M v OFSTED [2026] UKFTT 01002 (HESC)

First-tier Tribunal Care StandardsThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 20082025-01671.EYNeutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01002 (HESC)Hearing Heard on 8, 9 and 10 June 2026Venue Royal Courts of Justice
Before
Ms S Goodrich (Judge)Ms H Reid (Specialist Member)Mrs L Bromley (Specialist Member)
Between
Mrs MAppellant(RESTRICTED REPORTING ORDER MADE)AppellantOFSTEDRespondentDECISION AND REASONSDate 2026-07-06

The Appellant represented herself

[1]This is an appeal by Mrs M against the Respondent’s decision made on 15 September 2025 to cancel her registration on the Early Years Register to provide childcare as a child minder on domestic premises. The decision to cancel was made pursuant to Section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006. (“the Act”). The right of appeal lies under section 74 of the Act.

The Parties

[2]The Appellant has been registered with Ofsted as a provider of childminding services at her home since 2023.[3]The Respondent is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) and is the regulatory authority for childminding and childcare providers. Once a provider has been registered, Ofsted’s role is to establish whether the person or entity registered continues to meet the requirements for registration, underthe Regulations made pursuant to the Act, and remains suitable for registration.

Restricted Reporting Order

[4]The Tribunal made a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matters likely to lead members of the public to identify any child under the age of 18 to whom reference will be made.[5]Consistent with this, the names of the Appellant and her family members will be anonymised in this decision. We explain relationships at this stage. The Appellant is Mrs M. She and Mr M are married. They are the parents of MM, who is now 14 years old.

The Background

[6]This broad chronology appears to be as follows: On 14 October 2023 Mrs M registered with the Respondent as a childminder. Prior to registration Mrs M had worked for many years in childcare: initially as an au pair and nanny from 2003. Her daughter was born in 2012 and Mrs M had a career break until about 2017 after which she worked in pre-schools as an assistant and midday supervisor. She was a key worker during the pandemic. On 25 April 2025 there was an incident at home in which Mrs M struck her daughter with a belt three times. MM left the home and went to a friend, whose parents called the police. The police came to the Appellant’s home later that evening. On 29 April 2025 there was an initial LADO strategy meeting and it was agreed that the threshold had been met for joint enquiries under section 47 (of the Children Act 1989). On 30 April 2025 a social worker, the police and a LADO representative attended the Appellant’s home. On 30 April 2025 the Appellant made a serious childcare incident notification to the Respondent, in which she gave her account of what happened on 25 April 2025 as follows [C62]:
“On Friday 25th April at about 7.30, I was reprimanding my 13-yr old daughter and she was arguing back. I lost my temper and struck her with a belt 3 times. She then pushed me away and ran out of the house and to her friend’s house. She told the friend and her parents what had happened and they saw fit to call the police. Later that evening, after my husband brought my daughter back, the police arrived at our home. They spoke to all three of us individually.”
On 1 May 2025 the Appellant’s registration was suspended. On 2 May 2025 the LADO sent an email to the Respondent confirming that she had received a self-referral from the Appellant and a referral from the local children’s social work team. On 13 May 2025 the Appellant was interviewed under caution by the police and gave a no comment interview. On 26 June 2025 there was a face to face meeting between the Appellant and Ms Kelly Southern, Early Years Regulatory Inspector (“EYRI”). During this meeting the Appellant gave further details as to what happened on 25 April 2025. She stated:
“We got into an argument she was in my face, her belt was on the door, so I hit her with the belt, she had a bruise, but this was not from the belt this was from our physical altercation and her trying to push me away. I hit her on the legs, three times with the belt”
. On 2 July 2025 Kent Social Services closed their case with the Appellant and her daughter. The work that had been undertaken included that a Working Together Agreement was established and the Family Hub had worked with the Appellant to help her with parenting strategies, including setting boundaries around phone use and managing discipline more effectively. On 7 July 2025 the Respondent held a case review and decided to take steps to cancel the Appellant’s registration because it was considered that her violent act of physically harming a child was so significant that the Respondent could no longer be assured of children’s safety within the Appellant’s care. On 22 July 2025 the Respondent held a case review, in which it was decided to continue the suspension, whilst taking steps to cancel the Appellant’s childminding registration. On 23 July 2025 a Notice of Intention (NOI) to cancel the Appellant’s registration was served. On 2 September 2025 the Appellant sent written objections/representations in response to the NOI. On 8 September 2025 the objection outcome letter was sent to the Appellant in which the Appellant’s objection was not upheld. On 15 September 2025 the Notice of Decision (NoD) was served. On 13 October 2025 the Appellant lodged this appeal.

