Sidley Medical Practice v Care Quality Commission [2026] UKFTT 1032 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)

(Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01032 (HESC)

2025-01678.EA

Hearing Heard on 15 and 16 June 2026

Venue at the Royal Courts of Justice

Sidley Medical Practice

Appellant

Care Quality Commission

Respondent

Before

Ms S Goodrich (Judge)

Mr M Cann (Specialist Member)

Mr George Wright (Specialist Member)

DECISIONS AND REASONS

Representation

For the Appellant: Mr Harries KC, instructed by Veale, Wasborouh, Vizards.

For the Respondent: Ms Rao, counsel, instructed by Hill Dickinson.

The Appeal

Between

Sidley Medical PracticeClaimant

Care Quality CommissionDefendant

Date 2026-07-09

First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care)

[1]The hearing concerns the appeal lodged on 27 October 2025 against the Respondent's Notice of Decision (“NOD”) dated 29 September 2025 to cancel the Appellant's registration as a provider in respect of the regulated activities of:(a) Diagnostic and screening procedures;

(b) Family planning;

(d) Treatment of disease, disorder or injury; and

(e) Surgical procedures (the regulated activities), at Sidley Medical Practice, 44 Turkey Road, Bexhill-On-Sea, TN39 5HE (the Location).

[2]We are aware that other locations under the registration have been involved but, in practical terms, Turkey Road is the only location now in issue.

[3]It is common ground that the registration has always been subject to two conditions as shown by the certificate: i. “It is a condition of registration in respect of the regulated activities shown below that the membership of the partnership is as follows: Mr Frank Carter Asante Dr Sampson Obeng Kobi Asare” ii. Additionally, it is a condition of registration for each of the 5 regulated activities that the Appellant must ensure that the regulated activity is managed by an individual who is registered as a manager in respect of that activity at or from all locations.

[4]The decision under appeal was made under section 17 (1) (c) of the Act which sets out the Respondent’s power to cancel the registration of a service provider:

“The Commission may at any time cancel the registration of a person (“R”) under this Chapter as a service provider or manager in respect of a regulated activity … (c) on the ground that the regulated activity is being, or has at any time been, carried on otherwise than in accordance with the relevant requirements.”

[5]Relevant requirements include:(a) Conditions imposed by or under Chapter 2 of the Act;

(b) Requirements of any other enactments which appear to the Respondent to be relevant, i.e. those made by the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 (the 2014 Regulations) or the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 (the 2009 Regulations).

[6]The right of appeal lies under section 32 of the Act. Section 32(3) of the Act provides that on an appeal the First- tier Tribunal may confirm the Respondent’s decision or direct that it is not to have effect.

[7]Under section 32(6) of the Act the First- tier Tribunal also has power to: a) vary any discretionary condition for the time being in force in respect of the regulated activity to which the appeal relates, b) direct that any such discretionary condition is to cease to have effect, c) direct that any such discretionary condition as the First- tier Tribunal thinks fit shall have effect in respect of the regulated activity, or d) vary the period of any suspension. The Agreed Chronology

[8]This is as follows: 01.04.2013: The Appellant was registered with the CQC. 14.05.2024: The locations were inspected. Following that inspection, the overall rating was assessed as ‘Requires Improvement’. In terms of the individual domains, the service was rated ‘Inadequate’ for ‘well-led’ and concerns were also identified in relation to ‘safe’. By contrast, the domains of ‘responsive’, ‘caring’ and ‘effective’ were all assessed as ‘Good’. 02.07.2024: Three warning notices issued for breaches of Regulations 12, 17 and 18. Compliance required by 02.10.2024. 11.04.2025: Unannounced inspection of SMP and Albert Road branch surgery. The CQC's position is that multiple breaches were identified, including Regulations 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20, and failure to comply with the condition requiring a Registered Manager. 15.04.2025: Urgent Notice of Decision under section 31 issued, suspending registration from 15 April to 15 July 2025 13.05.2025: Appellant appealed the urgent Notice of Decision. 29.05.2025: Appeal withdrawn. 03.07.2025: Remote meeting held between CQC and the Appellant to consider action prior to expiry of the suspension. 14.07.2025: Second urgent Notice of Decision issued, suspending registration from 16 July to 15 October 2025. 22.07.2025: Notice of Proposal and appendices issued. 11.08.2025: Appellant appealed the second urgent NOD. 26.08.2025: Appellant’s representations submitted. 17.09.2025- 03.10.2025: Appeal hearing before the FTT. 29.09.2025: Notice of Decision issued to cancel registration (adopting the NOP of 22.07.2025). 09.10.2025: Remote meeting scheduled between CQC and Appellant to consider action prior to expiry of Second Notice of Suspension. 14.10.2025: Third urgent NOD issued, suspending registration from 15 October 2025 to 14 April 2026. 14.10.2025: FTT decision issued confirming suspension until 15.10.2025: Urgent NOD issued extending suspension from 15 October 2025 to 14 April 2026. 27.10.2025: Appeal lodged (against the cancellation decision under appeal dated 29 September 2025). 30.03.2026: Remote meeting held between CQC and Appellant to consider action prior to expiry of Third Notice of Suspension. 13.04.2026: Fourth urgent NOD issued, suspending registration from 14 April 2026 to 14 October 2026. The Hearing

