Olusola Ogundele v Ofsted [2026] UKFTT 591 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00591 (HESC)

2025-01605.EY

Venue Hearing held in Court 64, Royal Courts of Justice

on 31 March to 2 April 2026

Before

Tribunal Judge O’Neill

Specialist Member Jacoby

Specialist Member Graham

Mrs Olusola Ogundele

Appellant

-v-

Ofsted

Respondent

DECISION

Between

Olusola OgundeleClaimant

OfstedDefendant

Date 2026-04-16

[1]The APPEAL 1.1. This appeal is by Mrs Olusola Ogundele (“the Appellant”) against a decision by Ofsted (“the Respondent”) dated 12 August 2025 to cancel her registration as a childminder on the Early Years Register and both the compulsory (Part A) and voluntary part (Part B) of the General Childcare Register under section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006 (“CA 2006”).

[2]Attendance 2.1. The hearing of the appeal was conducted as a hybrid hearing, but the parties, the witnesses and the Tribunal Panel attended each day in person except for the final day where Tribunal Member Graham joined the hearing by CVP. 2.2. The Appellant represented herself. She was supported in the hearing by her husband, Mr Ogundele. 2.3. The Respondent was represented by Ms N Kohn (of Counsel). Also in attendance were Mr J Kellen (pupil barrister) and Mr M Hewit (paralegal). The Respondent’s witnesses were:(a) Mrs J Geoghegan, Early Years Regulatory Inspector at the Respondent; and

(b) Mrs L Bennett, Early Years Senior Officer at the Respondent.

[3]Evidence The Bundles 3.1. We were provided with a bundle which was paginated in sections from A to K. Including index pages and cover sheets the bundle had 405 electronic pages. 3.2. We were provided with a supplemental bundle which was paginated in sections from L to O. Including index pages and cover sheets the bundle had 158 electronic pages. 3.3. In this decision, references to documents will be to the pagination numbers unless stated otherwise using “MB” to indicate the main bundle and “SB” to indicate the supplemental bundle. Late Evidence 3.4. We were provided with the following documents as late evidence: (a) From the Respondent: (i) A further supplemental witness statement from Mrs L Bennett relating to the operation of the Respondent’s telephone system. 3.5. There was no clear objection from the Appellant to this witness statement being admitted. In any event, we decided to admit the document as late evidence. It was relevant to the issues in dispute and whilst late, it caused no prejudice to the Appellant. The Appellant was able to give oral evidence on the matters raised in the statement. We were therefore satisfied that the overriding objective would be best served by admitting the document as late evidence. 3.6. We carefully considered all the written evidence submitted to the Tribunal in advance and the oral evidence given to us at the hearing even if we do not mention it. We used the hearing to amplify and update parts of the written evidence and only record such of the oral evidence as is necessary to explain our decision.

[4]Preliminary Matters Adjustments 4.1. We noted that the issue of reasonable adjustments had arisen in the Appellant’s most recent inspection from the Respondent but no request for adjustments had been made to the Tribunal. We therefore enquired with both parties whether any adjustments to the hearing were required. Neither party requested any adjustments. 4.2. Nevertheless, because the Appellant had a diagnosis of dyslexia, we ensured that each time she was referred to a document, she had sufficient time to read and understand that document. We informed the parties that they could request a break at any time by indicating to the Panel.

[5]Background AND KEY CHRONOLOGY 5.1. The Appellant has been registered as a childminder since 2007, under registration number EY356520. She is registered on the Early Years Register and both the Compulsory (Part A) and Voluntary Part (Part B) of the General Childcare Register. Her inspection history was not in dispute and includes:(a) 2012 (not met with actions)

(b) 2015 (met)

(c) 19 April 2024 (not met with actions). (i) no valid paediatric first aid certificate; (ii) failure to ensure that records regarding minded children are accessible and available for inspection.

(d) 21 October 2025 – regulatory visit. 5.2. By a decision set down in the Notice of Decision dated 12 August 2025 (“the NoD”), the respondent determined to cancel the Appellant’s registration. The reasons for cancellation were that the Appellant no longer met the requirements for registration and the requirements imposed by regulations applicable to her registration. 5.3. On 18 March 2026, the Appellant made herself available for an inspection. Some of the Respondent’s previous concerns (i.e. those regarding her home environment and the lack of a paediatric first aid certificate) had been remedied. But the outcome of the inspection was a finding of Urgent Improvement.

