Sakina Care Limited v Care Quality Commission [2026] UKFTT 1191 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01191 (HESC)

2026-01968.EA

Hearing held remotely

on 13/08/2026

Before

Tribunal Judge Edwards

Specialist Member E Knapp

Specialist Member G Sharma

Between

Sakina Care LimitedAppellant

-v-

Between

Care Quality CommissionRespondent

DECISION ON LATE APPEAL

The Application

Date 2026-08-18

[1]The Tribunal is concerned with the Appellant’s application to submit a late appeal against the Respondent’s refusal to register it as a provider of accommodation for persons who require nursing or personal care at Ashton House Residential Home. Attendance

[2]Miss Neelam Ilyas, owner and Director of Sakina Care Limited represented the Appellant

[3]Mrs Winifred Carty, solicitor, represented the Respondent

[4]Miss Safa Mahmood of the CQC attended the hearing as an observer

[5]Lee-Ann Frampton Anderson of the CQC attended the hearing as an observer. Background

[6]The appeal concerns a Notice of Decision dated 04/06/2026 by which the Care Quality Commission refused the Appellant's application for registration in respect of the regulated activity of accommodation for persons who require nursing or personal care.

[7]The Notice of Decision was deemed served on 05/06/2026. Pursuant to section 32(2) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, any appeal was required to be brought within 28 days of service. The last day for lodging an appeal was therefore 03/07/2026.

[8]The Tribunal received the Appellant's notice of appeal on 05/07/2026, two days after expiry of the statutory time limit. The sole issue before the Tribunal at this preliminary hearing is whether the appeal should be admitted out of time. Legal Framework Health and Social Care Act 2008 Section 32(2) of the Act provides that no appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order. Tribunal Procedure Rules Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008, requires the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Rule 5(3)(a) provides that the Tribunal may extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, unless such extension or shortening would conflict with a provision of another enactment containing a time limit. Rule 20(1)(a) requires that an applicant must start proceedings before the Tribunal by sending or delivering an application notice to the Tribunal so that it is received - if the time for providing the application notice is specified in another enactment, in accordance with that enactment. Rule 20(4) requires that if the applicant provides the application notice to the Tribunal later than the time required by paragraph (1) or by any extension of time under rule 5(3)(a) (power to extend time) —(a) the application notice must include a request for an extension of time and the reason why the application notice was not provided in time; and

(b) unless the Tribunal extends time for the application notice under rule 5(3)(a) (power to extend time) the Tribunal must not admit the application notice. Relevant Authorities Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica

[2012] UKSC 20

The Supreme Court held that apparently absolute statutory appeal time limits may, in exceptional circumstances, be interpreted compatibly with

Article 6 ECHR

so that access to justice is preserved. Adesina v Nursing and Midwifery Council

[2013] EWCA Civ 818

The Court of Appeal confirmed that any discretion to permit a late statutory appeal is extremely limited and should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Stuewe v Health and Care Professions Council

[2021] EWHC 3362 (Admin)

The High Court reaffirmed that the relevant question is whether the circumstances are exceptional when viewed as a whole. Ordinary mistakes, misunderstandings or procedural errors will not ordinarily satisfy that threshold. Answering the question may or may not include consideration of whether or not the litigant has done everything possible to serve within time, depending on the facts of the case. Once the discretion (or duty) arises, it must then be exercised to the minimum extent necessary to secure compliance with Article 6 rights. Submissions

[9]We had the benefit of written submissions from both parties, and these were supplemented by oral submissions at the hearing. Appellant

[10]The Appellant accepts that the appeal was lodged out of time. Its explanation is that, acting without legal representation, it misunderstood the applicable deadline and mistakenly believed that the relevant period was calculated in working days rather than calendar days. It contends that the error was genuine, that the delay was very short, that it intended throughout to pursue an appeal, and that it lodged the appeal immediately once the position was understood.

[11]The Appellant relies on its status as a litigant in person. The Appellant’s representative accepts that she did not take advice throughout the process and did not query with the Respondent or the Tribunal the precise length of the statutory timetable. The Appellant’s representative told us that in previous dealings with the Respondent when submitting her application, she was advised that response times were calculated in working days. This probably led to the misunderstanding in respect of the appeal time limit.

[12]The Appellant further submits that no prejudice has been caused because the proposed service is not operational, no residents have been admitted, and the substantive appeal is arguable and ought to be determined on its merits. The Appellant accepts that the threshold for extending time is high but argues that the statutory limit is not absolute and the Tribunal does have discretion to admit the appeal out of time. The Appellant submits that refusing do to so would impair the essence of the right of appeal in this case and would breach the Appellant's rights under Article 6 of the EHCR. Respondent

[13]The Respondent opposes the application. It submits that the statutory time limit is fixed by primary legislation and that the authorities establish only an extremely limited ability to admit an appeal brought outside that period. The Respondent submits that the sole question for the Tribunal was whether such circumstances existed and whether refusal to admit the appeal would impair the very essence of the Appellant's right of appeal.

