Shaheen Mahmood Laryea v Ofsted [2026] UKFTT 1211 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01211 (HESC)

2026-01976.EY-SUS

Hearing Heard on 14 August 2026, remotely via video, with further deliberations on 18 August 2026

Before

Mr SJW Lewis (Judicial Member)

Ms L Owen (Specialist Member)

Between

Ms Shaheen Mahmood LaryeaAppellant

Between

OfstedRespondent

DECISION

Date 2026-08-20

The Appeal

[1]The Appellant brings this appeal (the Appeal) against a decision by the Respondent (the Decision), set out in its written notice dated 9 July 2026, to continue to suspend the Appellant’s registration – under section 69 of the Childcare Act 2006 (the Act) and the Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers) (Common Provisions) Regulations 2008 (the Regulations) – for a further 6 weeks from 10 July 2026 to 20 August 2026 (the Suspension). The Appeal is brought under regulation 12 of the Regulations. The Appellant acts as a litigant in person (i.e. without the benefit of legal representation). The Respondent opposes the Appeal.

The Hearing

[2]The Hearing The hearing took place via video (“the Hearing”). The Appellant represented herself. The Respondent was represented by Mr J Taylor.

Documents, Evidence, Submissions

[3]Documents, Evidence, Submissions The bundle of documents ran, initially, to 220 pages (but see below regarding late amendments and additions). The bundle includes: the application form; the response form; case management orders dated 27 July 2026 and 6 August 2026; witness statements, with supporting evidence; and relevant extracts from the Act and the Regulations.

[4]The Appellant relies on her own witness statement. The Respondent relies on a witness statement from(a) Joanne Wildman, a manager of a team of early years regulatory inspectors at Ofsted, and the person who made various regulatory decisions in this case (albeit not, in fact, the Decision), and

(b) Julia Crowley, an inspector who, among other things, conducted relevant inspections/visits. The Appellant gave oral evidence first, followed by Ms Crowley and then Ms Wildman.

[5]Both parties provided a skeleton argument and made closing oral submissions. In summary, the Appellant submits that the Suspension is not proportionate, given the relevant circumstances and developments since the Decision was made. The Respondent maintains that, having regard to a cumulative set of relevant matters and areas of risk, there is strong ongoing justification for the Suspension – indeed, in March 2026, the Respondent made a decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration (the Decision to Cancel). The Decision to Cancel has also been appealed by the Appellant and is the subject of separate proceedings before the Tribunal, with a hearing listed for 4 days in January 2027.

Preliminary Matters

[6]Preliminary Matters There were two late changes to the bundle. First, the day before the Hearing, one document was substituted (page 199). In essence: a duplicate email, containing supportive comments from one of the Appellant’s customers, was replaced by a similarly supportive email from another customer. Second, at the outset of the Hearing, we drew attention to the apparent absence of the Respondent’s notes relating to what appeared to be a highly relevant event in the chronology: an unannounced visit on 29 October 2025 (the October Visit). We therefore requested a copy. The Respondent confirmed that the notes (made by Ms Crowley) had been omitted in error and duly provided a copy. We added the notes to the back of the bundle (at pages F221-F239). A relatively extensive break was required for everyone to have sufficient time to read and adequately consider the notes. We continued with the Hearing after the Appellant confirmed she was ready.

Legal Framework and Principles

[7]Legal Framework and Principles Section 69(1) of the Act provides for regulations to be made dealing with the suspension of the registration of providers: Regulations may provide for the registration of a person registered under Chapter 2, 3 or 4 in the early years register or the general childcare register to be suspended for a prescribed period in prescribed circumstances.

[8]It also provides that regulations must include a right of appeal to the Tribunal.

[9]Regulation 8 of the Regulations provides: The registration of a [person who is registered under Chapter 2, 3 or 4 in the early years register or the general childcare register] may be suspended[, generally or only in relation to particular premises,] by the Chief Inspector, by notice, in the circumstances prescribed in regulation 9 for the period prescribed in regulation 10.

[10]Regulation 9 provides: The circumstances prescribed for the purposes of section 69(1) of the Act are that the Chief Inspector reasonably believes that the continued provision of childcare by the registered person to any child may expose such a child to a risk of harm.

[11]Regulation 13 provides that “harm” has the same meaning as in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989. In other words, harm has a relatively wide meaning and is a reference to:

“ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another.”

