Nest Social Care Ltd v Care Quality Commission [2026] UKFTT 787 (HESC)
[1]This is an appeal under section 32 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (the 2008 Act) against the Respondent’s decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration in respect of the regulated activity of personal care on the ground of dormancy.[2]The Respondent had relied on regulation 6(1)(c) of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, namely that the Appellant had not carried on the regulated activity for a continuous period of 12 months.Attendance
[3]The Appellant, Mr Joseph Ndilla, who, in his skeleton argument, described himself as the Director and Nominated Individual of Nest Social Care Ltd, appeared in person and was not legally represented.[4]The Respondent was represented by Mr Oliver Connor of Counsel, who was accompanied by Mr J Okunpolor Junior, instructing solicitor, and Ms S. Wilson, trainee solicitor.[5]The Tribunal heard oral evidence from Mrs Julie Paula Lindsay, Operations Manager at the Care Quality Commission (CQC). She adopted her written witness statement and answered further questions from the Tribunal and the Appellant.[6]The Tribunal also heard oral evidence from Mr Ndilla himself.[7]The hearing was conducted by remote means, using the Cloud Video Platform (CVP). The Tribunal was satisfied that all parties were able to participate fully in the proceedings, connectivity was good and a number of breaks were provided.Evidence and bundle
[8]Both parties agreed that all evidence was contained in the 183-page PDF bundle. There was no application to admit late evidence and Mr Ndilla confirmed that he had no additional evidence that he wished the Tribunal to consider.Background
[9]The Appellant was registered on 7 March 2024 to carry on the regulated activity of providing personal care.[10]As is common in the early days of newly registered services, the Respondent’s dormancy monitoring process was engaged. This meant that Nest Social Care Ltd was subject to regular monitoring to identify whether the regulated activity was in fact being carried on.[11]In this case, routine email enquiries were made by the Respondent to the Appellant at intervals during 2024. In response to enquiries made on 11 June 2024, 9 September 2024 and 9 December 2024, the Appellant confirmed on each occasion that it was not carrying on the regulated activity of personal care. These exchanges formed part of the Respondent’s ongoing monitoring of the status of the Nest Social Care Ltd’s registration.[12]A further enquiry was made on 10 June 2025, to which no response was received. In light of the absence of evidence that the regulated activity was being carried on, more than 12 months after the date of registration, the Respondent proceeded to consider whether the statutory ground of dormancy was made out.[13]On 15 July 2025, the Respondent issued a Notice of Proposal to cancel the Appellant’s registration.[14]On 17 July 2025, the Appellant sent an email asserting that Nest Social Care Ltd was “operational and actively providing regulated personal care”. That email was sent to an incorrect address and came to light only later in the process. In any event, it did not contain supporting evidence by way of corroboration of the assertion.[15]The Respondent proceeded to issue a Notice of Decision dated 8 September 2025, cancelling the Appellant’s registration on the basis that the regulated activity had not been carried on for a continuous period of 12 months. This decision was appealed on 3 October 2025.[16]On 27 October 2025, notwithstanding the cancellation, and following the 17 July 2025 email referred to above, the Respondent wrote to the Appellant seeking further documentation to assist in determining whether the regulated activity of personal care was indeed being carried on. The request identified for the Appellant categories of material which would assist to demonstrate the provision of the regulated activity, such as evidence of service user need, care planning documentation and daily records.[17]On 3 November 2025, the Appellant provided documentation in response, all of which are reproduced within the hearing bundle as exhibits to Mrs Lindsay’s statement and included: i. a care service contract, dated 24 March 2025 ii. a service user care plan, dated 21 March 2025 and iii. numerous daily care records, starting from 27 March 2025 and all of which related to one service user.[18]The Respondent subsequently reviewed that material prior to finalising its response to the appeal, dated 7 November 2025, maintaining its position that the Appellant had not carried on the regulated activity of personal care, for a continuous period of 12 months.Legal Framework
[19]By section 17(1)(e) of the 2008 Act, read together with regulation 6(1)(c) of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 (“the 2009 Regulations”), the Respondent is empowered to cancel a provider’s registration in respect of a regulated activity where the provider has not carried on that activity for a continuous period of 12 months.[20]The regulated activity relevant to this appeal is “personal care”. The meaning of that term is prescribed by regulation 2 and Schedule 1 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 (“the 2014 Regulations”). In summary, it encompasses:a. the provision of physical assistance to a person in connection with specified activities of daily living, including eating, drinking, washing, dressing and toileting; andb. the prompting of a person, together with supervision, in relation to such activities where that person is unable to make a decision for themselves in relation to the performance of those activities without such prompting and supervision.[21]It follows that, for the purposes of the statutory scheme, the question of whether a regulated activity is being carried on must be assessed by reference to that definition. The provision of services which fall outside it, however beneficial or appropriate in their own right, does not constitute the carrying on of the regulated activity for which registration is required.[22]In determining the appeal, the Tribunal has also had regard to the Respondent’s statutory objectives under sections 3 and 4 of the 2008 Act, including the need to protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of persons who use health and social care services, and to ensure that regulatory action is proportionate. Where no regulated activity is being carried on, the Respondent is unable to meaningfully assess the service or provide public assurance regarding the quality and safety of the regulated activity, in accordance with the statutory objectives.Evidence
