Thomas Bedford v Erika Greig & Anor [2025] UKFTT 1302 (PC)

[2025] UKFTT 01302 (PC)REF/2024/0681PROPERTY CHAMBER, LAND REGISTRATION DIVISIONFIRST-TIER TRIBUNALIN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION MADE PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(2) LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002THOMAS BEDFORDAPPLICANTERIKA GREIG & BEN AINSCOUGH(as personal representatives of the estate of Maxine Ainscough, deceased)RESPONDENTSProperty Address: 122 Stanford Avenue, Brighton BN1 6FETitle Number: SX72287Before: Judge Alexander BastinSitting at: Brighton County CourtOn: 7 & 8 October 2025Applicant’s Representation: Ollie Murrell (counsel)Respondents’ Representation: Self-representing___________________________________________________________________________DECISION___________________________________________________________________________Form RX1 a pplication to enter a Form A and Form II restriction – claimed beneficial interest pursuant to a constructive or resulting trust or proprietary estoppel – cohabitees – investment property – sole registered deceased – Respondent’s estate represented by her children – purchase funded by deceased, her son and mortgage in her name secured against her home (also registered in her sole name) - regular bank payments by Applicant to deceased roughly commensurate with period of mortgage – whether a representation or assurance – whether express or to be inferred from conduct – referability - acquiescence-based proprietary estoppelCases referred toPettit v Pettit[1970] AC 777Gissing v Gissing[1971] AC 886Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset[1991] AC 107Stack v Dowden[2007] 2 AC 432[2007] UKPC 53Jones v Kernott[2012] 1 AC 776Geary v Rankine[2012] EWCA Civ 555
Between
THOMAS BEDFORDApplicantERIKA GREIG & BEN AINSCOUGHRespondent(as personal representatives of the estate of Maxine Ainscough, deceased)RespondentDate 2025-10-16

