[1]The Appellant has applied to submit a late appeal against its cancellation as a provider of supported accommodation.[2]The purpose of this hearing is to determine that application and thereby decide whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed. Attendance[3]Mr Emil Mihal Lixandru, Counsel, represented the Appellant. He was accompanied by Mr Abiodun Adewole, Solicitor.[4]Miss Wendy Gutteridge, solicitor represented Ofsted.[5]Mr Maurice Cromwell, and Mr Kobi Akong Directors of AGAPE4ALL attended the hearing.[6]Miss Ibie, former Director and Nominated Individual of AGAPE4ALL attended the hearing. Background[7]The Appellant was a registered provider of supported accommodation. On 27/03/2026 the Respondent served a Notice of Proposal to cancel the Appellant's registration. The Appellant submitted written representations in response on 24/04/2026. Thereafter, on 21/05/2026 the Respondent issued a Notice of Decision cancelling the registration and sent it by Special Delivery to the Appellant's registered address. Royal Mail tracking records that the item was delivered and signed for on 22/05/2026. Pursuant to section 21 of the Care Standards Act 2000, the statutory period for bringing an appeal expired on 19/06/2026. No appeal was lodged within that period, and the cancellation took effect on 20/06/2026.[8]On 23/06/2026 the Appellant’s nominated individual, Ms Carmen Ibie, emailed the Respondent regarding the return of an application to change the nominated individual and appoint a new director. In that correspondence she referred to a Notice of Decision to Cancel Registration and stated that it had "already been formally challenged" and was subject to "ongoing legal proceedings". The Respondent relies on that email as evidence that the Appellant had knowledge of the Notice of Decision by that date. The Appellant states that this was a miscommunication.[9]On 06/07/2026 the Respondent wrote to the Appellant confirming that the cancellation had taken effect. Later that day the Appellant's solicitors asserted that the Notice of Decision had not been received and requested a copy. The Respondent provided a further copy of the Notice of Decision and delivery information on 07/07/2026. The Appellant lodged its appeal on 14/07/2026. As the appeal had been filed outside the statutory time limit, the Tribunal directed that a preliminary hearing be held to determine whether the appeal should be admitted out of time. Legal Framework Care Standards Act 2000 Right of Appeal and Time Limit Section 21(1) of the Care Standards Act 2000 gives a person the right to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against certain decisions made by The Respondent, including refusal of registration. Section 21(2) of the Act requires an appeal to be brought within 28 days of service of the Notice of Decision. Service Section 37(1) (a) – (c) of the Act provides that a notice may be served by personal service, by registered post or recorded delivery at a proper address or, as of 15/07/2026, by email. Under section 37(3), a notice sent by post is deemed served on the third day after posting unless the contrary is proved. Tribunal Procedure Rules Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008, requires the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Rule 8(4)(c) of the Rules provides that the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if it considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding. Relevant Authorities Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica [2012] UKSC 20 The Supreme Court held that apparently absolute statutory appeal time limits may, in exceptional circumstances, be interpreted compatibly with Article 6 ECHR so that access to justice is preserved. Adesina v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818 The Court of Appeal confirmed that any discretion to permit a late statutory appeal is extremely limited and should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Stuewe v Health and Care Professions Council [2021] EWHC 3362 (Admin) The High Court reaffirmed that the relevant question is whether the circumstances are exceptional when viewed as a whole. Ordinary mistakes, misunderstandings or procedural errors will not ordinarily satisfy that threshold. Preliminary issues[10]The Appellant applied to submit two witness statements for consideration as part of this application. The first was the statement of Mr Kobi Akong, Finance Director at the Appellant company, dated 09/08/2026. The second was the statement of Miss Carmen Ibie, former Nominated individual and Director, dated 11/08/2026.[11]The Tribunal made no order for witness statements to be prepared ahead of this hearing, neither did the Appellant request permission to do so at the last hearing. The Respondent made no objection to the admission of the documents and, while not accepting their contents, did not seek to cross examine either witness.