“The Tribunal to take over the case. The reason is I rely on Article 9 Regulation 63. I think that the ICO is too pressured to discharfge [sic.] its statutory function and/or this is a discreet legal point that they may lack grass root skills to deal with.”
“We appreciate your concerns are part of a wider issue with the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) and that some of your concerns may have been resolved since raising a complaint with us on21 March 2025 . However, we note that you have sent the ICO 68 emails to this case. Due to the high volume of correspondence sent, we have been unable to identify what exactly your current data protection issue with the SRA is. Please be informed that it is not for the ICO to read through large volumes of documentation to identify the main data protection issue. This is because we can only look into complaints to the extent appropriate. We also ask that you do not copy the ICO into any further correspondence, as these will not be responded to. In order for us to understand what exactly you are complaining about so we can make a decision, we ask that you clearly and concisely explain (in bullet points), what your current outstanding data protection concern is with SRA. Once we receive the above we will be back in touch with you. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.”
“165(1) Articles 57(1)(f) and (2) and 77 of the UK GDPR (data subject’s right to lodge a complaint) confer rights on data subjects to complain to the Commissioner if the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to him or her, there is an infringement of the UK GDPR. (2) A data subject may make a complaint to the Commissioner if the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to him or her, there is an infringement of Part 3 or 4 of this Act.” (2) A data subject may make a complaint to the Commissioner if the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to him or her, there is an infringement of Part 3 or 4 of this Act.”
“166(1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner– (a) fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b) fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months, beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c) if the Commissioner’s consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner– (a) to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or (b) to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order. (3) An order under subsection (2)(a) may require the Commissioner– (a) to take steps specified in the order; (b) to conclude an investigation, or take a specified step, within a period specified in the order.” (a) fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b) fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months, beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c) if the Commissioner’s consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner– (a) to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or (b) to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order. (3) An order under subsection (2)(a) may require the Commissioner– (a) to take steps specified in the order; (b) to conclude an investigation, or take a specified step, within a period specified in the order.”
“It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act, which regard the s.166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of Article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a Tribunal from the procedural failings listed in s.166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by Tribunals.”
“The treatment of such complaints by the Commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under Article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination.”
“For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so, the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint.”
“The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court). It will do so in the context of securing the progress of the complaint in question” (Killock and Veale, paragraph 87). As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.”
“it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an “appropriate” step has been omitted is limited.”
“However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”
“8(3) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if– … (c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it succeeding.” … (c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it succeeding.”
“The treatment of such complaints by the Commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under Article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination.”
“For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so, the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint.”