[9]The panel had received the bundles in this appeal consisting of the updated main bundle (1420 pages pdf) and the “Fordham bundle” (2949 pages pdf). We had also received the parties’ skeleton arguments as well as T109 applications from each party regarding the reception of further updating witness statements.

[10]At the start of the hearing the judge referred to the issues raised in the Respondent’s skeleton argument regarding the impact of section 19 of the Act. Mr Harries agreed that section 19 prevents an application to vary the partnership whilst an appeal against cancellation is undetermined.

[11]The judge summarised the history regarding the post of the registered service manager. Applications have been made as follows with outcomes as follows: Dr Asare - refused on 5 September 2024. Mr Asante - application withdrawn. Dr Kumar - refused. Mr Khan - application withdrawn on 26 January 2026. Mr Appiagyei - application made on 4 March 2026 but withdrawn on 26 May 2026.

[12]The parties agreed with the sequence above, and also that the last time a registered manager had been in post at the practice was in May 2023. It was agreed that neither Dr Asare and Mr Kumar had exercised their right of appeal against the refusal of the application each had made.

[13]It was common ground that Mr Fernandes had lodged an RSM application with the Respondent on 10 June 2026.

[14]The judge asked how the Appellant put its case given the structural issues regarding both the partnership and the lack of a registered manager, both of which are/remain conditions on the registration. The point was: even assuming the merits of Appellant’s case at the highest, what was the Appellant’s case as to what decision might lawfully be made on this appeal? The panel rose at 11 am to enable Mr Harries to take instructions and for the parties to confer.

[15]At 12.30pm Mr Harries explained that he had asked the Respondent to expedite consideration of the application of Mr Fernandes and that he had drafted some proposed conditions that he was in the process of discussing with his client.

[16]We allowed more time. In the event at 2pm Mr Harris said that he had considered carefully whether conditions could offer a workable solution. Whilst making no formal concession he recognised that conditions would involve relatively unknown time scales, which, he conceded, was not an attractive proposition. He applied for an adjournment to a date to be fixed following the outcome of Mr Fernandes’ application to be registered as the manager of the practice. This was on the basis that if the outcome of Mr Fernandes’ application was favourable, then this would assist the Appellant in his appeal against cancellation. If it were unsuccessful, then Mr Fernandes might seek to appeal. If he did so he could seek to have his appeal joined to this (adjourned) appeal

[17]So far as the partnership issue was concerned, Mr Harries submitted that the Respondent’s registrations guidance at paragraphs 12 and 14 permits an application to vary provider registration to be made. He suggested that this could be “worked into” a condition - if the Appellant were ultimately to be successful on the merits of the appeal against cancellation.

[18]Amongst other matters, Ms Rao submitted that section 19 of the Act presents an insurmountable problem. Contrary to the Appellant’s submissions, the Guidance does not relate to the situation where a decision to cancel registration has, in fact, been made.