[6]Legal Framework The Legislative Provisions 6.1. Part 3 of the CA 2006 sets out the legal framework for the registration and regulation of childcare providers. 6.2. Section 32 CA 2006 provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) includes “other early years providers” registered to provide early years childcare for children (from birth to the age of five years) for which registration is compulsory. The second register is “the Childcare Register”. This is divided into two parts: a compulsory register for providers caring for children from the age of eight to five for which registration is compulsory (“the compulsory part”); and a register which contains those providers registered to provide childminding/childcare for children aged over eight years for which registration is voluntary (“the voluntary part”). 6.3. Section 68 of the CA 2006 provides both mandatory (s.68(1)) and discretionary (ss.68(2-5)) powers by which a person’s registration may be cancelled. Pursuant to s.68(2), and insofar as is relevant for this appeal, a person’s registration may be cancelled if it appears to the Chief Inspector: “(a) that the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person's registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied, ….. (c) that he has failed to comply with a requirement imposed on him by regulations…” 6.4. Pursuant to s.73 CA 2006, where it is proposed to cancel registration (s.73(1)(e)), the Respondent must give a childminder notice of the intention (s.73(2)); any notice must include the reasons for proposing the step and inform the childminder of their rights (s.73(3)). Following any objection by the childminder which may be heard orally or in writing (ss.73(5) and (6)), the Respondent must issue a notice of the decision (s.73(7)). 6.5. Pursuant to ss.49 and 50 CA 2006, the Respondent has a duty to inspect early years provision in accordance with prescribed intervals and a discretion to inspect more frequently as appropriate – s.49(2)(b) and (c). This includes circumstances where there are no children on roll. 6.6. The powers of the Tribunal are limited by section 74 CA 2006. The Tribunal must either confirm the suspension or direct that it shall not have or shall cease to have effect (s.74(4)). If the Tribunal determines not to cancel a childminder’s registration, it may choose to impose conditions on his or her registration – s.74(5)(a). The Burden and Standard of Proof 6.7. The legal burden of proof at an appeal lies with the Respondent; the Respondent must establish the facts upon which it relies to support cancellation, and it must demonstrate that the decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration is proportionate and necessary. 6.8. The standard of proof is the same as in civil proceedings, it is for the Appellant to discharge on the balance of probabilities. 6.9. The Tribunal must make its decision based on all the evidence available to it as at the date of the hearing. The Tribunal is not restricted to evidence available to the Respondent when the Notice of Decision was issued. The Tribunal is in effect looking at the decision afresh, it is not reviewing the Respondent’s decision-making process.

[7]The Issues 7.1. The issues for determination by the Tribunal were those set out in the Scott Schedule which appears at MB/K399. At the start of the hearing, we clarified the issues with the parties. The Respondent accepted that Issue Five fell away completely, and Issue Two fell away as a standalone issue. Albeit the Respondent submitted that the facts pertaining to Issue two remained relevant to the issue of suitability. Accordingly, the issues to be decided were as follows: (a) Is the Appellant suitable to remain registered: (i) Notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant made herself available for an inspection on 18 March 2026, does her alleged previous lack of engagement with the Respondent mean she is unsuitable to remain registered (Issue One in the Scott Schedule). (ii) Does the Appellant’s late compliance with an action to complete a relevant Paediatric First Aid Course mean she is unsuitable to remain registered (Issue Two in the Scott Schedule). (iii) Does the Appellant’s failure to complete a Health Declaration Form (“HDF”) mean she is unsuitable to remain registered (Issue Three in the Scott Schedule). (iv) Does the Appellant’s alleged failure to engage with the relevant deferral processes mean she is unsuitable to remain registered (Issue Four in the Scott Schedule).

[8]Findings of Fact Issues One and Four 8.1. Issues One and Four overlap and therefore it is convenient to consider them together. 8.2. It was not in dispute that the Appellant had very recently (on 18 March 2026) made herself available for an inspection. But it was the Respondent’s case that notwithstanding this:(a) the Appellant had consistently failed to make herself available for an inspection or to supply the Respondent with information necessary to meet the criteria for an inspection to be deferred; and

(b) this exposes children to the risk of harm and puts the Appellant outside the requirements of suitability. 8.3. The Appellant’s position can be summarised as follows: (a) She did not receive the majority of the Respondent’s attempts to make contact with her, because: (i) she had a setting on her phone which screened calls that came from a private number; and/or (ii) the Respondent’s e-mails went to the Appellant’s junk mail folder and were not seen. (b) Where the Appellant did respond to say she was unavailable for an inspection, in each case this was due to ill health, and she engaged in the relevant deferral processes in good faith. 8.4. The Appellant’s evidence was set out in her first and second witness statement. In the Appellant’s first witness statement, she stated:

“I was experiencing health difficulties during the relevant period (Exhibit B1), which I did communicate to Ofsted. My request for inspection deferral was made in good faith based on genuine medical issues. I did not refuse inspection; I only needed reasonable time to recover. I was not childminding during the relevant period due to lack of children, caused by fluctuating demand due to parents working from home”. 8.5. In the Appellant’s second witness statement, she stated: (a) “I refute the assertion that I was unwilling to be inspected. Any delays arose solely from genuine illness”. (b) “My availability was limited by documented medical needs”. (c) “I never refused inspection; I requested deferrals strictly due to illness”. (d) “I have acted in good faith throughout and communicated consistently with Ofsted”. (e) “My temporary health condition should not be interpreted as unwillingness or unsuitability”. 8.6. In cross examination Ms Kohn took the Appellant through the chronology of contact attempts set out in the Notice of Decision (MB/H72). Of particular note were the following: (a) On 7 February 2022 the Respondent sent the Appellant a letter setting out its concerns that the Appellant had not submitted her DBS application or supplied the Respondent with evidence of childminding in the last three years. The letter included that the Respondent had contacted the Appellant four times by email between 13 December 2021 and 18 January 2022 and that the Appellant had not responded to any emails. (b) On 11 February 2022 the Appellant did contact the Respondent and discussed these concerns with an Early Years Regulatory Inspector. (c) On 23 March 2022 the Respondent served the Appellant with a welfare requirements notice. (d) On 28 March 2022 the Appellant supplied the Respondent with the required information and evidence to demonstrate that the actions were met. (e) Between 12 May 2022 and 19 July 2022, the Respondent made nine further attempts to contact the Appellant by telephone call and sent five letters/emails requesting that the Appellant contact the Respondent to arrange her inspection. (f) The Appellant contacted the Respondent on 27 July 2022 by email and the Respondent replied to that email and provided the Respondent’s contact number. (g) On 15 August 2022 the Respondent made contact with the Appellant and the Appellant confirmed that she had no children on roll and was not available until 9 September 2022. The inspection was arranged for this date. (h) On 8 September 2022 the Appellant emailed the Respondent and provided a sick note from her GP confirming she was off work unwell for the next month. The Respondent deferred the inspection due to the Appellant’s illness, until 7 October 2022. (i) In October, the Appellant sent in a further sick note from her GP that stated that the Appellant was unfit for work due to 'stress related' reasons until 15 October 2022. (j) In December 2022 the Respondent served the Appellant with a further Notice Of Intention due to non-payment of fees. The Appellant contacted the Respondent in January 2023 and paid the fee. The NOI process was ceased. (k) Between January 2023 to March 2024, the Respondent made extensive attempts to engage with the Appellant to arrange her inspection. (l) In September 2023, the Respondent issued the Appellant with a 'non-contact letter', setting out the Respondent’s concerns that the Appellant had not made herself available for inspection and listing all of the contact attempts that the respondent had made. (m) Following receipt of this letter in September 2023, the Appellant contacted the Respondent and was informed that an inspector had been trying to contact her to arrange her inspection. The inspector then made further attempts to contact the Appellant in October and November 2023. (n) The Respondent then sent a second non-contact letter. The Appellant replied stating that she was not available for inspection as she suffered a family bereavement and wished to delay her inspection. (o) Between December 2023 and February 2024, the Respondent contacted the Appellant five times by email and telephone call, including sending a text message before each attempted telephone call as had been requested. (p) On 7 March 2024 an inspector attended the Appellant’s premises unannounced to complete her inspection, however, found that nobody was present. The inspector hand-delivered a further non-contact letter. (q) On 18 March 2024 the Appellant contacted the Respondent regarding the hand delivered letter. The inspection was arranged for 19 April 2024 and was completed on that day. 8.7. When the majority of these dates and contact attempts were put to the Appellant, the Appellant claimed to have no or very limited memory of them. 8.8. When asked to confirm which family member it was that had sadly passed away, the Appellant was unable to provide precise details. She had to visibly pause in an attempt to remember. During the hearing we were told that up to 5 different family members had died including the Appellant’s mother, her auntie, her mother’s twin (who was a different person to her auntie), her mother and also her father in-law. Yet the Appellant was unable to provide the most basic details as to the circumstances of their passing e.g. the years in which they died. 8.9. The Respondent relied on the evidence from Mrs Geoghegan (paragraph’s 11 to 51 of her witness statement) which set out the multiple attempts that Mrs Geoghegan made to contact the Appellant. Starting at paragraph 25 of her witness statement, Mrs Geoghegan explained that the Appellant was scheduled for a reinspection around a year after the inspection in April 2024. Mrs Geoghegan made the following contact attempts: (a) On 12 March 2025, Mrs Geoghegan attempted to contact the Appellant by phone and e-mail. (b) On 28 March 2025 the Appellant replied to Mrs Geoghegan’s email confirming that she had not resumed childminding or completed the actions set at the last inspection. (c) On 31 March 2025, Mrs Geoghegan scheduled the Appellant’s reinspection for 2 April 2025. The Appellant replied to say she was not available on that day. (d) On 13 April 2025, the Appellant replied to Mrs Geoghegan and explained that she would not be available for an inspection as she was sick. (e) On 14 April 2025, Mrs Geoghegan replied and stated that she would request a deferral on the Appellant’s behalf. The deferral request was refused. (f) On 24 April 2025, Mrs Geoghegan e-mailed the Appellant and requested that the Appellant provide more information about her illness and when she believed she would be well enough for an inspection. She explained the deferral process again and that the inspection must be completed by 30 April 2025. (g) On 24 April 2024 the Appellant replied by email stating that she would not be available for an inspection before 30 April 2025 as she was unwell. 8.10. Mrs Geoghegan explained in her second witness statement (paragraphs 3 to 15) the following: (a) On 5 January 2026, Mrs Geoghegan attempted to contact the Appellant to arrange an inspection. She provided a link to the Respondent’s deferral process so that the Appellant could have used this guidance if a deferral was needed. (b) On 5 January 2026, the Appellant replied stating they she was out of the country and would make contact when they returned. The Appellant did not request an inspection deferral or provide any other information, including when they would return. (c) On 6 January 2026, Mrs Geoghegan sent an email to the Appellant to find out if the Appellant wished to request a deferral of her inspection, including an end date, so that the inspection deferral request could be submitted. The Appellant did not reply to Mrs Geoghegan’s e-mail. (d) On 12 January 2026, Mrs Geoghegan sent a further e-mail to the Appellant. She requested that the Appellant replied to confirm when she would be returning home so that the inspection deferral could be requested and the inspection scheduled. She also reminded the Appellant that inspection deferrals must be applied if the inspection cannot be completed. (e) On 12 January 2026 the Appellant replied and confirmed that they arrived in the United Kingdom “yesterday”