[12]Pursuant to regulation 10, the initial duration of suspension is six weeks. Such a suspension may, however, be extended, in circumstances set out in regulations 10(2) and (3). Regulation 10(3) provides that, where it is not reasonably practicable (for reasons beyond the control of the Respondent), within 12 weeks,(a) to complete an investigation by the Respondent into the grounds referred to in regulation 9 or

(b) for any “necessary steps” to be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm referred to in the regulation, the period of suspension may continue until the end of that investigation or until those steps have been taken. With regard to the Suspension, it seems to us that the Respondent, having completed its investigation and having made the Decision to Cancel, but in circumstances where there is an unresolved appeal in relation to the Decision to Cancel, would seek to rely on regulation 10(3)(b), with the “necessary steps” being those to cancel the Appellant’s registration.

[13]A suspension may also be lifted at any time, if the circumstances referred to in regulation 9 cease to exist.

[14]Regulation 12 provides the right of appeal to the Tribunal. On such an appeal, the Tribunal must either(a) confirm the decision to suspend the registration or

(b) direct that it shall cease to have effect.

[15]In our judgment, the correct approach in considering the Appeal is as follows:(1) First, we must ask ourselves whether, as at the date of the Hearing (rather than, for example, the date of the Decision), we are satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe the continued provision of childcare by the Appellant to any child may expose such a child to a material risk of harm. In this sense, we are to “step into the shoes” of the Respondent’s Chief Inspector and make the Decision afresh, rather than merely reviewing Ofsted’s earlier decision(s). As such, we can consider information/evidence not available to Ofsted at the time of the Decision. The burden of proof is on the Respondent. The relevant standard of proof (“reasonable cause to believe”) falls somewhere between “the balance of probabilities” and the lower threshold “reasonable cause to suspect”. The relevant belief is to be judged by whether a reasonable person, assumed to know the relevant law and be in possession of the relevant information, would believe a child may be put at a material risk of harm. The threshold, therefore, at this stage, is relatively low. We do not need to be satisfied there has been any actual harm, or that harm is likely in future. That said, having regard to the Upper Tribunal decision (see paragraph 20) in GM & WM v Ofsted

[2009] UKUT 89 (ACC)

, the contemplated risk needs to be one of “significant” harm. Being focused on assessing risk, we do not need to make any conclusive findings of fact (or resolve associated disputes of fact).

(2) Second, if satisfied that the above test/threshold relating to risk is met, we need to consider whether, objectively viewed, the relevant regulatory intervention (the Suspension) is proportionate, in all of the relevant circumstances. The Respondent, in our view, bears a persuasive burden in relation to this second issue. We set out our approach to considering this proportionality question further below.

[16]We had careful regard to these principles, and to the evidence and information before us, approaching the matter with an open and independent mind.

Background

[17]Background Given the broad principle that our role is primarily to assess risk (and then to consider the overall proportionality of the intervention appealed), rather than to resolve factual disputes, nothing in this section (or elsewhere in this document) ought to be taken as any conclusive finding of fact. However, it is nonetheless important that we set out what appears to us to be the most relevant context.

[18]The Appellant appears to have worked with children since she was a teenager in 2003. We want to be clear at the outset that there is no evidence, and no suggestion, that she has ever intentionally abused any child in her care. Indeed, there is no evidence, and no suggestion, that she has engaged in any conduct giving rise to material regulatory concern before approximately 2023. That may well be an important point in the consideration of any relevant issues at the hearing listed to consider the appeal against the Decision to Cancel.

[19]The basic chronology (without seeking to be comprehensive or finding facts conclusively) is quite complex. It appears likely, we think, to include the following:(1) In 2021, the Appellant appears to have registered on the Early Years Register and both parts of the Childcare Register. Her registered address was/is Flat 28 Powell Court in London (Powell Court), a one-bedroom flat. The Appellant did not at that time have any registered assistants, nor has since she had any. In other words, the Appellant has only been registered to care for children on her own and to do so at her domestic premises at Powell Court.

(2) In July 2023, the Appellant had her first inspection. There were no children on the roll at that time. The outcome was a “Met” outcome.

(3) In March 2024, the Appellant submitted a first application to register a non-domestic childcare provision referred to as “Apple Plum Nursery” (the Nursery) at 57 Beulah Road in Walthamstow (Beulah Road). Beulah Road is a significantly larger premises than Powell Court. That application was withdrawn the next month, however, after the Respondent pointed out that it had not been submitted under the correct legal entity.

