Ancora Children’s Homes Limited v Ofsted [2026] UKFTT 1124 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care StandardsThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 20082026-01942.EY-SUSNeutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01124 (HESC)RULE 14 ORDERIT IS ORDERED THAT:Save with the permission of the Tribunal, no person shall publish or disclose the name or address of any child who has been named, referred to or involved with these proceedings or any information that would be likely to lead to their identification in connection with these proceedings.This Order does not prohibit publication of the names of the parties to these proceedings.WARNINGThis Order must be complied with unless and until it is varied or discharged by the Tribunal. Any person who knowingly acts in breach of this Order may be held to be in contempt of court and may be liable to a fine, imprisonment, or other sanction.By Cloud Video Platformon 16 July 2026
Before
Tribunal Judge O’NeillSpecialist Member EverittAncora Children’s Homes LimitedAppellant-v-OfstedRespondentDECISION
Between
Ancora Children’s Homes LimitedClaimantOfstedDefendantDate 2026-08-05

The AppeaL

[1]Ancora Children’s Homes Limited (“the Appellant”) appeals against the decision of the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (“Ofsted” or “the Respondent”) dated 9 June 2026 to issue a Notice of Suspension (“NoS”). The NoS was said to be issued under sections 14A and 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000 and suspended the registration of a children’s home, managed by the Appellant (“the Home”), for 12 weeks, until 31 August 2026. Background AND KEY CHRONOLOGY[2]The Home was first registered with the Respondent in October 2023 to provide care for children of either gender with emotional and social difficulties and learning disabilities.[3]In late March 2026, the Respondent was notified by the Local Authority Designated Officer (“LADO”) of safeguarding allegations concerning staff at the Home. The Respondent was also informed of a police investigation. The allegations shall be referred to in this decision as “the Safeguarding Allegations”. To mitigate any risk of jigsaw identification we do not particularise the Safeguarding Allegations in this decision or name the Home. As is explained further below, we make no finding of fact in this decision, and therefore full particulars are not necessary.[4]In mid-April 2026, the Appellant received notice of the allegations and suspended the named individuals.[5]Subsequently, representatives of the Appellant and the Respondent attended an allegation management meeting (“AMM”) arranged by the LADO. At the AMM, the police confirmed that they had commenced an active investigation, and the Responsible Individual, Wendy Edward-Tsuro, confirmed that all staff working at the Home had been suspended pending investigation.[6]After that meeting, the Responsible Individual confirmed that the Registered Manager had also been suspended.[7]On 2 and 3 June 2026, the Respondent completed an inspection of the Home.[8]The Respondent issued the NoS on 9 June 2026.[9]The Appellant commenced these proceedings on 26 June 2026. Preliminary Matters Late Evidence[10]The Appellant applied to admit the following late evidence:a. a second supplemental witness statement of Wendy Edward-Tsuro with exhibits totaling 166 pages; andb. an external independent investigation report dated 8 July 2026.[11]We refused the application to admit the late documents, save that we noted that an external investigation had been undertaken and had concluded. Our reasons were as follows:a. The second supplemental witness statement contained little substantive factual evidence relevant to the issues in dispute. Its principal purpose was to exhibit further documents, but it did not explain their relevance or why they had not been produced earlier.b. The documents were substantial. The Tribunal had already permitted the Appellant to file one supplemental statement, and no good reason was given for producing further evidence late.c. Applying the overriding objective, we were satisfied that admitting the documents at that late stage would be unfair to the Respondent. The Appellant had already had a fair opportunity to file evidence; the documents could have been produced earlier, and their relevance had not been adequately explained. The Respondent therefore had limited opportunity to consider, respond to or challenge them.d. Further, Mr Tabori confirmed that he did not intend to take the Tribunal to most of the documents during the hearing. In those circumstances, the Appellant had not demonstrated that admitting them was relevant or necessary.e. As to the external independent investigation report, Mr Tabori confirmed that he was content for the Tribunal to note that an investigation had taken place and concluded. He did not pursue the application to admit the report itself. The report was therefore not admitted. Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro’s oral evidence[12]During the hearing, it became apparent that Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro had joined remotely from Dubai and intended to give oral evidence. The Tribunal had therefore to consider Presidential Guidance Note No. 1 of 2024: Taking oral evidence from abroad (“the Practice Guidance”).[13]The Practice Guidance reflects the principle that one State should not exercise the powers of its courts or tribunals in another State’s territory without that State’s permission. Breach of that principle may damage the United Kingdom’s diplomatic relations and is contrary to the public interest.[14]Before the hearing, the Appellant, through its legal representatives, should have checked the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (“FCDO”) website to ascertain whether the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) permitted oral evidence to be taken by live video or audio link from within its territory. Where a State has expressly refused permission, such evidence cannot be taken. In other cases, the party seeking to rely on oral evidence from abroad must apply to the Tribunal under the procedure set out in the Practice Guidance.[15]During the hearing, we checked the FCDO website. It confirmed that the UK had not been able to obtain the agreement of the Government of the UAE to allow individuals in the UAE to give evidence from the UAE by video link. Any request should be submitted on a case-by-case basis, but the FCDO are unable to confirm whether a response will be received.[16]Paragraphs 36 to 44 of the Practice Guidance set out the procedure where a witness wishes to give oral evidence from abroad. That procedure had not been followed. We therefore could not permit Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro to give oral evidence from Dubai.[17]The Appellant therefore had three options:a. apply for an adjournment to allow time for the Practice Guidance procedure to be followed;b. apply for an adjournment to allow Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro to return to England; orc. proceed with the hearing on the basis that Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro would not give oral evidence, and that the Tribunal would later determine what weight to attach to her written evidence.[18]Mr Tabori invited the Tribunal to proceed with option (c). Mrs Birks did not oppose that course but indicated that she would invite the Tribunal to attach little or no weight to Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro’s written evidence because it could not be tested in cross-examination.[19]Applying the overriding objective, including the need to avoid delay so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, we decided to proceed without oral evidence from Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro. We were satisfied that the appeal could still be determined fairly. Any prejudice to the Appellant arose from its failure to follow the Practice Guidance procedure; that was a situation of its own making. We address below the weight to be attached to Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro’s written evidence. Legal Framework The Legislative Provisions[20]The relevant legislation is:a. section 14A Care Standards Act 2000;b. section 20B Care Standards Act 2000;c. section 21 Care Standards Act 2000; andd. section 22B Care Standards Act 2000[21]Section 14A of the Care Standards Act 2000:
'(1) The registration authoritymay at any time suspend for a specified period the registration of a person in respect of an establishment or agency. (2) Except where the registration authority givesnotice under section 20B, the power conferred by subsection (1) is exercisable only on the ground that the establishment or agency is being, or has at any time been, carried on otherwise than in accordance with the relevant requirements.'
