Hazelmont (Kent) Limited v Ofsted [2026] UKFTT 1125 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care StandardsThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 20082026-01943.EYNeutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01125 (HESC)Heard by Video Link on 23 July 2026
Before
Ms S Goodrich (Judge)Dr E Stuart-Cole (Specialist Member)Ms M Tynan (Specialist Member)
Between
HAZELMONT (KENT) LIMITEDApplicant-v-
Between
OFSTEDRespondentDecision on Late Appeal ApplicationAppellant: Mrs Bal in person for in personRespondent: Ms Wendy Gutteridge, solicitor, Ofsted Legal ServicesDate 2026-08-05
[1]On 25 June 2026 Mrs Bal sought to appeal the decision dated 8 May 2026 made by the Respondent under section 20B of the Care Standards Act (“the Act”) to cancel registration to carry on a children’s home (‘the Home’).[2]However, the appeal is out of time. The preliminary issue therefore arises as to whether the Tribunal should extend time so as to allow the appeal to proceed.[3]Hereafter all dates referred to are in 2026 unless otherwise stated.[4]Directions were issued by Judge Khan on 3 July regarding the hearing of this preliminary issue. This included a direction that the parties send to each other their written submissions which duly occurred on 10 July.

The Hearing

[5]The hearing was conducted as a video hearing. There were no significant difficulties in connectivity. We had before electronic hearing bundle (130 pages pdf) prepared by the Respondent.[6]Mrs Bal confirmed that she had received and read the bundle and had it available to her for use in the hearing.

The Law

[7]Section 21(2) of the Act provides that:
“No appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order.”
[8]The question of whether discretion exists to extend the time limit provided by statute was considered in Sheikh v Care Quality Commission [2013] UKUT 137 (AAC) where the court was concerned with a different act but an identical provision. This was said:
“4. There can be no doubt that the Respondent was right to submit that the First-tier Tribunal had no power to admit the second appeal as such. Section 32(2) of the 2008 Act provides – “No appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order.”
Thus the time limit is in primary legislation and not in Tribunal Procedure Rules. Moreover, there is nothing in primary legislation authorising the extension of that time limit…”[9]The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 do not contain any powers to extend the time limit set out in statute. Rule 5(3)(a) allows only for the extension of time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction:
“(3) In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Tribunal may — (a) extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, unless such extension or shortening would conflict with a provision of another enactment containing a time limit;”
[emphasis added].[10]However, in the light of binding authority, the time limit in the Act is not an absolute one. The Supreme Court decision in Pomiechowski & Ors v District Court of Legunica Poland [2012] UKSC 20 established that an absolute statutory time limit should be read in a manner consistent with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[11]In Paragraph 39 of the judgment in Pomiechowski Lord Mance stated:
“...the statutory provision concerning appeals can and should all be read subject to the qualification that the court must have a discretion in exceptional circumstances to extend time for both filing and service, where such statutory provisions would otherwise operate to prevent an appeal in a manner conflicting with the right of access to an appeal process held to exist under article 6(1) ... ...[the Court] must have power to permit and hear an out of time appeal whicha litigant personally has done all he can to bring and notify timeously.”
[12]In R (on the application of)Adesina & Ors v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818, the case of Pomiechowski was applied and it was stated: “A discretion must only arise “in exceptional circumstances” and where the appellant “personally has done all he can to bring [the appeal] timeously.” and, also “...although the absolute approach can no longer be said to be invariable, the scope for departure from the 28-day time limit is extremely narrow.”

and, also

[13]Following Adesina, in some cases a test has been applied in relation to whether jurisdiction to extend time arises, containing two limbs:(1) that the circumstances are exceptional and(2) that the Appellant had done all they personally could have done to bring the appeal in time.[14]The Court of Appeal has since considered this in Lars Stuewe v Health and Care Professionals Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1605. Paragraphs 51-52 of the judgement clarify the position, and make clear that the test properly applied consists of the first limb only: that the circumstances are exceptional,taking into account all relevant factors, one of which may be the actions of the Appellant (as per the former second limb of the test). In the leading judgement