Dated this 16th day of October 2025

[1]This is my decision in respect of Thomas Bedford’s Form RX1 application to enter Form A and Form II restrictions against the title of 122 Stanford Avenue, Brighton (“the Property”), on the basis that he has a beneficial interest pursuant to a constructive or resulting trust or proprietary estoppel.[2]Title to the Property is registered in the name of Maxine Veronica Ainscough (hereafter “Maxine” to distinguish her from her son “Ben” who is the Second Respondent) but she passed away on 17 January 2021 and her estate is represented by her children Erika Greig (hereinafter “Erika”) and Benedict (collectively “the Respondents”) pursuant to letters of administration granted by the High Court on 24 November 2021. The Property[3]The Property is a freehold plot in Brighton on which there is/was a former police box. Maxine was registered as the proprietor on 20 August 2007. It was valued in about 2021 at £150,000 for probate. The parties’ respective cases[4]In his Statement of Case, Mr Bedford says that he and Maxine were in a relationship and cohabited for over 20 years and that in August 2007 they bought the Property at auction for £92,000 with intention of renovating it. His primary case is that a common intention constructive trust arose either from express discussions or can be inferred from conduct. His secondary case is based upon a resulting trust on account of his contributing £650 per month to cover the mortgage instalments from July 2007 to February 2015 when the mortgage was cleared and paying all auction, legal, planning and ancillary fees associated with the purchase and planned renovation. He contends that all this amounted to £65,000 equating to a 65% interest. Lastly, he contends he detrimentally relied upon Maxine’s express or implied assurances that he had or would have a beneficial interest in the Property and that it would be unconscionable for her (or her estate) to resile from them.[5]The Respondents dispute Mr Bedford’s case and say that it was Maxine and Ben who decided to buy the Property, contributing £15,000 and £25,000 respectively and with Maxine paying the associated costs and also taking a second mortgage against her home. They say, inter alia, that(a) Mr Bedford was not involved and has for many years failed to evidence his claim,(b) Maxine had never told Ben of his being involved,(c) Mr Bedford’s monthly contributions were towards living expenses and repaying Maxine money that he owed her.[6]Following a review of the parties’ Statements of Case in February 2025, the Tribunal ordered the parties to clarify their respective cases. Much of the Mr Bedford’s response to this Order repeats what was in his original Statement of Case but he does elucidate by stating, at paragraph 7, that he relies upon “numerous verbal discussions with [Maxine] regarding the purchase and development of the property.” It was “treated as a joint asset”, would benefit them both “and the survivor of the first death”. They discussed in whose name the legal title would be held and they agreed it would be simplest if in Maxine’s name as she was to extend her mortgage to raise the majority of the purchase price. They also agreed that Mr Bedford would “pay down the mortgage and deal with planning permission and development of the Property.” Lastly, Maxine and Benedict had separate discussions with the latter contributing £25,000 and having a beneficial interest as well as moving-in at a later date.[7]The Respondents’ clarification is that they put Mr Bedford to proof that he re-paid the mortgage and also assert that “at least a significant proportion if not all of any payments” that he made to Maxine were repaying money that he owed her. They also stress that the purchase was a joint venture between Maxine and Ben and that she would have told him if Mr Bedford had an interest. The legal framework[8]The starting point is that there is a presumption that the beneficial ownership of the Property follows the legal title; in other words that it lies with the Respondents as representatives of their mother’s estate. The burden of showing otherwise is on Mr Bedford to the civil standard (i.e. the balance of probabilities).[9]Where, as in this matter, there is no written declaration of trust, and no obvious “resulting trust” arising from a direct contribution to the purchase price, the usual route is a “constructive trust.” This form of trust, developed from Gissing v Gissing and Pettit v Pettit, was refined through Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset and later by Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott, as well as Abbott v Abbott. Later authorities have since applied and extended these principles.[10]A “common intention” constructive trust arises when both parties actually intended that, even though only one holds the legal title, the property would be shared beneficially. The party claiming must prove that this shared intention existed and that he or she relied on it to their detriment, making it inequitable for the sole owner to deny the interest.[11]That intention must be real, not merely presumed because fairness demands it. Courts cannot “impute” a common intention simply because it would seem fair. As Lewison LJ stated in Geary v Rankine:
“Whether the beneficial interests are to be shared at all is still a question of a party’s actual shared intentions” and “So Mrs Geary had to establish that despite the fact that the legal title to the property remained in Mr Rankine’s sole name, he actually intended that she should have a beneficial interest in it. As I have said that actual intention may have been expressly manifested, or may be inferred from conduct; but actual intention it remains.”
Paragraphs 19 and 21.[12]Similarly, Jones v Kernott confirms that “we accept that the search is primarily to ascertain the parties’ actual shared intentions, whether expressed or to be inferred from their conduct,” though “the scope for inference is wide.” Per Lord Walker and Baroness Hale at paragraph 31. Since people’s true intentions must be inferred from their actions and documents rather than recollections years later, the evidence must be objective.[13]A common intention can arise in two broad ways. “Type 1” cases involve an express understanding - some agreement, however loosely remembered - that the property would be shared beneficially. As Lord Bridge explained in Lloyds Bank v Rosset, this requires “express discussions between the partners, however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been.” Page 133.[14]“Type 2” cases, more frequently encountered, depend on inference from conduct alone. Courts may “deduce objectively” that both parties shared the relevant intention. As explained in Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, there must still be conduct “from which the court may reasonably infer that the parties actually had a common intention, even though they did not articulate it as such.” 9th Ed at paragraph 10-026.[15]Earlier formulations, notably Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank v Rosset, suggested that only direct contributions to the purchase price or mortgage payments would suffice:
“In this situation direct contributions … will readily justify the inference … but … it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do.”
Page 133. Thus, historically, only money paid toward buying the property could ground a trust. However, Stack v Dowden, Abbott v Abbott and Jones v Kernott confirm that the law has moved on – as per Baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden:
“The law has indeed moved on … The search is to ascertain the parties shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it.”
Paragraph 60.[16]The conduct from which intention may now be inferred is broad. Indirect financial input, or paying for or undertaking substantial works, can reveal a common intention and also amount to the “detriment” needed for a constructive trust. That detriment covers financial or comparable commitments that a person would not reasonably make unless he believed he had a stake in the property; it excludes things he would have done anyway, irrespective of ownership.[17]The issue of contributions to household expenses and/or a mortgage was helpfully addressed in Cohabitation & Trusts of Land: 4th Ed at paragraphs 4-057 and 4-058. “One significant issue of fact arises in the situation where D pays the mortgage instalments on a periodic basis and receives a financial contribution from C on a similar periodic basis. The question of fact for the court to resolve, in essence, is whether on the one hand C’s contribution is a contribution to the mortgage payment per se, which opens the door to an interest either under limb two or on the other hand simply a contribution by way of rent in relation to C’s occupation of the property, which plainly would not evidence or otherwise give rise to a beneficial interest. In such circumstances, the fundamental question is that of referability. Thus where D advertises that he has a room to let and C moves in and makes periodical financial payments to D, there would appear little prospect of persuading the court that a common intention should be imputed to the parties that C was understood to have a beneficial interest. Where however a relationship between C and D leads to C moving in to D’s residence, it might be more difficult to characterise an ongoing contribution as equivalent to an occupation rent. The determination of that issue of fact may be assisted by consideration of how, absent C’s contributions, D would otherwise have been able to meet the mortgage payments. In a case where there is agreement in terms that C’s payments are a contribution towards the mortgage, it would not on the face of it be difficult for C to establish a common intention in terms of Lloyds Bank v Rosset limb two. Where in the absence of C’s contribution D would not have been able to obtain or maintain the mortgage, again that would tend to suggest a common intention that C should share in the beneficial interest (for how else would C have been able to acquire or preserve the property at all?); all, however, will depend on the particular facts of the case. It might, however, be more difficult to reach the conclusion that C was understood by both parties to be entitled to a share where D would have been perfectly able to manage without C’s contribution. In Barton v Wray for instance, although C’s payments assisted D in paying the mortgage, no common intention was inferred in circumstances where the payments had not been specifically identified as mortgage contributions, and where D would have been able to maintain the mortgage even in the absence of such payments.”