[19]Ms Rao also submitted that:a. Mr Harries’ submissions require the panel to usurp the role of the CQC: the panel cannot make a decision regarding whether Mr Fernandes may or may not be a proper RM.

b. The Appellant has had three years to appoint an RM. She referred us to issue 7 in the Scott Schedule which posed the following issue: “Whether the Appellant meets registration requirements, including a functioning Partnership as registered and a Registered Manager?” and the Appellant’s response.

c. It was contrary to the overriding objective, including the avoidance of delay and the interests of justice, to allow the Appellant “another chance”.

d. The evidence shows the very deep concerns held regarding the operability of the practice, which has been subject to delays and uncertainty for years. The Integrated Care Board (ICB) are paying the Appellant to carry on the practice, whilst also paying caretakers. This is a continuing burden on the public purse.

[20]In his reply on issues of law regarding the adjournment application Mr Harries submitted that this was not a jurisdictional issue. The panel will have to determine whether there was/is an ongoing breach of regulation 17 “Good Governance”. The panel is entitled to have regard to the Appellant’s proposals. Decision on Postponement/Adjournment

[21]After having retired to consider the submissions made, we informed the parties that we had decided to refuse the application to adjourn/postpone the hearing. We reserved our reasons which we now give.

[22]In deciding this application to adjourn, we had regard to the overriding objective – see paragraph 2 of the Rules. This provides that:

[2]—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes—(a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;

(b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;

(d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and

(e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules; or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction….”

[23]This appeal was lodged on 27 October 2025. It has been carefully case managed. The hearing window for a 5 day hearing between 6 April and 19 June 2026 was set on 8 December 2025.

[24]On 2 January 2026 it was directed that the hearing be listed for 5 days commencing 15 June 2026.

[25]It is right to say that at a TCMH on 5 May 2026 the Appellant sought an adjournment of the hearing. This was on the basis that the final bundle was over 3,500 pages. It was pointed out that most of the bundle (i.e. the Fordham evidence) had been disclosed with the NOP in 2025. Judge Khan refused to revise the hearing date.

[26]The essential reason for the adjournment now sought is to enable the application of Mr Fernandes, made just 5 working days before the hearing, to be registered by the CQC as the service manager at this practice. On the evidence before us it appears that Mr Fernandes accepted the offer of this post on 5 May 2026. He had to apply for his DBS certificate so the application to the CQC was delayed until 10 June 2026. We understand that consideration of an application by the CQC’s Registrations Department may well take some weeks. We are aware from experience that such an application is not a “tick box” exercise.

[27]We have no power to require the CQC to expedite its processes so as to enable the Appellant to take priority over other outstanding applications, most of which will no doubt be of pressing importance to the individual applicants. Even if we did have such power, in our view, it would be wrong to exercise it in the Appellant’s favour. The simple fact is that the location has been without an RSM since mid-2023 and this, despite the fact that it was always a condition of registration that there be an RSM in post covering all the regulated activities. The Appellant has had very ample opportunity indeed, and not least since the NOP on 22 July 2025, to ensure that a suitable person was in post as the RSM and registered by the CQC.

[28]Some insight as to why the current state of affairs exists may lie in what was said in response to Issue 7 in the Scott Schedule. The Respondent’s case is that “the absence of an approved registered manager prevents lawful and safe operation”. The Appellant’s response was that “it is disputed that a finding is required as to the Appellant’s registered manager position”.

[29]We have considered and weighed all the completing arguments regarding the Appellant’s request for an adjournment. We recognise the significant importance of the role of the RSM to potential success in the appeal. However, this is not a situation, as sometimes arises, where the absence of an RSM has been unexpectedly caused by unfortunate circumstances, such as illness or abrupt departure. The absence of an RSM in post at the practice has endured since 2023, and appears to be connected to overarching governance issues.

[30]Importantly, there has been no functioning partnership in place since at least October 2025 when Dr Asante resigned. By definition, a partnership cannot be carried on by one person alone.

[31]The consequences of a cancellation decision are, of course, very serious. That is why the structure of Act ensures that any Appellant is provided with a significant opportunity to address the issues on the basis of up to date evidence regarding current compliance and circumstances. This opportunity is provided even before a decision is made: the Act provides for a Notice of Proposal to be provided so that the registered provider can seek to address the issues of concern and make representations.

[32]If an adverse decision is made and an appeal is lodged there is then a very significant period of time pending the during which the Appellant can seek to address and/or remediate the issues. This arises because the Tribunal considers evidence as at the date of the hearing.

[33]Mr Harries submits that it would be unfair to proceed with the hearing when the outcome of Mr Fernandes’ application has not been determined: there is a public interest in getting the decision right.