[22]Section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000 provides: '20B Urgent procedure for suspension or variation etc(1) Subsection (2) applies where— (a) a person is registered under this Part in respect of an establishment or agency and (b) the registration authority has reasonable cause to believe that unless it actsunder this section any person will or may be exposed to the risk of harm.(2) Where this subsection applies, the registration authoritymay, by giving notice in writing under this section to the person registered in respect of the establishment or agency, provide for any decision of the registration authoritythat is mentioned in subsection (3) to take effect from the time when the notice is given.(3) Those decisions are— (a) a decision under section 13(5) to vary or remove a condition for the time being in force in relation to the registration or to impose an additional condition; (b) a decision under section 14A to suspend the registration or extend the period of suspension.[23]The definition of ‘harm’ is as set out in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 i.e. as: “ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another”.[24]Section 21 of the Care Standards Act 2000 sets out that: Appeals to the Tribunal (1) An appeal against— (a) a decision of the registration authority under this Part; (b)… (c)… shall lie to the Tribunal. (4ZA )On an appeal against a decision to which a notice under section 20B relates, the Tribunal may confirm the decision or direct that it shall cease to have effect. (4A)… (4B)… (4C)… (5) The Tribunal shall also have power on an appeal: (a) to vary any condition for the time being in force in respect of the establishment or agency to which the appeal relates; (b) to direct that any such condition shall cease to have effect; (c ) to direct that any such condition as it thinks fit shall have effect in respect of the establishment or agency; or (d) to vary the period of any suspension.[25]Section 22B of the Care Standards Act 2000 sets out that:(1) The CIECSS may serve a notice on a person who is registered in respect of an establishment to which this section applies imposing on that person the requirement in subsection (2) in relation to that establishment.(2) The requirement is to ensure that no child is accommodated at the establishment unless the child:a. was accommodated there when the notice was served; andb. has continued to be accommodated there since the notice was served.[26]The Burden and Standard of Proof[27]The Tribunal reminds itself that it stands in the shoes of Ofsted and determines the appeal de novo at the date of the hearing. It must consider all the evidence available to it at that date and is not confined to the material before Ofsted when the decision was made.[28]The Tribunal further reminds itself that:a. the burden of proof rests on Ofsted;b. the applicable standard is whether there is reasonable cause to believe. That standard lies between proof on the balance of probabilities and reasonable cause to suspect; andc. reasonable belief is judged by the informed observer test:
“The reasonable belief is to be judged by whether a reasonable person assumed to know the law and possessed of the information available would believe that a person might be at risk if the conditions did not take immediate effect”
. The Issues[29]At the outset of the hearing, we raised with the parties the question of the legal test to be applied in determining this appeal. The point arose because, although the notice of suspension was identified as a notice issued under section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000, Mr Tabori’s skeleton argument took the position that the relevant decision was one made under section 14A of the Care Standards Act 2000.[30]Mr Tabori submitted that, although the notice referred to section 20B, it did so only as the procedural mechanism by which the suspension took immediate effect. He argued that:a. the substantive statutory ground relied upon by the Respondent was that contained in section 14A, namely that the establishment was being, or had been, carried on otherwise than in accordance with the relevant requirements;b. the Tribunal remained confined by the statutory and factual parameters of the NoS and, because the NoS relied heavily on historic matters and factual allegations, was being asked to determine whether those matters had been established;c. the Tribunal was therefore required to determine the factual matters on the balance of probabilities.[31]Mrs Birks submitted that every urgent suspension of this nature necessarily involves both provisions: section 14A confers the power to suspend registration, while section 20B provides the statutory basis for exercising that power urgently. She relied upon the wording of the notice, which stated that it was a notice of suspension of a children’s home issued under section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000, and upon the further wording of the notice that Ofsted had reasonable cause to believe that a person would or might be exposed to a risk of harm if the registration authority did not act.[32]We were not persuaded by Mr Tabori’s submissions and accepted Mrs Birks’ submissions. In our judgment, the statutory provisions are clear. Section 14A provides the power to suspend registration. However, section 14A itself recognises that the ordinary basis upon which suspension may be exercised is subject to the separate urgent procedure under section 20B. Where notice has been given under section 20B, the relevant question for the Tribunal is not whether each historic allegation has been proved on the balance of probabilities. The question is whether the statutory risk threshold under section 20B is met.[33]We were satisfied that the notice in this case was given under section 20B. The notice was described, in the papers before the Tribunal, as a notice of suspension of a children’s home issued under section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000.[34]The issues for the Tribunal therefore were:a. whether there was a reasonable cause to believe that the continued provision of services by the Appellant may expose any person to a risk of harm; andb. if so, whether suspension of the Appellant’s registration is proportionate in all the circumstances Analysis AND DECISION Executive Summary[35]We decided that: (a) there was reasonable cause to believe that the continued provision of services by the Appellant will or may expose any person to a risk of harm; and a. suspension of the Appellant’s registration was proportionate in all the circumstances.