Alex Koutouan v Ofsted [2026] UKFTT 938 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00938 (HESC)

Mr Alex Koutouan

Appellant

Ofsted

Respondent

2025-01614.EY

Before

Tribunal Judge S Goodrich

Specialist Member David Cochran

Specialist Member Martyn Green

Heard at The Royal Courts of Justice

On 26, 27 and 28 May 2026

Representation

Mr Praveen Saigal, for the Respondent

Mr Alex Koutouan represented himself

The Appeal

Between

Alex KoutouanClaimant

OfstedDefendant

Date 2026-06-21

[1]This is an appeal lodged by the Appellant against the Respondent’s decision dated 3 September 2025 to refuse to consent to waive his disqualification from providing childcare.

[2]The Appellant is disqualified from being registered on any register maintained by the Respondent due to the fact he was convicted on 21 December 2020 of the offence of Assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) contrary to section 47 of the Offences against the person Act 1861.

[3]On 4 June 2025 the Appellant made the application that disqualification be waived. It is the decision made on 3 September 2025 to refuse his application which is under appeal. The Parties

[4]It is common ground that Mr Koutouan has never been previously registered with the Respondent. As will be seen below, he first applied for registration on the VCR as a home child carer or nanny (HCC/Nanny) in 2022, and again in 2025.

[5]The Respondent is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) and is the regulatory authority responsible for making decisions regarding the applications made to be registered as a childcare provider. The Hearing

[6]The judge confirmed that the panel had received and read the main and supplementary bundles lodged which consisted of 156 and 94 pages respectively. The Appellant confirmed that he had a paper copy of each bundle provided by the Respondent.

[7]Preliminary issues were brought to our attention by Mr Saigal in the spirit of assisting the Tribunal and Mr Koutouan, as a litigant in person. The Appellant had sent to the Respondent an email at 5pm on Wednesday 20 May 2026 with a document attached headed:

“Appellant’s response to the Respondent’s T109 application dated 1st May 2026 and confirmation of continued pursuit of the appeal”

. The overall effect of this document was that it appeared to request that the order made by Judge Khan at the telephone case management hearing (TCMH) on 6 May 2026 be reviewed/revisited.

[8]We were aware, having read the late evidence permitted by Judge Khan’s order, that the statement of Mrs Hurst, Early Years Regulatory Inspector (EYRI), dated 1 May 2026, raised issues regarding the Appellant’s motivation to be registered and his honesty and integrity.

[9]We heard representations from each side. We noted that the order made in the TCMH on 6 May 2026 was made in the absence of the Appellant because he had not dialled in to the hearing. The Appellant had, however, written to the Tribunal on 2 May 2026 regarding the Respondent’s application to adduce late evidence. We noted also that the date for the TCMH had been set as long ago as 14 November 2025.

[10]In answer to the judge’s questions, Mr Koutouan said that: he had not been aware of the hearing on 6 May; he had mistaken the 6 May for this hearing i.e. the 26 May; and that there had been technical and other difficulties in obtaining legal representation.

[11]The panel retired to consider the issues raised by the Appellant in the document sent to the Respondent on 20 May 2026. We considered, and applied, the overriding objective. In so far as this document appeared to seek a review/revisiting of the order of Judge Khan on 6 May, we noted the terms of the order made that day, and also that the Appellant had not raised any issues regarding this order until 20 May 2026. Mr Koutouan’s email dated 2 May 2026 had appeared to agree that the evidence could properly be admitted. The evidence admitted pursuant to the order of Judge Khan on 6 May 2026 was plainly relevant and it had not then been suggested that it was unfair to receive it. The Appellant had been granted time to respond by way of evidence in response until 14 May 2026, but had not done so.