[34]We have carefully weighed the competing arguments. In our view it would not be in the interests of justice to adjourn this appeal. We consider that there is very considerable force in the Respondent’s submissions regarding the impact of delay upon this practice, and on upon the public purse. We acknowledge that the role of the RSM is, of course, extremely important but it is not, in this particular appeal, the only issue regarding governance. The Appellant has had very ample time indeed to address the partnership and governance issues. We note that the NOP regarding cancellation was issued some 11 months ago and the NOD was made in September 2025. The parties knew from December 2025 that the hearing window was between April and June and the hearing date of 15 June for five days has been fixed since 2 January 2026. Having considered all aspects of the overriding objective we consider that it is in the interests of justice that the hearing of the appeal should proceed so that the uncertainty regarding the adequacy of the overall governance of this practice, which has some 14,000 patients, is resolved as soon as possible. The Strike Out application

[35]After we announced our decision Ms Rao said that she intended to make an application to strike out the appeal pursuant to paragraph 8 (4) (c) of the Rules which provide that: “(4) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if— …. (c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding. “ Given the lateness of the hour, it was agreed that Ms Rao would provide her skeleton argument by email at 08.30am the following morning and that we would sit at 11am so as to provide time for Mr Harries to respond. The Respondent’s skeleton and a formal T109 application to strike out the appeal were duly lodged.

[36]In the event Mr Harries was able to provide his written skeleton shortly before midday which we then read. We then heard Ms Rao’s oral submissions before the midday adjournment and Mr Harries’ submissions at 2pm. We were satisfied that the Appellant had had sufficient time to consider the application made.

[37]Under Rule 8 (4) (c) of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding. The test is very similar to that in the Civil Procedure Rules (the CPR).

[38]As was explained in Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and the Company of the Bank of England (3)

[2001] UKHL 16

, and in particular by Lord Hope at [87] to [95], the power to dispose of a case summarily is a discretionary power which requires the exercise of judgement in weighing up the prospects of success. The test is essentially whether the prospect of success is fanciful. It is a high hurdle.

[39]The language of rules 2 and 8 of the Tribunal Rules are “borrowed” from the CPR. Applying the principles as explained in Swain v Hillman

[2001] 1 All ER 91

, the power is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for hearing at all.

[40]The power must be exercised with care and in accordance with the overriding objective to deal with a case fairly and justly - see the Tribunal Rules at paragraph 2 (above).

[41]The power to strike out an appeal must include assessing whether there is a realistic prospect that evidence could be adduced at trial to support the case being put, such that it would not be a waste of time and resources to proceed to a hearing. The burden of satisfying the panel that it should exercise discretionary power to strike out the appeal proceedings under the Rules rests with the Respondent.

[42]In ordinary civil litigation it is usual to have a “strike out bundle” which is essentially limited to the pleadings. For obvious reasons, that is not this case. We have inevitably read a wide range of material when preparing for this substantive hearing. Throughout our consideration of the strike out issues we have put entirely from our minds the evidence which is in dispute before us. We did so on a conscientious basis. We are not conducting a mini trial but are entirely focussed on whether or not the issues are fit to be tried. In doing so we have considered the case advanced by the Appellant at its highest.

[43]We are very grateful to both counsel for their written skeletons regarding the strike out application. We acknowledge, in particular, the thorough nature of the skeleton provided by Mr Harries. We mean no disrespect to either counsel if we do not deal with each and every argument advanced by each party although we have considered them all. We focus on the core issues.

[44]Amongst other matters the Appellant contends:

“77. To strike out this appeal simply on the basis that there is an ongoing breach of regulations because of the absence of a Registered Manager and/or because a variation of the registered partnership is prohibited would be to ignore the significantly wider circumstances to which the Tribunal is obliged to have careful regard and in particular, the capacity of the Appellant to achieve acceptable - albeit not perfect - regulatory compliance.”

[45]We recognize, of course, that once the appeal is determined (or if it were withdrawn by the Appellant), the constraint provided by section 19 of the Act will immediately falls away. The case advanced by Mr Harries for the Appellant is to the effect that the evidence of Dr Asare, Mr Fernandes, and others could result in the cancellation decision being effectively set aside and the imposition of conditions under section 32 (6) of the Act so as to enable:• The Appellant to submit an application to vary the existing conditions, or to make a new partnership application - which it will be able to do because the appeal will have been determined.