[14]The Respondent accepts the Appellant's explanation that it had misunderstood the reference to a period of 28 days and believed that the period was to be calculated by reference to working days. However, it submits that the Notice of Decision referred simply to a period of 28 days and that a misunderstanding of the deadline could not amount to an exceptional circumstance. Relying in particular upon Stuewe, the Respondent submitted that the relevant question was whether the Appellant had a meaningful opportunity to bring an appeal within time. It distinguished the present case from cases in which an appellant had been unable to exercise the right of appeal through no fault of their own, for example because of incapacity or some comparable circumstance.

[15]The Respondent submits that the Appellant received the Notice of Decision on 05/06/2026 and was clearly informed of the 28-day appeal period within the Notice of Decision. The Appellant had the entirety of the statutory period available in which to lodge an appeal. It noted that the Appellant had been actively engaged throughout the registration process and that, upon receipt of the Notice of Decision, was provided with clear information concerning its appeal rights and afforded the full 28-day statutory period. Given the significance of the decision to the Appellant, the Respondent submitted that there was nothing preventing the Appellant from taking steps to ensure that any appeal was lodged within time. The Respondent observed that the Appellant had not contacted either the Respondent or the Tribunal to clarify the applicable deadline.

[16]The Respondent further submits that the shortness of the delay and the absence of prejudice do not, of themselves, justify departure from the statutory scheme. It submits that section 32(2) draws no distinction according to the length of any delay and that the prescribed time limit is 28 days. It argues that there were sound policy reasons for the imposition of strict statutory time limits and if the mere fact of being only slightly late were sufficient to justify admission of an appeal, the statutory time limit would effectively become optional rather than mandatory. The Respondent submits that the 28-day period is a statutory requirement, not a target, and that permitting an extension in circumstances such as these would dilute the importance of the statutory limit established by Parliament. The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons

[17]In determining this application, we are not required to make any findings of fact. It is accepted that the appeal was submitted late and that the Appellant made a genuine mistake in miscalculating the statutory timescale. We have to decide whether the circumstances which led to the appeal being submitted late were exceptional, for the purposes of the relevant authorities. The burden is effectively on the Appellant to demonstrate circumstances sufficiently exceptional that refusal to admit the appeal would impair the very essence of the right of appeal recognised by Article 6. The question is not whether the Tribunal thinks an extension would be fair, but whether the very high threshold identified in Pomiechowski, Adesina and Stuewe is met.

[18]We understand and acknowledge that the Appellant made a genuine mistake and that, once this became apparent, the appeal was submitted without delay. We accept that the appeal was submitted only 2 days out of time. We further accept that the Appellant was acting without legal advice or representation and did its best during the appeal period to prepare a detailed appeal. Prior to this the Appellant had engaged appropriately with the Respondent in respect of the enforcement process.

[19]However, in applying the law correctly, we are unable to conclude that the circumstances outlined by the Appellant are exceptional. This is not a case where, as outlined in Stuewe, the Appellant was prevented from bringing an appeal and where the very essence of its right to appeal has been impaired. The Notice of Decision contained very clear directions as to the appeals process and the time limits. The time period was very clearly set out as being 28 days, as opposed to 28 working days. This appeal is clearly a matter of considerable importance to the Appellant. It has an impact on the Appellant’s ability to conduct its business. The Appellant could reasonably have been expected to check with either the Respondent or the Tribunal if there was any uncertainty as to the time period. This could have been done very quickly and easily. The Appellant not being legally represented created no bar, in our judgment, to the appeal being lodged on time. Ultimately, the Appellant has not demonstrated that it was prevented from lodging an appeal in time, nor that it took all reasonable steps to ascertain and comply with the statutory deadline.

[20]The fact that the delay in submitting the appeal was a short one does not in our judgment give rise to exceptional circumstances. We recognise that the delay was short. However, section 32(2) draws no distinction according to the degree of lateness. The authorities demonstrate that the relevant question is not the length of the delay but whether exceptional circumstances existed which prevented effective exercise of the right of appeal. The short delay is therefore a factor we have considered, but it is not determinative.

[21]We have considered the circumstances cumulatively rather than in isolation, namely the Appellant's status as a litigant in person, the genuine misunderstanding of the time limit, the shortness of the delay, the prompt lodging of the appeal once the mistake was identified, and the absence of any identified prejudice. Even when viewed collectively, those matters do not amount to exceptional circumstances within the meaning of the authorities.

[22]There has been no breach of the Appellant’s right to a fair hearing. The Appellant was informed of its appeal rights, knew of the decision affecting it, had the full statutory period available, and was under no practical impediment preventing the lodging of an appeal. The inability to pursue the appeal results not from any denial of access to a tribunal but from its failure to comply with the statutory time limit. We are therefore satisfied that refusal to admit the appeal would not impair the very essence of the Appellant's right of access to a court.

[23]We are satisfied that the circumstances relied upon by the Appellant do not meet the exceptional threshold identified in the authorities. Accordingly, the limited jurisdiction to disapply the statutory time limit in order to protect Article 6 rights does not arise in this case. The appeal cannot therefore be admitted out of time. Decision: 1. The Appellant’s application to submit a late appeal is refused. 2. This is the final hearing, and the appeal is hereby concluded. 24. First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued:18 August 2026