, and accepted that members of the public would walk across the Disputed Land as a shortcut, and that he had at no time sought to stop them from doing so.

[15]During the site visit, the First Respondent drew to my attention that there were services under the Disputed Land, installed by the utility companies, which served his house and no doubt his neighbours too. I do not consider that this shows that the Applicant was not occupying as an owner would do, since there was no evidence to demonstrate that these services were installed after 2000, nor to show who (if anyone) the utility company negotiated with prior to the installations.

[16]The parties had provided various documents to the Tribunal by way of disclosure and/or annexures to their statements of case. These included various emails from third parties in support of their cases, but none of those persons attended to give evidence before me, and – as I warned the parties in opening – I could therefore attach little weight to them.

[17]At the outset of the hearing, I dealt with a number of applications in relation to documentary evidence as follows:(1) The Applicant’s statement of case was not included in the bundle. The First Respondent objected to its inclusion. He indicated that he was not sure if he had received it, but although Mr Wood-Robinson was not able to provide any further information about service, there was a “signed for” receipt on the top of the document next to a hand-written note stating that a copy had been sent by recorded delivery to him, so its seems he may well have done so. In any event, I could not see that there was anything to provide any particular prejudice to him if the document were admitted. Mr Geary, who represented the Second Respondent – and whose clients had not been served with the Applicant’s statement of case until 2 days ago – also concluded there was no prejudice to his client from the admission of this material. I accordingly allowed it in.

(2) The Applicant applied to add some historical documents relating to the position in the period well before 2000. I declined to admit these documents on the basis that they were late and irrelevant, since the Applicant’s case was based on use since 2000.

(3) The Second Respondent invited me to view a 10 second video recording he had taken the previous night, showing people using the bins on the Disputed Land. The Applicant objected to this, but was unable to explain what prejudice this placed him under, since his own case was that there were bins on the land. Accordingly, I agreed to admit this, whilst noting that it may be of limited assistance in any event. The History of the Disputed Land (i). 2000-2010

[18]The Applicant purchased the Applicant’s Property in 2000. It was tenanted from the outset. Mr Wood-Robinson referred in his evidence to having 45 rental properties. I do not know whether they were all held via the Applicant, but it is clear that Mr Wood-Robinson, who lives in Cowes, has a considerable portfolio to manage. This was relevant to the amount of time that Mr Wood-Robinson himself spent at the Applicant’s Property.

[19]Mr Wood-Robinson’s evidence was that there was a garage, with wooden garage doors opening onto the Disputed Land when he purchased.

[20]Mr Wood-Robinson confirmed that he knew that he was not buying the Disputed Land. He said that he did not know who owned it until much later, but he believed that anyone, including him and his tenants, could park there, provided they didn’t block the access to the garage. He confirmed that he did not purport to grant his various tenants of the Applicant’s Property any rights to use the Disputed Land, as he knew that he could not do so, and said that he didn’t tell them anything at all about the Disputed Land. He also said that he did not take any steps to prevent anyone from using the Disputed Land, provided access to the garage was maintained, because he knew he had no right to do so.

[21]In 2005, the Applicant obtained planning permission to build (or rebuild) a garage with a garage door opening directly onto (and indeed over) the Disputed Land, and did so in 2006. Mr Wood-Robinson told me that during those works he used the Disputed Land for skips, and once that work was finished he tarmacked it. He had not asserted this before in the documents he had filed – although he had included a photocopy of one page of his “book” showing what cheques he had written to whom and indicated that this showed him paying for the aggregate in September 2006. He agreed with Counsel for the Second Respondent that he did this work “out of the goodness of his own heart” since he knew that the Disputed Land did not belong to him and he could not stop others from using it. However, I am satisfied that he also viewed the ability to use it (whether that was on exclusive basis or otherwise) as a benefit for his tenants and wanted to ensure that the access to the garage was adequate.

[22]The surface of the Disputed Land was a little different to the surface of the Iceland car park and the small road which gave access to it, but based on my observations on the site visit, I do not consider that the resurfacing works made it clear that the Disputed Land “went with” the Applicant’s Property, as opposed to the adjoining Iceland car park or the road. I do not therefore consider that the resurfacing itself is sufficient to amount to the taking of possession in this case.