(4) On 23 May 2024, the Appellant submitted a second application to register the Nursery under “Apple Plum Nursery Ltd” (i.e. the correct legal entity). The Appellant was/is the sole director and the Nominated Individual.

(5) On 8 August 2024, the Respondent carried out its first pre-registration visit at Beulah Road. It fed back that registration would not be recommended. In essence, it had not been demonstrated, at that point, that the premises were sufficiently safe and suitable. The Appellant withdrew the application.

(6) On 21 August 2024, the Respondent received a disclosure, from a member of the public, that the Appellant was allegedly caring for “around 10 babies” from Powell Court. The Respondent received similar concerns on 30 September 2024, which also alleged that she had been using assistants (i.e. her sister and her mother) who were not registered assistants, and further alleged that she had been providing childcare from Beulah Road and operating it as a nursery despite not being registered to do so.

(7) On 4 November 2024 and on 5 November 2024, the Respondent attempted to carry out unannounced visits at Beulah Road and at Powell Court. Access could not, however, be gained on either day.

(8) On 18 November 2024, an inspection of the Appellant’s childminding registration was arranged and carried out at Powell Court. The outcome was “Not Met”. The Appellant had no children on roll at that point. During the inspection, the Appellant is reported to have said that she had only cared for one child since her last inspection, to have denied caring for the number of children referred to in the concern raised by the member of the public, and to have denied using unregistered assistants. The inspector raised actions in relation to information and records and risk assessment.

(9) On 27 December 2024, the Appellant submitted a third application to register the Nursery at Beulah Road. Arrangements were made to conduct a regulatory visit on 7 March 2025.

(10) On 6 March 2025, the Respondent received information that childcare was being carried out, daily between 8.30 am and 6 pm, at Beulah Road, and that some “major building work” was allegedly being undertaken there.

(11) On 7 March 2025, the Respondent carried out the second registration visit, as planned, at Beulah Road. The premises were found to not be suitable for the care the Appellant wished to provide. The application was again withdrawn, for a third time. The Appellant asked about registering the premises as her childminding address under the “50% rule”, and was provided information on how to apply for that.

(12) On 18 March 2025, the Respondent met with the local authority to discuss concerns and later received some information from it relating to the Appellant having allegedly expressed an intention, on 28 March 2025 and 11 April 2025, to provide childcare at Beulah Road, despite not being registered to do so.

(13) On 11 April 2025, the Respondent carried out an unannounced visit at Beulah Road, to check whether there was any unregistered childcare being provided there. There was no evidence of that or anyone being present.

(14) On or around 13 May 2025, the Appellant applied to use Beulah Road as an additional childcare address linked to her childminding registration. Due to the history, the Respondent decided to conduct an inspection of the childminding registration prior to any approval of the additional premises.

(15) On 14 July 2025, Ms Crowley first became involved, with the matter being allocated to her as a regulatory case.

(16) On 15 September 2025, the Respondent (i.e. Ms Crowley) duly carried out an announced inspection of the Appellant’s childminding registration at Powell Court (the September Inspection). The Respondent provided the Appellant with a 3-day window in which it would carry out the visit. It is said, by Ms Crowley, that the Appellant appeared, during initial communications about this window, to become challenging, anxious, and/or angry, about having a window rather than a specific single day identified in advance, before apologising and returning to a calmer demeanour. On the day of the visit, the Appellant was caring for 3 early years children. She had 4 such children on roll at the time. She is said to have presented as calm throughout. The outcome was “Good”. Ms Crowley therefore explained that she could now complete the approval visit immediately. The Appellant appears, though, to have told the Respondent during the inspection that Beulah Road was not ready yet as some further work, repairs, or assessment was required. She is said to have indicated that such things were booked and would let Ms Crowley know when the premises were ready for the approval visit.

(17) The two subsequently engaged in email discussion about delays to the visit. On 3 October 2025, the Appellant is said to have indicated that Beulah Road would be ready in the next week or two. On 6 October, the Appellant appears to have emailed Ms Crowley to say Beulah Road will “probably” be ready by the end of the month. Ms Crowley says this was a surprise, given the Appellant previously seemed very keen for things to progress swiftly.

(18) On 7 October 2025, the Respondent received concerns from the local authority that the Appellant was providing childcare at Beulah Road. This is said to have been based on information from a grandparent of a child who had allegedly been attending Beulah Road regularly for around a year.