[12]We decided that there was no good reason to review Judge Khan’s decision that the evidence was relevant, and that it was fair to receive it. We considered that the general points that the Appellant made in the document sent on 20 May 2026 regarding fairness and/or the issue of weight would be taken into account when evaluating the issues and the merits of the appeal overall. Restricted Reporting Order

[13]Neither party applied for a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules and we do not consider that such an order is necessary. Reasonable Adjustments

[14]Neither party suggested that reasonable adjustments might be required. As he represented himself, the judge explained to Mr Koutouan that if he did not understand anything he need only ask and the panel would do what it could to assist. Mr Koutouan confirmed that he understood. He confirmed his understanding at various times during the hearing.

[15]When Mr Koutouan gave oral evidence he was asked general questions about his background by the judge by way of introduction. It emerged that he spoke English as a second language. He told us that he was brought up in Paris from the age of four years. French was the language spoken in his family and he was educated in France. He had started a degree in accountancy in Paris. He had come to live in the UK in 2015 and has lived here since. He told us that he had worked for the bar/company by whom he had been employed at the time of the offence for three or four years, and had worked his way up from being a barman. He had been a manager for about a year at the time of the assault.

[16]The Appellant came across as a very able speaker in English at all times. We were, however, mindful of the difficulties that may be involved when speaking in a second or additional Language. Amongst other matters, this can include loss of nuance and subtleties in meaning that may be hard to express. We have borne this in mind throughout when considering his evidence. The Background Chronology

[17]Based on records before us this appears to be as follows: 15 March 2020: the Appellant, whilst working as a manager in a bar, had assaulted a colleague with a wine rack, causing a broken arm. 21 December 2020: the Appellant was convicted of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH) at East London Magistrates’ Court. He received a sentence of imprisonment of 12 weeks, which was wholly suspended for 12 Months with a rehabilitation activity requirement (as well as related orders regarding costs, compensation and victim surcharge). 29 November 2022: the Appellant made his first application to Ofsted for waiver of the disqualification (in association with his application for voluntary registration as a Home Child Carer (HCC)/Nanny). 13 December 2022: An Interview was conducted by Mrs Devine, EYRI). 22 December 2022: The waiver application was refused. The reasons for refusal included: i. The nature and seriousness of the offence and the risk to children. ii. Failure to demonstrate, during the relatively short period that had elapsed since the conviction, that he had undertaken any additional work beyond the rehabilitation activity requirement ordered by the court as part of his sentence, to evidence his rehabilitation and mitigate the risks to others, in particular children. iii. No evidence of employment since his conviction to demonstrate teamwork, or that he can manage his emotions and conduct himself professionally in a workplace environment. 27 February 2023: it appears from contemporaneous records made that on this date Ofsted made enquiries of a Mr Sika’a, a home child carer registered with the Respondent since 31 October 2022. Mr Sika’a had stated in his application form that he had moved into 34 Marischal Road London SE13 5LG (hereafter the 34A Marischal Road address) in November 2020. According to the record made by Ms Rasmusse, when spoken to on 27 February 2023, Mr Sika’a became agitated and said that Mr Koutouan had moved out two weeks ago. Ofsted’s case is that when asked by Ms Rasmusse on 28 February 2023, the Appellant stated that he had moved out of 34A Marischal Road in the first week of February 2023. It is apparent from the record made that the inspector concluded that the information presented meant that Mr Sika’a was no longer disqualified by association and the regulatory case was therefore closed. 25 March 2025: Appellant submitted an application to be registered on the VCR as a HCC/nanny. He gave his home address as 28 Ravensbourne Park London SE6 4RW and said that he had moved there on 31 May 2024. 6 May 2025: The Appellant submitted his second waiver application. 7 August 2025: A waiver interview conducted by Mrs Hurst, Early Years Regulatory Inspector, (EYRI). Amongst other matters, Mrs Hurst recorded that the Appellant stated that he had remained living at 34A Marischal Road until 31 May 2024. This was different to what had been recorded by Ms Rasmusse on 28 February 2023, and also different to what he said in his application on 25 March 2025. 29 August 2025: a case review held and the decision made by Mrs Layla Davies, Early Years Senior Officer (EYSO), to refuse the waiver application. 3 September 2025: Ofsted issued a decision letter refusing to waive the disqualification. On the same day (3 September 2025): the Appellant filed an appeal against Ofsted's decision. The Decision under Appeal