The Decision under Appeal

[7]In summary the Respondent cancelled the Appellant’s registration because it considered that the prescribed requirements for registration had ceased to be satisfied. It considered that Mrs M is no longer suitable to remain registered as a childcare provider. The significant concerns regarding Mrs M’s ongoing suitability were said to be:• “Breaches to safeguarding requirements of the EYFS relating to corporal punishment.• Your initial understanding and lack of acceptance about you striking your daughter with a belt being wrong. You harmed a minor with intent due to a loss in your temper.• A strong safeguarding response was required because of your actions.• Police investigation into the matter continues to be ongoing.”[8]We note at this stage that in October 2025 the police confirmed their earlier decision to take no further action - essentially because MM did not wish to give evidence.

The Appeal

[9]In section H of the Notice of Appeal Mrs M provided grounds of appeal drafted by counsel. Amongst other matters, it is contended that: a) the Respondent is wrong in concluding that the Appellant no longer meets the prescribed requirements for registration and is also no longer suitable to remain a registered childminder. It is also submitted that the decision to cancel registration is unnecessary and disproportionate. b) the Appellant does not use corporal punishment to manage the behaviour of children. The events of 25 April were an isolated momentary lapse which the Appellant regretted immediately. The Appellant is ashamed of her actions and has expressed deep shame and remorse from the outset. The Appellant accepts that her explanation of the law during the strategy meeting was not correct. c) the Appellant has taken responsibility for her behaviour. Social services closed their case at the beginning of July 2025. The Appellant has undergone further safeguarding training. She has taken practical steps to understand what went wrong and to remediate. In light of this, there is no risk of repetition.

The Hearing

[10]We had received and read an agreed indexed and paginated bundle consisting of 344 pages pdf, which included witness statements, exhibits, the Scott Schedule and other material, which we had read in advance. At the start of the hearing the Respondent had handed up the email dated 14 May 2025 from the Ms Lawford, the LADO advisor, to Mrs Southern. The broad contents of this email had been referred to in the witness evidence, but the actual email had been accidentally omitted.[11]The panel had been alerted to the fact that Mrs M’s daughter, MM, wished to attend the hearing. Simple enquiries revealed that courts do permit access by young persons aged at least 14, provided they are accompanied by an adult. In the event MM, (who is now 14 and a half), and her father attended the hearing, and both wished to be present during the proceedings.[12]The panel entertained concerns as to whether the presence of MM might inhibit the evidence of any witnesses and/or the questions of Mrs M that might otherwise be asked, and/or might inhibit the evidence and/or representations that Mrs M might otherwise want to give.[13]The panel therefore made a temporary order under paragraph 26 (5) (b) excluding Mr M and MM so that the issues arising could be freely discussed.[14]After her family left the hearing room, Mrs M made it very clear that she had never wanted, and still did not want, Mr M and MM to attend the hearing. She was very concerned as to the impact that being present at the hearing might have on her daughter. She thought that having to relive events would be damaging to her. The effect of what Mrs M said was that there was, however, nothing she could do to deter her daughter and her husband from attending.[15]We allowed time so that Mrs M could speak to Mr M and MM. In the event when we resumed the hearing in open session, both Mr M and MM said that they wished to continue to attend in order to support Mrs M. Mr M said that they wanted to demonstrate that they are a united family.[16]The Respondent’s position, having taken instructions, was that its witnesses would feel inhibited in their evidence if MM were present.[17]We start from the obvious point of principle that these are public proceedings. The principle of open justice is very strong indeed. The expectation is that the proceedings are conducted in public unless departure from that principle is justified in the interests of justice.[18]We had little doubt that the presence of MM might well inhibit the evidence given, and also the questions that might be asked by the parties and/or the panel. We therefore exercised our discretion paragraph 26 (5) (b) of the Rules to exclude MM from the entire hearing. We were well aware that, at a practical level, our decision to exclude MM meant that Mr M could not attend and so was effectively excluded, albeit not intentionally.[19]We decided that it was appropriate to allow the opportunity for Mr M and MM to provide written statements by 9 am on 9 June 2026. We would then hear any objections to the late evidence from the Respondent and decide whether to admit further statements. In the event no statements were provided.