. The Appellant did not provide any other information regarding her availability for inspection or request an inspection deferral. (f) On 15 January 2026, the Appellant contacted Mrs Geoghegan and stated that she had been signed off by her GP on sick leave. (g) On 19 January 2026, the Appellant contacted Mrs Geoghegan and explained that her GP had extended her sick note. (h) On 20 January 2026, Mrs Geoghegan requested that the Appellant send a copy of her new and previous sick notes from her GP so that an inspection deferral could be requested. The Appellant did this and Mrs Geoghegan replied and stated that she would request a deferral of her inspection. A deferral was agreed to 22 February 2026. 8.11. Mrs Geoghegan explained in her third witness statement (paragraphs 3 to 15) the following: (a) On 4 March 2026, Mrs Geoghegan contacted the Appellant by e-mail and explained that because she had not been available for inspection within the 14 days of the last inspection deferral ending due to her illness, Mrs Geoghegan would now apply for another inspection deferral. A further deferral was agreed to 13 March 2026. (b) The inspection was completed on 18 March 2026. 8.12. The correspondence between the parties as set out by Mrs Geoghegan in her three witness statements (and summarised above) was not challenged or disputed by the Appellant. Similarly, the chronology set out in the NOD was not challenged. The Appellant claimed not to be able to remember many of the contact attempts, but she did not suggest that they did not happen. Furthermore, Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence was corroborated by the documents (i.e. the copy e-mails and contact attempt records) that were exhibited to her witness statements. We therefore accepted Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence and the chronology set out in the NOD as an accurate chronology of events. 8.13. In response to the above chronology and Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence, the Appellant’s oral evidence was that: (a) where the Respondent had sent e-mail in relation to a proposed inspection, which had not been responded to, that was because the e-mail had gone to the Appellant’s junk mail folder and so the Appellant had not seen it; and (b) the Appellant had a setting on her phone which meant she did not receive calls that came from a private number. 8.14. It was put to the Appellant by Ms Kohn that her account was not plausible because what the chronology showed is that the Appellant has an extensive history of ignoring contact attempts until the 11th hour when a consequence is imminent; only at that point would the Appellant engage. The Appellant did not accept this contention and maintained that she either did not receive the call attempt or did not see the relevant e-mail. 8.15. The Respondent also relied on the evidence from Mrs Bennett. In Mrs Bennett’s final supplemental witness statement, she explained that when the Respondent makes an outbound call it would come from either an inspector’s mobile device or from the Respondent’s Microsoft Teams phone system. In either case, the number does not show as a private or withheld number; it shows either as the inspector’s mobile number or the central Ofsted number. In oral evidence, Mrs Bennett clarified that the Respondent has been using Microsoft Teams for all outbound calls since 2021. The Appellant did not challenge this evidence in cross examination. Mrs Bennett’s supplemental statement was supported by screenshots of the calls in operation with the numbers showing and so we accepted her evidence. 8.16. We decided that the Appellant had knowingly failed to make herself available for inspection consistently and repeatedly over the period December 2021 to 18 March 2024 and then again from 6 January 2026 to 18 March 2026. Our reasons are as follows: (a) We preferred Mrs Geoghean’s and Mrs Bennett’s evidence over the Appellant’s evidence. We found Mrs Geoghegan and Mrs Bennett to be fair and balanced in their evidence. As set out above, their evidence was corroborated by the Respondent’s contemporaneous documents and largely unchallenged by the Appellant. (b) In contrast, we did not find the Appellant’s account to be plausible. We were not persuaded that each time the Respondent unsuccessfully attempted to make contact with the Appellant by e-mail this was because the subject e-mail had gone to her junk mail folder and so had not been seen. Given the sheer volume of contact attempts that were made by the Respondent, and the fact that the Appellant did respond to e-mails when a consequence became imminent, we do not find the Appellant’s account plausible. The Appellant offered no documentary evidence to support her oral evidence. Further, even if we were to accept that the Respondent’s e-mails had gone to the Appellant’s junk mail folder, that did not explain why the Appellant failed to respond to the Respondent’s alternative contact attempts (i.e. those by phone and text message). We comment further on that below. (c) Further, we did not find the Appellant to be a reliable witness. As mentioned above, the Appellant gave evidence that several members of her close family had died. She also gave evidence that these were important family members to her. But she was unable to remember even the year, let alone the exact dates, that each of them died. In each a case they were alleged to have died no earlier than 2019. In our judgment, this undermined the Appellant’s reliability as a witness. (d) In our judgment, it is more likely than not that the Appellant received the Respondent’s multiple e-mails but knowingly chose not to respond to them. (e) We reject the Appellant’s evidence that she did not respond to the Respondent’s contact attempts made by phone because she had a setting on her phone that screened out private or withheld numbers. We accepted Mrs Bennett’s evidence that the Respondent’s phone system does not use private or withheld numbers and has not done since at least 2021, which covers the material period in these proceedings. Accordingly, we find it more likely than not that the Appellant received the Respondent’s multiple telephone calls but knowingly chose not to answer or respond to them. 8.17. Further to the above, we were not persuaded that the Appellant would willingly engage with the Respondent in any future inspection. At paragraph 17 of Mrs Geoghegean’s third witness statement she explained the during the inspection on 18 March 2026, the Appellant had expressed reluctance about being involved in a further future inspection. She stated: “I showed the Appellant the Early years inspection toolkit grade descriptors and explained the proposed inspection outcome grading is likely to be urgent improvement and should this be the case the reinspection will be within six months. The Appellant was upset and ‘said six months is too much for me’. The Appellant said she is ‘not happy about it’ and explained that when she didn’t have her first aid in place she couldn’t get a sound nights sleep and she ‘can’t have another inspection’, she is ‘tired and had enough’”. 