[18]The notice of decision (NoD) dated 3 September 2025 is a matter of record. Amongst other matters, the Respondent considered that it could not be assured that children would be safe in the Appellant’s sole care as an HCC. The Respondent was concerned that the Appellant had not demonstrated an awareness of how to manage any occasions of challenging behaviour effectively. The Legal Framework

[19]Regulations provide for the Chief Inspector to make a discretionary decision to consent to waive disqualification for purposes that include voluntary registration under the Act. If such consent is granted the applicant shall not be regarded as disqualified from registration for the purposes specified in the Chief Inspector's consent. This means that a substantive application for registration can then be considered.

[20]Under the Childcare (Disqualification) and Childcare (Early Years Provision Free of Charge) (Extended Entitlement) (Amendment) Regulations 2018, any determination made by the Chief Inspector as to whether to give consent under regulation 10 is a prescribed determination for the purposes of section 74(2) of the Act.

[21]The other relevant provision of Section 74 are: (4) On an appeal the Tribunal must either—(a) confirm the taking of the step, the making of the other determination or the making of the order (as the case may be), or

(b) direct that it shall not have, or shall cease to have, effect. (5) Unless the Tribunal has confirmed the taking of a step mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (e) or the making of an order under section 72(2) cancelling a person's registration, the Tribunal may also do either or both of the following— (a) impose conditions on the registration of the person concerned;….” The Guidance

[22]The guidance “Applying to waive disqualification: early years and childcare provision” (updated October 2018) includes the following:

“We consider each request on its own merits, taking into account matters such as the reasons for your disqualification, the length of time since the matter took place that disqualifies you, the reasons why you believe we should waive your disqualification and any risks to children from allowing you to provide or work in early years and childcare provision. We may ask you for more information, or…..or we may ask you to attend an interview before making our decision. We will notify you in writing of our decision. If we decide to waive your disqualification, the letter we send you will explain the circumstances that apply to our decision. We may limit the decision to waive disqualification to one type of employment or to particular premises.”

Oral Evidence

[23]We heard oral evidence from the following: For the Respondent Mrs Rachel Hurst, EYRI Mrs Layla Davies, EYSO. The Appellant Mr Koutouan Mr Ngunga Barthe Ngoma, Chief Executive of the Congolese Children’s Association.

[24]All witnesses called to give evidence adopted the contents of their statements, (whether in formal statement or letter form), as the truth, and these stood as their main evidence. All the Respondent’s witnesses were asked supplemental questions before being cross examined by the Appellant. Since the Appellant was in person the judge offered, and he accepted, assistance in the formal introduction of his evidence and supplemental questions. At the Appellant’s request, the judge also assisted in the introduction of the evidence of Mr Ngoma and the Appellant asked supplementary questions of his witness.

[25]We took reasonable breaks after the evidence in chief of each of the Respondent’s witnesses (in addition to other regular breaks) so as to provide the opportunity for Mr Koutouan to consider his questions.

[26]We will not set out all the oral evidence given but will refer to parts as necessary when giving our reasons. We will refer to aspects of the oral evidence and closing submissions as necessary when giving our reasons. The Burden and Standard of Proof

[27]In an appeal against the refusal to waive disqualification it is for the Appellant to satisfy us the waiver he seeks should be granted. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

[28]Where, however, a party makes an allegation of dishonesty or lack of integrity, the burden lies on the party making that allegation to prove it on the balance of probabilities. The respective positions of the parties

[29]In very broad summary, the Respondent relies upon the serious violence involved in the assault, a specified offence. Little weight could be attached to the evidence regarding rehabilitation. There were also significant concerns regarding the Appellant’s honesty and integrity. The information provided by the Appellant on 28 February 2023 was dishonest. It was to provide cover for Mr Sika’a because they were living in the same accommodation, and the latter was therefore disqualified by association. Waiver should not be granted. There was very considerable reason to doubt that the Appellant has any genuine interest in providing childcare.