[36]Our detailed reasons are set out below. In summary they were that:a. there was reasonable cause to believe that the continued provision of services by the Appellant may expose any person to a risk of harm because: i. the Safeguarding Allegations are serious and remain under investigation by the police and therefore unresolved; ii. there is no Registered Manager, nor any staff working, in the Home and the permanent Responsible Individual in on a period of extended leave; iii. the findings following the inspection on 2 and 3 June 2026 remain unresolved,b. suspension of the Appellant’s registration was proportionate in all the circumstances. The Threshold for Suspension[37]On the evidence available, we were satisfied that a reasonable person, knowing the law and possessed of that evidence, would believe that, unless action is taken under section 20B, a person would or might be exposed to a risk of harm. The Safeguarding Allegations[38]Section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 defines “harm” as “ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development”, including impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another. “Ill-treatment” expressly includes sexual abuse and non-physical forms of ill-treatment.[39]The following matters were not in dispute:a. following Ofsted v GM and WM [2009] UKUT 89 (AAC), the contemplated risk must be one of significant harm;b. if established, the Safeguarding Allegations would amount to sexual abuse or other ill-treatment and would therefore fall within the statutory definition of harm; andc. sexual abuse of a child is, by its nature, capable of amounting to significant harm.[40]Accordingly, the question was not whether the Safeguarding Allegations had been proved, but whether they, together with the wider evidence, gave rise to reasonable cause to believe that a person would or might be exposed to a risk of significant harm if the Respondent did not act urgently.[41]Mr Tabori originally submitted that the section 20B threshold had not met because, when the NoS was issued, there were no children resident at the Home, all staff had been suspended, and the Appellant had confirmed that there would be no further admissions until further notice. He argued that, in those circumstances, there was no reasonable cause to believe that, unless Ofsted acted, a person would or might be exposed to a risk of harm. He rowed back from this position in his written closing submissions in which he accepted that “if the NoS is found to have been based on a decision under s 20B and not just s 14A, the fact of the police and LADO investigation meets the low threshold”. As is set out above, we decided that the NoS was issued under section 20B. Mr Tabori therefore accepted that the statutory threshold had been met.[42]Mr Tabori further submitted that regulatory action based on risk requires close attention to precisely how and why the evidence demonstrates that individuals may be at risk, and to the seriousness of that risk. He relied on NMC v Persand [2023] EWHC 3356 (Admin), in particular paragraph 41. He submitted that Ofsted had not identified how or why any child would presently be exposed to risk.[43]Notwithstanding Mr Tabori’s concession, we decided that the Safeguarding Allegations were sufficient to found a reasonable belief that a person might be exposed to a risk of significant harm if the suspension did not remain in effect. Section 20B does not require the Tribunal to be satisfied that harm has occurred or is more likely than not to occur. The statutory language is “will or may be exposed to the risk of harm”. The threshold is therefore concerned with risk, not proof of past harm or that future harm is probable.[44]At the date of the hearing, the Safeguarding Allegations remained the subject of an ongoing police investigation. We remind ourselves that an unresolved investigation is not, without more, sufficient to justify suspension. The question is whether there remains a real possibility that evidence sufficient to support enforcement action against the Appellant will emerge from that investigation Ofsted v GM and WM [2009] UKUT 89 (AAC) [32] .[45]We noted the e-mail from Detective Sergeant Nicola Hadfield dated 25 June 2026 at MB/289. That e-mail stated:
“I have at this time put a hold on all third-party material being accessed and reviewed and believe that focusing on [redacted] phone download review will help us (Police) identify if there has been any wrong doing… which may support an evidence led investigation as opposed to a victim led one. The phone has since been downloaded, and this is being converted into a format which will allow DC Clark to be able to review the results. This will be prioritised however please be mindful that this is being completed alongside demand and other commitments. DC Clark is aware of [redacted]’s bail, and we will look to progress this as soon as possible… Should [redacted]’s phone not highlight any concerns or evidence to support the disclosure it is unlikely there will be sufficient evidence to progress this investigation further…”
[46]We also had regard to paragraph 19 of Mrs Costello’s (Regulation Inspection Manager and decision maker for Ofsted) witness statement, in which she stated: “We need to understand the implications on the ongoing safeguarding investigation. Children may be exposed to emotional, physical, or sexual harm if there are unsafe adults employed at the home. Children may be exposed to child exploitation if there is not the right support and supervision provided. Children who have already experienced trauma may be subject to further trauma in their lives in a time where they should be safe and their holistic needs met”.[47]On this evidence, we were satisfied that there remained a real possibility that evidence sufficient to support enforcement action could emerge from the police investigation, particularly from the review of the mobile phone download. That conclusion was based not merely on the ongoing investigation, but on the nature of the allegations and the identified line of enquiry.[48]We further remind ourselves that, at paragraph 28 of Ofsted v GM and WM [2009] UKUT 89 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal stated that, “if Ofsted resists an appeal on the basis that further investigations are required, it must make clear what those investigations are and what steps it may take depending on their outcome”. We were satisfied that requirement was met. Mrs Costello’s evidence was that the outcome of that enquiry might materially affect the regulatory assessment. In our judgment, this was an appropriate position to take. The police had custody of the mobile phone and therefore only the police were able to investigate the mobile phone download. It was therefore appropriate to await that investigation.[49]We then considered whether the evidence justified urgent action. Section 20B applies where the registration authority (and therefore this Tribunal on appeal) has reasonable cause to believe that, unless it acts under that section, any person will or may be exposed to the risk of harm. We accept that this requires a present risk assessment and a rational explanation of why urgent regulatory action is required. We also accept that this must be considered alongside the voluntary measures taken by the Appellant.