Reasonable Adjustments

[20]We were conscious throughout that the practical effect of our decision to exclude MM meant that Mr M would not be present to support Mrs M. It had become clear that Mr M’s possible attendance was always limited to one day because of his work commitments. In the event, Mrs M had made it very clear that she wanted to proceed.[21]There were two aspects that came to the forefront during the morning. Firstly, it was obvious to us that Mrs M was very distressed and emotional. We considered the practice direction regarding vulnerable adult and sensitive witnesses. We considered that Mrs M was a “sensitive witness” i.e. that the quality of the evidence given by her might well be diminished by reason of her distress. The panel were also aware that Mrs M spoke English as an additional language.[22]We ensured that there were frequent and regular breaks whilst evidence was being given in order to facilitate concentration and allow Mrs M time to process the oral evidence. The judge also asked questions of witnesses, and assisted Mrs M in her questions, in order to seek to ensure, so far as practicable, that Mrs M was able to participate fully in the proceedings. She also assisted the Appellant to introduce her evidence in chief.

The Oral Evidence

[23]At the start of the hearing on the second day Ms Williams applied for the email from Ms Lawford, the LADO advisor, dated 14 May 2026 to be received into evidence. Mrs M did not object. We agree to receive it because we already had evidence about the contents of this email and it was best to see the actual email itself.[24]We heard oral evidence from the following: For the Respondent Kelly Southern - EYRI Paula Sissons - Early Years Senior Officer, (EYSO) For the Appellant Mrs M.[25]All witnesses called to give evidence adopted the contents of their statements as the truth, and these stood as their main evidence. Each witness then answered questions by the other party and some questions from the panel. We will refer to aspects of the oral evidence and submissions as necessary when giving our reasons.

The Law

[26]The legal framework for the registration and regulation of childminders is to be found in Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 (“the Act”).[27]Section 32 of the Act provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) contains those providers registered to provide early years childminding/childcare for children from birth to the age of five years for which registration is compulsory. We were informed that, contrary to paragraph 1 of Mrs Sissons’ witness statement paragraph 1, the Appellant’s registration was under the Early Years Register only.[28]Section 40 of the Act imposes a duty upon those registered as early years providers to comply with the welfare requirements set out in the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS).[29]Section 68 of the Act provides for the cancellation of a person’s registration in certain circumstances. Section 68(2) provides that Ofsted may cancel registration of a person registered on the Early Years Register, if it appears:
“(a) that the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person’s registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied, …. (c) that he has failed to comply with a requirement imposed on him by regulations under that Chapter.”

The Early Years Register

[30]The prescribed requirements for Early Years registration are provided for the Childcare (Early Years Register) Regulations 2008. Those which are relevant in this case are as follows: 1. The applicant is an individual who is suitable to provide early years childminding …………. 4. The applicant will comply with the EYFS [Early Years Foundation Stage] welfare requirements.