[30]In essence, the Appellant’s case is that:(a) the offence arose from a single adult workplace incident; no child was involved; nearly five years have passed; there has been no further offending, safeguarding incident, or allegation of violence. He relies upon his reflection, behavioural change, safeguarding learning, and evidence of stable conduct since the offence.

(b) Rehabilitation, present suitability, and proportionality remain central considerations. The appeal is advanced on the following basis: (a) Ofsted has placed excessive weight on historic conduct. (b) Insufficient weight has been given to present-day suitability.

(d) Honesty concerns are disputed and do not amount to deliberate deception.

(e) Current safeguarding risk has not been evidenced. (c) Any inconsistencies relating to the address history arose during a period of unemployment, housing instability and involved misunderstanding rather than any concealment. (d) He denies involvement in any improper childcare grant arrangements and submits speculation should not be a substitute for evidence. (e) Rehabilitation is demonstrated through conduct over time. He relies upon: (a) absence of reoffending; (b) reflection and emotional development; (c) safeguarding and childcare-related learning; (d) community engagement; (e) strategies for conflict management and de-escalation. Rehabilitation should not be assessed solely by whether additional formal courses were undertaken.

(f) He submits that: (a) rehabilitation is genuine; (b) current safeguarding risk is low; (c) refusal is no longer proportionate. Our Consideration

[31]We are required to consider the application for waiver of disqualification afresh and to make our own decision based on the evidence as at the date of the hearing. The overarching issue is whether, standing in the shoes of the Chief Inspector, we consider it appropriate, in the exercise of our discretion, to consent to waive the disqualification.

[32]Subject to fairness, we can consider any new information or material that was not available at the date of decision which is relevant in our “de novo” i.e. fresh decision-making. So, an appellant may contend that, whatever the position at the time of the decision under appeal, that position has changed materially and may bring evidence to support that. This could include bringing evidence to show that the facts and circumstances were not as alleged, or as interpreted by the Respondent. An Appellant may seek to show that the opinions or conclusions reached were wrong, mistaken or unreasonable. It also includes the opportunity to provide new evidence to show that since the decision was made the concerns raised have now been addressed by further reflection, training, employment, voluntary work etc. It follows that the nature of an appeal in this jurisdiction provides a very full opportunity to the Appellant to address the issues based on up-to-date evidence.

[33]The redetermination in this appeal includes consideration of the written evidence provided by both sides, as well as the oral evidence, and where both sides have had the opportunity to test the evidence by asking questions. We have considered all the evidence and submissions before us with care. It is not necessary to make findings on every point of dispute between the parties or every matter raised. We focus our findings on what we consider to be core matters. If we do not refer to any particular aspect, it should not be assumed that we have not taken all of the evidence or submissions into account. In what follows we have sought to record matters we considered to be of particular significance.

[34]On any basis: a) Mr Koutouan lost control of his temper on 15 March 2020 whilst at work as a bar manager. We accept that within the overall category of assault occasioning ABH, this was a very serious assault: the victim’s arm was broken. b) The fact that a weapon was used (the wine rack) is a serious aggravating feature, as is the fact that the Appellant was in a position of responsibility as the bar manager. c) The seriousness of the assault is shown by the sentence of the court: a custodial sentence was imposed for a first offence, albeit that the term of imprisonment was suspended. d) We bear in mind that the offence involved is a prescribed offence. In other words, the effect of disqualification endures, although relevant consent to waive the disqualification may be granted for specific purposes.

[35]The Appellant says that he completed all the training required of him under his sentence. Whilst this is almost certainly the case, there is no formal evidence as to what this training actually consisted of. In our view the subsequent safeguarding courses on which the Appellant relies are basic and standard requirements for any substantive registration application (which would be considered if we were to consent to waive disqualification). We note that the Appellant has not provided formal evidence of any training, coaching, counselling or therapy he has undertaken, over and above what he described as the probation requirements linked to his sentence, to deal with issues raised by his past conviction: sudden and uncontrolled anger; disproportionate force; use of a weapon; significant assault committed when in a dominant position.

