Ashley Chaplin v Information Commissioner & Anor [2026] UKFTT 838 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 00838 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0297

First-tier Tribunal

General Regulatory Chamber

Hearing Heard on: 27 May 2026

Date 09 June 2026

Information Rights

DN IC-377904-F0Q8

Considered on the papers by CVP

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHRIS HUGHES

TRIBUNAL MEMBER ANNE CHAFER

TRIBUNAL MEMBER SUSAN WOLF

Between

ashley chaplinAppellant

INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondent

COMMISSIONER OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICERespondent

Appearances

Appellant: in person for in person

for First Respondent: did not appear

Second Respondent: Ms Paige Jones (counsel)

Decision: The appeal is Dismissed

REASONS

[1]The Appellant was concerned about how the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) had investigated a death in 2018 which it regarded as a suicide and which he considered to be a murder. There was over time a degree of contact between these parties and the Appellant was engaged in litigation with the local council as the coroner sought permission to bury the body.

[2]On 2 September 2024 he sent a detailed letter to the MPS headed: A: My Request for Information And B: Corruption of Met Police Officers in the Handling of my Request C: FOI Request – Communications iro my Requests

[3]Under the heading “B: Corruption of Met Police Officers in the Handling of my Request” he asked for information: “In this regard, in order for me to properly and fully consider the legal process going forward in the conduct of [PC Sibila Arslanagic-Sparkes], [PC Arslanagic-Sparkes] line manager and the investigating officer I request: 1. The name and rank of AS’s line manager that gave the advice 2. Confirmation that the investigating officer being referred to by AS, is D. Sergeant Aylward2

[4]Under the heading “C: FOI Request in Relation to My Requests” he asked for “1. all communications undertaken by Police Constable Sibila Arslanagic-Sparkes in relation to my requests and the communications indicated undertaken with the investigating officer and line manager. 2. The communications between the investigating officer and Directorate of Legal Services, that was referred to.”

[5]On 21 January 2025 the MPS replied to C:

“DECISION The Metropolitan Police Service neither confirms nor denies that it holds the information you have requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the Section 40(5A)(5B) exemption. This response therefore represents a Refusal Notice in accordance with Section 17(1) of the Act. Please see the legal annex for the sections of the Act that are referred to in this letter. REASON FOR DECISION A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual. In most cases, Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, as I will explain below. To confirm or deny whether personal information exists in response to your request could publicly reveal information about an individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR). Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation (please see the advice and assistance section below). Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the UK GDPR.”

REASON FOR DECISION

[6]The response clearly set out the basis for the refusal as well as the policy reason – the right to privacy and then went on to explain the right of access under the DPA and sent a link to a form to assist him in exercising that right.

[7]The Appellant sought an internal review of the refusal and the MPS maintained its position.

[8]The Appellant complained to the Information Commissioner arguing that “The first point to note is that while many communications may refer to me, the underlying communications are unrelated to me, but to the deceased.” He claimed that s40 therefore did not apply aand urged that “In the event that any part of my request should engage ROA [right of access] under GDPR [General Data Protection Regulation] then it should be released thereunder, but only if it is unable to be released under FOI.

[9]The IC in his decision notice of 14 July 2025 addressed this argument (DN paragraph 10):

“…Commissioner is only considering the refusal of the requests under FOIA. If the complainant wishes to have an assessment made under data protection legislation then they will need to make a right of access request to the MPS under that legislation, as previously invited … and submit a separate complaint to the Commissioner for consideration.”

[10]The IC went on to consider the wording of the request and the clear links to the Appellant in both parts (B and C) and concluded:

“29. In this case, given the wording of the requests and their clear links to the complainant, the Commissioner finds that the MPS was entitled to issue a section 40(5A) NCND response under FOIA to refuse to confirm or deny that the information was held. 30. The Commissioner does not find it necessary to also consider the application of section 40(5B).”

[11]In his appeal the Appellant argued that his request was a “meta” request which involved both his personal information and other information and “Information pertaining to the requester, would be expected to have been minimal and should have been handled under the same request, but applying GDPR regulation to personal data, the rest of the data requested would be expected to fall under the FOI Act and would reasonably be expected to contain the bulk of information requested in the Meta request for information.”

[12]In resisting the appeal the IC explained that a NCND response was intended to obscure whether any information was held since giving an answer to the question of whether information was or was not held revealed personal information. Furthermore the IC guidance on mixed information was:

“If you cannot separate the mixed information, you should consider all of the requested information as if it were the requester’s personal data. As explained above, confirmation or denial would in itself reveal whether or not the Appellant had made prior requests to MPS and therefore the IC remains of the view that MPS were correct to refuse to do so in accordance with section 40(5A) FOIA.”

[13]The MPS supported the IC in resisting the appeal relying on s40(5A), in addition to submitting arguments on s40(5B) relating to the various individual members of the MPS.

[14]In his presentation to the tribunal the Appellant confirmed that towards the end of 2025 he had made a subject access request for information held by the MPS which was the subject of the FOIA requests before the tribunal. He provided copies to the tribunal of the material provided as a result of his subject access requests. From a consideration of this material it is both personal data relating to him and also personal data of the various members of the MPS.

Statutory framework

[15]This is an appeal brought under s57 of the Freedom of Information Act. S58 sets out the powers of the tribunal: 58 Determination of appeals.(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b)to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.

(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.

[16]The general right of access to information is set out in s1 FOIA which provides: 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities. (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

[17]However s2 makes provision for exemptions from this right: 2 Effect of the exemptions in Part II. (1) Where any provision of Part II states that the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to any information, the effect of the provision is that where either— (a) the provision confers absolute exemption, or (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the information, section 1(1)(a) does not apply.

[18]Part II of FOIA (sections 21-44) is titled Exempt Information.

[19]S40 FOIA deals with personal information: 40 Personal information. (1) Any information to which a request for information relates is exempt information if it constitutes personal data of which the applicant is the data subject. … (5A) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by virtue of subsection (1). (5B) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to other information if or to the extent that any of the following applies— (a) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with section 1(1)(a)— (i) would (apart from this Act) contravene any of the data protection principles, or …..

Deliberation

[20]The wording of the requests contained in the letter of 2 September 2024 clearly identifies the material sought as falling within the description of the Appellant’s personal data. An inspection of the material the Appellant received from the MPS in his subject access response confirms that and its relation to the individual members of the MPS who are mentioned in the request or in the material identified.

[21]The tribunal is satisfied that the IC decision is correct and the MPS was entitled to apply s40(5A) in refusing to release the material. The tribunal is also satisfied as to the application of s40(5B) by the MPS.

[22]This appeal is dismissed. Signed Hughes Date: 1 June 2026