The issues

[18]The issues are:18.1 Did Mr Bedford and Maxine share a common intention, either express or to be inferred from their conduct, that the former would have a beneficial interest in the Property and did he act in reliance upon this common intention to his detriment?18.2 Did Mr Bedford contribute to the purchase of the Property such as to give rise to a resulting trust?18.3 Did Maxine represent, either expressly or impliedly, to Mr Bedford that he had a beneficial interest in the Property and did he rely upon such a representation to his detriment so that it would be unconscionable for Maxine’s estate to go back upon her word? Or has an acquiescence-based estoppel arisen?[19]I am not concerned with the quantification of Mr Bedford’s interest, if he has one.

How judges decide cases

[20]The parties, and the Respondents in particular, may find it helpful if I say a little about how English judges decide civil cases such as this.[21]First, judges have no special abilities or superhuman powers that enable them to determine when someone is mistaken or lying, or to go back in time to see or hear what was actually said and done. Rather, they consider the parties’ witness statements and supporting documents, listen to the witnesses giving live evidence at trial, listen to the parties’ submissions and then come to a decision. Judges decide cases on the basis of the material and arguments put before them by the parties; they are not investigators and do not look for evidence. Each party is, therefore, responsible for putting forward the evidence and other material that they wish to rely upon, and formulating their legal arguments, so as to persuade the judge to find in their favour.[22]Secondly, there are two important procedural rules which judges have to observe. First, there is the burden of proof. Generally, the party asserting something in a civil case such as this, will bear the burden of proving it. In this case, Mr Bedford bears the burden of proving his case. This is important because if the person bearing the burden of proof satisfies the Court or Tribunal that something happened, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did happen. Conversely, if that person does not satisfy the Court or Tribunal that something happened, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did not happen. The decision is binary: Either something happened or it did not and there is no room for maybe. Sometimes, therefore, the result of a case will depend upon who bears the burden of proof. Secondly, there is the standard of proof. In civil cases such as this, the standard of proof is simply the balance of probabilities. This means that if the judge considers that something that is in issue in the case is more likely to have happened than not, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did happen. The more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence required to persuade the judge that something is more likely to have happened than not.[23]Thirdly, there is the issue of fallibility of memory. It is nowadays generally acknowledged that human memory is quite fallible. This can be particularly important in cases where some of the relevant facts occurred a long time ago and memories may have dimmed over the years. Judges prefer to rely upon contemporaneous documentary evidence, where available, as it tends to be more objective and reliable than memory alone.[24]Lastly, judges must give reasons for their decisions. They are not, however, required to address every piece of evidence tendered or every argument raised. They deal with the issues that matter most. It should be borne in mind that a judge’s findings of fact are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression made upon the judge by the evidence. Further, that although judgments are unlikely to explain all aspects of a judge’s reasoning, and might well have been better expressed, they should at least address the main issues and enable the parties to understand how the decision was reached.