[50]We decided that, notwithstanding the voluntary measures taken by the Appellant, action under section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000 remained necessary. Our reasons were:a. the Safeguarding Allegations are extremely seriousness. Whilst we make no findings concerning the truth of those allegations, they form an important part of the context in which the Tribunal must assess the level of risk. Whilst the Safeguarding Allegations focus on one member of staff, if proven they may implicate multiple members of staff;b. the voluntary measures depend on the Appellant’s continuing compliance. Mrs Costello’s evidence was that the Respondent was “unable to take the provider’s word that no children would be admitted, and we have a duty to protect and safeguard children”. Mrs Costello was unable to say, when questioned, why the Respondent was unable to take the Appellant’s word, other than it was Ofsted’s policy not to take a provider’s word that they would not admit children. In our judgment this was less than satisfactory. We were not persuaded that a blanket policy, as was suggested by Mrs Costello, could ever be appropriate. Each case must be assessed on its own merits. Nevertheless, we were persuaded, on the facts of this case that a voluntary assurance, even if given in good faith, is not equivalent to an enforceable statutory suspension. It could be withdrawn or departed from at any time and did not prevent the Home from resuming admissions before the unresolved Safeguarding Allegations had been adequately addressed;c. The Appellant’s position was that the assurances it had offered provided the Respondent no less protection than a suspension. Mr Tabori submitted that even if the Appellant was suspended there was nothing to physically stop the Appellant from recommencing services. We reject that position. Section 24A makes it an offence to carry on or manage an establishment while the person's registration is suspended. There is no equivalent sanction for failing to comply with a voluntary assurance or undertaking;d. the voluntary measures did not answer the wider concerns arising from the allegations (i.e. the questions about safeguarding culture, management oversight, staff conduct and the adequacy of supervision). We comment on these further below.[51]For these reasons we decided that, notwithstanding the voluntary measures taken by the Appellant, action under section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000 remained necessary. The statutory threshold had therefore been met. The Inspection[52]On 2 and 3 June 2026, the Respondent completed an inspection of the Home. Several shortfalls were identified, including:a. there were no staff or management arrangements at the home;b. leaders and managers had failed to meet children's individual needs in relation to assessments; andc. leaders and managers had not consistently maintained staffing levels sufficient to meet children’s assessed needs.[53]Given our conclusions set out above, we need not consider the inspection findings. The statutory threshold has already been met. But the Respondent’s case was that these inspection findings, coupled with the Safeguarding Allegations, contribute to the reasonable belief that children may be exposed to harm if admissions resume before those matters are addressed. For the sake of completeness, we have considered them.[54]The Appellant disputes those findings and contends that staffing arrangements were appropriate, that assessments were robust, and that the steps taken following the allegations demonstrated responsible safeguarding action rather than regulatory failure. No staff or management[55]We decided that the lack of a Registered Manager, the absence of any staff working in the Home, and the lack of a permanent Responsible Individual coupled with the Safeguarding Allegations, would lead a reasonable person to believe that, unless enforcement action was taken, children may be at risk of harm. Our reasons were as follows:a. The Appellant’s case was that its decision to suspend the Registered Manager and the staff working in the Home was taken to protect children and preserve the integrity of the police and LADO investigations. Mr Tabori submitted that it would therefore be wrong to “punish” the Appellant for taking such action by further suspending the Appellant’s registration.b. A suspension under section 20B of the Care Standards Act 2000 is a protective emergency measure; it is not punitive. The suspension operates as a neutral holding measure to maintain safety while regulatory investigations are conducted; it does not determine culpability. We accept that the practical and financial consequences may be severe. This is why, where the statutory threshold is met, the Tribunal separately considers whether suspension is proportionate in all the circumstances. But the decision to suspend nevertheless remains fundamentally preventative, not penal. We therefore reject Mr Tabori’s submission that the suspension is punitive.c. We accept that the Appellant's decision to suspend its staff cannot, of itself, constitute wrongdoing. Indeed, we accept that such action may constitute an appropriate safeguarding response.d. However, the question is not whether the suspension was justified. The question is whether, at the date of the hearing, there was reasonable cause to believe that children admitted to the Home would or might be exposed to a risk of harm absent regulatory intervention.e. It was not in dispute that, at the date of the hearing, there was no Registered Manager actively managing the Home and no operational staff team available to care for children. We refer to and repeat our reasons set out at paragraphs 38 to 51 above. For those reasons, we were not persuaded that the absence of resident children answers the statutory test. The Tribunal is entitled to consider the position that may arise if the suspension were lifted. In those circumstances, the Home would retain the ability to admit children notwithstanding the absence of an established management and staffing structure and children may be exposed to the risk of harm because there would be no staff available to keep them safe.f. It was also undisputed that the Responsible Individual, Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro, was on extended leave from 2 July 2026 and was not due to return until 31 August 2026. Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro’s evidence was that, during her absence, Mr Ben Harper would hold “full operational authority across the Appellant’s portfolio throughout this period” and had “been fully briefed on all matters relating to [the Home] and this appeal, and remains fully contactable at all times”.g. At paragraph 13A of her witness statement, Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro stated:
“A properly planned and clearly delegated period of leave is not, of itself, a matter of regulatory concern; sound governance depends on leadership structures that are resilient and do not rely on any one individual being permanently and continuously present”
. We take no issue with that proposition. She is entitled to take leave and, provided appropriate cover is in place, we agree that this should not present an issue. h. The Respondent’s concern, as explained by Mrs Sithembinkosi Nothando Mzila at paragraph 19 of her witness statement, was that Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro’s absence may result in a lack of “effective and consistent leadership”. This was because her absence has occurred, whilst the Safeguarding Allegations remain under investigation and whilst the inspections findings remain unresolved. At this stage, we are not required to make findings of fact, nor to be satisfied that those concerns are made out. We do not need to be persuaded at this stage that those concerns were made out in the evidence. What can be said is that the concerns are neither fanciful nor unsupported. The Responsible Individual is the person nominated by the registered provider to supervise the management of the service and to ensure that the provider complies with its legal and regulatory obligations. That person therefore plays a key leadership role. i. We had difficulty accepting Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro’s evidence concerning Mr Ben Harper because it could not be tested in cross-examination. We therefore attached little weight to it. Moreover, Mr Ben Harper provided no evidence. He neither filed a witness statement nor attended the hearing. We therefore preferred and accepted Mrs Sithembinkosi Nothando Mzila’ evidence. On that evidence we were satisfied that there was a risk of a lack of effective and consistent leadership. Not simply because Mrs Wendy Edward-Tsuro had taken leave, but because that leave had fallen during a significant period of unrest for the Appellant. j. In our judgment, the absence of effective and consistent leadership may place children at a risk of harm. Leadership provides the framework through which safeguarding arrangements are implemented, monitored and enforced. Without appropriate oversight and direction, there is an increased risk that safeguarding concerns will not be identified or addressed promptly, that staff will not receive sufficient guidance or supervision, and that risk assessments and care planning will be ineffective. Such failings may compromise the service’s ability to protect children from harm and promote their welfare.[56]For these reasons, we decided that the lack of a Registered Manager, and the absence of any staff working in the Home and the lack of a permanent Responsible Individual, coupled with the Safeguarding Allegations, would lead a reasonable person to believe that unless enforcement action was taken, children may be at risk of harm. Leaders and managers had failed(i) to meet individual needs and(ii) to consistently maintain staffing levels sufficient to meet children’s assessed needs.[57]The Appellant had mounted detailed criticisms of the inspection findings concerning staffing ratios and initial assessment documentation. In his skeleton argument At paragraph 48 , Mr Tabori invited the Tribunal’s to decide whether there were such failings. He repeats that invitation in his written closing submissions, where he invited us to accept the Registered Manager’s evidence. We decline to make any findings of fact for the reasons already stated above.[58]The Respondent relies on identified occasions when it says staffing fell below assessed requirements, it had concerns regarding supervision, and there were deficiencies in initial assessments. Those concerns have been set out in Mrs Sithembinkosi Nothando Mzila and Mrs Mary Costello’s witness statements. We are therefore satisfied on the available evidence that the concerns are neither fanciful nor unsupported. They are disputed, and the Appellant’s criticisms may ultimately prove well-founded in whole or in part. However, the Tribunal's task is not, at this stage, to determine that dispute. The issue is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that risk of harm may arise.[59]Had the Appellant accepted the inspection findings and produced a detailed, evidenced, measurable and timed action plan addressing them, the Tribunal may have reached a different conclusion. In the absence of such evidence, and having regard to the unresolved Safeguarding Allegations, the uncertainty over the operational management and staffing structure, and the outstanding inspection concerns, we were satisfied that the statutory threshold remained met. Proportionality[60]The parties agreed that:
““the mere fact that the threshold is passed does not necessarily mean that the power of suspension in regulation 8 must be exercised”
Ofsted v GM [2009] UKUT 89 (AAC) at paragraph 22 . Having decided that the statutory threshold is met, we must consider whether suspension of the Appellant’s registration is proportionate in all the circumstances. Before doing so, there is a point of law which we must decide. Does the Tribunal have power under section 21(5) of the Care Standards Act 2000 to impose a new condition in place of the suspension? The parties’ positions[61]Mrs Birks submitted that the Tribunal has no power under section 21(5) of the Care Standards Act 2000 to impose a new condition in place of a suspension. She argued that section 21(5) concerns only appeals relating to conditions already in force and does not confer a free-standing power to create and impose new conditions. In support of that interpretation, she relied on the wording of section 21(5)(a)–(c), submitting that the repeated reference to “any such condition” in subsections (b) and (c) refers back to the existing condition identified in subsection (a). On that basis, the Tribunal’s powers are limited to varying, removing, maintaining or otherwise dealing with conditions already in force, rather than imposing new ones.[62]Mrs Birks further submitted that section 21(5) must be read in the context of the wider structure of section 21. She argued that section 21(3) concerns appeals against non-urgent enforcement action, section 21(4) concerns urgent action taken by a justice of the peace, and section 21(4ZA) concerns appeals against decisions to which a notice under section 20B relates, as in the present case. According to Mrs Birks, section 21(5) operates within that framework and does not expand the Tribunal’s powers in a section 20B appeal beyond those otherwise provided by the legislation.