Because We Care Northampton Ltd v Care Quality Commission [2026] UKFTT 1144 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care StandardsThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01144 (HESC)2025-01676.EABy Microsoft Teamson 6 August 2026
Before
Tribunal Judge O’NeillSpecialist Member M Adolphe
Between
Because We Care Northampton LtdAppellant-v-
Between
Care Quality CommissionRespondentDECISIONDate 2026-08-10

The AppeaL

[1]Because We Care Northampton Ltd (“the Appellant”) appeals against the decision of the Care Quality Commission (“the CQC” or “the Respondent”) dated 22 September 2025 (“the Notice of Decision”) to cancel the Appellant’s registration, so that it is no longer authorised to carry on the regulated activity from or at Because We Care Northampton, 30 Brookfield Rd, Northampton, NN2 7LS (“the Service”). The Preliminary Hearing[2]The parties made the following applications:a. the Respondent’s application to strike out these proceedings dated 7 July 2026; andb. the Appellant’s renewed application to postpone the final hearing dated 8 July 2026.[3]The parties were directed to attend a preliminary hearing, at which the applications would be considered. Those in attendance were:a. For the Appellant: i. Mr Chay Lynch, Director.b. For the Respondent: i. Dr Mary-Teresa Deignan, Counsel. ii. Mr John Okunpolor, Solicitor at the CQC. iii. Miss Ifeyinwa Osu, Paralegal at the CQC. Background AND KEY CHRONOLOGY[4]The Appellant registered as a provider with the Respondent in November 2018. Miss Fiona O'Donnell was the Registered Manager and Nominated Individual.[5]The Service is a domiciliary care agency providing support to people in their own homes. Mr Lynch confirmed that there are currently 5 service users receiving care by the Service.[6]The Service was previously inspected on 21, 26 and 27 November 2019, and received an overall rating of ‘Required Improvement’ One area rated ‘Good’, and four rated ‘Requires Improvement’.[7]Mr Lynch became the Acting Manager of the Service in January 2025.[8]Between 10 to 23 June 2025 the Respondent conducted an inspection of the Service. This rated the Service as ‘Inadequate’ in two domains, and ‘Required Improvement’ in the three other domains. The Service was therefore rated ‘Inadequate’ overall.[9]On 10 July 2025, the Respondent issued a Notice of Proposal to cancel the Appellant’s Registration.[10]No conditions or suspension of admissions to the Service have been imposed since the assessment. However, the Appellant on the advice of the Local Authority paused any new acceptance of new care packages until the necessary improvements were implemented to resolve the proposed enforcement action.[11]On 14 August 2025, the Appellant submitted full and detailed representations.[12]On 22 September 2025, the Respondent notified the Appellant that it had decided to reject the representations made and that it had adopted the Notice of Proposal. The Notice of Decision was issued.[13]A further inspection commenced on 6 January 2026 as part of the appeal process to determine whether improvements had been achieved and sustained. This inspection found continued breaches across the same regulatory areas. Preliminary Matters Adjustments[14]Mr Lynch made an application for adjustments to the hearing process. The adjustments sought, together with the Tribunal’s response, are set out in the table below. Mr Lynch confirmed that he was content with the Tribunal’s response in each case. Adjustment Sought Tribunal Response Permission to refer to written notes and a laptop throughout the hearing. The requested measure was already available as part of ordinary case management. Therefore, no separate adjustment determination was required. Questions to be asked individually This was agreed. Questions and directions to be given in plain English wherever reasonably practicable. This was agreed. Permission to ask for questions to be repeated or rephrased where necessary without any adverse inference being drawn. The requested measure was already available as part of ordinary case management. Therefore, no separate adjustment determination was required. That the Tribunal and the Respondent’s advocate indicate clearly when moving from one issue or topic to another. This was agreed. Where a document was referred to in the bundle, Mr Lynch requested that the relevant bundle, section and page number was identified. The requested measure was already available as part of ordinary case management. Therefore, no separate adjustment determination was required. Regular breaks This was agreed. The Tribunal agreed to break after one hour. In addition, the Tribunal explained that if Mr Lynch required a break outside of the agreed time, then he could raise his hand to indicate, and the Tribunal would do its best to accommodate the request. At the commencement of the hearing the Tribunal explain:• the order in which matters will be dealt with;• the issues to be determined;• what is expected of the Appellant during each stage of the hearing. The requested measure was already available as part of ordinary case management. Therefore, no separate adjustment determination was required. At the conclusion of the hearing, any directions made by the Tribunal are clearly explained. The requested measure was already available as part of ordinary case management. Therefore, no separate adjustment determination was required. The Tribunal confirmed that any directions would be explained and then confirmed in a written order. Where the Tribunal considers additional evidence is required from the Appellant, Mr Lynch requested that the Tribunal identifies, in clear terms, the categories of evidence sought. This was not agreed. The Tribunal explained that whilst the Tribunal has an enabling jurisdiction, it must apply the Overriding Objective, which requires to be fair to both parties. The Tribunal cannot therefore advise the Appellant as to what evidence it requires to make its case. If the Appellant requires advice, then it will need to source independent advice. That the Tribunal actively case manages the hearing where appropriate. The requested measure was already available as part of ordinary case management. Therefore, no separate adjustment determination was required. That the Tribunal considers whether any communication support, including the appointment of an intermediary or other suitable assistance, is appropriate and available to assist participation Mr Lynch confirmed that he was not making an application for the Tribunal to appoint an intermediary. In any event, the Tribunal was not persuaded that an intermediary was necessary. The Tribunal will generally consider appointing an intermediary when there is evidence that demonstrates that, by reason of the individual's communication or participation difficulties, they would be unable to participate effectively in the proceedings without such assistance and where adjustments falling short of an intermediary would not adequately address those difficulties. There was no such evidence in this case. Mr Lynch had produced clear and comprehensive written submissions and therefore the evidence suggested that he was able to communicate and participate in the proceedings with the adjustments set out above. Legal Framework The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008[15]The relevant statutory provisions were:a. Section 13(1) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, which provides: The registration under this Chapter of a person (“S”) as a service provider in respect of a regulated activity must in prescribed cases be subject to a registered manager condition.b. Section 17(1)(c) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, which provides: The Commission may at any time cancel the registration of a person (“R”) under this Chapter as a service provider or manager in respect of a regulated activity:(a) …(b) …(c) on the ground that the regulated activity is being, or has at any time been, carried on otherwise than in accordance with the relevant requirements c.