The evidence

[25]The following is agreed:25.1 In about June 2000, Maxine lent Mr Bedford £10,000 so that he could buy a holiday home in Brighton Marina Village which he is the sole registered proprietor of. He has not repaid the loan. He recorded the fact of this loan in a handwritten “To whom it may concern” note dated 23 June 2000. Mr Bedford admitted during his oral evidence that he had no recollection of writing this document and his counsel accepted that the loan had not been repaid.25.2 In 2007, Mr Bedford identified the Property as a possible investment opportunity and told Maxine about it.25.3 Maxine was registered as the sole proprietor of the Property on 20 August 2008. The conveyancing file was not in evidence before me and there is nothing in writing to confirm Mr Bedford having a proprietary interest. There was no evidence before me as to when completion took place.25.4 The purchase was funded: Maxine £15,000, Ben £25,000 and the balance by a mortgage secured by Maxine against her own home (of which she was the sole registered proprietor/owner). Mr Bedford made no contribution to the purchase.25.5 The Respondents claimed and Mr Bedford accepted that Maxine had never told them of his having an interest in the Property even though Ben contributed to the purchase monies. The parties agreed that Mr Bedford and Ben did not have a good relationship.25.6 Although Mr Bedford and his engineering company BPP Ltd were involved to some extent in the planning process, planning consultants Lewis & Co were instructed.25.7 As well as the £10,000 loan in 2000 (see above), Maxine made the following bank transfers / cheque payments:• £2,000 on 28 March 2007 to Mr Bedford. In his oral evidence, he told me that he did not remember this.• £265 in October 2007 to Brighton & Hove Council – the planning application fee. In his oral evidence Mr Bedford accepted that Maxine had paid this notwithstanding his pleaded case that he had paid all the fees.• £2,115 on 5 August 2008 to Lewis & Co – the planning consultants. In his written evidence he said that he had paid the costs associated with the purchase of the Property including the auction fee, legal fees and planning permission. In his oral evidence, he said that he thought he had paid this but accepted that he might have got this wrong.• £10,000 on 26 November 2010 to BPP Ltd – Mr Bedford’s company. In his oral evidence, Mr Bedford said that he could not remember this. He thought he must have had cash-flow problems. He could not show evidence of having re-paid this sum and did not know whether he had.• £30,000 between 13 June and 12 July 2011 to an unidentified recipient. The relevant page of Maxine’s bank statements is missing but that approximately this sum left her account during this period is plain from pages 189-191 of the Trial Bundle. Mr Bedford said in his oral evidence that he knew nothing about this.• £3,000 on 24 January 2012 to Mr Bedford.• £10,000 on 6 March 2014 to Mr Bedford. He thought that this was a temporary loan but did not remember it. There was no evidence put before me of Mr Bedford repaying Maxine any of the money paid to him or his company.25.8 Mr Bedford made, inter alia, the following bank transfers to Maxine:• 10 payments of £250 from September 2006 to June 2007.• 92 payments of £1,000 from July 2007 to February 2015. The £1,000 payments were made monthly throughout this period but five of them were returned unpaid (May, June, October and December 2011 and April 2012). There is no evidence to suggest that Mr Bedford made-up these missed months.25.9 By letter dated 6 August 2021, Halifax confirmed to Ms Greig that Maxine’s mortgage was opened on 5 May 1999 and closed on 1 June 2016. During this period the Halifax received £7,860.40 on 1 May 2009 from Maxine’s Allied Dubar endowment policy. The only property linked to this mortgage was 39 Edburton Avenue – Maxine’s home. There was no written/documentary evidence as to when the mortgage balance was cleared save that the account was closed on 1 June 2016.

