“may confirm the decision or direct that it is to cease to have effect”. 5.9.
“…the provision of personal care for persons who, by reason of old age, illness or disability are unable to provide it for themselves, and which is provided in a place where those persons are living at the time the care is provided…” (my emphasis added). (ii) Treatment of disease, disorder or injury is defined by paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 of the 2014 Regulations as: “…the provision of treatment for a disease, disorder or injury by or under the supervision of (a) a health care professional, or a team which includes a health care professional, or (b)a social worker, or a team which includes a social worker, where the treatment is for a mental disorder…” (my emphasis added). (e) The definition of both Regulated Activities requires “the provision of” that activity. The definitions todo not include preparatory activities. Therefore, to carry on doing the Regulated Activity, a service provider must be actually doing it in the first place. Carrying on does not mean to prepare to do something; that is something different. (f) We accept that the Tribunal should also interpret the legislation in light of its purpose. This is known as the purposive approach to interpretation. The purposive approach requires the Tribunal to consider the context of the legislation, identify the purpose of a statute and to interpret its language, so far as possible, to give effect to that purpose. Mr Muchenje does not expand on this argument in his skeleton argument but in our judgment, it produces no different result to the above. The 2009 Regulations are made under the 2008 Act. The purpose of the Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the 2008 Act is aligned with the Respondent’s main objective as set out in Section 3 of the 2008 Act, which is “to protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of people who use health and social care services”. (g) The Respondent submits that where a service provider has become dormant, they represent a potential risk to service users. That is because the Respondent cannot be assured that the service provider has kept up to date with best practice, that it’s policies and documents are up to date, that their staff remain sufficiently trained and ready to provide any regulated actively safely. We accept those submissions. (h) The purpose of the legislative provisions therefore is to provide the Respondent with a mechanism to identify any service provider that is dormant (i.e. those that are not carrying on regulated activities) and therefore a potential risk and manage that risk (i.e. by cancelling their registration). (i) The Respondent submits that the two care plans that were submitted by the Appellant were evidence only of an intention to carry on the Regulated Activities, but they were not evidence of the actual carrying on. We accept those submissions. The position is put beyond doubt by the letter dated22 August 2025 at page 135. That letter shows that there was an intention for services to start in the future (i.e. after the conclusion of these proceedings) but services were not currently commenced or ongoing. 6.10. For these reasons we were persuaded that the Appellant had not been carrying on the Regulated Activities for a continuous period of 12 months prior to the date of the Notice of Decision and had not up to the date of the Panel’s decision on15 January 2026 . Accordingly, under Regulation 6(1)(c) of the 2009 Regulations the ground for cancellation of the registration of the Appellant in respect of the Regulated Activities are made out. But that is not the end of the analysis. We must also be persuaded that we should cancel the Appellant’s registration, which requires us to give consideration to issue of proportionately. We consider that further below. Ground Four The Parties’ Positions 6.11. It is the Appellant’s case that the Respondent ignored the two care plans that the Appellant had provided or considered them insufficient. The Appellant submits that this “sets an arbitrary evidential threshold” which “breached principles of fairness”. 6.12. The Respondent submits that it acted at all times within the regulatory framework. Our Decision 6.13. As set out above, in making this decision we are not reviewing the decision of the Respondent. The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Respondent and considers the appeal de novo (i.e. we consider the matter afresh) as at the date of the hearing.Accordingly, whether or not the Respondent applied inconsistent evidentiary standards when making its decision is irrelevant. Ground Four is therefore without merit and dismissed. 6.14. As is explained at paragraph 6.9(i) above, we have considered the two care plans in making this decision. Issue Two: Is the cancellation of the Appellant’s registration proportionate in all the circumstances of the case? Ground Five and Six 6.15. Grounds Five and Six both go to the issue of proportionality, and we have therefore taken then together in this decision. The Parties’ Positions 6.16. The Appellant submits that the cancellation is the “most extreme sanction” and failed to consider alternatives such as warning notices or conditions. 6.17. The Respondent’s position is that its decisions were and remain reasonable, justified and proportionate. Our Decision 6.18. We remind ourselves that we are not reviewing the Respondent’s decision but considering the matter afresh. The question of proportionality is therefore to be considered as at the date of this decision. We decided that it was reasonable and proportionate to cancel the Appellant’s registration. Our reasons were: (a) Firstly, whilst Mr Muchenje submits that the Respondent failed to consider the imposition of conditions. It is correct that if we were persuaded to direct that the Notices of Decision were to cease to have effect, then we could also direct (under section 32(6)(c)) any discretionary condition as the Tribunal thinks fit in respect of the Regulated Activities. Mr Muchenje does not explain in his skeleton argument what conditions he says should have been considered and we can think of none that would be appropriate. Conditions are generally only effective where regulated activities are being provided. They are not in this case and so we are not persuaded that conditions would be appropriate. (b) Secondly, It is not correct that the Respondent provided no warning to the Appellant. In its letter dated4 February 2025 , the Respondent made express reference the Respondent’s powers in Regulation 6(1)(c) of the 2009 Regulations. Further, at paragraph 31 of her witness statement, Mrs Perrins explains very clearly that if the Appellant was to start providing the Regulated Activities to the two service users they had provided care plans for then, “it is likely the appeal would no longer be necessary”
“there is nothing that could be compared to CQC’s assessment framework, and no effective or useful rating could be given”