(a) a body of persons corporate or unincorporate

[16]The relevant rules from The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 (“the HESC Rules”) are:a. HESC Rule 2, which provides:(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes: a. dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;b. avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;c. ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;d. using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; ande. avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it: a. exercises any power under these Rules; or b. interprets any rule or practice direction.(4) Parties must: a. help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and b. co-operate with the Tribunal generally. b. HESC Rules 8(4)(c) and (5), which provide: (4) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if: a. … b. … c. the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding.(5) The Tribunal may not strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings under paragraph (3) or (4)(b) or (c) without first giving the applicant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out. The Issues[17]The Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s appeal had no reasonable prospect of success because:a. it had no registered manager; andb. there was no reasonable prospect of the Appellant’s case, or part of it succeeding.[18]The Appellant opposed the application to strike out the appeal and said the appeal should proceed to a full hearing. The Appellant’s position was that:a. whilst there was no Registered Manager in post, on 15 July 2026, Mr Lynch had submitted an application to become the Registered Manager. Active steps had therefore been taken to address the issue;b. genuine factual disputes remained and should not be decided without evidence being heard;c. it was unrepresented, had tried to comply, and a strike out would be unfair and disproportionate given the serious consequences. Analysis AND DECISION Executive Summary[19]We decided to strike out the whole of the proceedings. Our detailed reasons are set out below. In summary they were that:a. the proceedings have no reasonable prospect of success because there is no registered manager in place; andb. there is no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at a final hearing.[20]The Appellant’s renewed application to postpone the final hearing was dismissed. No Registered Manager The Parties’ Positions[21]It was not in dispute that:a. at the date of the preliminary hearing, there was no Registered Manager in post at the Service; andb. there had been no registered manager in post since at least 22 September 2025.[22]By section 13(1) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 and regulation 5(1)(a) of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations) 2009/3112, it was a requirement of the Appellant’s registration with the CQC that its registration be subject to a registered manager condition.[23]Dr Deignan took us to a copy of the Appellant's registration certificate in the bundle at page 134. That document stated:
“Conditions of registration that apply to: Because We Care Northampton Ltd for Personal care 1. The registered provider must ensure that the regulated activity personal care is managed by an individual who is registered as a manager in respect of that activity at or from all locations”
.