[23]The Tribunal had before it the documentary evidence contained within the hearing bundle, comprising a single PDF of 183 pages, together with the oral evidence and submissions of the parties.[24]The Tribunal heard oral evidence from Mrs J P Lindsay, CQC Operations Manager. She adopted her witness statement and answered questions from the Tribunal and from the Appellant. Her evidence addressed, in particular, the Respondent’s dormancy monitoring process, the email communications with the Appellant, and her assessment of the documentation relied upon by the Appellant.[25]Mrs Lindsay explained that, in her professional opinion, the material provided by the Appellant did not demonstrate the provision of the regulated activity of personal care. She referred to the care plan and daily care records, which she considered did not identify any needs requiring physical assistance or contain evidence of prompting and supervision within the meaning of the statutory definition. She maintained that the material indicated befriending and support of a social or domestic nature rather than delivery of regulated personal care.[26]The Tribunal also heard evidence from Mr Joseph Ndilla on behalf of the Appellant. He relied upon his witness statement and expanded upon it orally. He described the support said to have been provided to a 94‑year‑old service user, where he emphasised supervision, monitoring, encouragement and assistance with meals, and he submitted that this amounted to personal care within the meaning of the Regulations. He did accept that no direct physical assistance with activities such as eating, washing or dressing was provided, but contended that prompting and supervision were nevertheless provided. He gave an example recorded in the daily record sheet of leaving out a snack for the service user, to ensure that they ate it later that evening, thereby prompting them to take nutrition. He also relied heavily on what he had perceived to be the lack of specificity within the guidance to the legislation that he had received from the CQC.[27]It was agreed by Mr Ndilla that the relevant parts of the care plan related to sections 1,2,3 and 7 and that it appeared that it was only section 3 (food, drink and diets) that his case relied upon.[28]Both parties made submissions at the conclusion of the evidence. The Respondent submitted that the evidence did not establish the provision of personal care as defined within the 2014 Regulations.[29]The Appellant maintained that the statutory definition was met, in particular by reference to prompting and supervision in relation to eating.The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons
[30]The Tribunal has considered all of the evidence in the round, applying the statutory definition of personal care set out in the 2014 Regulations.[31]The Appellant relied upon documentation including a care service contract, a service user care plan and daily care records. It was noted that these documents were not signed by the service user. The Tribunal has considered the Appellant’s case at its highest, taking the documentation at face value notwithstanding these deficiencies.[32]The Tribunal noted that the relevant sections of the care plan identified in evidence were sections 1, 2, 3 and 7. It was accepted by the Appellant himself that sections 1, 2 and 7 did not identify any needs requiring the provision of personal care.[33]As regards section 3 (food, drink and diet), whilst reference was made to assisting with meals, such as preparing and heating meals, the Appellant primarily relied upon providing supervision, monitoring and prompting for the service user. In considering all of the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal did not find that it identified a need engaging the statutory definition of personal care. In particular, it did not demonstrate that the service user was unable to make decisions in relation to eating and drinking without prompting and supervision. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that in response to questions in his oral evidence, Mr Ndilla accepted that the service user did not actually require any physical assistance with eating.[34]Even taking the Appellant’s evidence at its highest, the Tribunal was unable to identify evidence that the service user was unable to make a decision for themselves in relation to any relevant activity without prompting and supervision, as required by the statutory definition. That element of the definition is central, and its absence is determinative.[35]Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the activities relied upon by the Appellant constituted the carrying on of the regulated activity within the meaning of the 2014 Regulations.[36]The Tribunal finds that the Appellant did not properly understand the statutory definition of personal care. The evidence appears to show that the Appellant was providing a form of social support or companionship service. Whilst that may be of value to the service user, it does not amount to the regulated activity of personal care as defined in the legislation.[37]The Tribunal was informed by the Appellant that he now has additional service users. However, no evidence of these clients was provided, nor was evidence produced to substantiate his assertion that other service users were being supported during the relevant period.[38]The Tribunal also notes that the documentation relied upon by the Appellant, including the care service contract, service user care plan and associated records, is dated after the expiry of the relevant 12‑month period. This further undermines the Appellant’s case that the regulated activity was being carried on during that period.[39]In those circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the Appellant has not established that it was carrying on the regulated activity of personal care at any material time and was properly described as being dormant for a continuous period exceeding 12 months.[40]The Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent’s decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration was proportionate. The statutory ground of dormancy was established over a sustained period, during which the Appellant repeatedly confirmed that it was not carrying on the regulated activity and subsequently failed to demonstrate that it had done so within the meaning of the legislation. The Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s evidence that, in the absence of the provision of the regulated activity, it is unable to inspect or assess the service against the fundamental standards or provide assurance to the public. In those circumstances, the maintenance of a dormant registration would undermine the proper operation of the regulatory scheme.[41]The Tribunal further notes that the Respondent afforded the Appellant opportunities to demonstrate that the regulated activity was being carried on, including by seeking further documentation following the commencement of the appeal. The material provided did not satisfy the statutory definition. In those circumstances, we find that cancellation was a reasonable and necessary response.[42]The Tribunal also takes into account that cancellation does not prevent the Appellant from making a fresh application for registration should it wish to provide regulated personal care in the future. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration was reasonable and should stand. Decision The appeal is dismissed. The Respondent’s decision dated 8 September 2025 is confirmed. District Tribunal Judge D Hyland Date Issued: 26 May 2026