Lady Justice Carr said this:

“53. The need to import the notion of reasonableness, as suggested in Rakoczy, underscores the importance of adhering to the approach identified above. It is both undesirable and counter-intuitive for there to be potentially intricate and nuanced debate as to the reasonableness of a litigant’s conduct in the context of an examination of whether the “exceptional circumstances” jurisdiction exists. 54. As set out above, therefore, the central and only question for the court is whether or not “exceptional circumstances” exist, namely where to deny a power to extend time would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. Any gloss is unhelpful. Answering the question may or may not include consideration of whether or not the litigant has done everything possible to serve within time, depending on the facts of the case. Once the discretion (or duty) arises, it must then be exercised to the minimum extent necessary to secure compliance with Article 6 rights. 55. (having referred to several examples of the approach laid down in Adesina as deployed on the facts of individual cases) …..ultimately each case will turn on its own facts and the assistance to be drawn from the outcomes on the facts of other cases may be limited.”

The Applicant’s Case

[15]At the start of the hearing the judge explained that it was for the Applicant to satisfy us that there were exceptional circumstances, and further, that the panel should exercise its discretion to permit the late appeal. As the Applicant represented herself the judge asked her questions to elucidate the circumstances on which she relied.[16]Mrs Bal said that she had notified Ofsted that she would become the Responsible Individual (for the registered setting) from 7 April.[17]Her father-in-law was admitted to hospital on 11 May and remained there until he died. He has been diagnosed with cancer in December 2023. He had come to live with the family and had done extremely well. On 23 May 2026 when they went to see him he was in a vegetative state. Mrs Bal was at the hospital and was not taking phone calls. Her father-in-law died on 28 May.[18]Mrs Bal told us that she was working throughout this time and did communicate with Mr Shekleton of Ofsted on 22 May as the result of which he sent her the NoD dated 8 May. She said did not have any mental capacity to deal with any appeal. She could not do anything after her father-in-law died because in her culture there is a mourning period where people come to the home and this includes religious ceremonies. There would be constant people in and out of the house to show their respects.[19]Mrs Bal agreed that on 22 May she had liaised with Ofsted and made them aware of changes. She said that during this period she did not access the appeal forms on-line or seek legal advice. She said she did not have the mental capacity. She knew what had to be done but she was not able to put the documents together for a legal representative. She had sent the email on the 26May but after that she was not able to deal with anything.

The Respondent’s Case

[20]Mrs Gutteridge relied on her written submissions. There is no dispute that the decision was validly served on the company on 11 May. The fact that Mrs Bal was not made aware of it by Mr Virdi was due to internal governance issues. Mrs Bal confirms that the registered office is under the control of the co-director of the Applicant company, Mr Manjit Virdi. The absence of one of the directors where the other was not absent cannot amount to exceptional circumstances for the Applicant company. It is relevant to the question of exceptionality that Mrs Bal is not the registered provider. She is one of two current directors of the Applicant company. Whilst Mrs Bal states that there were ongoing proposed changes to the directorship of the company, these have not yet taken place. Again, changes to organisational structure do not constitute exceptional circumstances. No explanation has been provided why the appeal could not have been submitted by Mrs Bal during the period she was in correspondence with Ofsted between 22 May when the copy Notice was sent to her, and 26 May when she sent a lengthy response. As to Mrs Bal’s bereavement, the matters relied upon do not amount to exceptional circumstances sufficient to explain or justify the entirety of the delay.

