Social Care Wales v Jessica Gibbons [2026] UKFTT 1176 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care StandardsThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 20082026-01912.ISO-WNeutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01176 (HESC)Hearing Heard on 13 August 2026, remotely via videoMr SJW Lewis (Judge)Ms R Flynn (Specialist Member)Mr D Styles (Specialist Member)Social Care WalesApplicantJessica GibbonsRespondentDECISIONThe ApplicationDate 2026-08-17
[1]Social Care Wales (SCW) brings an application dated 3 June 2026 (the Application), under the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016 (the Act) to extend – or, more accurately, to further extend – an Interim Suspension Order (the ISO) initially made by SCW’s Interim Orders Panel (the IOP) on 4 April 2024 against Ms Gibbons, the Respondent to these proceedings (the Proceedings). The Respondent was registered as, and was working as, a Residential Child Care Support Worker at material times. Unless extended by the Tribunal, the ISO was due to expire on 3 October 2026. It had already been extended by the Tribunal at a hearing on 9 September 2025, following an earlier application to do so from SCW. This is therefore now SCW’s second application to extend it.

The Hearing

[2]The Hearing The Application was determined at a remote hearing held via video on 13 August 2026 (the Hearing). SCW was represented by Ms C Rawle, a solicitor from Blake Morgan LLP. SCW relied on the evidence of one witness, Mr Jonathan Price, who attended the Hearing. The Respondent did not attend and has not engaged in the Proceedings.

Documents, Evidence, Submissions

[3]Documents, Evidence, Submissions The bundle of documents runs to 322 pages. It includes:(1) the form setting out the Application;(2) a case management order that appears to have been issued to the parties on 13 July 2026 with directions for the Hearing;(3) a witness statement from Mr Price, with multiple exhibits, along with an earlier statement from Mr Price prepared for the 2025 hearing before the Tribunal, with multiple exhibits;(4) extracts from the Act and guidance, and a report of the Court of Appeal case of General Medical Council v Hiew [2017] 1 WLR 2007.[4]SCW has also provided a skeleton argument. In summary, SCW submits that the underlying allegations in this case are of a very serious nature and that there is a compelling argument to extend the ISO for a further 12 months as the relevant level of risk has not, on the evidence, diminished and in order for an ongoing police process to complete along with any associated fitness to practise proceedings that may follow.[5]Mr Price gave oral evidence, doing so under oath. His ability to assist the Tribunal in relation to detailed matters relating to the underlying allegations was inevitably somewhat limited, given the limitations in the information he has to date had access to. But we found him generally to be highly reliable, as a witness, on those matters he had direct knowledge of.[6]We have had regard to the written and oral evidence before us, even if we do not explicitly refer to it all specifically below.

Preliminary Matters

[7]Preliminary Matters The Tribunal considered whether to proceed with the Hearing in the absence of the Respondent. The Tribunal had regard to the principles of a fair hearing and to the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 (the Rules). Having heard submissions and from Mr Price too on this preliminary matter, the Tribunal concluded that it should proceed in the Respondent’s absence:(1) First, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondent had been notified of the Hearing or that reasonable steps had been taken to notify her of it. On the evidence before us, a formal order, providing such notification, had been issued by the Tribunal on 13 July 2026. Further, we are satisfied that Mr Price sent two recent emails to the account held on record for the Respondent and, in relation to both, had received a message (or similar) indicating the emails had been delivered. In the first email, dated 14 July 2026, Mr Price referred to the Proceedings and to the fact a hearing had by then been listed by the Tribunal, and offered to respond to any queries she might have. In the second, dated 11 August 2026, Mr Price forwarded the most recent update received by SCW from the police, and referred, albeit not expressly, to the Hearing being “on Thursday” (i.e. on 13 August 2026). While we cannot be clear whether any such messages were read by the Respondent, we are satisfied (having due regard to the wider evidence – referred to more fully below – that the Respondent appears, in effect, to have ceased engagement with SCW and/or the Tribunal) that reasonable efforts have been made to notify the Respondent of the Hearing. Among other things, we are told there is no other known email address to use and no telephone number other than one which, having been tried in the past, appears to no longer be connected or available.(2) Second, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the Hearing. The evidence suggests an established history of non-engagement from the Respondent in relation to relevant matters. The last contact from the Respondent was with Mr Price, by phone, back in November 2023. There does not appear to be any sufficient prospect that adjourning, to provide the Respondent with a further opportunity to engage and to attend a later hearing, would result in any greater participation from the Respondent. There is no medical evidence to indicate the Respondent is too unwell to attend, or any evidence to suggest she is otherwise unable to. We had in mind that the ISO is due to expire in early October 2026 and that, therefore, an effective hearing needs to occur relatively soon. Plainly, there is no application for an adjournment (and SCW submitted we ought not to adjourn). We also had some regard to overall seriousness that others, such as SCW, the IOP, and the Tribunal at the previous hearing have attached to the underlying allegations and any associated level of risk.[8]The Tribunal also considered a second preliminary matter. It became clear at the outset of the Hearing that one of the specialist members of the Tribunal had been part of the Tribunal panel at the hearing in September 2025. The Tribunal raised this matter with SCW at the start of the Hearing. SCW had no objections, and could see no material issue with the same. Having considered the matter, the Tribunal was content in all the circumstances, including the fact that two of the members – including the judicial member – were entirely fresh to the case, to proceed with the Hearing, and to do so with all three members remaining in place.