(19) On 29 October 2025, following up on such concerns, the Respondent carried out an unannounced visit at Beulah Road (the October Visit). The Appellant and her mother were present. The October Visit appears to have been relatively dramatic and relevant, in a number of respects, to the Respondent’s decision-making. We return to it in more detail below but, among other things, the Respondent found the Appellant to be caring for 16 children that day at Beulah Road – there is no dispute about that number. They all, in essence, at least at times, appear to have been being looked after in one room (which was not big enough for them all). There are, however, other matters relating to the October Visit which are in dispute, including, for example, in relation to Ms Crowley’s account of the Appellant being obstructive and aggressive.

(20) On 31 October 2025, a multi-agency meeting was held, including the Respondent, to discuss concerns. This meeting was Ms Wildman’s first material engagement in the case. Later that day, the Respondent held a case review meeting (chaired by Ms Wildman, attended by Ms Crowley), and Ms Wildman made the decision to suspend the Appellant’s registration with immediate effect. In a phone call later that day, Ms Crowley informed the Appellant of the Decision, and served the notice by email. Ms Crowley’s evidence is that the Appellant became angry in that call and, among other things, made derogatory comments about Ofsted and accused her of trying to ruin her business and taking a bribe from another large provider which the Appellant believed considered her as a threat to its business.

(21) On 4 November 2025, Ms Crowley held another discussion on the phone with the Appellant. Ms Crowley’s evidence is that the Appellant was calm and respectful in this call, as she had been at the September Inspection.

(22) On 10 December 2025, the Appellant’s registration was suspended for a second period. Ms Wildman made that decision.

(23) On 16 January 2026, the Appellant requested that the Respondent lift the suspension. It declined to do so.

(24) On 22 January 2026, the Appellant’s registration was suspended for a third period. Ms Wildman made that decision.

(25) On 23 January 2026, the Respondent issued a notice of intention to cancel the Appellant’s registration. Ms Wildman made that decision. It seems to have been made somewhat earlier than the service of the notice, during a case conference in or around December 2025.

(26) On 18 February 2026, the Appellant submitted written objections to the notice of intention to cancel. Those objections were considered by a colleague of Ms Wildman, who upheld the decision/notice.

(27) On 4 March 2026, the Appellant’s registration was suspended for a fourth period. That decision was made by a colleague of Ms Wildman, due to her absence at that time.

(28) On 20 March 2026, the Respondent issued a formal notice of the Decision to Cancel, along with a letter in response to the Appellant’s objections. That decision was made by a colleague of Ms Wildman’s at the Respondent.

(29) On 14 April 2026, the Appellant’s registration was suspended for a fifth period. Ms Wildman made that decision.

(30) On 17 April 2026, the Appellant appealed the Decision to Cancel. As indicated, that appeal forms part of a separate process before the Tribunal. We are told that a 4-day hearing has been listed to determine that appeal, which will involve a different test and approach, in January 2027.

(31) On 28 May 2026, the Appellant’s registration was suspended for a sixth period. That decision was made by a colleague of Ms Wildman, due to her absence.

(32) On 9 July 2026, the Appellant’s registration was suspended for a seventh period. The Decision was made by a colleague of Ms Wildman, Ms Pooni, due to Ms Wildman’s absence at that time. It was made at or following a case review conducted on 8 July 2026.

(33) On 27 July 2026, the Appellant presented the Appeal. On or around 27 July 2026, a case review was held by the Respondent and it decided to defend the Appeal. Ms Wildman chaired that meeting and made that decision. Conclusions with Reasons Summary

Conclusions with Reasons

[20]We have come to the following conclusions on the limited information before us:(1) First, in our judgment, there would, at present, be a material risk of harm to children if the Suspension was not in place. We are satisfied that the relevant (and relatively low) threshold relating to risk is met. In other words, we are satisfied that a reasonable person would believe that continued provision of childcare by the Appellant to any child may expose such a child to a risk of significant harm.

(2) Second, in our judgment, the Suspension is, at present (i.e. as at the time of the Hearing), objectively justified as proportionate.

[21]We set out further reasoning below. What follows is not designed to cover all of the matters touched on in documents. It is however designed to be sufficient to clarify the core reasons why we reached our decision.

Our Decision Regarding Risk

[22]Our Decision Regarding Risk Stepping back and trying to look at things in the round, we are satisfied that, as at the date of the Hearing, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the provision of childcare by the Appellant may expose children to a risk of significant harm. We take a similar view to that expressed by the Respondent: i.e. we consider there to be a number of different (but connected) matters which are relevant and which, cumulatively and collectively, give rise to the relevant risk. We rely on the following in support of our view.

