Steve Sanders v The Information Commissioner & Anor [2026] UKFTT 486 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 00486 (GRC)Case Reference: EA/2023/0544
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Hearing Heard on: 9 th September 2025Date 13 May 2026
Information Rights
Decided with a hearing
Before
JUDGE KIAIMEMBER SAUNDERSMEMBER EDWARDS
Between
STEVE SANDERSAppellantTHE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentFINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICERespondentMr Sanders represented himself for Appellant for First Respondent: The First Respondent was not represented for Second Respondent: The Second Respondent was not represented.Decision: The appeal is refused.REASONS
[1]This Decision relates to an Appeal brought by Steve Sanders against a decision notice (“DN”) issued by the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) on 21 November 2023 upholding the Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS’s) reliance on section 14 FOIA to refuse the Appellant’s requests made by the Appellant. The Commissioner noted that the complainant had sent a very high volume of requests and associated correspondence, much of which related to their dissatisfaction with the outcome of their own financial complaint and FOS’s refusal to revisit it. The Commissioner found that the cumulative burden imposed on FOS was significant, that many requests were of limited wider public value, and that FOIA was being used as a means to pursue or reopen issues already concluded by FOS.[2]In doing so, the Commissioner accepted that FOS was entitled, under section 14 FOIA to treat the Appellant’s requests as vexatious under section 14 FOIA and was not required to take further steps.[3]The Tribunal concludes that the DN dated 21 November 2023 (reference IC245170Y5T6, correctly IC236767N5L4) is upheld. FOS was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA to refuse the Appellant’s requests Brief Background and Procedural History[4]On 10 February 2022 an Ombudsman at FOS issued a dismissal decision on the Appellant’s complaint about AXA Insurance. FOS’s covering communications stated this represented the end of FOS’s process and that FOS would not take the matter further. Further emails of 31 May 2022 and 4 July 2022 warned about excessive contact; on 21 December 2022 FOS confirmed that the case would not be reopened and imposed restrictions on direct contact.[5]Between 18 February and 18 December 2022, the Appellant submitted 32 FOIA requests to FOS, all relating to the handling of a complaint he brought to it against AXA Insurance. Those requests are not set out here due to their length but have been considered in full. In summary the requests sought copies of guidance, rules and codes of conduct issued to FOS staff; various materials from the organisation’s internal guidance platform, ‘Discovery’; information relating to staff training, as well as guidance on its complaints handling and call recording procedures. They further sought information about the number of complaints received alleging bullying and harassment to consumers, together with details of FOS’s internal staff disciplinary processes; a copy of the 2018 Channel 4 Dispatches documentary concerning FOS; details of the storage capacity of its computer systems; and information regarding the publication of its decisions.[6]Three internal reviews—dated 9 September 2022 (covering 26 requests), 3 March 2023 (covering 5 requests) and 21 March 2023 (covering 1 request)—upheld reliance on section 14(1). Following investigation, the Commissioner issued the DN on 21 November 2023, finding that section 14(1) was correctly engaged. The Appellant appealed on 19 December 2023.[7]The evidence records significant correspondence volumes: by September 2022 FOS received 69 FOIA/internal review items and over 160 emails from the Appellant in that year; between November 2022 and March 2023, 200–300 further emails were sent, escalating after 10 March 2023 to a total of 800–900 emails copied to multiple recipients, which FOS says overloaded inbound email queues and impaired its ability to send or receive email for a period. The Appellant disputes these numbers.[8]FOS maintains that the volume and complexity of the emails caused some FOIA requests to be responded to late or missed.[9]Since 9 September 2022, FOS had received a further 59 information requests, including 25 internal review requests, 3 subject access requests and over 150 pieces of other correspondence to its data protection team.[10]The Appellant disputes some of these figures (as addressed in further detail below). Requests[11]The Appellant submitted 32 information requests to the FOS between February 2022 and March 2023.[12]These are not set out here due to the length of doing so. However, Table 2 at page D1037 of the Respondent’s Bundle sets out the 32 requests addressed in the Commissioner’s DN. The Appellant has not disputed the accuracy of this table.[13]The requests sought extensive material, including internal guidance, staff codes of conduct, training information, extracts fr’s internal “Discovery” system, details of IT storage capacity, a copy of a Channel 4 Dispatches documentary, and information concerning publication of FOS decisions. FOS refused to comply with all requests, relying on section 14 FOIA on the basis that the requests were vexatious. Three internal reviews—dated 9 September 2022, 3 March 2023 and 21 March 2023—upheld the application of section 14 FOIA.[14]Following the internal reviews, the Appellant complained to the ICO. Decision Notice (21 November 2023)[15]The Commissioner considered the 32 requests for information submitted by the complainant to FOS between February and December 2022.