[12]We decided to admit the statements on the basis that they contain relevant information related to the determination of this application. Both statements form a part of our evaluation as set out below. Submissions Respondent[13]We had the benefit of written submissions from both parties which were contained in the bundle. These were supplemented by oral submissions by the advocates and the abovementioned witness statements.[14]The Respondent submits that the appeal is out of time and should not be admitted. It argues that the Notice of Decision was properly served in accordance with section 37 of the Care Standards Act 2000 on 22/05/2026 and that the statutory appeal period expired on 19/06/2026. It relies on Royal Mail delivery records, the fact that the Notice was sent to the Appellant's proper address, and the presumption of service arising from the statutory scheme. Royal Mail records show that the document was delivered and signed for. It is submitted that there is an important distinction between a notice not being delivered at all and a notice being delivered but not subsequently opened, read or acted upon. The Respondent’s obligation is to prove delivery in accordance with the statutory scheme, not to prove that the contents were read by a particular individual. Any administrative failure within the company after delivery cannot be attributed to the Respondent and does not undermine the validity of service.[15]The Respondent further relies on Ms Ibie's email of 23/06/2026 as evidence that the Appellant had actual knowledge of the Notice of Decision. It submits that the Appellant's present assertion that it did not become aware of the decision until July 2026 is inconsistent with the wording of that email. The email specifically referred to the Notice of Decision dated 21/05/2026 and stated that the matter had already been formally challenged and was subject to ongoing legal proceedings. The Appellant's explanation, namely that Ms Ibie was in fact referring to the earlier Notice of Proposal and the representations made against it, does not satisfactorily explain the express reference to a Notice of Decision, the date of 21/05/2026, or the assertion that legal proceedings were ongoing. The Respondent argues that if the Appellant genuinely had no knowledge of the Notice of Decision, it would have expected the email to say so, or alternatively to refer to the written representations in response to the Notice of Proposal rather than to legal proceedings.[16]The Respondent contends that the Appellant has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances capable of justifying an extension of time and has produced no evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the Notice was served and received. It submits that the authorities establish an extremely high threshold and that the evidence, taken at its highest, disclosed no more than an internal failure within the Appellant organisation and did not fall within the narrow category of cases where time may be extended. It submits that the question is not whether it would be fair or desirable for the appeal to proceed, but whether refusal of an extension would impair the very essence of the statutory right of appeal.[17]Even if the Tribunal were to accept that the Appellant only became aware of the decision on 06/07/2026 or 07/07/2026, the Respondent submits that there remains an unexplained further delay before the appeal was lodged on 14/07/2026. Appellant[18]The Appellant accepts that the appeal was filed after the expiry of the statutory time limit but seeks an extension of time on the basis that the Notice of Decision was not received. The delay arose from a genuine lack of knowledge of the Notice of Decision rather than any deliberate failure by the Appellant to exercise its appeal rights. The Appellant' submits that the evidence relied upon by the Respondent does not establish that those responsible for the company had actual knowledge of the cancellation decision before 06/07/2026. It was argued that, had the Notice been received, the company would have acted promptly given the seriousness of the consequences flowing from cancellation.[19]The Appellant argues that the Respondent should have followed up the Notice of Decision sent in the post with an email confirming the decision. The Appellant states that this was done following service of the Notice of Proposal and should have been repeated following the Notice of Decision. The Appellant submits that the failure to do so renders service ineffective.[20]The Appellant's case is that neither the company nor Ms Ibie received the Notice allegedly delivered on 22/05/2026. Ms Ibie states that she does not recognise the signature recorded on delivery and says that the reference to "AGAPE" on the tracking information raises concern because the company's name is Agapé4All Limited. She maintains that she first became aware that Ofsted regarded the registration as cancelled when Ofsted wrote on 06/07/2026.