• A decision to be made by the Respondent on the application submitted by Mr Fernandes on 10 June 2026.

[46]In our view, the Appellant’s case in response to the strike out application, whilst advanced by Mr Harries with great skill and tenacity, really amounts to a reprisal of the application to adjourn/postpone the hearing of the appeal pending a decision by the CQC regarding the registration application lodged by Mr Fernandes on 10 June 2026.

[47]Overall, it appears to us that the Appellant argues that consideration of proportionality requires a hearing/redetermination regarding every new aspect and/or refinement of the facts/circumstances on which it relies. This includes, as per Mr Harries’ submissions, that Dr Asare has taken note of the counsel offered by his colleagues and has developed his insight.

[48]We carefully considered the application through the lens of established legal principles regarding strike out applications in the context of the Civil Procedure Rules. There are, of course, some differences between the demands of civil litigation as between parties, and the issues involved in the regulation of health care services by the statutory regulator, but the core issues are the same.

[49]In our view, rational decision making requires us to start with the will of parliament - as expressed in the statute. The Act, and the secondary legislation made thereunder, provides an overall system for the state to regulate the provision of care/services i.e. the provision of “regulated activities” to service users by means of the requirement to register, and ongoing regulatory powers regarding inspection and enforcement measures. The main objective of the Respondent in performing its functions is to protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of people who use health and social care services. The Commission is to perform its functions for the general purpose of encouraging the improvement of health and social care services, and the provision of health and social care services in a way that focuses on the needs and experiences of people who use those services, and the efficient and effective use of resources in the provision of health and social care services – see section 3 of the Act.

[50]The Act and the secondary Regulations made thereunder provide for applications to vary the registration of service providers, and also for new registered service managers to be appointed by the Respondent.

[51]However, the Act specifically prevents a variation of any existing conditions (other than a registered manager condition) when a decision to cancel has been made and remains undetermined. Section 19 of the Act provides: (1) Except in case A or B…., a person registered under this Chapter as a service provider or manager (“R”) may apply to the Commission— (a) for the variation or removal of any condition for the time being in force in relation to the registration, other than a registered manager condition required by section 13(1), (b) for the cancellation of the registration, ….or (c) for the cancellation of, or the variation of the period of, any suspension of the registration. …………. (3) Case B is where— (a) Commission has given R notice under section 28(3) of its decision to cancel the registration, and (b) either the time within which an appeal may be brought has not expired or, if an appeal has been brought, it has not yet been determined.

[52]In our view the effect of section 19 is clear. It prohibits any variation to a partnership until after an appeal against a cancellation decision has been determined.

[53]Mr Harries relies on paragraphs 12 and 14 of the registrations guidance and submits that this permits variation. In our view the guidance deals with the applications that can be made, and not those which are prevented by statute under section 19.

[54]We also consider it would not be an appropriate exercise of our powers to impose conditions regarding the submission/making of a partnership application as suggested. In our view, however it is dressed up, the Appellant effectively invites the Tribunal to circumvent section 19.

[55]Turning then to the issue regarding the registered service manager (RSM) application, Mr Harries submitted that Mr Fernandes’ suitability is relatively straightforward because it involves assessment of the criteria in Regulation 7 (i.e. “necessary qualifications, skills and experience”). Mr Fernandes has previously been registered as a manager with the CQC so, it is said, this is relevant to whether cancellation of provider registration might be considered necessary and/or proportionate. The implication of the submissions made was that the panel could therefore find or express views that Mr Fernandes does, (or may well) meet, the necessary requirements.

[56]In our view to do so would be wholly inappropriate. The Tribunal’s task is to decide appeals against decisions which have actually been made, (and which carry a right of appeal). Whenever the need to register a new RSM arises, application has to be made by the proposed RSM to the registrations department of the CQC. Once validated an application has to be duly considered and determined in accordance with the regulations and any applicable guidance. This involves due diligence inquiries, and, usually, an interview. Such applications are also considered in the context of the specific service and location involved.