[16]The Commissioner found that all the requests arose from the complainant’s ongoing dissatisfaction with FOS’s dismissal of his underlying financial complaint in February 2022. Following that decision, the complainant raised multiple service complaints, data protection complaints and extensive correspondence, seeking to challenge or overturn the Ombudsman’s decision. FOS provided evidence that, despite repeatedly informing the complainant that the decision was final and would not be revisited, the complainant continued to submit further FOIA requests as well as lengthy and frequent correspondence on related themes.[17]The Commissioner recorded that the complainant’s contact had escalated significantly: by September 2022, FOS had received 69 information requests or internal review requests from him, along with over 160 emails in that year. Between November 2022 and March 2023, a further 200–300 emails were received, escalating in early March 2023 to a total of 800–900 emails. Many messages were sent in bulk to approximately 200 individuals across the organisation. FOS reported that this volume and frequency overwhelmed parts of its email system, preventing it for a period from sending or receiving emails and impairing its operational and statutory functions.[18]FOS also highlighted the breadth of the requests, which affected multiple internal teams—including casework, HR, IT, legal and security—and which would require extensive coordination and experienced staff time to respond to. By way of example, FOS estimated that reviewing and redacting only the internal guidance requested would require around 25 hours of work by approximately 39 senior staff, diverting them from statutory duties. FOS additionally submitted that many requests contained or were accompanied by allegations of dishonesty, misconduct, bullying, discrimination or maladministration by staff, and that the complainant’s correspondence exhibited a pattern of cross referencing, repetition, corrections to previous emailed versions, and repeated demands for reexamination of closed matters.[19]The Appellant’s position, summarised by the Commissioner, was that he considered FOS to have mishandled his original complaint, to have acted contrary to its own procedures, and to have failed to provide required information in a timely manner. He stated that the volume of his correspondence was necessitated by FOS’s failures, missed deadlines, missing information and refusal to revisit the Ombudsman’s decision. He submitted that the decision was not final and could lawfully be reopened, that FOS had acted improperly or fraudulently, and that his requests were essential to exposing unfairness and procedural irregularities. He also referred to external criticism of FOS, including the 2018 Dispatches programme, to argue that his requests raised matters of wider public interest.[20]The Commissioner rejected the complainant’s submission that the correspondence volume was necessary, finding instead that by September 2022 it was clear that the complainant intended to continue making requests until FOS revisited his complaint—something FOS had repeatedly and explicitly stated it would not do. The Commissioner found that FOIA was being used, whether intentionally or not, to continue a private dispute and to challenge a decision that was final and could not be reopened through FOIA. He further found that the requests’ value was predominantly private, relating to the complainant’s personal grievance, and that any wider public interest was minimal. He concluded that any serious purpose or value whether private or not did not justify such level of correspondence and the clear disruption and burden this would place on FOS.[21]The Commissioner concluded that the cumulative burden on FOS was “significant” in terms of time and resources. It imposed an unjustified and disproportionate burden on the organisation’s resources. He noted that while FOIA provides a right of access to information, it is not intended to be used as a means of continuing to dispute or seek to reverse decisions that are final. He concluded that the Appellant’s use of FOIA was inappropriate and not the correct or most appropriate channel to continue the Appellant’s dispute.[22]The Commissioner concluded that it was clear that regardless of the response FOS would issue, the level of correspondence and requests would continue. ‘The Commissioner considers it is fair to say that by September 2022 it was clear that volumes of correspondence and requests would continue until the complaint had, in their mind, proved this view and secured a revisit to their complaint, something which FOS had already said in the decision in February 2022, and the correspondence in the May and July would not happen’.[23]He added that for both September 2022 and March 2023, the Commissioner did not agree that the level of requests and correspondence was necessary to chase outstanding or late information requests, concluding that he could see how FOS would find the volume of correspondence and frequency of correspondence difficult to manage and how information could therefore have been missed or delayed. He concluded that the appropriate means of challenging this would have been a referral to the Commissioner under section 50 of FOIA, once statutory timeframes had expired.