[63]Mrs Birks also relied on a number of recent First-tier Tribunal decisions, including Carmen Nosegbe v Ofsted, Safe Hands Care and Support Services v Ofsted and Guardian Homes (Midlands) Ltd v Ofsted, submitting that, whilst not binding, those decisions are consistent with its interpretation of the statutory scheme.[64]In response, Mr Tabori submitted that the Respondent’s interpretation was inconsistent with the statutory language. He argued that, unlike sections 21(4ZA) and 21(4ZB), section 21(5) is not confined to any particular category of appeal and applies whenever “an appeal” has been brought. He further submitted that section 21(4ZA) does not state that, in a section 20B appeal, the Tribunal may only confirm the decision or direct that it cease to have effect.[65]Mr Tabori also relied on the use of the word “also” in section 21(5), submitting that this indicates that the powers contained in that subsection are additional to, rather than excluded by the decision-specific powers contained elsewhere in section 21. He contended that section 21(5)(c), which empowers the Tribunal to direct that “such condition as it thinks fit shall have effect”, confers a freestanding power to impose a new condition and is not limited to appeals concerning conditions already in force. He argued that the Respondent’s interpretation could not be correct because section 21(5)(d), which permits variation of the period of a suspension, does not concern conditions at all and would be deprived of practical effect if its availability depended upon an appeal also relating to conditions.[66]Mr Tabori further submitted that the Respondent had identified no principled basis for preventing the Tribunal from imposing conditions following a successful appeal and that such an interpretation would undermine the principle of proportionality by preventing the Tribunal from substituting a less intrusive regulatory measure for one it considered disproportionate. He also argued that the First-tier Tribunal authorities relied upon by the Respondent were of limited assistance because in each case the appeal was dismissed and the issue of the Tribunal’s powers following a successful appeal was not considered. Our decision[67]We decided that the Tribunal does have the power under section 21(5) of the Care Standards Act 2000 to impose a new condition in place of the suspension. Our reasons were as follows:a. We were not persuaded by Mrs Birk’s submissions. In our judgment, the interpretation advanced by Mrs Birks is inconsistent with both the language of the provision and its place within the statutory scheme.b. We accept Mr Tabori’s submission that section 21(5) is drafted in terms of general application. Unlike sections 21(4ZA) and 21(4ZB), which are expressly directed to particular categories of appeal, section 21(5) applies where “an appeal” has been brought. There is no express limitation confining its operation to appeals against conditions already in force or excluding its application to appeals arising from notices under section 20B.c. We were not persuaded by Mrs Birk’s argument that the references to “any such condition” in section 21(5)(b) and (c) demonstrate that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to conditions already in existence. Whilst those words undoubtedly refer back to the condition mentioned in section 21(5)(a), the language of section 21(5)(c) is materially broader. The subsection empowers the Tribunal to direct that “such condition as it thinks fit shall have effect”. Read in its ordinary and natural sense, that wording confers a discretion on the Tribunal to determine what condition should have effect following the appeal. Had Parliament intended to confine the Tribunal to maintaining, removing or varying only pre-existing conditions, clear language to that effect could readily have been used.d. We also attach weight to the use of the word “also” at the commencement of section 21(5). In our judgment, that wording indicates that the powers contained within the subsection are additional to the decision-specific powers conferred elsewhere in section 21. Section 21(4ZA) provides that the Tribunal may confirm the decision or direct that it shall cease to have effect. However, it does not state that those are the only powers available to the Tribunal in such an appeal. The absence of limiting language supports the conclusion that section 21(5) supplements, rather than restricts, the powers available on appeal.e. Further, we accept Mr Tabori’s submission that the Respondent’s interpretation sits uneasily with section 21(5)(d), which empowers the Tribunal to vary the period of a suspension. That power does not concern conditions. If section 21(5) were only engaged where an appeal related to conditions already in force, subsection (d) would have little or no practical function.f. Further still, the Respondent’s construction would significantly curtail the Tribunal’s consideration of proportionality. We accept Mr Tabori’s submission that it would prevent the Tribunal from substituting a less restrictive condition in circumstances where it concluded that a suspension was no longer justified but that some regulatory safeguard remained necessary. We see no indication in the statutory language that Parliament intended to deprive the Tribunal of that power.g. We have considered the First-tier Tribunal decisions relied upon by Mrs Birks. Whilst those decisions merit respect, they are not binding upon this Tribunal. In any event, they are not determinative of the issue before the Tribunal. As Mr Tabori submitted, each case resulted in the dismissal of the appeal and the Tribunal was not required to consider the scope of its powers following a successful appeal or whether it could substitute conditions in place of the impugned decision. Accordingly, we derive limited assistance from those authorities on the specific question of statutory interpretation which arises here.h. Drawing these matters together, we conclude that section 21(5) is not confined to appeals concerning conditions already in force and is capable of operating in conjunction with an appeal under section 21(4ZA). We therefore accept Mr Tabori’s submissions and reject those advanced by Mrs Birks. Properly construed, section 21(5)(c) empowers the Tribunal, where appropriate, to direct that such condition as it thinks fit shall have effect, including the imposition of a new condition in substitution for a suspension or other regulatory measure. Is suspension of the Appellant’s registration proportionate in all the circumstances? The parties’ positions[68]On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Tabori’s submitted that:a. the decision to suspend registration was disproportionate because the Respondent failed to adopt the least intrusive measure capable of achieving its objective (i.e. to prevent any children being admitted to the Home);b. proportionality requires a regulator (and therefore this Tribunal on appeal) to choose the least intrusive measure that is reasonably capable of achieving the objective;c. it was accepted by the Respondent that a suspension of registration was a more intrusive measure than a Restriction on Accommodation ("RoA");d. an RoA would have achieved the Respondent’s objective because there no children resident in the Home, admissions had already been suspended, there were no non-suspended staff available to care for children;e. there is no statutory basis for saying that an RoA cannot be imposed where there are no children currently living at the home;[69]In the alternative, Mr Tabori invited the Tribunal to find that the suspension was disproportionate and simply it set aside under section 21(4ZA) and remit the matter to the Respondent to decide what to impose (which must include an RoA or section 13(3) conditions).