Knowingly providing unregistered childcare or childcare at unregistered premises

[23]Knowingly providing unregistered childcare or childcare at unregistered premises There does not appear to be a dispute that the Appellant provided unregistered childcare and/or childcare at unregistered premises (i.e. at Beulah Road). It seems to be clear she was doing so on the day of the October Visit. It is less clear, to us, how many other times – or for how long – such childcare had been provided at Beulah Road, but there is at least a reasonable prospect that it had been on many occasions and over a period of many months. The Appellant appears to accept that she did so for around a year, between the autumn of 2024 up to the October Visit at the end of October 2025.

[24]There may be a dispute about whether the Appellant always knew, subjectively, that she was not registered to do so and/or, more precisely, whether she was not permitted to do so. In her evidence, the Appellant referred to a discussion she says took place with an Ofsted employee, called Siobhan, in August 2024. The Appellant asserts that, in that discussion, this employee indicated that she could not see any reason why the Appellant could not provide childcare from Beulah Road. The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s account on this point is unreliable or otherwise inaccurate. Its evidence and submissions were, to summarise, that its employee would not, in the relevant circumstances, have made any comment that could properly be interpreted as giving permission to the Appellant to start using Beulah Road. It also indicated that this is matter that shall be explored more fully in the hearing listed for January 2027. We do not make any finding of fact. That said, we did not find the Appellant’s account on this point, in all the apparent circumstances at that point in the chronology, to be obviously persuasive. We do not find that account sufficiently persuasive to remove the concerns relied on by the Respondent. At this point, and on the limited evidence before us, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant made a decision to start using Beulah Road even though she was aware she was not permitted to do so. The decision appears to have been made in circumstances where the Appellant felt under considerable pressure from parents of the child she had been caring for and/or wished to care for to use the bigger and better premises, and where she (or others such as her family) has invested a lot of time and money in trying to get Beulah Road ready and registered. On balance, there are, in our view, reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant was aware that she was not properly registered to use Beulah Road, and that she should not be using it, but did so anyway. In this way, there are similarly reasonably grounds to believe that the Appellant thereby placed children at a risk of harm, given the lack of effective regulatory oversight which inevitably flowed from her action/decision.

[25]While there may be some complexity to the surrounding context, it does seem that the Appellant had been informed, on two occasions, that Beulah Road had not been considered suitable (at those times) for the relevant provision of childcare. The Respondent takes the view that in going on to use it, the Appellant demonstrated a flagrant and wilful disregard for the importance of complying with regulatory requirements – and by extension, the arrangements in place to ensure the safety of children. The Respondent suggests that such things, especially when taken with other matters referred to below, at least cast serious doubt over her overall reliability, integrity, and honesty, when it comes to such professional and regulatory matters. Indeed, it says vital trust has been broken. We return to this point further below.

Using unassessed assistants

[26]Using unassessed assistants While again we do not seek to make conclusive findings of fact, there are, in our view, reasonable grounds to believe the Appellant provided relevant care with the help of unassessed assistants. The Appellant appears to accept that she has been assisted, in a such a way, by her sister and that she was not assessed by the relevant regulator at material times. The Appellant appears to accept that the same or similar applies to her mother. The Appellant further accepts, it seems, that she has used other assistants, or at least one other assistant, sourced from agencies or similar. We are satisfied that, as a general proposition, children may well be placed at a heightened risk of harm by the use of unassessed assistants. While it could be argued that such a risk may be lower in circumstances where, as here, the relevant individual is in a relatively strong position to understand and evaluate any potential risk posed by such assistants (e.g. if they know them very well), that is not how the system is meant to operate or needs to operate. It is very important that assistants are properly assessed/vetted by the regulator. There may be issues relating to such assistants that are not widely or otherwise known, and which could be highly relevant to any risk posed to children. A statutory regulator is, in this way, denied the opportunity to satisfy itself as to the suitability or otherwise (in relation to competence, character, conduct, etc) of the assistants to work with children. The Respondent submits that the Appellant is particularly culpable in this respect in relation to her mother, given that she is said (see below) to have engaged in conduct during the October Visit, when children were present, which specifically put children at a risk of emotional harm.

[27]In summary, we think this is a further factor which adds to the overall risk profile.