[23]Mr Wood-Robinson wasn’t able to be clear about how often he visited the Applicant’s Property during this – or any other - period, but his evidence was that he knew that his tenants had used the Disputed Land because they told him so – though he could not recall any particular conversation with any particular tenant about this, or suggest why they would have been discussing this with him. I think in reality it is more likely that he inferred that they must have been using it – or at the very least, that whoever was using it was not causing any issues for his tenants, because if they had, he would have been told about it.

[24]Although the evidence is weak, I think that the right inference to draw is that the Applicant’s tenants did use the Disputed Land for parking, but I am not satisfied that there is sufficient evidence for me to conclude they were not the only ones who did so. There was nothing to stop any of the occupants of the houses on Warwick Place from parking there if the space was vacant when they arrived, as with any on street parking space – subject of course to not blocking the access to the garage when it was needed. But there was no evidence as to what the garage was used for during this time or how often access was needed, so I cannot infer that members of the public would not in fact have parked there because of how often access to the garage was required.

[25]Of course, knowing that the Applicant had stored a skip there and had tarmacked the space after the works finished might have led some to believe that the space was owned by the Applicant, and to refrain from using it for that reason, but there was no evidence that the occupiers of the nearby houses had known who had carried out the resurfacing (ie whether it was the Applicant or the local authority), and a skip can be stationed on a public highway. Furthermore, Mr Wood-Robinson accepted that the occupiers of these houses stored their domestic wheelie bins on the Disputed Land during this period, so it is clear that they did not in fact refrain from using the Disputed Land as it suited them to do. (Indeed, the fact that they stored their wheelie bins there is, in my view, sufficient to preclude a finding that the Applicant was in possession of the Disputed Land).

[26]There was no evidence that the Applicant’s tenants had ever stopped anyone else from parking there, or took any action to prevent them from storing their bins there, and the Applicant admitted that he would not have done so himself because he knew that he did not own the land.

[27]Mr Wood-Robinson accepted that the commercial bins referable to the Applicant’s Property were initially put elsewhere, within the Applicant’s Property. Accordingly, I do not accept that, in the period prior to 2010, the Applicant’s tenants had been using the Disputed Land for bin storage.

[28]Accordingly, I do not consider that there is enough evidence for me to be satisfied that the Applicant or its tenants had a sufficient degree of factual control, or the intention to exclude others, during the period 2000-2010. The claim that the Applicant had adverse possession during this period is therefore rejected. (ii). 2010 – 2020

[29]The First Respondent told me during his evidence that he initially moved into 9 Warwick Place as a tenant, in about 2010. This was not challenged by anyone, but it is right to record that this had not been mentioned in his statement of case, and the Applicant had assumed that he had only taken up occupation in 2016 when the documents show that he purchased that house.

[30]The First Respondent said that when he first moved in, a Mr Nash, who operated a flower shop nearby, was using the garage on the Applicant’s Property for storage of flowers, and that Mr Nash told him that he (the First Respondent) could park on the Disputed Land when Mr Nash was not there. Mr Nash was a family friend of the First Respondent’s.

[31]It is clear from this that Mr Nash was himself using the Disputed Land for parking. As I understood it, Mr Nash was a licensee of the Applicant. Whilst there is no authority, I consider that the same presumption that his use is to be treated as use by the Applicant will apply. Mr Geary attempted to persuade me that some different principle should apply because a licensee has no estate to which the right to use the Disputed Land can accrete, but I think the real question which arises here is whether the use made by a third party is made on behalf of the adjoining landowner or not (and not whether the licensee could himself claim to have expanded the licence as a result of his adverse possession). I see no reason to treat a licensee differently from a tenant so far as the landowner’s claim is concerned: the use by Mr Nash should be treated as use by the Applicant, since there was no evidence that he ever made it clear to the Applicant that he was purporting to possess the Disputed Land in his own right.

[32]But what about the First Respondent’s use at this time? Should that also be treated as use made by the Applicant as made under a licence granted by Mr Nash, who had himself been given permission to use the garage by the Applicant? This turns on whether the basis on which the First Respondent used the land was by virtue of a permission or licence given by Mr Nash, or, whether he merely asked him out of courtesy because it would block access to the garage if he parked there?