[70]On behalf of the Respondent, Mrs Birks submitted that:a. section 22B of the Care Standards Act 2000 creates a distinct enforcement power enabling the Respondent to restrict accommodation by preventing the admission of new children whilst allowing existing residents to remain in placement;b. the Respondent’s Enforcement Policy, described the effect of an RoA as preventing a setting “from accepting further placements”, and submitted that the power is intended to limit admissions rather than prohibit accommodation altogether;c. it is an established principle in regulatory law that conditions should not be so onerous as to amount in practice to a suspension. Where a suspension is required, the regulator should employ the statutory suspension power rather than achieve the same outcome indirectly through conditions or restrictions;d. on the facts of this case, an RoA, which would prevent all admissions would be a de facto suspension and therefore the suspension was not disproportionate;e. there was no evidence before the Tribunal establishing that the suspension had or would cause the Appellant reputational harm. Mrs Birks relied upon the fact that Ms Edward-Tsuro had not given oral evidence.[71]During the hearing, we queried with the parties whether the Tribunal had the power under section 21(5) to order an RoA given that Section 21(5)(c) expressly refers to "conditions". Neither party specifically addressed it in their written submissions. Our decision[72]We decided that the suspension was proportionate in all the circumstances. Our reasons were as follows:a. As set out above, we were satisfied that the Tribunal has power under section 21(5)(c) of the Care Standards Act 2000 to impose a new condition in place of the suspension. Section 21(5)(c) refers expressly to "conditions".b. But a section 22B restriction on accommodation is not described in the Care Standards Act 2000 as a "condition” i.e. a condition of registration. It is a separate enforcement measure and is described in the Care Standards Act 2000 as a “requirement”. On that analysis, section 21(5)(c) empowers the Tribunal to impose or vary conditions of registration, but it does not empower the Tribunal to impose a requirement under section 22B (i.e. a restriction on accommodation).c. We put this point to Mr Tabori during the hearing. He did not seek to persuade us that a requirement and a condition are one and same things. His position was that, if the Tribunal lacked power to order an RoA, that would be a “slightly odd lacuna”, given that proportionality must be considered and an RoA was available to the Respondent.d. Whilst Mr Tabori's submissions are not without force, we consider that the Tribunal is constrained by the express language enacted by Parliament. Accordingly, we were not satisfied that the Tribunal had the power to order an RoA under section 21(5)(c) of the Care Standards Act. Had Parliament intended the Tribunal itself to make a restriction on accommodation order, it would have said so expressly, particularly given that section 22B contains its own procedural framework.e. In the alternative, Mr Tabori submitted during the hearing that it was open to the Tribunal to order a condition which had substantially the same effect as an RoA i.e. a condition not to admit any new children.f. Mr Tabori accepted the general principle that a regulator (and so this Tribunal on appeal) should not seek to achieve a de facto suspension through conditions where the statutory test for suspension has been met. However, Mr Tabori submitted that this principle did not arise in the present case. The prior question was whether suspension was a proportionate response at all. He argued that, because an RoA could have achieved the Respondent's safeguarding objective through a less intrusive measure, suspension was unnecessary and therefore disproportionate.g. We do not accept Mr Tabori’s submission. It proceeds on the premise that the Tribunal must review the Respondent’s decision-making process and determine whether it ought to have adopted a less intrusive measure. That is not the Tribunal’s function in this appeal. The Tribunal must determine the matter afresh on the evidence before it at the date of the hearing. For the reasons already given, we are not satisfied that the Tribunal has power to impose a restriction on accommodation under section 22B. Nor are we persuaded that it would be appropriate to achieve, by way of a condition, what would in substance amount to the same outcome.h. Conditions of registration must be workable. If a tribunal imposes conditions that make it practically impossible for the service provider to operate, such as what has been proposed by the Appellant, then we accept that the order would operate as a de facto suspension. Conditions are intended to enable the safe provision of services, not prohibit them altogether. If the tribunal determines that the risk is so severe that no workable conditions can safely mitigate it, the lawful step is to impose an interim suspension, We therefore reject Mr Tabori’s submission.i. Given the above analysis, we are satisfied that no less restrictive measure was available to address adequately the risks which gave rise to the Respondent’s decision to suspend registration.j. In the further alternative, Mr Tabori invited the Tribunal to set aside the NoS on the basis that the suspension was disproportionate in any event and remit any consideration of any next steps to the Respondent. We decline that invitation for the following reasons: i. The Safeguarding Allegations are extremely serious. Those allegations are not limited to one employee at the Home; they implicate all staff working there. If proven, then the risk of harm will be significant. ii. We are required to consider whether public confidence in the sector would be severely undermined if the Appellant were permitted to continue operating unrestricted while under investigation. In our judgment, the public would expect both the regulator and this Tribunal to take precautionary measures whilst the allegations are investigated. Given the seriousness of the