London Academy and Recruitment Centre Limited v Care Quality Commission [2026] UKFTT 1175 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care StandardsThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 20082026-01951.EANeutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01175 (HESC)Heard by Video Link on 6 August 2026
Before
Ms S Goodrich (Judge)Ms J Everitt (Specialist Member)Mr D Styles (Specialist Member)
Between
London Academy And Recruitment Centre LimitedApplicant-v-
Between
Care Quality CommissionRespondentDecision on Late Appeal ApplicationMr Aris, director of the company, in person. for ApplicantMr Okunpolor, solicitor, CQC. for RespondentDate 2026-08-17
[1]On 2 July 2026 the Applicant, by its director, Mr Aris, lodged an appeal against the Respondent’s decision to cancel registration dated 1 September 2025, made under section 28 of the Health and Social Care Act (2006 “the Act”).[2]On 13 March 2023 the Applicant had been granted registration as a provider in respect of the regulated activity of personal care at London Academy & Recruitment Centre Ltd, G10 Expressway, 1 Dock Road, London, E16 1AH.[3]The nature of the decision made on 1 September 2025 was that cancellation was in accordance with the regulations because the registered provider had not provided regulated services for (at least) twelve months.[4]In the appeal form lodged with the Tribunal dated 2 July 2026, the Applicant acknowledged that the appeal was out of time and an extension was sought. The preliminary issue therefore arose as to whether the Tribunal should extend time so as to allow the appeal to proceed.[5]Directions were issued by Judge Khan on 3 July 2026 for the hearing of the preliminary issue. This included a direction that the parties send to each other their written submissions and any authorities relied on by 17 July 2026. The Respondent was also required to provide an electronic bundle by 24 July which was duly received (77pages pdf).[6]The Respondent lodged written submissions on 17 July 2026. The Applicant did not do so at that time.[7]Late evidence By notice dated 24 July 2026 the Applicant applied to be allowed to rely on late evidence, which included a medical report dated 24 July 2026 and evidence regarding travel arrangements to and from Lagos. Directions were issued on 3 August as the result of which a further application to adduce late evidence was made on 5 August 2026.[8]In summary, the medical report signed by a Dr Sadiq at Kubwa General Hospital dated 24 July 2026 refers to Mr Aris having been admitted to the hospital in an unconscious state on 28 September 2025. Having given other clinical details, the letter states that Malaria and Typhoid fever were diagnosed. Mr Aris was discharged on 3 January 2026 on oral medication and was advised to observe strict bedrest.[9]On 5 August 2026 the Applicant wrote to the Tribunal seeking an adjournment of the preliminary hearing. In summary the grounds for the adjournment concerned:[1]“Serious medical and health incapacity deficiency”[2]“Court room language and communication barriers”.[10]The Applicant sought an order postponing the hearing of his application for 28 days so as to provide him with the opportunity to secure the services of a barrister. It was directed that the application to postpone would be considered at the hearing. The Hearing The hearing was conducted via video link. There were no connectivity issues. In view of the information provided by Mr Aris regarding his health and his concern about his ability to communicate, the judge reflected back some of Mr Aris’s points to ensure his understanding and also made sure that he had the time he needed to explain the circumstances on which he relied.[11]The judge summarized the outstanding applications regarding late evidence, and also Mr Aris’ application for a postponement. The judge explained that the panel was aware of Mr Aris’ concern, in the context of his health and the fact that English is not his first language, that he would be cross-examined for three hours, but sought to re-assure Mr Aris this was unlikely to be the case.[12]In the exercise of case-management the panel considered it convenient to deal with the late evidence applications first. Mr Okunpolor said that the Respondent no longer objected to the reception of the late evidence. The panel agreed to receive all the documents provided by the Applicant with his applications, noting that the weight to be attached to them would be a matter for overall assessment in the light of all the material before us.[13]The judge explained to Mr Aris that, before considering his application to postpone the hearing, it might be helpful to explain what a hearing of this nature involves. As set out in the Respondent’s submissions, the Applicant would need to satisfy the panel that there were exceptional circumstances to extend time. The scope for doing so has been described as extremely narrow. The usual process where an Applicant is self-representing is the judge will ask questions to enable him to explain his case. Mr Okunpolor could then ask questions on behalf of the Respondent. It was likely that the whole hearing would take about an hour.[14]Mr Aris said that it was when he saw the hearing would last three hours he had started thinking about his condition. Since he has had his sickness, he is weak and he is afraid of collapsing. Asked by the judge if he felt able to continue today, he said yes - but he also said that some technical questions may come up, and also that it (his appeal) was to do with his life and livelihood.[15]The judge explained to Mr Aris that it was for him to decide if he wanted to go ahead today or if he still wanted to apply to the panel for a postponement. Mr Aris said that he wanted to go ahead.[16]The Law Section S.32 (2) of the Act provides that:[17]“No appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order.” The question of whether discretion exists to extend the time limit provided by statute was considered in Sheikh v Care Quality Commission [2013] UKUT 137 (AAC) where the court was concerned with a different act but an identical provision. This was said:
“4. There can be no doubt that the Respondent was right to submit that the First-tier Tribunal had no power to admit the second appeal as such. Section 32(2) of the 2008 Act provides – “No appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order.”