Exceeding permitted ratios

[28]Exceeding permitted ratios There again appears to be no dispute that the arrangements in place at the time of the October Visit led to the Appellant far exceeding the permitted ratio (i.e. the ratio of staff to children). There are two potential scenarios, it seems:(a) the Appellant was providing such services alone, for 16 young children; or

(b) the Appellant was providing such services with the assistance of her mother (as an unassessed assistant). While the latter scenario has at times been denied, there are at least reasonable grounds to believe that is likely to be what was happening that day. But in either scenario, permitted ratios would have been far exceeded.

[29]Such ratios are important. There are in place for good reason. There are grounds to believe that the Appellant put children at risk of significant harm on that day. To take an obvious example: had there been a fire, on that day, it would have been very difficult for the Appellant (or the Appellant and her mother) to have got all 16 children out safely and speedily. There are countless other scenarios in which such children, with inadequate staff members present, could be put at risk: there could have been an accident, or a medical issue or emergency, or a behavioural issue, or any other kind of significant issue relating to one or more of the children (or indeed the adults) which could well have made it impossible to safely focus on and care adequately for all of the children. In addition, the evidence suggests that one or two adults could not also provide sufficient stimulation for such a large group of young children.

[30]Moreover, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant was well aware she was operating well over the permitted ratio. She appears to accept this. She referred to feeling very stressed about this at the time she realised the visit was taking place. She asserted in her oral evidence that she had made efforts that morning to try to secure additional (albeit unassessed) assistants, and was either let down or otherwise was unable to secure the same. She had the option to not accept the children. She appears to have felt unable, or to have been unwilling, to make such a decision. This again, building on wider points, tends to suggest the Appellant was, at that time at least, either unwilling or unable to act in line with acceptable practice and comply with important regulatory requirements.

Personal conduct or attitudinal issues towards the regulator and engagement

[31]Personal conduct or attitudinal issues towards the regulator and engagement There is a dispute about exactly what occurred during the course of the October Visit. As ever, we do not seek to make conclusive findings of fact. But there are, in our judgment, reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant has, at material times, engaged broadly in the type of conduct alleged by the Respondent, and has held views towards Ofsted of the type alleged. The strongest evidence in support of this comes from Ms Crowley who had three relevant interactions with the Appellant at material times, which we consider below. We have to say that, in our view, Ms Crowley came across in the Hearing as a witness who was trying to assist the Tribunal with accurate evidence – she very much appears to be an experienced and competent inspector, and a reliable and accurate witness. She does not present as someone likely to be over-sensitive or to have misinterpreted matters in some fundamental way. She told us that she made her notes of the visit very soon after it ended (while matters were fresh in her memory), and the information in those notes was consistent with the evidence in her statement and in her oral evidence. In addition, we were able to form some views ourselves based directly on our observations of the Appellant during the Hearing. In broad terms, and for present purposes, we are satisfied that Ms Crowley’s account provides objectively reasonable grounds for the concerns relied on by the Respondent. In relative terms, and while not making conclusive findings, the Appellant did not appear to be as reliable or accurate as Ms Crowley and, in general, had it been necessary to make findings of fact, we would have been minded to prefer the evidence of Ms Crowley where it was in dispute.

[32]First, there is the evidence from Ms Crowley that the Appellant became overly challenging and difficult in the initial discussion about providing a window rather than a particular date for the October Visit. That account appeared, on the face of it, to be credible and persuasive. As such, it would then be consistent with the idea that the Appellant, when placed under stress, was liable to become frustrated, unreasonable, or angry, etc, when dealing with Ofsted.

[33]Second, there is the evidence from Ms Crowley after the October Visit relating to the call in which she conveyed the Decision to the Appellant. That account appeared to be credible and persuasive, on the face of it, too. Indeed, the Appellant appeared in her oral evidence to accept that she was emotional, upset, and/or shocked about the Decision and, in such circumstance, said things she later regretted (including the highly-implausible suggestion that Ms Crowley had accepted some kind of bribe). The Appellant’s apparent conduct both before and after the October Visit would appear, on the face of it, to make it more likely that she acted in a similarly unfiltered manner during the visit.