[21]The Appellant also contends that Ofsted has misconstrued Ms Ibie's email of 23/06/2026. Mr Akong and Ms Ibie both state that her reference to the Notice having been "formally challenged" was intended to refer to the company's representations against the earlier Notice of Proposal, rather than to any appeal against a final Notice of Decision. They say that Ms Ibie had resigned as director and nominated individual with effect from 15/05/2026, was corresponding in relation to the return of the application to change the Nominated Individual and was unaware that a final cancellation decision had already been made.[22]The Appellant further relies on the fact that Ms Ibie had ceased to be a director and nominated individual with effect from 15/05/2026. It is submitted that Ofsted's continuing communication with Ms Ibie did not establish that the company itself had received or was aware of the Notice of Decision. The Appellant criticises the Respondent for not taking steps to communicate with other officers of the company.[23]The Appellant submits that it would be in the interests of justice for the appeal to be heard on its merits. It argues that refusal of an extension would prevent consideration of substantive challenges to Ofsted's decision, would have serious consequences for the company's operations and other proceedings before the Tribunal, and could affect children placed within its services. The Appellant therefore invites the Tribunal to find that the circumstances justify the admission of the appeal notwithstanding its late filing.
The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons
[24]The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons The Appellant accepts that the appeal was submitted outside of the statutory timescale, which expired on 19/06/2026. The Tribunal therefore lacks jurisdiction unless the circumstances fall within the narrow exception recognised in Pomiechowski and Adesina. The issue is not whether a general extension of time would be fair, but whether refusal to admit the appeal would impair the very essence of the Appellant's right of appeal.[25]This application turns upon whether the Notice of Decision was received by the Appellant. The Appellant submits that proof of postal service creates only a rebuttable presumption and it therefore not determinative. The Respondent acknowledges that the authorities pertaining to “exceptional circumstances” allow for situations in which notices sent by post are not actually delivered, but it is for the alleged recipient to prove that delivery was not affected. Therefore, for the application to succeed, we have to be satisfied, on balance, that the Notice of Decision was not delivered to the registered address. This would amount to exceptional circumstances because it would have completely extinguished the Appellant’s opportunity to appeal against the Respondent’s decision to cancel its registration.[26]The Respondent has submitted a Royal Mail tracking notice which purports to show that the Notice of Decision was delivered to the Appellant’s registered address by Royal Mail Special Delivery on 22/05/2026. There is no dispute about the correctness of the address. It happens to be Ms Ibie’s home address where she lives by herself. At the time of the alleged delivery, it was the registered address submitted by the Appellant to the Respondent for the purpose of written communications and service of documents. It subsequently changed in June 2026, but at the time of the purported service it was correct. The Notice of Proposal to cancel the Appellant’s registration was also sent there by the same means and safely received by Ms Ibie in March 2026.[27]The delivery document contains an electronically scribbled signature which is indecipherable and it states, “Signed for by: AGAPE”. The Respondent could not tell us whether the “AGAPE” information would have to come from the recipient. Nonetheless, the implication from the document is that the Notice of Decision was delivered to the registered address and signed for by a person within that address who was aware of the name of the company.[28]On the other hand, Ms Ibie has provided a statement, which contains a statement of truth, in which she states that she never received the Notice of Decision on 22/05/2206. She states that she was in the UK (and presumably residing at the property) on this date. She does not recognise the signature on the document and would not have simply signed “AGAPE” on the delivery confirmation.[29]The Respondent submits that the delivery confirmation is corroborated by Ms Ibie’s email to Ofsted on 23/06/2026. The email was sent by her in response to the Respondent’s decision to deny her request to change the Nominated Individual, made because she had stepped down as a Director of the company. In the email, Ms Ibie makes specific reference to “a Notice of Decision to Cancel Registration which was issued on 21/05/2026”. She states that “the Notice of Decision has already been formally challenged and is therefore currently subject to legal proceedings.