[33]Since Mr Nash did not give evidence, I have little to go on. However, the First Respondent’s written statement of case said this:

“…Mr Nash informed me that I could park on the land in question…. because he did not own it on his title deeds.”

[34]Doing the best I can, I think that it likely that when the First Respondent moved in, he asked Mr Nash (with whom he had a prior relationship) whether the Disputed Land was “his” (in the sense that it had been let to him with the garage), and Mr Nash said no. This tends to suggest that Mr Nash was not asserting any right to control the use of the Disputed Land, but the fact that it was agreed that the First Respondent could only park on the Disputed Land when Mr Nash was not there points the other way: it suggests that Mr Nash was in fact controlling who could use the Disputed Land and when. However, I think that there is another explanation here: I think that the reason it was agreed that the First Respondent would not park on the Disputed Land when Mr Nash was there was not so much because they thought that Mr Nash had some superior right to park on the space but because Mr Nash had a right not to have his access to the garage blocked. In short, I think that it was agreed that because it was not included in Mr Nash’s ‘title deeds’, the First Respondent had the same right as anyone else to park there subject to Mr Nash’s right to access the garage over the Disputed Land.

[35]I do not therefore consider that the First Respondent’s use of the Disputed Land during this period can be considered to be pursuant to a licence granted by Mr Nash, and therefore I do not consider that the Applicant can count the First Respondent’s use of the Disputed Land during this period as its own. Since I accept that the First Respondent made substantial use of the Disputed Land during this period, the Applicant did not have possession of it.

[36]When Kevlars took over the Applicants’ Property, Mr Nash left, since they initially wanted to use the garage. The First Respondent said that they (Kevlars) did not park on the Disputed Land and they were fine with him doing so. The evidence was nowhere near detailed enough to allow me to conclude that Kevlars asserted any right to control the use of the Disputed Land and granted the First Respondent a licence. It was entirely consistent with the First Respondent simply parking there when he wanted to and nobody objecting. I cannot therefore conclude that the First Respondent’s use of the land during the time that Kevlars were the tenant was by virtue of any licence granted by the Applicant’s tenants, and I cannot therefore conclude that his use of the Disputed Land during this period was for the benefit of the Applicant.

[37]The First Respondent told me that Kevlars subsequently stopped using the garage, and both he and Mr Wood-Robinson said that a Mr Doyle was then allowed to use it for furniture storage. The First Respondent told me that Mr Doyle did not drive so only used the Disputed Land for occasional loading and unloading. He said that he asked Mr Doyle whether he minded if he (the First Respondent) parked on the Disputed Land, and that he would move if he needed to, and Mr Doyle said he was happy with that.

[38]The picture that emerged from this evidence is that the First Respondent was, during this period, the primary user of the Disputed Land. Mr Wood-Robinson said that he was not the only user of the Disputed Land, and I accept that too: Mr Doyle was clearly using it too from time to time. Mr Doyle’s use would of course be treated as use by the Applicant on the same basis that Mr Nash’s use was. But, his use was limited, and is nowhere near enough to establish possession on behalf of the Applicant on its own.

[39]So, the real question is how to treat the use of the Disputed Land by the First Respondent during this period. This is a question of interpretation of the conversation between the First Respondent and Mr Doyle. Again, I did not have the benefit of evidence from Mr Doyle, and the First Respondent’s evidence was brief.

[40]However, doing the best I can, it seems to me significant that the First Respondent knew (from Mr Nash) that the land was not included in the ‘title deeds’ with the garage. Against that background, it seems to me that when the First Respondent asked whether Mr Doyle minded him parking there, he was not asking for permission to use the Disputed Land. Rather he was asking whether it would interfere with Mr Doyle’s ability to access the garage if he were to do so. As Mr Geary pointed out, you can tell someone they can park in front of your house without intending to possess the area available for parking. I do not therefore consider that the First Respondent’s use of the Disputed Land during this period was under a licence from Mr Doyle, so I do not consider that the Applicant can have the benefit of it.

[41]Furthermore, since the First Respondent was the primary user of the Disputed Land at this time, if the Applicant does not have the benefit of the First Respondent’s use, it is clear that the Applicant cannot have been in possession of the Disputed Land at this time.

[42]Moreover, there was some evidence that others had used the Disputed Land during this period too.