Thus the time limit is in primary legislation and not in Tribunal Procedure Rules. Moreover, there is nothing in primary legislation authorising the extension of that time limit…”[18]The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 do not contain any powers to extend the time limit set out in statute. Rule 5(3)(a) allows only for the extension of time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction:
“(3) In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Tribunal may — (a) extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, unless such extension or shortening would conflict with a provision of another enactment containing a time limit;”
[emphasis added].[19]However, in the light of binding authority, the time limit in the Act is not an absolute one. The Supreme Court decision in Pomiechowski & Ors v District Court of Legunica Poland [2012] UKSC 20 established that an absolute statutory time limit should be read in a manner consistent with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[20]In Paragraph 39 of the judgment in Pomiechowski Lord Mance stated:[21]“...the statutory provision concerning appeals can and should all be read subject to the qualification that the court must have a discretion in exceptional circumstances to extend time for both filing and service, where such statutory provisions would otherwise operate to prevent an appeal in a manner conflicting with the right of access to an appeal process held to exist under article 6(1) ... ...[the Court] must have power to permit and hear an out of time appeal whicha litigant personally has done all he can to bring and notify timeously.” In R (on the application of)Adesina & Ors v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818, the case of Pomiechowski was applied and it was stated:
“A discretion must only arise “in exceptional circumstances” and where the Appellant “personally has done all he can to bring [the appeal] timeously.”
[22]and, also “...although the absolute approach can no longer be said to be invariable, the scope for departure from the 28-day time limit is extremely narrow.” It is to be noted that in Adesina at [14] this was said by Maurice Kay LJ:[23]“…. one only has to consider hypothetical cases to appreciate that, without some margin for discretion, circumstances may cause absolute time limits to impair “the very essence” of the right of appeal conferred by statute. Take, for example, a case in which a person, having received a decision removing him or her from the Register, immediately succumbs to serious illness and remains in intensive care; or a case in which notice of the disciplinary decision has been sent by post but never arrives and time begins to run by reason of deemed service on the day after it was sent (Nursing and Midwifery Council (Fitness to Practice) Rules 2004, rule 34(4)). In such cases, the nurse or midwife in question might remain in blameless ignorance of the fact that time was running for the whole of the 28 day period. It seems to me that to take the absolute approach in such circumstances would be to allow the time limit to impair the very essence of the statutory right of appeal.” Following Adesina, in some cases a test had been applied in relation to whether jurisdiction to extend time arises, containing two limbs:(1) that the circumstances are exceptional and(2) that the Appellant had done all they personally could have done to bring the appeal in time.[24]The Court of Appeal has since considered this in Lars Stuewe v Health and Care Professionals Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1605. Paragraphs 51-52 of the judgement clarify the position, and make clear that the test properly applied consists of the first limb only: that the circumstances are exceptional,taking into account all relevant factors, one of which may be the actions of the Appellant (as per the former second limb of the test). In the leading judgement Lady Justice Carr said this: “53. The need to import the notion of reasonableness, as suggested in Rakoczy, underscores the importance of adhering to the approach identified above. It is both undesirable and counter-intuitive for there to be potentially intricate and nuanced debate as to the reasonableness of a litigant’s conduct in the context of an examination of whether the “exceptional circumstances” jurisdiction exists.[54]As set out above, therefore, the central and only question for the court is whether or not “exceptional circumstances” exist, namely where to deny a power to extend time would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. Any gloss is unhelpful. Answering the question may or may not include consideration of whether or not the litigant has done everything possible to serve within time, depending on the facts of the case. Once the discretion (or duty) arises, it must then be exercised to the minimum extent necessary to secure compliance with Article 6 rights.