8.18. The Appellant did not challenge Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence or suggest it was untrue and so we accepted it. The Appellant did give oral evidence that she would be willing to engage fully with the Respondent in any further inspection. This was in contrast to what she had told Mrs Geoghegan in our judgment further undermined her reliability as a witness. In light of the Appellant’s history as set out above and given her previous comments to Mrs Geoghegan during the inspection on 18 March 2026, we rejected the Appellant’s oral evidence. 8.19. With respect to the Respondent’s deferral process, we decided that the Appellant had failed, in all instances but the exchange on 20 January 2026 (see paragraph 8.10(h) above) to make a deferral request as she was required to do and that she failed to engage meaningfully with the Respondent’s request for further information necessary to meet the criteria for an inspection to be deferred. The exchange on 20 January 2026 stood out as different because in that case Mrs Geoghegan proactively offered to make a deferral request on the Appellant’s behalf and advised what information was required to make that request; the Appellant complied and, in that case, provided the required information. 8.20. The government has published guidance on inspections and visits: deferring, pausing and gathering additional evidence (“the Inspections Guidance”). This was in the bundle at page J377 and referred to in the Respondent’s Counsel’s skeleton argument. That guidance states: “A deferral request should be made at the earliest possible opportunity (usually before 4:30pm on the day of notification) to the inspection support administrator or the inspector who notifies the provider of the inspection. A request can be made on the telephone or in person, but should be confirmed in writing (preferably by email) so that we can consider it promptly”. 8.21. Accordingly, where an inspection deferral was sought, the Appellant was required to make a deferral request to the inspection support administrator or the inspector. In our judgment, the Appellant did not do this and therefore did not engage fully with the deferral process. As is made clear in the above chronology on multiple occasions, the Appellant informed Mrs Geoghegan (i.e. the inspector) that she was unwell and so unavailable for the planned inspection, but at no point did she make a proactive deferral request. In our judgment, it was not sufficient for the Appellant to simply inform Mrs Geoghegan that she was unwell; she needed to make an express request for a deferral and did not do this. The Inspection Guidance does not state that it is sufficient for the provider to say they are unwell or unavailable, but they must make a request for a deferral. This was not done by the Appellant. Further, the Appellant was less than forthcoming when she was requested by Mrs Geoghegan to provide further information regarding her various health conditions (we consider the request for a health declaration form further below). Ms Kohn confirmed during the hearing that the Respondent accepted in each case that the Appellant was genuinely unwell; she had provided sick notes from her GP. But as was explained by Mrs Geoghegan, when the Appellant was requested to provide further information, that information was not always forthcoming. We accepted that evidence. Issue Two 8.22. It was not in dispute that: (a) at the inspection on 19 April 2024, it was found that the Appellant had not maintained her paediatric first aid certificate (“PFAC”), (b) an action was set for the Appellant to complete her PFAC by 10 June 2024, (c) completion of the PFAC remained outstanding from January 2024 to 9 March 2026. 8.23. In her first witness statement, the Appellant stated that: “At the time of the 19 April 2024 inspection, I had no early‑years children on roll and therefore was not actively providing care. I previously held an approved first‑aid certificate, but it was not renewed as I have no children on roll. I have now completed my Paediatric First Aid Certificate (Exhibit A1) and have continued to uphold safeguarding and regulatory responsibilities”. 8.24. This was incorrect, as was explained by Mrs Geoghegan at paragraph 19 of her second witness statement. The first aid training certificate that was exhibited to the Appellant’s statement was an emergency paediatric first aid training certificate. Mrs Geoghegan explained that the emergency certificate is not a full and relevant qualification as required by the ‘Statutory framework for the early years foundation stage’ (“EYFS”). Annex A of the EYFS provides the criteria for effective Paediatric First Aid (“PFA”) training and distinguishes the difference between an emergency and full PFA training. An emergency PFA course is a 6-hour course which covers some basic first aid training where the full PFAC is a minimum of 12 hours and covers a full complement of first aid training. This was not disputed by the Appellant. 8.25. At paragraph 8 of Mrs Geoghegan’s third witness statement, she explained that on 4 March 2026 she received an e-mail from the Appellant. That e-mail stated: “I also wanted to update you regarding my First Aid training. The training provider informed me that although I booked the correct course, I had not completed the required e-learning beforehand. I missed one question, so they changed the course to Emergency First Aid instead of the full First Aid course that I originally paid for”. 8.26. Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence was not challenged and corroborated by the e-mail exhibited to her statement and so we accepted it. 8.27. In her second witness statement the Appellant stated: “I completed my first aid qualification as soon as I became aware of the administrative error”. 