[30]Ms Ibie, in her statement, states that her reference to the notice being formally challenged was to the Notice of Proposal which was subject to challenge by representations made by the Appellant on 21/04/2026. She maintains that she was not aware of the Notice of Decision until 06/07/2026 when this was communicated by the Respondent via email.[31]Having considered the evidence, we find on the balance of probabilities that the tracking notice is genuine and is proof of effective service of the Notice of Decision. The Appellant has provided no evidence to support a conclusion that Royal Mail made any error or failed to deliver the Notice of Decision as set out in the tracking notice. It demonstrates that delivery was affected to the registered address and was signed for by an occupant of the property. Ms Ibie is the only person residing there. We prefer the evidence contained in the tracking notice to Ms Ibie’s bare denial as set out in her statement.[32]We further find, on balance, that the email of 23/06/2026 demonstrates that Ms Ibie was aware that the Notice of Decision had been served. We accept that it is theoretically possible that Ms Ibie confused the Notice of Proposal and the Notice of Decision. However, we find that explanation inherently unlikely because the email accurately identified the document as a Notice of Decision and correctly identified the date of 21/05/2026, which was the date of the Notice of Decision rather than the Notice of Proposal. In our judgment, the email demonstrates that Ms Ibie was aware of the Notice of Decision and that this corroborates the validity of the tracking notice.[33]In assessing the reliability of Ms Ibie's evidence we have considered her witness statement, the timing of that statement, the contemporaneous email of 23/06/2026, and the absence of any explanation when Ofsted raised the email directly with the Appellant's solicitors on 07/07/2026. We place greater weight on the contemporaneous email than upon the later explanations provided after the significance of the email had been identified by Ofsted.[34]We reject the Appellant’s assertion that Ms Ibie being out of the country at the time she sent the email would have led to her being confused. We also reject the assertion that the Respondent should have followed up service of the Notice of Decision with an email. The Respondent is under no obligation to do so and, in our judgment, has affected service correctly pursuant to Section 37(1)(b) of the Act. Likewise, the Respondent was under no obligation to have notified other officers of the company of the Notice of Decision. Ms Ibie was, and remained until the cancellation of the service, the Nominated Individual and even after stepping down as a Director of the company, she remained a person with significant control until 05/07/2206. It was, in our judgment, entirely appropriate for the Respondent to communicate with her alone.[35]Finally, we reject the Appellant’s submission that we should allow the late appeal on the basis of its substantive merits or the wider impact on the company and any children who it may serve. Our determination can only be based on whether exceptional circumstances exist which could give rise to the exercise of our discretion to disapply the statutory timeframe for submission of the appeal. As we have found, as a matter of fact, that the Respondent properly served the Notice of Decision, we are not satisfied that the circumstances fall within the narrow category of exceptional cases identified in the authorities. Accordingly, there is no proper basis upon which the Tribunal could admit the appeal notwithstanding the statutory time limit.[36]Even if we had not found that the Notice of Decision was validly served, we note that the Appellant accepts that it became aware of the decision by 07/07/2026. The appeal was not lodged until 14/07/2026. No detailed explanation has been provided for that further delay. Whilst considerably shorter than the overall period of delay, this factor also weighs against the application.[37]Drawing the evidence together, we find that:(i) the Notice of Decision was properly served at the Appellant's registered address;(ii) the Royal Mail tracking evidence is reliable;(iii) the contemporaneous email of 23/06/2026 demonstrates awareness of the Notice of Decision;(iv) the later explanations offered by the Appellant are not persuasive; and(v) this case does not disclose the exceptional circumstances contemplated by Pomiechowski, Adesina and Stuewe. The application must therefore be refused. Decision: 1. The Appellant’s application to submit the late appeal is refused. 2. This is the final hearing of the appeal, and the matter is hereby concluded. Judge R Edwards First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 13 August 2026