[55](having referred to several examples of the approach laid down in Adesina as deployed on the facts of individual cases)…..ultimately each case will turn on its own facts and the assistance to be drawn from the outcomes on the facts of other cases may be limited.”[25]Our consideration We took into account all the evidence and submissions placed before us. If we do not refer to each and every point made it does not mean that we have not considered all the matters raised.[26]We find that the facts regarding service are as follows:(i) At the time of registration with the Respondent on 13 March 2023 the Applicant company had provided the email address jerry@laar.org.uk as its address for all communications.(ii) This was also the email address included in the Applicant’s Statement of Purpose.(iii) It was the email address used by the Applicant in December 2023 when responding to an email sent by the CQC regarding the issue of dormancy.(iv) It was also the email address the Applicant used when lodging the appeal application – and the address that the Tribunal has successfully used for correspondence with the Applicant.[27]We find that the NoD to cancel registration dated 1 September 2025 was sent on that date to the Applicant at the email address that he had provided to the Respondent for communication in accordance with section 94 (2) (a) and (b) of the Act. We find that the deemed date of service was 2 September 2025 – see s.93 (2A) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008.[28]An Applicant who has been properly served may not have actually read the NoD, but this does not mean that service is not effective – for obvious reasons. In our view if a registered person agrees to communication by email it is their responsibility to check their mailboxes, including junk and spam folders. Indeed, Mr Aris had said in the appeal application form that he had done this.[29]The contents of the NoD are noteworthy. It explained the right of appeal in clear terms. It provided a hyperlink to enable access to an appeal form. It made clear that the right of appeal had to be exercised within 28 days of the date the notice was served.[30]We find that the 28 days provided for the lodging of an appeal expired on 30 September 2025. The Applicant lodged the appeal on 2 July 2026, some 270 days after the expiry of the appeal period.[31]The Appeal Application Form In the appeal application form (the AAF) Mr Aris stated that the date of receipt of the NoD was 2 July 2026. However, it is common ground that 2 July 2026 was the date that he had telephoned the Respondent. It was said by the Applicant in the AAF that during that call, “we were informed that the registration had been revoked in September of the previous year.” This tends to imply that Mr Aris was not aware of this before but, as will be seen at a later stage, this was not the position he advanced at the hearing.[32]In the AAF this was also said:[33]“This appeal has been submitted outside the normal time limit because we were never served with the decision revoking our registration. We did not receive a revocation letter, notice of decision, or any other correspondence informing us that our registration had been cancelled. We only became aware of the decision after contacting the Care Quality Commission by telephone, at which point we were informed that our registration had been revoked in September of last year. As we were unaware that a decision had been made, we were unable to exercise our right of appeal within the prescribed time limit.” In section G of the AAF the following was said:[34]“The Applicant also asks the Tribunal to take into account that no notice of the decision was received, preventing the Applicant from exercising the statutory right of appeal within the prescribed time limit. In section H of the AAF the Applicant repeated much of the above but also included the following: • “This appeal has been submitted outside the normal time limit because we were never properly notified of the decision to revoke our registration. The Care Quality Commission has stated that it sent an email advising us of the cancellation. However, we did not receive any such email. We have checked our email inboxes and spam/junk folders and have found no record of the alleged email.” • “We respectfully ask the Tribunal to extend the time for bringing this appeal because the delay was entirely outside our control and resulted from our not receiving notification of the decision. We respectfully ask the Tribunal to allow this appeal, extend time because we were not notified of the decision, and reinstate our registration or remit the matter to the Care Quality Commission for reconsideration.”[35]Pausing there, it is very clear indeed from the AAF that the only reason relied on by the Applicant for extension of the time limit was that the NoD had never been received. The exercise of discretion invoked by the Applicant was therefore plainly put on the basis that, as a matter of actual fact, the Applicant had not been informed of the decision. It was also asserted by the Applicant that:
“Had we received the decision notice, we would have exercised our right of appeal immediately.”