Legal Framework and Principles

[9]Legal Framework and Principles Relevant provisions in the Act SCW is the regulator for the social care profession in Wales. Section 68(1) of the Act provides that SCW’s main objective in carrying out its functions is to protect, promote and maintain the safety and wellbeing of the public in Wales.[10]Sections 143-149 of the Act deal with the imposition of interim orders.[11]Under section 144(4) of the Act, there are two types of interim[12]Section 144(5) of the Act provides that the IOP may make an interim order only if it is satisfied that the[13]Under section 144(6) of the Act, where an interim order is made, it takes effect immediately but may not have effect for a period of more than 18 months (unless extended by the Tribunal).[14]Under section 146 of the Act, an interim order must be reviewed by the IOP within 6 months of the date imposed. If, following such a review, an interim order remains in place, it must be further reviewed within 6 months of the review.[15]Under section 148(1) of the Act, SCW may apply to the Tribunal for an interim order to be extended or further extended. By section 148(2), the Tribunal, on such an application, may:(a) revoke the interim order;(b) in the case of a conditional registration order, revoke or vary any condition;(c) extend, or further extend, the order for up to 12 months; or(d) make no change to the order or to the period for which the order is to have effect.

Other relevant principles

[16]Other relevant principles In GMC v Hiew, the Court of Appeal gave guidance as to the principles to be applied when considering an application for an extension of an interim order. We remind ourselves of those principles. To summarise:(1) It is an exercise of judicial discretion.(2) The criteria to be applied by the Tribunal are the same as for the making of the original interim[17]Given the general principles above, nothing in this section (or elsewhere in this document) ought to be taken as any conclusive finding of fact. However, it is nonetheless helpful for us to set out what appears likely to be the most relevant context.[18]The Respondent registered with SCW on 30 March 2022 and was employed by a private company from 1 March 2022 (the Company).[19]On 31 October 2023, a strategy meeting was held by the relevant local authority about allegations made regarding the Respondent’s alleged conduct. According to the notes, information was shared which alleged that the Respondent had, despite having by then been suspended by the Company, expressed an interest in or applied for a role at another residential care home in the local area.[20]On 1 November 2023, Mr Price contacted the Respondent by email to inform her of the above disclosure/referral. The Respondent called Mr Price the next day. She indicated that she did not know, at that point, what she was said to have done wrong.[21]On 1 November 2023, the Company disclosed to SCW that the Respondent was the subject of a safeguarding and police investigation in light of some allegations made about her conduct in relation to a young person (Young Person 1).[22]On 7 November 2023, the police confirmed to SCW that there was a police investigation underway into the Respondent’s alleged conduct. To summarise: that investigation remains ongoing; it is said, by the police, to be complex; it is unclear when it will conclude or what the outcome will be. The most recent update is from 10 August 2026: it confirmed that the position remains the same and recommended SCW contact the police again at the end of October for a further update. In the meantime, any substantive investigation by SCW has been placed on hold, so as not to prejudice the investigation being conducted by the police.[23]On 21 November 2023, the Company disclosed to SCW that the Respondent had resigned and was working in a factory of some kind. On the same day, the Respondent spoke to Mr Price on the phone. She informed him that she had resigned and was now working in a factory. She indicated that she still did not know what she was said to have done wrong. This was the last contact Mr Price, or SCW or the IOP had with the Respondent, despite attempts to contact her (by phone, post, and email).[24]On or around 21 January 2024, SCW was made aware of additional concerns regarding the alleged conduct of the Respondent towards another young person (Young Person 2).[25]On 8 February 2024, a position of trust strategy meeting was held. The allegations relating to Young Person 2 were considered.[26]On 4 April 2024, the IOP met and made a decision to impose the ISO, for a period of 18 months (to expire on 3 October 2025), on the grounds that it was necessary for the protection of the public and/or otherwise in the public interest. The IOP conducted reviews on 2 October 2024 and 21 March 2025 and concluded that the ISO needed to remain in place, on the same grounds. The Respondent did not engage with those proceedings, or those hearings.[27]On 9 September 2025, to consider SCW’s first application, the Tribunal held a hearing and, on 11 September 2025, granted the application to extend the ISO for 12 months (until 3 October 2026). The Respondent did not engage with the proceedings or attend the hearing.[28]In June 2026, SCW made the Application, to further extend the ISO for another 12 months (until 3 October 2027). Again, the Respondent has not engaged.