8.28. The Appellant’s second witness statement was inconsistent with the account she gave to Mrs Geoghegan in her e-mail on 4 March. We were not therefore persuaded by the Appellant’s evidence. Further, or in the alternative we reject the Appellant’s evidence as set out in her second witness statement. The Appellant was aware no later than 19 April 2024 that she no longer had the required PFAC, but she did not remedy that until 9 March 2026. She did not therefore complete the PFAC as soon as she became aware of the issue, she waited almost two years to do so. 8.29. Mrs Bennett explained at paragraph 6 of her witness statement, that the requirements of the EYFS, apply at all times while registered, and not only in cases where children are being cared for by the Appellant. She further explained in her oral evidence that this means that the Appellant was required to have a current PFAC at all times, irrespective of whether she had children on roll or not. This was because children may be cared for at any time when a provider is registered. This evidence was not challenged and so we accepted it. Issue Three 8.30. It was not in dispute that as at the date of the hearing, the Appellant had not provided the Respondent with a completed HDF. 8.31. The relevant chronology in respect of the HDF is as follows: (a) 21 October 2022 – The Respondent requests that the Appellant completes a HDF (Notice of Decision, MB/H76). (b) 9 November 2022 – The Appellant confirmed that she would complete the HDF and stated that nothing had changed with her health (Notice of Decision, MB/H76). (c) 29 November 2022 – The Respondent attempted to call the Appellant and sent an email confirming that the HDF must be submitted (Notice of Decision, MB/H76). (d) 6 May 2025 – Mrs Geoghegan requested by e-mail that the Appellant complete an HDF. She provided a link to where the form could be accessed (Mrs Geoghegan witness statement, paragraph 42 and Exhibit JG/19). (e) 15 January 2026 – Mrs Geoghegan had a telephone conversation with the Appellant in which they discussed the HDF. The Appellant agreed to complete the HDF during the call (Mrs Geoghegan second witness statement, paragraph 11). (f) 15 January 2026 – Mrs Geoghegan followed up her telephone call with an e-mail and provided a copy of the HDF (MB/H267). (g) 15 January 2026 – Mrs Geoghegan sent a second e-mail to the Appellant in which she explained that the HDF must be completed. (h) 20 January 2026 - Mrs Geoghegan e-mails the Appellant to enquire whether she had completed the HDF (Mrs Geoghegan second witness statement, paragraph 13). (i) 25 February 2026 - Mrs Geoghegan had a telephone conversation with the Appellant in which they discussed the HDF. The Appellant requested that Mrs Geoghegan resend the HDF to her and Mrs Geoghegan did this by e-mail (Mrs Geoghegan third witness statement, paragraph 7 and Exhibit JG/26). 8.32. In her oral evidence, the Appellant claimed either that she had not received the HDF previously or that she could not remember receiving the HDF. Given Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence as set out above, we reject the Appellant’s evidence. We preferred Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence over the Appellant's evidence. Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence was corroborated by the e-mails exhibited to her statement. It was simply not credible for the Appellant to suggest she never received the HDF; she received it on multiple occasions. It is similarly not credible for the Appellant to claim she has no memory of receiving the HDF. In our judgment, the Appellant received the HDF (multiple times), she knew she had received it, but she chose not to complete it. 8.33. It was not in dispute that during the inspection on 18 March 2026, the Appellant claimed, for the first time, that she had been unable to complete the HDF due to financial hardship. In her second witness statement the Appellant stated: “Regarding the financial hardship associated with completing the Health Declaration Form (HDF), I have given Ofsted consent to contact my GP for my health records”. 8.34. The Panel asked the Appellant to provide details of the conversation she had with her doctors’ surgery. The Appellant’s evidence was unconvincing and unreliable; it lacked detail and specifics. The Appellant explained that she had been told that her doctor would charge somewhere between £120 and £150 to complete the HDF. But the Appellant was unable to confirm when exactly this conversation took place. The Appellant offered no documentary evidence to corroborate her oral testimony (e.g. an e-mail from her doctors or a statement of charges). The Appellant had taken no steps to enquire whether the alleged charge could be waived due to financial hardship. Further, the Appellant offered no evidence (other than her witness evidence) that she was experiencing financial hardship (e.g. an income and liabilities statement). Accordingly, on the available evidence, we were not persuaded that the Appellant had been unable to complete the HDF for financial reasons. 8.35. Mrs Geoghegan and Mrs Bennett’s consistent evidence was that the Respondent required the Appellant to complete a HDF because of the number of illnesses she had suffered from which had resulted in deferrals to her inspection. The Respondent needed to be satisfied that the Appellant was fit and well enough to care for children as this may have impacted on her suitability. Of particular note is what the Appellant told Mrs Geoghegan about her health during the 18 March 2026 inspection. Mrs Geoghegan explains this at paragraph 22 of her third witness statement. She stated: “During the inspection the Appellant confirmed that her arm pain is ongoing when she lifts her arm up, therefore it is unknown how this injury may impact on her ability to safely lift and care for children and any long-term effects this injury may have”. 8.36. The Appellant did not challenge Mrs Geoghegan on this evidence and therefore we accepted it. 8.37. In her oral evidence, Mrs Bennett explained that the reason why the Respondent needs the Appellant to complete the HDF and the reason why it is relevant to the Respondent’s assessment of suitability is because the Respondent needs to assess whether the Appellant is safe to look after children. Mrs Bennett gave the example that if the Appellant is still experiencing arm pain, then this may impact her ability to lift and carry children which may have a serious consequence if she ever needed to evacuate the children in her care in an emergency.