[24]Taking a holistic view, the Commissioner determined that the 32 requests were vexatious under section 14(1) FOIA. He therefore concluded that FOS was entitled to refuse them, and he required no further steps. Grounds of Appeal[25]The Appellant advances extensive grounds (as set out in the placeholder grounds of appeal dated 12 December 2023, the original grounds of appeal dated 24 March 2024 and amended grounds of appeal dated 10 September 2024 and 11 September 2024), which the Tribunal summarises as follows (noting that the most recent grounds of appeal alone are 49 pages). i. Background[26]The Appellant states he originally contacted FOS in 2010, and again in 2014, but was repeatedly told - negligently and incorrectly - that he could not complain about AXA as he was not its customer or policyholder. This advice is now accepted by FOS to have been wrong.[27]Because of this, the Appellant pursued litigation against AXA. At a County Court hearing on 26 May 2016, AXA secured a strikeout order based on procedural default. The Appellant alleges AXA misled the Court in various respects (such as through use of a backdated expert report).[28]Between 2007 and 2014, the Appellant suffered 11 sewage/foul water floods in his former home. He alleges AXA admitted liability for the initial claims but never paid redress. His property was ultimately taken off the council tax list as “derelict” and beyond repair. AXA offered derisory settlement amounts (£70 and £850). ii. The Appellant’s Core Allegation: Systemic Misconduct by FOS[29]The Appellant claims that once FOS accepted (in 2019) that it had negligently turned him away, it sought to “get rid of” his complaint rather than investigate it. His allegations include: · FOS colluded improperly with AXA and its solicitors. · FOS engaged in covert communications about him containing defamatory content. · FOS made unlawful assurances to AXA that it would “help them out” by closing his case. · FOS withheld evidence and personal data, including a key 19 minute, 39 second telephone call between an Ombudsman Manager and AXA’s solicitor. · The recording was disclosed only in a heavily redacted 4 minute, 29 second version. · When eventually disclosed, it allegedly reveals that FOS had predetermined the outcome before the Appellant’s submissions were even considered.[30]The Appellant asserts that this undermines the independence of both the investigator and the Ombudsman, contradicting repeated written assurances that an Ombudsman would “look at everything afresh” iii. The Dismissal Decision and FOS’s alleged Noncompliance with DISP Rules[31]The Appellant says the Ombudsman (Mr Langford) dismissed his case without considering the merits, contrary to: · DISP 3.3, which requires giving a complainant an opportunity to be heard before dismissal, and · FOS’s own internal guidance.[32]He says he was given neither: · AXA’s submissions, nor · any opportunity to make representations.[33]Therefore, the dismissal was void for procedural unfairness, ultra vires and in breach of natural justice. iv. Dismissal Decisions Not Final[34]The Appellant cites FOS’s own internal guidance (disclosed under FOIA years earlier) stating:
“A dismissal decision isn’t a determination under our rules. It is possible that we might later revisit a complaint we dismissed…”
[35]He says this contradicts FOS’s statements to the IC that dismissal decisions “are final and cannot be revisited”, and he claims these statements were fraudulent.[36]The Appellant says FOS misled him by telling him a complaint could be reopened but later denied him access to any process to do so. He repeatedly sought the application procedure, relevant forms and guidance, but was met with silence or hostile responses, including from an Ombudsman Leader (Mr Howell). v. The Secret Telephone Call Recording[37]The Appellant argues that the most significant piece of evidence is the covertly withheld telephone call (approximately 19:39 minutes) between FOS and AXA’s solicitor. He states: · The call was never disclosed until many months after the Ombudsman’s dismissal. · Only 4:29 minutes was initially disclosed in heavily redacted form. · FOS asserted (falsely, as later admitted) that redactions were required because the call involved “other cases”. · In March 2024, FOS’s solicitor (Mr Cameron) admitted the redactions were excessive and based on a misunderstanding.[38]The Appellant says this belated admission vindicates his position and shows that the FOS’s previous statements to the IC were false. vi. Interaction with FOI Requests[39]The Appellant submits that many of his FOIA requests—criticised by FOS—were: · directly prompted by FOS’s unlawful withholding of evidence, · reasonable attempts to understand or challenge FOS’s false assertions, · legitimate attempts to obtain documents required for him to reopen the case.[40]He alleges the IC wrongly treated legitimate requests as vexatious because he accepted FOS’s characterisation without independent examination of evidence. v. Alleged Flaws in the IC’s Investigation[41]The Appellant contends that the IC: · Did not request or consider relevant documentary evidence. · Relied on only two email chains from FOS. · Uncritically adopted FOS’s assertions (many of which he says were fraudulent). · Failed to assess whether FOS had followed its own procedures—despite FOIA section 14 requiring contextual factual evaluation. · Treated evidence of FOS misconduct as evidence of the Appellant’s unreasonableness. · Failed to examine contradictions between FOS’s representations and its internal guidance. · Failed to consider the incomplete scope of the purported “dismissal” (which only covered 2 of 11 floods).[42]He argues the investigation was neither evidence based nor impartial and was irrational. vi. Allegation of Apparent Bias in the IC’s Decision[43]The Appellant claims the language used in the decision notice demonstrates bias because: · The IC presents FOS’s claims as factual (“FOS explained…”, “FOS advised…”) · but presents the Appellant’s submissions in distancing language (“the complainant believes…”, “they consider…”).