[36]The request made is to waive disqualification regarding childcare: an area in which the Appellant has never worked. Moreover, this is an area that inevitably involves very great care by those responsible for registration, especially when a person is disqualified because of an offence involving violence. Children are, by definition, vulnerable. Children whose needs are met by a carer in a private home care setting are particularly vulnerable for obvious reasons.

[37]It is not part of the Appellant’s case he had ever attempted to find any work for himself as a home child carer/nanny (paid or otherwise) either before or after his applications for waiver in either 2022 or 2025.

[38]In our view the time elapsed since the commission of an offence is always very relevant but the passage of time, in and of itself, is not the key issue. A reasonable decision maker will look to see what has happened in the intervening years and will consider all the relevant circumstances.

[39]In his responses in interview on 7 August 2025 Mr Koutouan had emphasised that he had been unable to obtain any employment with, for example, retail businesses such as Lidl or Argos because of his conviction. When Mr Koutouan gave evidence it became apparent that he had, in fact, been working since his conviction. It emerged that, to his credit, he had taken advantage of the opportunity offered by the probation service to work on Network Rail. He did so for about 15 months. He also told us that he had worked for DHL as a delivery driver.

[40]The Appellant also told us that for some years he has been working as an advisor to students on a self-employed/commission basis under the umbrella of an organisation called MHAB Multi Business Limited (MHAB). We noted that the childcare courses the Appellant had undertaken had been under the auspices of this company. Mr Ngoma also told us that he had first met the Appellant in the context of the Appellant’s connection with MHAB. The DBS request was also made in connection with MHAB.

[41]After the decision under appeal had been made, matters of concern were investigated regarding the registration of Mr Sika’a on the VCR. This was the subject of the new evidence admitted by Judge Khan on 6 March 2026.

[42]Mr Sika’a has not been called as a witness in these proceedings so we are appropriately circumspect regarding the findings we make. On the face of the information before us between September 2025 and the last week of February 2026 up Mr Sika’a had received some £37,797 paid by the Student Loan Company (the SLC). The SLC pays for the costs of childcare provided by Home Child Carers provided that they are registered with Ofsted. It is said that the above sum is considerably in excess of that which might ordinarily be expected to be paid in childcare expenses incurred by students in receipt of government finance/assistance. It appears that claims had been made for up to 11 families for four days a week. We understand that under the SLC rules/scheme the upper limit of the number of families for whom services can be provided is limited, at any one time, to two.

[43]Mrs Hurst’s evidence was that during the inspection of Mr Sika’s registration which was carried out on 17 March 2026 Mr Sika’a had said that:• He and Mr Koutouan had studied to be a nanny together;

• Mr Koutouan works with the universities and finds families to nanny;

• Mr Koutouan is the “go between” the families and himself to provide care;

• He (Mr Sika’a) was fully aware that the Appellant was disqualified and that he (Mr Sika’a) knew about his conviction.

[44]In his oral evidence Mr Koutouan confirmed that each of the points above (given by Mr Sika’a to Mrs Hurst) was the truth. We noted that Mr Koutouan had denied that Mr Sika’a had known of his conviction. We regard this as improbable because they had lived together and were very closely associated together. We noted that Mr Koutouan disputed that the account recorded by Ms Rasmusse reflected what was discussed on 28 February 2023. In our view, the overwhelming probability is that Mr Khoutouan told Ms Rasmusse that he had moved out in February 2023. We also consider it very likely that the account recorded by Ms Ramusse was made contemporaneously and was accurate because she had closed the regulatory case on the strength of the similar information provided by Mr Sika’s and Mr Koutouan.

[45]Mr Koutouan’s own oral evidence was that he had acted as an agent or “go-between” for Mr Sika’a, so as to recruit student clients who needed childcare. Mr Koutouan told us in terms that he did so on occasions in exchange for a fee. He referred to having received a fee of £250.