The ‘Early Years Foundation Stage Statutory Framework for Childminders’

[31]The EYFS framework is mandatory for all persons registered on the early years register. The safeguarding and welfare requirements are in section 3 of the framework. This provides at 3.58 (in the 2024 version): “Childminders must not give or threaten corporal punishment or any punishment which could negatively affect a child's well-being. Childminders must take reasonable steps to ensure that corporal punishment is not given by anyone who is caring for or is in regular contact with a child, or by anyone living or working in the premises where the childminding is taking place. Any childminder who does not meet these requirements commits an offence. A person will not be considered to have used corporal punishment (and therefore will not have committed an offence), if physical intervention was taken to avert immediate danger of personal injury to any person (including the child) or to manage a child’s behaviour if absolutely necessary.’ (A footnote makes clear that “physical intervention” is where practitioners use reasonable force to prevent children from injuring themselves or others or damaging property.)

The Right of Appeal

[32]Section 74(1) of the Act provides a right of appeal to the Tribunal. An applicant for registration or (as the case may be) a registered person may appeal to the Tribunal against the taking of any of the following steps by the Chief Inspector under this Part— (a)…… (e). the cancellation of the person's registration (4). On an appeal the Tribunal must either—(a) confirm the taking of the step, the making of the other determination or the making of the order (as the case may be), or(b) direct that it shall not have, or shall cease to have, effect. (5). Unless the Tribunal has confirmed the taking of a step mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (e) or the making of an order under section 72(2) cancelling a person's registration, the Tribunal may also do either or both of the following— (a) impose conditions on the registration of the person concerned; (b) vary or remove any condition previously imposed on the registration.

The Burden and Standard of Proof

[33]The Respondent bears the burden of proving any facts on which reliance is placed in support of the allegation that the Appellant does not meet the requirements for registration i.e. that she is no longer suitable. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities,[34]The burden rests on the Respondent to satisfy us that cancellation is justified, necessary and proportionately required in the public interest. The issue of proportionality involves a judgement which balances the public interests engaged against the interests of the Appellant.

Our Consideration

[35]We are required to determine the matter afresh and to make our own decision on the evidence as at today’s date. This includes consideration of new information or material that was not available at the date of decision which is relevant to the decision made. It is open to any appellant in any given case to rely on evidence to show that the facts were not as alleged and/or to dispute alleged breaches and/or to contend that opinions or views reached were wrong and/or mistaken and/or unjustified and/or that the issues have since been addressed. It is also open to any appellant to show that, whatever the past, there has been a change since the decision made such that the decision to cancel is no longer in accordance with the law and/or is not today necessary and/or proportionate.[36]The redetermination in this appeal includes consideration of the evidence provided by both sides in this appeal as well as the oral evidence which has now been subjected to cross examination. We have considered all the evidence and submissions before us. If we do not refer to any particular aspect of the evidence/submissions it should not be assumed that we have not taken these into account. It is not necessary for us to decide every point raised before us. We will not set out all the oral or documentary evidence before us but will refer to parts of it when making our key findings.[37]In assessing the evidence we bore in mind that the quality of Mrs M’s evidence might well be diminished by reason of her distress. We were also very mindful of the difficulties involved when speaking in a second or additional Language. Amongst other matters, this can include loss of nuance and subtleties in meaning that may be hard to express. We have borne this fully in mind throughout when considering the evidence.