Because We Care Northampton Ltd for Personal care

[24]We were therefore satisfied that, as a condition of the Appellant’s registration, it was required to ensure that the regulated activity of personal care was managed by an individual who is registered as a manager in respect of that activity at or from all locations. It therefore follows that because there had been no Registered Manager in post since at least 22 September 2025, the Appellant had been in breach of its conditions of registration since at least 22 September 2025.[25]The Notice of Decision was issued under section 17(1)(c) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. It was therefore the Respondent’s case that the Appellant had carried on otherwise than in accordance with the relevant requirements because the Appellant is and has been in breach of the relevant requirements (i.e. its conditions of registration) since at least 22 September 2025.[26]Dr Deignan submitted that it was appropriate to dispose of the appeal by way of strike out because this presented an insurmountable problem for the Appellant; even if the Appellant were to succeed on the merits, it would nonetheless be unable to fulfil the legally mandated requirement to have a registered manager in place. That would immediately place it in breach of its registration. Accordingly, the appeal was without any prospect of success.[27]Mr Lynch made few submissions during the hearing but relied on the written position statement that he had filed in advance. His position was:a. since the Respondent's made its application to strike out the appeal, he had applied to become the Registered Manager of the Service (“the Registered Manager Application”);b. The Registered Manager Application was under consideration by the registration department at the CQC;c. the Respondent's submission that the absence of a Registered Manager presents an insurmountable obstacle should be considered in light of the factual developments that had occurred since the application was made (i.e. the Registered Manager Application). Our