[46]Standing back, we are entitled to consider why Mr Koutouan, wishes to be registered (albeit on the VCR only). It is not necessary to be registered with the Respondent in order to work as a home child carer/nanny: it is a voluntary register. Common sense tells us that the opportunity for regular paid work might be more limited without Ofsted registration on the VCR, but that the scope for voluntary work as a HCC/nanny without registration may be greater since it is unpaid.

[47]The Appellant has said that his wish to work as a HCC/nanny has been inspired by his wish to give back to the community. We note that this has not been demonstrated by any paid or voluntary work as a home child carer/nanny. He referred also to his relationship with his nephews and nieces, but no further detail or evidence was provided.

[48]Mr Koutouan relies on the evidence of Mr Ngoma who told us that Mr Koutouan had spoken at events organised by the Congolese Children’s Society (CCS) on a roughly annual basis, so as to encourage young people to take the right path.

[49]We noted that Mr Ngoma’s letter in support of the Appellant was dated January 2026. It is not clear to us why the Appellant’s involvement with the CCS had not been mentioned in terms in the 2025 application or in the 2025 interview.

[50]Even taking Mr Ngoma’s evidence at its highest, laudable though the Appellant’s efforts to address a group of children at the CCS about once a year might be, the evidence as a whole does not explain to us why the Appellant seeks registration to work as an HCC/nanny, when he has never worked in this particular field before.

[51]Having considered all of the evidence in the round we have very significant concerns regarding the Appellant’s motivation in seeking registration. The Appellant has not satisfied us as to why consent to waive his disqualification should be granted.

[52]The Appellant contends that the consequences of the refusal of this application are significant and are unduly harsh. However, this must be considered in overall context. It is notable that the Appellant had been unable to obtain employment in public facing retail such as Argos or Lidl since his conviction. In our view his ability to control his temper or behaviour has not been tested in any context that may shed light on his ability to respond to situations of challenge or confrontation.

[53]Experience informs us that the care of children can be extremely demanding and taxing. In our view, when the past history includes a past conviction for ABH which involved a suspended prison sentence, a significant level of confidence on the part of the regulator is required before it might be considered appropriate to grant registration to work with children, even on a voluntary basis. The trust of the public in the system of registration depends upon confidence in the regulatory judgements made regarding registration, and not least when a waiver is necessary because a serious offence of ABH has been committed in the past. In the exercise of our discretion we decline to consent to waiver of disqualification in the Appellant’s favour.

[54]We consider that our refusal to waive disqualification is in accordance with the law and the guidance and is justified and necessary in pursuit of the public interest in the protection of the health, safety and well-being of young children. Proportionality

[55]We have balanced the interests of the Appellant against the public interest engaged. Proportionality requires consideration of the least restrictive measure(s) that are consistent with the public interest engaged, namely, the public interest in the protection of the health, safety and well-being of children.

[56]As set out above, Mr Koutouan has never previously worked in childcare. This is not, therefore, a situation where an appellant is being deprived of the opportunity to pursue a previous occupation/vocation enjoyed prior to the commission of the disqualifying offence. The Appellant can, in fact, seek to work as an HCC in any event. The effect of our adverse decision is that he will not be able to pursue his application for voluntary registration because he remains disqualified. He will not therefore be able to rely on registration/Ofsted approval in any future endeavours.

[57]The Appellant places particular emphasis on the power to waive disqualification on a conditional basis. We recognise we have the power to consider conditional inclusion and that the exercise of this power might well be appropriate in some circumstances. However, although given the opportunity Mr Koutouan could not explain how conditional inclusion might apply to the circumstances of his case. He did not put forward any particular conditions, for example, registration linked to a particular prospective employer or family.

[58]On the evidence before us we are unable to devise any meaningful, feasible or workable conditions that would address the issues in this appeal.

[59]We have considered the evidence regarding the overall impact of our decisions on the private life and business life interests of the Appellant. In our view the public interests engaged in the refusal of this application for waiver far outweigh the interests of the Appellant. The decision to refuse to waive disqualification is proportionate. Decision The decision made by the Respondent on 3 September 2025 is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed. Judge Goodrich First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) 21 June 2026