Our Findings

[38]We have considered all the evidence in the round. We find that the outline facts are set out in the chronology at paragraph 6 above.[39]We remind ourselves of the very positive evidence from parents of children minded by Mrs M. The letters before us are thoughtful, well-written and powerful. In short parents have taken the time and trouble to write detailed letters in support. Parents speak very highly of Mrs M’s character and reputation and the warm and loving bond that she has with their children. The overall effect of the evidence is that they consider that the incident was isolated, occurred out of the blue, and that Mrs M is deeply remorseful.[40]In her oral evidence Mrs M said that she had been called by the school to collect her daughter. After she arrived she learnt that MM had made an allegation of sexual misconduct against another pupil that afternoon. Mrs M doubted that her daughter’s allegation was true. An argument ensued in a taxi on the way back home. On return home Mrs M was very concerned that MM was texting her friends. She felt strongly that this was wrong.[41]In the course of a heated argument in MM’s bedroom she took a belt from the back of the door of MM’s bedroom and struck MM with it three times on the legs. Mrs M’s said in evidence that Mr M took the belt out of her hands but she had stopped hitting MM when this occurred.[42]We considered the email sent by Ms Watson, the LADO adviser, to Mrs Southern on 14 May 2025 in which she states:
“I attended the Strat (i.e. strategy) meeting last week. It was confirmed that a joint meeting was undertaken with SW (i.e. social worker) and police. Initially mother’s presentation raised concerns as she was verbally aggressive towards police and social workers – she did not appear to understand the significance of her actions. She lacked empathy and tried to take control of the discussion with professionals...She accepted that she hit her daughter with a belt - referring to it as lashings….. Social worker describes a big shift in mother’s presentation as she now appears to understand the implications more as Police, children’s services and Ofsted involved.…. Mum stated that she did not feel that her actions were against the law as she did not use a chair to hit her daughter.”
[43]A number of points arise from this email. Mrs M points out that this is not direct evidence and so cannot be tested. She disputes, in particular, that she would ever have used the word “lashings” as it is not a word she knows. As we understand it, the email is the account of the LADO advisor regarding what was said at the strategy meeting by those who had attended the Appellant’s home on 29 April. Mrs M’s own evidence was that she was, indeed, very assertive when the police, social worker and LADO representative arrived without notice at a time when she was looking after minded children. She had remonstrated with the officer when he had placed a foot inside her door. She had asked that he remove his foot, and effectively start over by knocking again on the door.[44]We note that Mrs M has never denied that she hit her daughter with a belt. We note also from the Appellant’s representations (undated but made in or about August 2025) it was stated that “when questioned about the legality of physical discipline, she stated her belief at the time that physical punishment was not illegal unless it left marks. She now recognises this was incorrect. She admitted openly that using a belt was wrong and illegal and expressed deep regret, not as a professional safeguarding issue, but as a mother who had broken her own values. She was ashamed and remorseful from the moment it occurred.”[45]We noted that in the response to the Scott Schedule (SS) it had been said: “the incident in question was one heated moment that got out of hand. It had never happened before and will never happen again. When my daughter stormed off to her friend’s house, the friend’s father (who had never even met me) decided to involve the police. That is when the whole thing was blown out of proportion. As a result of this I have had my career of over 20 years taken away from me. It is unreasonable to suggest that at any stage I lacked understanding of the seriousness of my actions. I was remorseful from the very beginning…”.[46]In answer to Ms Williams’ questions about “the whole thing was blown out of proportion”, Mrs M said that she did not use these words. It became clear that the response to the SS was sent from her email address and by way of attachment on 8 May 2026. She said she had no recollection of writing this and that it was possible that her husband had helped her.[47]We noted that reference has been made in the documents to other incidents between mother and daughter. These were not explored by Mrs Southern at the face to face meeting she had with Mrs M and formed no part of the Respondent’s case before us.[48]In her evidence Mrs Southern confirmed that it was her view that during the interview Mrs M was remorseful.[49]Reference was made in the NOD to the fact that the Appellant had declined to answer questions in the police interview. It is clear that this was on the advice of a solicitor. We draw no inference at all from the fact that Ms M exercised her right to silence.