[57]We consider that it would be wrong in principle to make any findings that bear upon the suitability of Mr Fernandes and/or the merits of his application to be registered as the RSM whilst his application is pending. We have reached this view applying first principles. Parliament has provided that Mr Fernandes’ application falls to be considered by the Respondent as the primary decision maker. The applicant has the right of appeal, by way of redetermination, in the event of an adverse decision by the Respondent. Although it might be that Mr Fernandes is willing to yield this important protection, we do not consider that it would appropriate for this panel to make any observations regarding the merits or otherwise of an application that has not yet been considered or decided by the regulator.

[58]Amongst other matters, we do not have any access to information that may/will be considered by the registrations department of the Respondent in the exercise of due diligence.

[59]In our view there is also a clear and obvious risk that any findings the Tribunal might make regarding either the merits of Mr Fernandes’ application and/or the capacity or ability of potential new prospective partners, might be based on incomplete information. This, in itself, might provide scope for subsequent challenge on public law grounds regarding inconsistency, legitimate/reasonable expectation and the like. In our view, the prospect of uncertainty and/or of satellite litigation looms if the Tribunal panel were to abrogate to itself functions or powers that it simply does not have.

[60]As set out above, the Appellant contends that the fair outcome of a hearing on proportionality grounds is that conditions might be imposed regarding the partnership and/or or the proposed RSM. We had, at the start of the hearing, invited the Appellant to present the conditions envisaged to be feasible and workable, but these did not materialise – see para 7 above. Mr Harries submitted that conditions that amount to conditional or contingent inclusion/removal could be imposed. It appeared to be suggested that if, for example, a registered manager was not in post by a given date then registration would be automatically cancelled. Mr Harries submitted that, in this way, there would be finality. We observed then, and now, that there is no statutory provision under the Act that reflects the concept of contingent inclusion/removal and/or review of conditions and/or any process as to how it is to be determined if breach has occurred.

[61]We have considered all the arguments advanced. In our view the outcomes sought by the Appellant cannot realistically be granted, even assuming all other matters in its favour. The Respondent has satisfied us that the prospect of the Appellant succeeding in obtaining a direction that the Respondent’s decision to cancel registration is not to have effect, and that an order for conditions and/or for contingent inclusion/removal, could instead be imposed, is properly to be characterised as fanciful.

[62]The fact that the Respondent has satisfied us that the threshold test in a strike out application is met under paragraph 8 (4) (c) of the Rules is not an end to the matter because we must consider the exercise of our discretion.

[63]One matter that has been of concern to us is the fact that this application was made so very late in the day, and when very significant time, effort and expense has already been incurred by both parties. Inevitably, the fact that the application was not made before the hearing commenced caused us to consider very carefully whether the high threshold test was met. We have explained why we consider that the Respondent has discharged that burden. We are also satisfied that there is no other good reason for a hearing to be held.

[64]As to the issue of discretion, it is our view that the fact that the impact of the structural issues were not picked up before now can be understood in context: it is usual for the focus to be on the alleged breaches of fundamental standards because that is the core statutory basis for an appeal against a cancellation decision. Our general experience is also that, given the Tribunal function on appeal is that of redetermination, (and where new/late evidence regarding improvements, remediation and insight is the norm), it is relatively rare for strike out applications to be made.

[65]The important point is that we are satisfied that the full impact of section 19 of the Act was not appreciated by the Respondent until the skeleton was prepared. Whilst the Appellant criticises the Respondent for the late emergence of the impact of section 19, we note, in the interests of balance, that it is not a matter that had occurred to those representing the Appellant. This is, after all, the Appellant’s appeal. We noted from the response to the SS regarding issue 7 is that a particular approach had been employed regarding the RM role.

[66]We recognise that Dr Asare feels aggrieved because it was the panel who required focus upon the structural issues. It is submitted that the Respondent’s approach in seeking a strike out order was therefore “opportunistic”. The reality is that the panel had to require both parties to focus, so as to ensure that the resources and expertise of the Tribunal might be used effectively.

[67]Having considered the exercise of our discretion in the round, the Respondent has satisfied us that an order striking out the appeal in its entirety is fair, just, necessary and proportionate. There was/is no reasonable prospect of success in this appeal. Decision The Appellant’s application to adjourn the appeal is refused. The appeal is struck out pursuant to paragraph 8(4) (c) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules. The appeal proceedings are therefore concluded. 1. Care Standards First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 09 July 2026