[36]The Respondent’s submissions The Respondent served its submissions on 17 July 2026. These set out the history of the correspondence between the CQC from November 2023 sent to and received from the email address jerry@laar.org.uk and also info@laar.org.uk.[37]The Chronology Copies of correspondence leading up to the decision show that:[38]On 10 November 2023, the Respondent sent an email to the Applicant’s email addresses: jerry@laar.org.uk and info@laar.org.uk requesting confirmation of whether the Regulated Activity had been carried on from the Location since 15 March 2023. On 7 December 2023, the Applicant emailed the Respondent from jerry@laar.org.uk confirming they had not carried on the Regulated Activity from the Location since 15 March 2023. On 24 April 2025, the Respondent sent an email to the Applicant’s email addresses: jerry@laar.org.uk and info@laar.org.uk requesting confirmation of whether the regulated activity had been carried on from the Location since 15 March 2023. However, no response was received from the Applicant. On 2 May 2025, the Respondent sent a further email to the Applicant ’s email addresses: jerry@laar.org.uk and info@laar.org.uk seeking the same information as above. No response was received from the Applicant. On 10 July 2025, a Notice of Proposal (NoP) proposing to cancel the Applicant’s registration was sent to the Applicant’s email addresses: jerry@laar.org.uk and info@laar.org.uk. On 1 September 2025, as no representations had been received in response to the NoP, the latter was adopted and a Notice of Decision (NoD) was sent to the Applicant s email addresses: jerry@laar.org.uk and info@laar.org.uk. On 20 November 2025, as no appeal challenging the Notice of Decision had been forwarded by the Tribunal, and because well over the 28 days period for appeal had passed, a letter was sent by email to the Applicant’s email address: jerry@laar.org.uk confirming that their registration had been cancelled. On 2 July 2026, the Applicant contacted the Respondent by telephone and was informed that their registration had been cancelled. On 2 July 2026 the Respondent resent the letter dated 1 September 2025 to jerry@laar.org.uk. On 2 July 2026 the Applicant filed their appeal with the Tribunal. On 3 July 2026 the Respondent emailed jerry@laar.org.uk to again confirm that their registration had been cancelled and explained that if they wished to provide the Regulated Activity, a new Service Provider and Registered Manager application would need to be submitted for consideration. The Hearing In the hearing before us Mr Aris made it clear that his position was that he had received (some) correspondence from the Respondent. He told us that before he became ill, he had understood that cancellation had been made. He said he had received “this” two days before he travelled from the UK to Lagos on 25 September 2025. He became ill on 28September 2025. He was not discharged from hospital until 3 January 2026 but he was so weak that he had to cancel his flight to the UK. He rebooked the flight to a new date, 4 March 2026.[39]When asked by

the judge to explain what had happened two days before he had travelled to Lagos he said:

“There was something I was dealing with in the system. I went to the spam and saw a lot of emails from CQC. I put them in the inbox. I saw that one was urgent- which was the cancellation. In that cancellation they gave me 30 days to respond to it.”
[40]The judge asked Mr Aris if he knew the date of this email. He could not say but said it was “expiring on the 30th”. He said he had had two days to respond to the letter before his illness (had occurred).[41]Asked by the judge why he had not acted on his appeal after March 2026 Mr Aris said that was a good question. He said that this was why he was here today. By the time he was discharged from hospital he had become so weak that he could not do anything. He could not think of business or money. From that time until 2 July he had not done anything in terms of business. He did not have the stamina to do anything. He did not open the computer. He had had a life-threatening attack.[42]In answer to Mr Okunpolor’s questions, Mr Aris confirmed that his position was that he had first become aware of the NoD on 23 September 2025. He said that the Notice of Proposal (NoP) might have been in the bundle of the emails sent, but he had concentrated on the one “that expired on 30 September”. When he got to Nigeria he wrote some things in response and thought that he would take a second look and then send it off. If the NoD had not gone to “spam” he would have picked it up on time.[43]In answer to Mr Okunpolor, Mr Aris said he did not remember having emailed the CQC in 2023 to say that the service was dormant. He said that everything from the CQC had been going into “spam”. Mr Okunpolor asked whether, if he knew everything since 2023 had been going into spam, he had been checking regularly. Mr Aris said that he had had discussions with the CQC to put his registration on hold so he “did not have anything again” from the CQC. We take this to mean that his case was that he had not been expecting anything.