[34]Third, there is the evidence from Ms Crowley about the October Visit. As mentioned: she has been consistent in her account and it had the ring of plausibility. To summarise, Ms Crowley’s account includes the following assertions. It is a striking account of both the Appellant and her mother being unreasonable, uncooperative, and obstructive. She says that, initially, she was on arrival ignored by the Appellant’s mother, despite clearly being aware of her presence outside the premises. She says that the mother eventually came to the door but initially refused to allow Ms Crowley access, and claimed only to be a cleaner and that any children present were her grandchildren, before returning inside and trying to obscure Ms Crowley’s view by placing barriers in the way. She says that, after further delays, the Appellant eventually came to the door, appearing to be exasperated and angry, and only reluctantly allowing Ms Crowley in. She says the 16 children were all, by then, sitting on baby floor seats, with no sufficient toys or play equipment. Some, she says, were distressed, some silent. She says some were fidgety and shuffling about, causing at least one child to fall forward and “hit” their head on the floor. She says she had to draw to the Appellant’s attention that one or more children had fallen in this way and needed to be assisted. She describes a chaotic scene which was, in her view, obviously unsafe. She says the Appellant initially denied that her mother was working with the children, describing her as the cook. Most of the children appear to have been aged 1, with a few being 2, 3 or less than 1. At various points, she says that both the Appellant and her mother expressed the view that any issues had been Ofsted’s fault, in a loud and aggressive manner, in front of children, making it difficult and traumatic for Ms Crowley to respond or otherwise discharge her duties. She says that the mother may have been more aggressive but that the Appellant also engaged in such behaviour. The Appellant appears to accept that her mother engaged in some such behaviour, and thus put children at risk of emotional harm, but denies she did, suggesting that Ms Crowley has confused or conflated the two of them. While that is possible, there are reasonable grounds for giving greater weight to Ms Crowley’s account for present purposes. She says that the Appellant became angry when told she needed to contact the parents and ask them to collect their children as she could not permit unregistered care to continue and again in relation to a delay in permitting the children to be fed a hot lunch. She says that both the Appellant and her mother continued to be very difficult when the parents started to arrive, and that the Appellant for example sought to prevent or otherwise make it difficult for the parents to speak with Ms Crowley or vice versa, and repeatedly blamed Ofsted for the situation. She says they repeatedly shouted and raised their voices, all of which was likely to distress the children present, and failed to adapt their behaviour even after Ms Crowley reminded them of the possible impact on the children observing such conduct. On one occasion, she says the mother held her arms and pushed her backwards with some force. Once all but one of the children had left, she says that the Appellant continued to be obstructive in responding to her questions: refusing, initially, to confirm her mother’s name; being very slow to assist with providing information about the names, ages, and details of the children, initially indicating that she did not have access to such information and then, slowly, when challenged further, providing it.

[35]In the Hearing, there were a few things which did reduce further the level of confidence we felt able to have in the Appellant. For example, at one point, when it seemed to have become clear there was someone else in the room with her (mainly just outside the view of the camera) during the course of the Hearing, the Appellant was slow to be open and transparent about that rather than being clear and direct. There are also some other indications that the Appellant is not always accurate or reliable on important matters. For example: in one of the supportive accounts provided by a parent on 6 August 2026, the parent stated that “since November 2025”, the Appellant “has been caring for my … children … in my home several days each week” (at page 202); but in a letter to Ofsted on 16 January 2026, the Appellant herself stated (at page 71) that “during my suspension period, many parents approached me with offers to care for their children in their homes. I recognise the seriousness of the suspension … I therefore declined all such requests…”

[36]Overall: there are reasonable grounds to believe, in our view, that the Appellant has not always been accurate or transparent or reasonably cooperative with her regulator, in relation to important matters, and has not respected the importance of the regulator’s role or of complying with the relevant regulations. There are reasonable grounds for a belief that some of the relevant conduct may have been deliberate rather than the product of oversight, mistake or incompetence. This is relevant to the overall risk as it reduces the confidence that the regulator, or this Tribunal, can have in the ability or willingness of the Appellant to comply with relevant requirements in the future, especially when under pressures (e.g. to get a return on her investments, to please parents, to try to avoid an uncomfortable truth or reality, etc) to do otherwise.

Cumulative effects – and assessing risk at the time of the Hearing

[37]Cumulative effects – and assessing risk at the time of the Hearing As indicated, we rely on the cumulative effect of various factors. Taking these various factors together, we are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant may place children at risk if permitted to continue to care for them. The risk relates more to her ability to make sound, safe, and responsible decisions about the administration/management of operational arrangements, rather than anything more personal about her direct contact or care for the children individually. But those things are important and give rise to the relevant risk for all of the children that would or might be under her care.