The Allegations

[29]The Allegations There is not a lot of detailed information, before us, about the specific allegations. There is limited direct evidence, before us at this time, to support any such allegations. However, it appears likely that the allegations (the Allegations) can be accurately summarised in the following way:(1) It is alleged that the Respondent engaged in conduct towards Young Person 1, while she was residing at the home where the Respondent worked in her regulated role, in ways which amounted to “blurring” professional boundaries and which included sexual touching. The blurring boundaries allegation includes an allegation the Respondent had inappropriate conversations with Young Person 1 about Young Person 1’s sex life. The sexual touching allegation includes an allegation that the Respondent touched the thigh and breasts of Young Person 1. It appears to be alleged that Young Person 1 was adversely impacted as a result of the alleged conduct. There seems to be at least some video evidence (not seen by us or SCW) that is considered to potentially provide support for some of the allegations made by Young Person 1.(2) It is alleged that the Respondent engaged in conduct towards Young Person 2, while she was residing at the home where the Respondent worked in her regulated role, in ways which amounted to an inappropriate sexual relationship and/or included the Respondent providing Young Person 2 with some unlawful street drugs.(3) While unclear, it would appear from the limited evidence before us that the young people involved were vulnerable and still children at the material time.[30]The above is taken, largely, from the initial referral document from the Company, and the two main strategy meetings on 31 October 2023 and 8 February 2024.

Conclusions with Reasons

[31]Conclusions with Reasons Summary We have come to the following conclusions on the limited information before us:(a) First, in our judgment, it is necessary, for the protection of the public, for the ISO to be extended, and for it to be extended for a further 12 months.(b) Second, further or in the alternative, the order ought to be extended for a further 12 months because it is in the public interest to do so.[32]We set out further reasoning below. What follows is not designed to cover all of the matters touched on in documents. It is however designed to be sufficient to clarify the core reasons for our decision.