DecisioN

[28]An application for strike out under HESC Rule 8(4)(c) must be taken in two stages. First, we must decide whether the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. If we are satisfied that it does not, strike out does not automatically follow. The statutory language of HESC Rule 8(4) is that the “Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings” if one or more of grounds (a) to (c) are made out. The use of the word “may” means the Tribunal has a discretion which requires the Tribunal to consider the overriding objective in HESC Rule 2.[29]We were satisfied that the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success. Our reasons were:a. To defeat the application for strike out, the Appellant need not show that that its case will probably succeed at the final hearing; it need only show that it has a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, chance of succeeding Swain v Hillman [1999] EWCA Civ 3053 .b. Dr Deignan referred us to the case of Three Rivers No 3 [2001] UKHL 16. In that case the House of Lords decided that for a case to be fanciful, it must be entirely without substance. Dr Deignan referred us to paragraph 95 of the judgment which stated: “it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible”.c. For the reasons set out above, Dr Deignan submitted that this was exactly the sort of case envisaged in the Three Rivers judgment.We accepted those submissions. At the date of the preliminary hearing, on the undisputed facts before us, even if the Appellant were to succeed in proving all the facts that it offers to prove (i.e. those disputed in the Scott Schedule), it would still be unsuccessful in the appeal. That is because it has no Registered Manager. We accept that this presents an insurmountable obstacle for the Appellant because it amounts to an ongoing breach of its conditions of registration. That breach alone would justify cancellation under section 17(1)(c) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008.d. The Appellant has therefore failed to persuade us that it has a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, chance of succeeding in the appeal. In our judgment, the case as it stands today, is entirely without substance. The appeal therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.[30]But, as noted above, this is not the end of the analysis. We are required to consider whether we should exercise our discretion to strike out the appeal. In our judgment this requires us to ask whether there is any other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at a final hearing which must include a consideration of the overriding objective.[31]We were not satisfied that there was any other compelling reason why the appeal should be disposed of at a final hearing.[32]We considered, in particular, the fact that Mr Lynch had made the the Registered Manager Application. We were not persuaded that this provided a compelling reason for the appeal to proceed to a final hearing, for the following reasons:a. First, the fact that an application had been made provided the Tribunal with no assurance that it would be granted. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the merits of that application, nor would it be appropriate for us to form any view about its likely outcome. Mr Lynch was unable to give any clear indication as to when the application was likely to be determined. The Tribunal was therefore being asked to proceed on the speculative basis that the application might, at some future point, be granted. We accepted Dr Deignan’s submission that it would be wrong in principle for the Tribunal to proceed on that basis. To do so would be to disregard the factual position as it stood at the date of the preliminary hearing.b. Secondly, the timing of the Registered Manager Application was significant. As noted above, it was not in dispute that there had been no Registered Manager in post at the Service since at least 22 September 2025. The Respondent made its application to strike out the appeal on 7 July 2026. It was only after that application had been made that Mr Lynch submitted the Registered Manager Application, on 15 July 2026. That chronology is important. Mr Lynch had previously applied to become the Registered Manager of the Service in October 2025. The CQC requested further information in respect of that application, but Mr Lynch did not provide it. The application therefore did not proceed. In those circumstances, Mr Lynch was aware, from at least October 2025, of the need to regularise the position. He could have pursued the earlier application by providing the information requested or made a further application at a much earlier stage. Mr Lynch explained that he had been advised not to make an earlier application. We pass no comment on that advice other than to say that is between Mr Lynch and his adviser. In any event, we were not persuaded this provided an adequate explanation.c. In those circumstances, we find that the application made on 15 July 2026 was made too late to amount to a compelling reason for the appeal to proceed to a final hearing. The Appellant was seeking, in effect, to rely upon a recent application, made only after the strike-out application had been issued, to avoid the consequences of a state of affairs which had existed for many months. We do not consider that the existence of that late and undetermined application materially alters the prospects of the appeal as they stood at the date of the preliminary hearing.d. We also considered the overriding objective, which requires the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Dr Deignan invited us to have regard to rule 2(e) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules, which refers to “avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues”. She submitted that the Tribunal was able to determine the strike out application at the preliminary hearing and that to defer the matter to a final substantive hearing, in circumstances where the Registered Manager application might or might not have been determined by then, and might or might not have been granted, would cause unnecessary delay. We accepted that submission.e. We also had regard to rule 2(a), which requires the Tribunal to deal with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs, and the resources of the parties. We recognise that this appeal is of the utmost importance to the Appellant. If the Respondent’s application to strike out the appeal is granted, the Notice of Decision will take effect and the Appellant’s registration with the CQC will be cancelled. That is plainly a serious consequence.f. However, having weighed those consequences carefully, we are satisfied that strike out is proportionate. The appeal must be assessed on the facts as they stood at the date of the preliminary hearing. At that date, there was no Registered Manager in post. The Appellant’s reliance on Mr Lynch’s recent application to the CQC was speculative. The application had not been determined, there was no indication when it would be determined, and there could be no assurance that it would be granted.g. Further, the lateness of the application is significant. The absence of a Registered Manager had persisted for many months. Mr Lynch had previously applied in October 2025 but did not provide the further information requested by the CQC. The application of 15 July 2026 was made only after the Respondent had applied to strike out the appeal. In those circumstances, the Appellant cannot rely on that late application as a compelling reason for the appeal to proceed to a final hearing.h. We therefore accepted Dr Deignan’s submission that further delay would be contrary to the overriding objective. The Tribunal was able to determine the strike out application fairly and properly on the information before it. Requiring the parties and the Tribunal to proceed to a final hearing would not be proportionate where the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. We therefore decided that the whole of the proceedings should be struck out. No reasonable prospect of the Appellant’s case, or part of it succeeding[33]In the alternative, the Respondent invited the Tribunal to strike out the appeal because, on its merits, it has no reasonable prospect of success.[34]Dr Deignan took us to the Scott Schedule at page 12 of the bundle. The Schedule identifies 59 alleged regulatory breaches. Of those allegations, 54 are admitted by the Appellant and only 5 are disputed. Dr Deignan therefore submitted that the overwhelming majority of the matters relied upon by the Appellant were no longer in issue.[35]Dr Deignan properly accepted, however, that the existence of those admissions did not necessarily mean that the appeal was bound to fail. In particular, she accepted that if there were evidence before the Tribunal capable of establishing that the Appellant had remedied, or had taken effective and sustainable steps to remedy, the admitted breaches, it would remain open to the Tribunal to allow the appeal. Her submission was that the material before the Tribunal was insufficient to support such a conclusion.[36]Mr Lynch disagreed. He submitted that there was adequate evidence before the Tribunal, including an action plan, demonstrating that appropriate remedial steps had been taken or were being taken.[37]Accordingly, there was a material dispute between the parties as to the adequacy and effectiveness of the steps said to have been taken by the Appellant to address the admitted breaches. In our judgment, that dispute could not properly be resolved at the preliminary hearing. Determining that issue would have required an assessment of evidence that was not before us and findings of fact which could only properly be made following a consideration of the full evidential picture at a final hearing.[38]We were therefore not satisfied that the Respondent had established that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success on its substantive merits. The issues identified above are matters which require determination at a final hearing and are not suitable for resolution on a strike out application.[39]It follows that the Respondent's alternative ground for strike out was not made out. However, in light of our conclusion in relation to the first ground of the application, that finding does not affect the overall outcome. Even if all disputes concerning remediation were resolved in the Appellant's favour, the absence of a registered manager would still be fatal to the appeal. The Respondent's application to strike out the appeal therefore nevertheless succeeds. The Appellant’s renewed application to postpone the final hearing[40]Mr Lynch made no submissions on the Appellant’s renewed application to postpone the final hearing. In any event, given the decision as set out above, the application falls away and so is dismissed.[41]DecisioN The Respondent’s application dated 7 July 2026, to strike out the whole of the proceedings under HESC Rule 8(4)(c) is successful.[42]The appeal is struck out under Rule 8(4)(c).[43]This is a final decision. The Appellant can apply for the decision to be set aside because of procedural error, or for permission to appeal because of legal error. Any application must be received by the Tribunal within 28 days and should be made on one of the relevant appeal forms (S1 or P1) which can be downloaded from the website or obtained from the Tribunal’s administrative centre.[44]The Appellant’s renewed application to postpone the final hearing is dismissed. 45. First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 10 August 2026