Safeguarding Allegations combined with the (disputed) inspection findings, we are satisfied that public confidence would be negatively impacted if no action was taken. iii. We have considered the impact of the continued suspension on the Appellant. This is not a case where we were required to consider the financial impact caused by the loss of income. That is because the Appellant had already voluntarily taken steps to close the Home before the Respondent issued the NoS. In any event, we were provided with insufficient evidence to assess any financial impact. iv. It was suggested during the hearing that the Appellant may have to pay increased insurance premiums because of the suspension. We were provided with insufficient evidence to persuade us of that as a fact. Even if that were so, the balance fell in favor of protecting any children who may become resident in the Home. v. We accepted that the Appellant may suffer some reputational harm because of the suspension. It is possible that some business associates, or members of the wider community, may attach stigma to the suspension. But again, we decided that balance fell in favour of protecting any children who may be resident in the Home. Those working in the sector will understand that suspension is an interim measure and is not determinative of the facts underlying the allegations. If the suspension is lifted in due course, then any stigma will have been short term. vi. The evidence from the police is that their investigation is likely to conclude around the end of July 2026. Mrs Costello explained in her witness statement and confirmed in her oral evidence, that if the Appellant’s position changes (which we understood her to mean that the police decide not to pursue any investigation), then the Respondent would review the position. We are therefore satisfied that the suspension will be in place no longer than necessary.[73]For these reasons we decided that the suspension was proportionate in all the circumstances. RULE 14 ORDER[74]Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 (“the HESC Rules”) provides that:(1) The Tribunal may make an order prohibiting the disclosure or publication of: (a) specified documents or information relating to the proceedings; or (b) any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any person whom the Tribunal considers should not be identified.(2) The Tribunal may give a direction prohibiting the disclosure of a document or information to a person if: (a) the Tribunal is satisfied that such disclosure would be likely to cause that person or some other person serious harm; and (b) the Tribunal is satisfied, having regard to the interests of justice, that it is proportionate to give such a direction.[75]There was no dispute that the Tribunal should make an order under HESC Rule 14 prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any document, information or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any of the children or young people referred to in these proceedings. The Tribunal makes that order as set out on the headnote of this decision.[76]During the hearing, Mrs Birks, for the Respondent, invited the Tribunal to extend that order to prohibit the disclosure or publication of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Appellant. Mrs Birks submitted that that was a real risk of jigsaw identification which could lead to the children or young people who have been referred to in the proceedings being identified.[77]In her closing submissions, Mrs Birks simply stated that the extent of any reporting restriction required will depend upon the level of detail set out in the Tribunal's decision.[78]The Appellant opposed the widening of the Rule 14 order beyond that which it has agreed to.[79]Neither party was able to refer us to any case law during the hearing, nor have they done so in their written submissions. We have considered the recent Upper Tribunal decision of KTS v Governing Body of Milby Primary School [2026] UKUT 41 (AAC). That concerned a case from the First Tier Tribunal, Health Education and Social Care Chamber (Special Educational Needs and Disability) but the principles derived from the case are of assistance here.[80]It was decided that:a. Open justice remains the starting point. Any derogation from open justice must be specifically justified and proportionate.b. Rule 14 orders require an individualised balancing exercise. Orders under rule 14 are not to be treated as routine or automatic. The tribunal must carry out a fact-sensitive balancing exercise.c. Protection of a child may justify anonymity. There is a strong public interest in protecting children involved in litigation. Anonymity for a child may be justified where publication would interfere with the child’s privacy or welfare interests. However, the need to protect a child does not automatically require anonymity for every other person or institution involved in the proceedings.d. Naming a school is a separate question from protecting a child. The Tribunal held that the child could remain anonymous while the school and governing body were identified. The fact that naming a school might increase the possibility of “jigsaw identification” does not automatically justify withholding the school's identity. The tribunal must assess the actual risk and whether less restrictive measures can adequately protect the child.e. Restrictions must be no wider than necessary.[81]As set out above, it was agreed between the parties in this case that protection of the children and young people who have been referred to in these proceedings justified anonymity.[82]We were not persuaded, on the present form of the decision, that it was necessary or proportionate to anonymise the name of the Appellant. We accept that naming the Appellant may increase the possibility of jigsaw identification, particularly when considered alongside the chronology of the regulatory action and the fact that the proceedings concern a children’s home. However, we assess that risk as low and adequately mitigated because the Home is not named or identified by address; the registered manager is not named; no child or young person is identified by name, age, gender, placement history, school, local authority, family details or other personal characteristics; the Safeguarding Allegations are not particularised; and the Rule 14 order prohibits publication or disclosure of any information likely to lead to identification of any child or young person.[83]For these reasons we decline to extend the Rule 14 order beyond that which the parties have both agreed to. Decision[84]The appeal is dismissed.[85]The Respondent’s decision dated 9 June 2026 to issue a Notice of Suspension under sections 14A and 20B Care Standards Act 2000 for 12 weeks, until 31 August 2026, is confirmed. Judge O’Neill 05 August 2026 First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care)