Mr Bedford’s evidence

[26]Mr Bedford’s written evidence was that he and Maxine became a couple in around 2000 and that from around 2002 he gradually began to move in with her at her home in Edburton Avenue. Then in 2006, when the Property came up for sale, he and Maxine decided to buy and renovate it. They discussed how to finance the purchase and agreed she would extend her mortgage to £65,000 on the understanding that he would make monthly payments to her to cover the additional cost. He did this by increasing his monthly standing order to Maxine to £1,000 of which over £600 was to cover the extended mortgage (see above) although he did not know exactly how much. He “suspect[ed] that she couldn’t have afforded [the mortgage] without me.” He also said that he paid the associated purchase and planning costs of about £8,000.[27]During cross-examination and in answer to my questions, Mr Bedford said that it had not been necessary to document his investment in the Property. It had not occurred to either of them. They had had a brief companiable discussion about whose name it should be in. He did not remember who raised the issue but he had said it should be in his name as he was going to pay the greater part. He thought that Maxine had countered by saying the mortgage was going to be in her name, so he had agreed to the Property being in her name. When asked why not in their joint names, he said that they were a mature co-habiting couple and it was a joint investment decision. Mr Bedford confirmed that he contributed nothing to the original purchase but did pay associated fees and expenses - he did “not have a clue” how much but “perhaps a few thousand”. He also said that Maxine had not told Ben about his interest because Maxine was protective of Ben and he and Ben had not had the best of relationships.

The Respondents’ evidence

[28]Both of the Respondents’ written evidence was that Mr Bedford and their mother were not as close as Mr Bedford suggested. The two of them kept separate and independent finances, lifestyles and for the most part separate social circles. Ben had lived with them at Maxine’s home for a number of years and “it was not a close and loving relationship but one of convenience.” During cross-examination, Ben agreed that their relationship was “something beyond friends” but did not agree that they lived as “man and wife.” Ms Greig accepted that they were “sharing a bed” by the time the Property was bought.[29]It was Ben’s evidence that he and his mother decided to buy the Property as a longer-term investment and to assist him into the property market. They were excited about the project and discussed at some length how they would finance and develop it. Mr Bedford was not involved and had no say in the decision to buy it. Given his poor relationship with Mr Bedford, Ben would have declined to be involved if he was to be. His mother was acutely aware of this and he did not believe that she would have put him in such a position. He and Maxine bought the Property and put it in her name with his return being based upon any increase in value. There was no mention of Mr Bedford being involved and so Ben saw no issue with the informality. His sister knew all about it and he trusted her and Maxine completely. Neither Maxine nor Mr Bedford had ever mentioned the latter having an interest. Ben thought it was normal that his mother had turned to Mr Bedford for help with redeveloping the Property given their relationship and his connections.[30]Although both Respondents were pressed on the credits and debits to Maxine’s current account, neither accepted that she could not afford the mortgage without Mr Bedford’s increased monthly contributions. They thought £1,000 per month or about £230 per week would have been an appropriate contribution to household expenses (including his mobile telephone) for a three-bedroom house. The previous figure of £250 per month or under £60 per week would not have been enough. Maxine was also still giving him “vast handouts” and also had savings. When the coincidence of the timing of the £1,000 per month and the purchase were put to her, Ms Greig replied that her mother’s increased outgoings (i.e. on the extended mortgage) might have led her to demand that Mr Bedford start making a proper contribution.[31]Ms Grieg was asked about her letters sent after Maxine’s death acknowledging that Mr Bedford would get his share of the Property. The worst thing in the world had just happened (i.e. her mother passing away) and she would have said anything. Mr Bedford had asserted an interest and she had tended to believe and trust him. But later he had been unable to provide any evidence as to what he was claiming.