[44]He says this creates unequal treatment and shows the IC preferred FOS’s narrative without verifying facts.[45]He also says references to the Channel 4 Dispatches documentary were framed as “the complainant considers” when the documentary itself was objectively highly critical, widely reported and led to Parliamentary scrutiny. vii. Failure to Take Into Account Relevant Considerations[46]The Appellant alleges that the IC misdirected himself by stating it was “not his remit” to examine whether FOS followed procedure. He submits: · Assessing proportionality under section 14 requires understanding the factual background. · If FOS acted unlawfully or improperly, higher volumes of correspondence or requests may be reasonable. · Therefore, the IC’s refusal to assess procedural context made the section 14 determination irrational. viii. Summarised Grounds of Challenge[47]The Appellant’s consolidated grounds include: - Apparent bias by the Commissioner (including failure to consider relevant considerations and reliance on fraudulent/incorrect assertions). It is said the Commissioner accepted “bare, unevidenced and misleading assertions” from FOS while failing to give proper weight to materials which, the Appellant submits, evidence fraud, maladministration and improper redactions. - Failure to conduct an evidence-based investigation The Commissioner did not, it is said, interrogate FOS’s claims against contemporaneous materials demonstrating misconduct and data handling failings. - Mischaracterisation of motive The requests were necessary to understand FOS processes and expose failings, not to prolong a closed dispute. - Error regarding the finality of dismissal decisions Internal FOS guidance (obtained via FOIA in 2020) states that dismissals are not determinations and may be revisited; March 2024 correspondence is said to acknowledge excessive redaction and support the Appellant’s position. - Misapplication of section 14(1) and Dransfield Persistence due to delay/evasion was misread as vexatiousness; the Commissioner failed to assess holistically and overweighted follow-ups. - Public interest and systemic concerns The 2018 Dispatches programme and other commentary show significant public value in transparency over FOS processes. - Later in time disclosures March 2024 correspondence accepting excessive redaction is said to vindicate FOIA requests about call recordings, recusal and recordkeeping. - FOS misled the ICO FOS has misled the ICO by presenting false bare assertions as truth. This invalidates conclusions drawn by the ICO. It is FOS which is vexatious, not the Appellant. “In the face of the FOS’s conduct, which includes fraud, harassment, discrimination and victimisation together with numerous false and misleading assertions and the IC’s questionable reliance on such assertions, the Appellant was and is entirely justified in seeking answers and information to ensure a fair and unbiased resolution of the matter at hand”. ix. Conclusion[48]In summary, the Appellant argues that: · FOS misled the IC. · The IC adopted FOS’s narrative without scrutiny. · The IC failed to consider key evidence later shown to have been improperly withheld. · The application of section 14 FOIA was legally and factually unjustified. · The entire decision is unsafe, tainted by bias, irrationality, and material factual error.[49]For completeness, we add that all grounds and submissions have been considered; where not expressly addressed below, they have been taken into account. First Respondent’s Response[50]In its short response dated 3 May 2024, the Commissioner adopts the DN’s reasoning and submits it is correct in law and fact. Second Respondent’s Response[51]In submissions dated 13 August 2024 and 11 October 2024, FOS supports the DN and submits that this case represents a paradigm example of the circumstances for which section 14(1) exists. It maintains that even on Mr Sanders’ own pleaded case, there is no reasonable prospect of the appeal succeeding.[52]FOS submits that the Commissioner’s conclusion was plainly correct. Applying the principles in Dransfield and subsequent authority, FOS relies in particular on:(i) the volume and frequency of the Appellant’s requests;(ii) the significant burden imposed on staff by their breadth and complexity;(iii) the absence of any genuine public interest purpose, the requests instead forming part of the Appellant’s pursuit of grievances arising from FOS’s handling of his complaint against AXA;(iv) the harassing effect of the Appellant’s persistent allegations of misconduct and dishonesty against FOS staff; and(v) the continuing and escalating nature of the correspondence. FOS submit that Mr Sander’s approach to arguing this case is like the FOIA requests underlying the case, grossly disproportionate.[53]FOS further submits that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal do not engage with the Commissioner’s reasoning and do not identify any error in the application of section 14(1). Instead, the grounds rehearse the Appellant’s dissatisfaction with FOS’s handling of his underlying AXA complaint and criticisms of the Commissioner, none of which are relevant to the question before the Tribunal.[54]FOS rely on the 3 tables provided in the Respondent’s bundle, setting out the various requests and factors underlying reliance on section 14. Appellant’s Submissions in response to the Second Respondent’s initial response[55]The Appellant reiterates his case and emphasises that his amended grounds of appeal identify several instances in which FOS is said to have made misleading or fraudulent submissions during the ICO investigation, and that these submissions were subsequently relied upon by the IC in reaching the DN under appeal.