[43]The Second Respondent (who purchased the Iceland Property in 2016) stressed that his tenants had used the Disputed Land in order to maintain the Iceland Property, and particularly the drainpipe which runs down into the Disputed Land, as and when necessary, and that he himself inspected this drain about once a year to check that all was in order. He said that he had never been stopped doing so. The use which the Second Respondent described is minimal, and can at best add a little weight to evidence of user by others.

[44]There was, I am sure, use made of the Disputed Land by other members of the public, as a short cut from the Iceland car park to the High Street as I observed on the site visit. Whilst this is not inconsistent with possession by the Applicant, it can, in my view, form a small part of the picture.

[45]The only other evidence was an email from a Megan Old, suggesting that her partner had parked a motorbike on the Disputed Land from 2016-2019. Mr Wood-Robinson did not accept that this had happened, and Ms Old did not attend to answer questions about her ‘evidence’ so as explained above, I can only give this limited weight.

[46]However, for the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant had possession of the Disputed Land during this period. 2020 – 2022

[47]My findings in relation to this period do not matter in light of the conclusions I have reached above. However, for completeness, I will consider the position.

[48]In 2020, Mr Doyle invited the First Respondent and one other neighbour to share the garage with him, presumably in order to reduce the cost to him. Both accepted that offer, and did so. The First Respondent continued to park on the Disputed Land.

[49]Mr Wood-Robinson said that he found out later that Mr Doyle had ‘sub-let’ . He had a clear memory of asking the other neighbour to return their key – which they did immediately - but could not recall if he’d asked the First Respondent to cease using the garage.

[50]As I have indicated above, there is a presumption that a sub-licensees’ use of additional land is for the benefit of the owner. However, I am not satisfied that the presumption applies here: the First Respondent does not appear to have been using the Disputed Land with the garage. Rather he appears to have continued to use the Disputed Land as he was before and started to use the garage for storage and as a home gym, in common with others so entitled. Furthermore, even if it did apply, it would be of little weight here, because the First Respondent could clearly have made use of the Disputed Land separately from his use of the garage given the proximity of his house – and had indeed done so. Mr Doyle was well aware of this, so in my view, the First Respondent had made clear to the Applicant (via Mr Doyle) that his use of the Disputed Land during the time he had the right to use the garage was not as a result of his use of the garage, so the Applicant cannot take the benefit of it. The First Respondent’s continued use of the Disputed Land during this period prevents the Applicant from having had adverse possession of it. 2023 onwards

[51]The First Respondent said that Mr Doyle stopped using the garage in about 2022, and then he was told that he could not take over the arrangement because a new tenant was moving in to the Applicant’s Property and they wanted to use the garage. That new tenant was Crazies.

[52]The First Respondent’s evidence was that the Applicant told him that at around the time that Crazies moved in that he (the Applicant) owned the Disputed Land and that he (the First Respondent) had to stop parking there.

[53]The First Respondent did not stop parking there. He continued to keep his car there until about 2 years ago when his son, who is now 19, acquired his first car, and started parking this on the Disputed Land. However, I think that he may have been able to use it less often, since the principals of Crazies themselves sometimes parked there too.

[54]Crazies put their commercial waste bins on the Disputed Land. The First Respondent said that this was the first time this had happened since he moved in to 9 Warwick Place, and I accept that evidence. The bins have clearly caused some issues regarding noise so I think that there would have been issues earlier if the bins had been there earlier.

[55]There were issues between the First Respondent and the tenants of Crazies more or less from the outset, and ultimately, this led the Applicant to making the application to Land Registry which is the subject of this reference.

[56]Crazies have since left, and been replaced by a Mr Uddin, who runs an Indian restaurant. The bins remain on the Disputed Land, and the First Respondent/his son have continued to park on the Disputed Land when able to do so.

[57]In light of the continued use of the Disputed Land by the First Respondent since 2023, when there is no question of that use having been by virtue of any permission from the Applicant or its tenants, the Applicant has not been in possession of the Disputed Land. Disposal

[58]It follows from my findings above that the Applicant has not been in possession of the Disputed Land for any 12 year period. Accordingly, I will direct that the Applicant’s application be cancelled.

[59]Should either party wish to claim costs from the other, an application must be made in accordance with the directions in the order. Judge Tozer K.C. Dated this 11th day of February 2026 By Order of The tribunal