The Tribunal’s Consideration

[21]We took into account all the material placed before us. If we do not refer to each and every point made it does not mean that we have not considered all the matters raised.[22]The chronology is as follows: 8 May: Notice of Decision (NoD) to cancel registration produced, addressed to the proper address of the Appellant company – the registered office of the company provider. 11 May: NoD delivered by courier. Proof of delivery from the courier that the Notice was delivered and signed for at 13:12 hours. 22 May: Telephone call between Ofsted and Mrs Bal. Ofsted sent copies of the NoD to cancel (8 May) and the NoD to suspend (20 May) by email to Mrs Bal at her request. In his email Jay Shekleton, Social Care Compliance Inspector, referred Mrs Bal to the decision letters for details of the next steps she may wish to consider. 26 May: Mrs Bal emailed Ofsted to confirm receipt and she provided detailed representations. 28 May: Mrs Bal’s father-in-law died in hospital. 9 June: Expiry of the 28-day appeal period set out in section 21(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000. 15 June: Mrs Bal lodged an appeal. She mistakenly appealed against the NoD to suspend registration dated 20 May, and not the decision to cancel cancellation dated 8 May. It appears that this error was appreciated at a hearing regarding the suspension appeal on 25 June. 25 June: Mrs Bal lodged the appeal against the Notice of Decision to cancel registration dated 8 May.

Our consideration

[23]We find that the Appellant company was properly served at company’s registered address on 11 May in accordance with section 37 of the Care Standards Act 2000. The fact that Mrs Bal’s co-director did not tell her about the NoD (or any preceding correspondence) does not mean that service was not effective. The 28 days for lodging of an appeal expired on 9 June. The Applicant lodged her appeal on 25 June, some 16 days after the expiry of the appeal period, and applied for an extension.[24]The matters on which she relied in her appeal form were that the NoD was not bought to her attention by her co director. She stated that the fact of the NoD to cancel dated 8 May (amongst other matters) was first bought to her attention by Mr Shekleton of Ofsted on 22 May 2026. Her case is that this left her with very little time, (which she believed to be 14 days), to prepare and submit an appeal. Her father-in-law died on 28 May and the funeral took place on 10 June. She contends that these events significantly affected her ability to prepare an appeal.[25]It is apparent from the documents before us that Mrs Bal had sent an email on 21 May 2026 to Ofsted making representations regarding the suspension that had been imposed on 27 February 2026, and which was due to expire on 22 May 2026.[26]Having received a copy of the decision to cancel registration on 22 May Mrs Bal emailed lengthy representations to Ofsted on 26 May.[27]Mrs Bal told us that she was unable to act upon the appeal rights after her father-in -law died on 28 May 2026 because of the need to be present for condolence and religious ceremonies. We are not persuaded that these issues prevented her from lodging an appeal at this time. Mrs Bal is a qualified lawyer, and in practice (albeit not in litigation). Lodging an appeal in the Tribunal is a reasonably simple process. It is one that is successfully navigated by the very many litigants in person who regularly lodge appeals before the Tribunal, and who have no legal training. The NoD itself provided a hyperlink to the appeal form and to the Tribunal guidance.[28]Having considered the material before us as a whole, we consider that the underlying reason Mrs Bal did not lodge an appeal in time is because that Mrs Bal and her co Director were not communicating. It is evident from the correspondence before us that there were significant issues regarding the functioning of the company. This is not an exceptional circumstance. Mrs Bal, as a matter of fact, received the NoD which informed her about appeals rights and how to access the appeal form on 22 May, when there was still some seventeen days left to lodge an in-time appeal. Mrs Bal was plainly capable of completing an appeal form because she sent representations to Ofsted on 22 and on 26 May. Whilst we, of course, have sympathy to the fact that Mrs Bal’s father-in-law passed away on 28 May, we are unable to accept that the overall circumstances were such as to have deprived Mrs Bal of her ability to exercise appeal rights. We do not consider that bereavement adequately explains why she did not lodge an appeal. We do not consider that the matters on which Mrs Bal relies, either individually or cumulatively, amount to exceptional circumstances.[29]For the reasons given the Applicant has not satisfied us that the circumstances of this case meet the test of exceptionality recognised by the Supreme Court in Pomiechowski, and as further explained by the Court of Appeal in Lars Stuewe. We exercise our discretion so as to refuse to extend time. DECISION IT IS ORDERED THAT: 30. The application to extend the time limit for lodging the appeal is refused. Judge Goodrich First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued:05 August 2026