Analysis & discussion

[32]Much of the evidence in this matter is not in dispute (see paragraph 25 above).[33]Mr Bedford’s case essentially boils down to this: that he was the one who identified the Property (agreed), that he and Maxine expressly discussed buying it as a joint asset to benefit them both and the survivor of the first death (not agreed) and that he increased his monthly standing order to Maxine to £1,000 for approximately the period that it took for the mortgage to be paid off (indisputable on the documentary evidence).[34]In response, the Respondents’ case essentially boils down to the following. That it was only Maxine on the title (indisputable), that the mortgage was secured against her home and in her name only (agreed), that neither Maxine nor Mr Bedford had ever mentioned the latter having an interest even though Ben had invested £25,000 (agreed), that Ben and Mr Bedford did not have a good relationship (agreed), that Maxine and Mr Bedford maintained relatively independent lives (not agreed), that Mr Bedford played no decision-making role vis-à-vis the Property (not agreed), that Mr Bedford’s monthly contributions were increased to an appropriate level for the couple’s standard of living and at a time when their mother had taken on an increased liability (not agreed), and that their mother could afford the mortgage herself and had savings. There was also the fact that Maxine had lent Mr Bedford considerable sums of money over the years (indisputable).[35]Having considered the parties’ written and oral evidence and the relevant documentary evidence, these are my findings.[36]I found Mr Bedford to be an unimpressive and unreliable witness. His memory was notably poor, and his written account of express discussions was, at best, thin - see paragraphs 7 and 8 of his supplementary Statement of Case and paragraph 14 of his Witness Statement. He added little of substance in oral evidence. While I have taken into account the passage of time and his age, his evidence was inconsistent and prone to exaggeration, particularly regarding his involvement and financial contributions around the time of purchase and with regard to planning.[37]Although it is accepted that Mr Bedford assisted in locating the Property and contributed to some extent to the redevelopment plans - evidenced by a few drawings prepared by his company and an “Application for approval of details reserved by condition” in the Trial Bundle - this is, as the Respondents suggest, explicable by his relationship with Maxine and his professional background and contacts. His claim that he was responsible for preparing and submitting the planning application is contradicted by documentary evidence showing that Lewis & Co undertook this work.[38]Mr Bedford’s assertion that he paid “all” associated costs and fees is unsupported by any evidence. In fact, the evidence shows that Maxine paid both the planning application fee and a substantial sum to Lewis & Co. Notably, his written evidence refers to paying about £8,000, whereas his oral evidence reduced this to “a few thousand” with an admission that he did “not have a clue” what fees and expenses he had paid.[39]There was an almost complete absence of documentary evidence supporting his case (though see below regarding mortgage instalments). He was unable to recall most of Maxine’s loans to him and his company and nor could he remember writing the acknowledgment in 2000 (see paragraphs 25.1 and 25.7 above). While he suggested in evidence that he may have repaid the loans, he was uncertain and unable to produce any supporting documentation. Mr Murrell accepted in closing that Mr Bedford had not repaid the £10,000 lent in 2000.[40]I conclude that either Mr Bedford’s memory is so poor or both his involvement in the purchase and planning process and his financial contributions so exaggerated, that I treat the rest of his evidence with caution.[41]On the issue of purchase and planning, I prefer Ben’s evidence and accept that it was he and his mother who made the decisions and that Mr Bedford was not involved in them. I consider it highly improbable that neither Maxine nor Mr Bedford would not have mentioned the latter’s involvement, especially since(a) Ben had invested £25,000,(b) the number of years that had passed (i.e. 2007 until c. 2021), and(c) the three of them had lived together for a considerable period of time. I also accept the Respondents’ evidence that Maxine and Mr Bedford kept separate and independent finances. There was no evidence of them having a joint bank account and no evidence of them jointly owning a property together.[42]I have given quite some thought to Mr Bedford’s increased monthly contributions. I accept that, even if we do not have the precise dates, they lasted approximately the period of the mortgage and, therefore, that they might be referable to an agreement or common understanding between him and Maxine that he would have an interest in the Property. However, Mr Bedford bears the burden of proof and there are a number of factors that weigh against him. First, Maxine lent him £10,000 in 2000 that had not been repaid and for which there was no suggestion that she had an interest in the property Mr Bedford bought. Secondly, although I have not seen any evidence as to what savings Maxine had, she quite clearly had considerable savings because she passed at least £25,000 to Mr Bedford and BPP between 2007 and 2014 plus there was the £30,000 to an unidentified recipient in mid-2011. Thirdly, there is the fact (agreed) that the Respondents had never heard it mentioned that Mr Bedford had an interest. There was nothing to suggest that they had anything other than a close relationship with Maxine and, of course, Ben lived with her and Mr Bedford for a number of years and had contributed £25,000 to the purchase. I reject Mr Bedford’s rather off-the-cuff suggestion in oral evidence that that the reason for this non-disclosure was that Maxine was being protective of Ben.