[44]In response to Mr Okunpolor’s question, Mr Aris agreed that the first time he had requested medical evidence regarding his stay in hospital was on 24 July 2026. He agreed that he had provided two documents from Kubwa General Hospital: one provided to the Tribunal with his application, and one sent to the CQC. He agreed that there were differences between the two: one had a stamp and a registration number, and the other did not.[45]We have considered all of the material before us.[46]In our view there are significant inconsistencies in the accounts that Mr Aris has given. In our view it is notable that in the AAF: a) Mr Aris repeatedly asserted that the Applicant company had had no correspondence at all from the Respondent. Indeed, he had positively asserted in the AAF that he had searched his spam/junk box to no avail. Now he says that he had, in fact, discovered letters in his spam folder on 23 September 2025 and had then moved them to his inbox. b) The repeated factual assertion was made in the AAF that the Applicant had no knowledge at all of the NoD until 2 July 2026. Now he says that he did have knowledge on 23 September 2025 but he did not act on it then. He was then taken ill on 28 September 2025. c) No mention was made of any illness at all in the AAF. Now he says that he was unconscious on 28 September 2025, in hospital until 3 January 2026 and also unable to leave his bed until 1 or 2 July 2026.[47]We consider that the Applicant’s account has significantly changed since the AAF was lodged. We noted also that Mr Aris agreed that it was on 24 July 2026 that he had first sought medical evidence to support his case that he had suffered an illness that had rendered him incapable of lodging an appeal. On the face of it the medical report dated 24 July 2026 was provided that very day. We noted that there are features in the medical report that are unusual. It does not record a date of birth for the patient or any patient ID number. Mr Aris told us that Kubwa General Hospital is a state hospital. However, the email referenced in the letterhead is a gmail address.[48]Mr Aris said that he had been lying in his bed from the time he had been discharged from hospital in Lagos until 1 July 2026. He said that it was only on 2 July 2026 that he stood up. He said that up to the end of June he was still in bed and could not stand up or do anything. He had been fighting for his life. It was at the end of June 2026 that he has started having hope of living and that is why he had made the phone call to the CQC. He said that he was not capable of any work. However, in the AAF he had referred to having secured clients seeking places (at the registered service) who required the Applicant to hold a valid CQC registration, which is why he had telephoned the CQC on 2 July. He also referred to financial losses if this arrangement did not go ahead.[49]Mr Aris relies on his continuing weakness/ill health as the consequence of the illnesses described in the hospital letter. He sought to show us packets of medication he was provided with when he had been in Nigeria. He told us that he has a GP in the UK but Mr Aris has not provided any UK medical evidence regarding his state of health/incapacity from March 2026 onwards.[50]We considered all the material before us in the round.On Mr Aris’s own case he knew on or about 23 September 2025 that he had received from the CQC a notice of a decision (NoD) to cancel registration. This was because the regulated activity had not, in fact, been provided since registration in March 2023.[51]We find that this NoD informed the Applicant of the right of appeal and that this had to be lodged within 28 days. On his own case Mr Aris read the NoD on or about 23 September 2025 and he disagreed with it. He said that he had even started drafting a response before he was admitted to hospital (on 28 September).[52]Even if we assume in Mr Aris’ favour that he was taken ill and was admitted to hospital on 28 September 2025, the medical and other evidence before us does not explain in any satisfactory way why the Applicant was unable to lodge an appeal far sooner than 2 July 2026. On any basis the delay involved in making this appeal application is very significant indeed. He knew of the decision in September 2025 but took no steps to contact the CQC until 2 July 2026.[53]In the application before us the basis on which discretion was originally sought in the AAF was entirely different to that now advanced. The inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole are such that we are not persuaded that the circumstances on which the Applicant relies were as he has stated.Such are the inconsistencies in the Applicant’s account that we are unable to attach any significant weight to his account, or the medical evidence on which he relies. We are not satisfied that there were any exceptional circumstances that operated at the relevant time so to deprive the Applicant of the essence of the right to appeal.[54]For the reasons given the Applicant has not satisfied us that the circumstances of this case meet the test of exceptionality recognised by the Supreme Court in Pomiechowski, and as further amplified by the Court of Appeal in Lars Stuewe. We decline to exercise our discretion so as to extend time. DECISION 1. Judge Goodrich 2. First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 17 August 2026