[38]Building on and related to this point, we are not satisfied that the steps that have been taken or proposed by the Appellant have been or are currently sufficient to reduce the risks we have in mind to an acceptable level. We have regard to the fact that she has in the past received a “Good” rating. But that was following an announced inspection and in circumstances where she had only 3 children with her. We have regard to the positive character references or testimonial type documents provided by parents. While positive, we only place limited weight on such documents, not least given that the authors may have limited understanding of relevant matters and have not had their accounts or evidence tested in a hearing. We have regard to the Appellant’s suggestion that one or more cameras be used to monitor her. This may be relevant but is insufficient. It would not provide sufficient assurance. It would depend on the integrity of the Appellant to do it properly and reliably. It would not necessarily prevent problems, even if it may create a retrospective record of them. The regulator would not be able to monitor them in real time or effectively. We have regard to the indication that the Appellant recognises that her mother has proven to be too emotionally involved and cannot return to work at her premises (even though well regarded by the children and parents), and to her indication that she has regrets and remorse and believes she could and would act differently in the future in relevant respects.

Our Decision Regarding Proportionality

[39]Our Decision Regarding Proportionality Being satisfied that the risk threshold is met, we turn to the second question about proportionality. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Suspension is, at present, objectively justified as proportionate.

[40]First, the harm contemplated is more than merely trivial or minor: it is, in our view, sufficiently significant/serious. It could, realistically, include a significant level of physical, emotional, or developmental harm. We have most in mind the potential for such harm arising from so many young children being cared for by so few adults, by unassessed assistants, in unregulated premises, all under a key individual who, at present, has some vital trust and confidence to try to rebuild with her regulator. There was a realistic and sufficient possibility of serious physical harm arising from the arrangements that appear to have been in place. There is only limited evidence, at present, of well-developed insight, though we do think this is something which appears to be developing. At this time, in light of the other evidence, any positive points or plans are not sufficient, in our view, to reduce the overall risk profile enough.

[41]Second, there is a legitimate aim engaged in relation to the measure adopted. It relates to the protection of vulnerable children from a risk of significant harm. The Suspension relates directly to the pursuance or achievement of that aim. The high importance of that aim means that the Suspension is more readily justified as proportionate. The immediate purpose is to keep children safe. The Suspension is justified, for these reasons, at present. Ofsted is under a duty (pursuant to Regulation 11) to keep the Suspension under review. Much may turn, in the end, on the outcome of the hearing in January and whether by then the Appellant has developed sufficient insight etc and can demonstrate it.

[42]Third, we have endeavoured to have careful regard to the adverse impact of the Suspension, on the Appellant and any other relevant people. We can see that, generally, it will have an adverse impact. It would appear to reduce the Appellant’s income. It may well cause reputational damage (including unfair damage due to unfair stigma or rumours – e.g. that the Suspension may be the result of other types of alleged misconduct). That said, there is a lack of direct or persuasive evidence from the Appellant about the real nature and degree of any such impact (e.g. of financial losses etc). While there is some, there is no sufficient evidence before us that children are or will be, as a result of the Suspension continuing, disproportionately impacted. Overall we are content, on the current evidence, that the high importance of the legitimate aim outweighs the adverse impact at present.

[43]Fourth, in light of the above, we are satisfied the legitimate aim cannot realistically be achieved adequately by a less-restrictive measure (whether by way of potential conditions or any other alternative). This is especially the case, in our view, given the current concerns, which we judge to be reasonable, in relation to the Appellant’s ability or willingness to be accurate, open, transparent, and reliable with her regulator – and to recognise, understand, and accept the importance of regulation and the associated requirements. It is both appropriate and reasonably necessary, in our view, for the Suspension to remain at this time. Our decision is based on the limited information before the panel, as it must be, at the time of the Hearing. We did not consider it necessary to, in addition, rely on the importance of any wider legitimate aim, such as that of maintaining public confidence in the overall statutory scheme. But, had we done so, that may have been a further factor supporting our decision.

Outcome

[44]Outcome In our judgment, the statutory criteria for suspension remain satisfied and the continuation of the Suspension is presently proportionate. The Appeal is therefore dismissed and the Decision is confirmed.

[45]For the avoidance of doubt: nothing above should be taken as a guide to what we think the outcome should be of the hearing of the Appellant’s appeal against the Decision to Cancel. Things may (or may not) be materially different by that stage – e.g. in relation to the nature and extent of the Appellant’s insight, or whether sufficient trust and confidence exists – and the test to be applied is different. In other words, we should not be taken, in this decision document, to be indicating that we think that the Appellant’s registration should have been or should be cancelled: we offer no view on that question – it shall be a matter for that Tribunal at the time of that hearing. SJW Lewis Date Issued: 20 August 2026