[9]Analysis 9.1. Section 68(2)(a) CA 2006, permits the Chief Inspector to cancel a provider’s registration if it appears to him that “the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person's registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied.” 9.2. The prescribed requirements in the CA 2006 include matters set out in the Childcare (Early Years Register) Regulations 2008 (“the EYR Regulations”) and the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008 (“GCR Regulations”). 9.3. Part 1 Schedule 2 EYR Regulations 2008 state at Paragraph 1 that an applicant must be “suitable to provide early years provision”. 9.4. Part 1 Schedule 2 and Part 1 Schedule 5 of the GCR Regulations 2008 similarly stipulate that an applicant for registration on part A (compulsory part) of the General Childcare Register and part B (voluntary part) must be “suitable to provide childcare”. 9.5. In our judgment, the Appellant is not suitable to provide early years provision and is not suitable to provide childcare. Our reasons are as follows:(a) We refer to and repeat our findings of fact as set out at paragraphs 8.1 to 8.21 above. (i) The Appellant knowingly failed to make herself available for an inspection consistently and repeatedly over the period December 2021 to 18 March 2024 and then again from 6 January 2026 to 18 March 2026. Whilst the Appellant did make herself available for an inspection on 18 March 2026, this does not absolve her of her poor engagement with the Respondent prior to this date. (ii) In our judgment, it is more likely than not that the Appellant will continue her course of conduct and continue to fail to engage with the Respondent in relation to future inspections. (iii) The Appellant did not comply with or engage meaningfully with the Respondent’s deferral process.