[43]Fourthly, I do not accept Mr Bedford’s pleaded case (see paragraph 7 of his supplementary Statement of Case - oddly this important point was not addressed in his Witness Statement) or oral evidence that he was not on the title along with Maxine because it was more straightforward to put the title in her name as she was extending her mortgage. It was open to Maxine and Mr Bedford to put the Property in whoever’s name they wished since the mortgage was secured against Maxine’s home, not the Property. If anything, this points the other way. If they were to own the Property as joint tenants (see paragraph 7 of Mr Bedford’s supplementary Statement of Case), then it is remarkable that his name was not on the title or that this arrangement was not formally recorded or the subject of a restriction in his favour on the title. Fifthly, there is also the fact that on 1 May 2009 (almost two years after buying the Property) Maxine paid off £7,860.40 of her mortgage borrowing through an endowment policy. Sixthly, Mr Bedford could not tell me how much he was contributing to the mortgage itself.[44]Lastly, I do not think it can be confidence said that Maxine could not afford the mortgage without Mr Bedford’s contributions. First, one would imagine that Halifax would have assessed affordability before lending. Secondly, the highest Mr Bedford put it in his oral evidence was that he suspected Maxine could not have afforded the mortgage without him. He did not say that he knew she could not afford it or that they had discussed this. Thirdly, although I was not given a forensic analysis of all Maxine’s bank statements over the relevant period, Mr Murrell did point me to her bank statements for July to August 2008 and November to December 2010 showing that Maxine was running a monthly deficit. However, Mr Bedford was living at her house and almost all of his expenses, including his mobile telephone bill, were coming out of her account. I note that she kept a healthy balance: £14,000+ in July to August 2008 and £36,000 in November 2010 before writing a £10,000 cheque to Mr Beford’s company. There was also the unaccounted for £30,000 in mid-2011 which Mr Bedford said he knew nothing about. Maxine may not have had a large income but she was not short of money. It is perfectly possible, as the Respondents suggest, that when Maxine extended her mortgage, she also required Mr Bedford to contribute considerably more to their living expenses. The £250 per month (or £57.53 per week) that he was originally paying would have far too little. There is also the Respondents’ point that Maxine advanced/lent Mr Bedford and his company a considerable amount during the mortgage period.[45]Mr Bedford has, therefore, failed to satisfy me that he had express discussions with Maxine or that she made any representations to him about his having an interest prior to purchase of the Property or subsequently. He has also failed to satisfy me that there was conduct, namely his indirectly paying the mortgage, from which such an intention should be inferred. This means that both his constructive (both express and inferred) and resulting trust claims fail (it must be remembered that for a resulting trust to arise there must be referability).[46]This leaves proprietary estoppel for which Mr Murrell’s primary argument is based upon express assurances (or “active encouragement” – see Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property at 15-009). As will be apparent from my findings above, I have not found any express assurances or active encouragement and so proprietary estoppel cannot succeed on this basis.[47]Mr Murrell also argues “acquiescence-based estoppel” or “passive encouragement”, this being based upon Maxine having stood by and allowed Mr Bedford to act to his detriment knowing that he mistakenly believed he would obtain an interest in the Property. For this, Maxine must (or should) have been aware of(a) her own proprietary rights,(b) Mr Bedford’s expenditure or other detrimental act(s), and(c) Mr Bedford’s mistaken belief that he had or would acquire an interest in the Property. On the findings that I have made above, I cannot find such a claim made out. There is nothing to suggest that Maxine or the Respondents had (or ought to have had) any idea that Mr Bedford had a mistaken belief as to acquiring an interest. I preferred Ben’s evidence regarding who made the decisions on the Property and the limited extent of Mr Bedford’s involvement and Mr Bedford has failed to establish that he was indirectly paying the mortgage or that he mistakenly believed he was acquiring an interest.

Conclusion and disposal

[48]Accordingly, I will direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel Mr Bedford’s original application dated 20 February 2024 (made by a Form RX1 of the same date) to enter a Form A and Form II restriction against the title to 122 Stanford Avenue, Brighton.

Costs

[49]As regards costs, paragraph 9.1(b)(i) of the Land Registration Division’s Practice Direction provides that if the Tribunal decides to make an order about costs, ordinarily the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the successful party’s costs.[50]My preliminary view is that the Respondents are entitled to payment by the Mr Bedford of their reasonable and proportionate costs (i.e. on the Standard Basis) since referral by HMLR to the Tribunal on 15 November 2024.[51]Any party who wishes to make an application for costs should file and serve by email(a) written submissions on the principle of who should pay costs and upon what basis (not on the amount of costs claimed), and(b) an estimate (not a bill or schedule of costs) of the total costs claimed, on the Tribunal and on the other party by 5 pm on 30 October 2025.[52]If such a costs application is served, then the recipient should file and serve by 5 pm 13 November 2025 their submissions in response.[53]The party applying for costs may then file and serve a brief response by no later than 5 pm 20 November 2025. Dated this 16th day of October 2025 Judge Alexander Bastin By Order of The Tribunal