Key reasons

[33]Key reasons First, the Allegations are serious. If true, and we stress the word “if” there, they would amount to a serious breach of trust, between an individual charged with providing care and a vulnerable child in need of care and support. If true, they would indicate a sexual motivation that may be more difficult to manage than other motivations for misconduct. If true, building on the latter point, the allegations suggest a pattern of misconduct. There are grounds to think that, if true, such or similar conduct could be repeated in the future. The Allegations call seriously into question the suitability of the Respondent to work with vulnerable young people in particular, and the safety of any such work.[34]Second, there are reasonable grounds to think, at this point in time and on the limited evidence available to us, that the Allegations may be true (or partly true). They have been made by two separate individuals. They were sufficient to lead the Company to suspend the Respondent. They have been sufficient to lead to what we are told is a “complex” and long-running police investigation. There is evidence before us to indicate that there may be video footage providing some support for some aspects of the allegations raised by Young Person 1.[35]Third, if there was to be any repetition of the alleged conduct, the potential harm arising could be very significant. There could be sexual, emotional, psychological harm. It could seriously impact vulnerable young people’s trust and confidence in those trusted to care and support them, and have a potentially major impact on their overall wellbeing, concentration, achievements, etc.[36]Fourth, there is no or no sufficient evidence before us that the level of risk of harm to other young people who might come into contact with the Respondent – if she (without the ISO being in place) were to return to regulated work – has reduced in any material way or to a sufficient extent. There is, of course, nothing at all from the Respondent – nothing, for example, to put the alleged matters into a different context, to indicate insight, or to suggest steps taken to reduce risk of any repetition. Indeed, the evidence we do have tends to point the other way as it indicates the Respondent may have tried to obtain similar work in another home nearby while suspended.[37]Fifth, we are satisfied that, in the circumstances, more time is required. We accept that, realistically, SCW cannot, at present, progress its own investigation and process due to the risk of prejudicing the police process. There would then appear to be two likely scenarios. In the first, the police investigation is concluded and the Respondent is charged with a criminal offence leading to a trial. The associated fitness to practise investigation and process would only be likely to start or re-start after the conclusion of such a trial. In the second scenario, the police investigation concludes with no further action (or similar), allowing SCW to then start or re-start its fitness to practise investigation and process. Either way, it is likely that a substantial amount of additional time will be required before there is sufficient clarity in relation to the outcome of any criminal or regulatory processes. At present, on the current (albeit limited) evidence, we are satisfied that the ISO is necessary and proportionate in order to protect the public and/or is in the public interest until such processes have progressed sufficiently for matters to be clearer.[38]Sixth, having regard to general principles of proportionality:(a) we do not think that any lesser regulatory option (such as a less restrictive conditional ISO) is available and workable which would be sufficient to achieve the legitimate aim of keeping the public adequately safe, in the interim, from the risk of harm; and(b) there is no or no sufficient evidence of any adverse impact, on the rights or interests of the Respondent, from the ISO being extended. In relation to (a), it is, apart from anything else, not practicable to devise something without (adequate) engagement from the Respondent. In relation to (b), while it is easy to infer that there may well be some adverse impact from the ISO on the Respondent, there is no evidence from the Respondent about the nature or degree of any such impact, this does not seem to be a case where a respondent has worked in the profession for many years and has invested highly in a professional career, and the evidence that is before us would tend to suggest the Respondent has been able to find some paid work outside the regulatory setting. Any impact on the Respondent is outweighed by the importance of the legitimate aim and the need, at present, for the ISO.[39]Seventh, there is a real risk, in our judgment, that public confidence in the regulatory scheme, and its ability to adequately protect the public (including vulnerable people) from significant harm, would be damaged by a decision not to extend the ISO in these circumstances. To be clear, we do not consider it necessary to rely on this additional basis for justification – the other matters set out further above (especially those relating to risk of actual harm to the public) are more significant factors in our minds. But we do think this adds something to further strengthen the case to extend the ISO.

Outcome

[40]Outcome The Application is granted. The ISO is extended for a further 12 months (to expire on 3 October 2027). 41. First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued:17 August 2026

order

(a) an interim suspension order, which is an order suspending the registered person’s registration; and(b) an interim conditional registration order, which is an order imposing conditions on the registered person’s registration. order: (a) is necessary for the protection of the public; (b) is otherwise in the public interest; or(c) is in the interests of the registered person. order: the protection of the public; the public interest; the Respondent’s own interests. (3) The onus of satisfying the Tribunal such criteria are met falls on the regulator. The standard of proof is the civil standard: the balance of probabilities. (4) The Tribunal can take into account factors such as: the gravity of the allegation(s); the nature of the evidence; the seriousness of any risk of harm; the reasons why the case has not been concluded; any prejudice to the Respondent if an interim order is continued. (5) It is not the function of the Tribunal to make primary findings of fact about the events which led to the suspension. (6) It is not the function of the Tribunal to consider the merits of the case for suspension; but rather, on the basis of the evidence before it, to ascertain whether the relevant allegation(s) – rather than their truth or falsity – justify the extension of the suspension. (7) The evidence with the application will include evidence as to the opinion of the regulator (or the relevant interim orders panel) as to the need for an interim order: the Tribunal should give that opinion such weight as in the circumstances of the case it thinks fit; it is not bound to follow or defer to it. Background and basic chronology