(b) In our judgment, each of these cases suggest either reluctance to comply with or a lack of understanding and insight into the Appellant’s regulatory obligations. If the Appellant is unwilling or unable to understand and comply with her regulatory obligations, then she is not suitable to be registered to provide early years provision and/or childcare.

(c) We refer to and repeat our findings of fact as set out at paragraphs 8.22 to 8.29 above. Whilst the Appellant has now completed her PFAC, the fact is that she was without a PFAC from January 2024 until 9 March 2026. Whilst she did not care for any children during this time, she could have, and so the lack of a PFAC could have placed children at a risk of harm. In our judgment this is further evidence that the Appellant lacks the appropriate level of understanding and insight into her regulatory obligations and demonstrates a level of disregard for them. As set out above, if the Appellant is unwilling or unable to understand and comply with her regulatory obligations, then she is not suitable to be registered to provide early years provision and/or childcare.

(d) Finally, we refer to and repeat our findings of fact as set out at paragraphs 8.30 to 8.37. The Appellant has still not completed an HDF. On day two of the hearing, she stated that she had booked a doctor’s appointment for 2 April (after the Tribunal hearing had finished) to complete the form. In short, this was too late. This means that neither the Respondent, nor the Tribunal, prior to or during the course of the hearing has been able to establish that the Appellant is sufficiently fit and well to care for children safely. During the inspection on 18 March 2026, the Appellant informed Mrs Geoghegan that she was still experiencing arm pain when she lifts her arm. In our judgment this presents a risk of harm to children because we have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the Appellant would be able to lift a child and evacuate them in an emergency. Accordingly, on the available evidence, we are not therefore persuaded that the Appellant is suitable to be registered to provide early years provision and/or childcare. 9.6. For these reasons we decided that the Appellant is not suitable to be registered to provide early years provision and/or childcare. Accordingly, we decided that cancellation of the Appellant’s registration is necessary. 9.7. We also decided that cancellation of the Appellant’s registration was proportionate. The Appellant’s evidence was that she was not currently looking after any children and had not done so for almost three years. This was not therefore a case where a decision to cancel would shut down a busy business. Put another way, the Appellant was not currently relying on her childminding business to support herself financially. 9.8. The Appellant explained that she was currently in her second year of a nursing degree. We asked her whether a decision to cancel her registration would impact on her future studies or employability options and the Appellant confirmed that it would. But the Appellant was unable to explain how or why with any specificity and had provided no documentary evidence to support her position. 9.9. Whilst we accepted that there may be a potential impact on the Appellant’s future, in our judgment the balance fell in favour of cancellation. The Appellant is not suitable to be registered and to allow her to remain registered would create the risk of harm to any children in her care. We therefore decided that cancellation was not only necessary but also proportionate. 9.10. For these reasons we decided to confirm the Respondent’s decision dated 12 August 2025.

[10]Decision 10.1. The appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 12 August 2025, to cancel the Appellant’s registration is refused. 10.2. The decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration is confirmed. Judge O’Neill Date Issued: 16 April 2026