[50]The essential reason that registration was cancelled because of the admitted fact that Mrs M used a belt to strike her daughter three times. Why did this happen? In our view it is clear that this happened because Mrs M lost control of her temper. We can see that there may be reasons that provide a context to this loss of temper. It appears to us that Mrs M’s own family history may well be complex. The implication of her evidence was to the effect that she was triggered because her daughter had made an allegation of sexual assault and was texting her friends about it. She said in evidence that as someone who had herself been sexually assaulted she “had to make MM understand the implications of accusing someone, and carrying on her shoulder the stigma of being sexually assaulted, but she (MM) wasn’t having it.” She went on to say that she followed MM to her bedroom. She was at the door. She hit MM three times on the leg. Mr M took the belt from her.[51]Mrs M told us that since the incident she had been to her GP who prescribed an anti-depressant but she stopped taking this after a month. However, she said that she has since resumed the prescription. She is now receiving private counselling. From her evidence, this appears to be directed to her experience of past childhood trauma.[52]Whilst we acknowledge these complexities, the fact is that the events of 25 April 2025 showed a very significant loss of control which resulted in unacceptable violence to a child. The fact that a belt was taken from the door, and effectively used as a weapon, shows that this was an intentional act, albeit that the intention was formed in the heat of the moment. The Appellant’s behaviour was in breach of the standards required of those who deliver care to young children.[53]We have little doubt that, whatever the initial impression Mrs M may have given to the agencies involved she was, and is, very deeply ashamed by what she did.[54]We note that Mrs M has produced certificates regarding the safeguarding training that she had undertaken before the incident. She had also produced the certificate regarding safeguarding training in May 2025. In our view such training is standard: it is no more than one would expect to be undertaken by any childminder on a regular basis. This violent incident did not occur because of any lack of knowledge regarding appropriate behaviour towards children. We noted that the Appellant has not researched or undertaken any development or training regarding anger management control.[55]We considered the fact that Mrs M’s loss of control was in the context of her argument with her own 13 year old daughter. The children Mrs M looks after as a childminder are, of course, much younger, and are not part of her family. In our experience children of all ages can be very challenging and demanding, and that includes those who are aged 1 to 3 years old. In our view it is the loss of control that is of key significance.[56]In our view it is not today possible to be assured that such marked loss of control will not happen again. We find that Mrs M no longer meets the suitability requirements of the EYFS. She is unsuitable to be registered.[57]We consider that the Appellant’s personal interests merit the protection of the ECHR by reference to Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 8.[58]The Respondent has satisfied us that the discretionary decision to cancel registration was, and is, in accordance with the law.[59]We are also satisfied that the decision was objectively justified and necessary in order to protect the public interests engaged. This includes public confidence that anyone who is registered as a childminder is suitable. The public, families and children in general are entitled to expect that the regulator will ensure that children receive care in a setting that is run by a provider who is suitable. They are entitled to expect that Ofsted will take steps to prevent the continuation of registration if the provider is not suitable.[60]In weighing factors relevant to proportionality we recognise that the impact of this decision is very serious indeed. Cancellation will bring an immediate end to the Appellant’s registration as a childminder, and with very profound impact upon her career and livelihood. Mrs M told us that she has followed the advice of her counsellor which was to build on her self-esteem and confidence by activities outside of the home. She has started studies in Health and Social Care at foundation level with a view to studying for a degree. She is also studying to be an interpreter. We recognise that the decision we make will have a profound impact upon the Appellant’s prospects in any post or role that requires a DBS certificate, such as foster caring, teaching or allied posts, and health care or related posts. The reasons for cancellation may well also have broader reputational implications for the Appellant affecting her standing in the community and her employability in general.[61]We attach very significant weight to the public interest in children being looked after in a way that is compliant with the regulations i.e. that the provider is/remains suitable.[62]In our view It is not feasible to devise appropriate conditions for someone who is not suitable to be registered.[63]We have balanced the impact of the decision upon the interests of the Appellant against the public interest. We consider that the facets of the public interest engaged outweigh the interests of the Appellant and all those affected. In our view the decision to cancel registration was (and remains) reasonable, necessary and proportionate. Decision The decision to cancel registration is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed. Judge Goodrich First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 06 July 2026