[56]The Appellant relies on legal authority to the effect that proven fraud has the capacity to undermine decisions in their entirety. He cites, in particular, HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank and Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley in support of the proposition that fraud “unravels all”.[57]The Appellant emphasises that the courts have held that a party who has misled a decision maker cannot later assert that such misinformation was immaterial to the outcome.[58]The Appellant states that he invited counsel for FOS, on 18 September 2024, to address the matters he raises, but that no response had been received as of 20 September 2024.[59]The Appellant further submits that counsel for FOS faces what he describes as a conflict between her professional obligations to the Tribunal and her instructions from her client, in circumstances where, he says, FOS has provided misleading material to the IC.[60]He asserts that FOS’s legal and executive leadership must have been aware of the issues he raises and suggests that this creates further concern as to FOS’s approach.[61]The Appellant also disputes FOS’s submission that the amended grounds of appeal relate primarily to dissatisfaction with an earlier FOS determination regarding AXA Insurance. He maintains that this characterisation is inaccurate.[62]The Appellant states that each FOIA request relevant to this appeal was justified by evidence and his past dealings with FOS. They are not based on unfounded allegations.[63]He contends that the evidence FOS provided to the IC does not support its allegation that the Appellant was vexatious. Instead, he argues that the material demonstrates the opposite and suggests inappropriate conduct by FOS. Legal Framework[64]The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows: 1. General right of access to information held by public authorities(1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. 14. Vexatious or repeated requests (1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.(2) Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.[35]There is no further guidance on the meaning of “vexatious” in the legislation. The leading guidance is contained in the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) decision in Information Commissioner v Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC), as upheld and clarified in the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and another & Craven v Information Commissioner and another [2015] EWCA Civ 454 (CA).[65]As noted by Arden LJ in her judgment in the CA in Dransfield, the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one: “…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious.” (para 68).[66]Judge Wikeley’s decision in the UT Dransfield sets out more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the CA. The ultimate question is, “is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?” (para 43). It is important to adopt a “holistic and broad” approach, emphasising “manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests.” (para 45). Arden LJ in the CA also emphasised that a “rounded approach” is required (para 69), and all evidence which may shed light on whether a request is vexatious should be considered.[67]The UT set out four non-exhaustive broad issues which can be helpful in assessing whether a request is vexatious:a. The burden imposed on the public authority by the request. This may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings between the parties. “…the context and history of the previous request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor.” (para 29).b. The motive of the requester. Although FOIA is motive-blind, “what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority.” (para 34).c. The value or serious purpose. Lack of objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own, but is part of the balancing exercise – “does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought?” (para 38).d. Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff. This is not necessary in order for a request to be vexatious, but “vexatiousness may be evidenced by obsessive conduct that harasses or distresses staff, uses intemperate language, makes wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour or is in any other respects extremely offensive.” (para 39). 23. Overall, the purpose of section 14 is to “protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA” (UT para 10), subject always to the high standard of vexatiousness being met.[68]Section 14(1) does not require evidence of improper motive. The statutory test is concerned with the effect of the requests and the proportionality of requiring a response. The role of the tribunal[69]The tribunal’s remit is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved exercising discretion, whether he should have exercised it differently. The tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner. The Tribunal conducts a full merits review of the Commissioner’s decision, but within the limited statutory question of whether FOIA Part I was complied with.[70]The burden of proof in satisfying the Tribunal that the Commissioner’s decision was wrong in law or involved an inappropriate exercise of discretion rests with the Appellant. The relevant standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Issues and

Evidence

[71]By way of evidence and submissions we considered a bundle consisting of 1232 electronic pages and a closed bundle of 3 electronic pages (consisting of unredacted copies of correspondence contained in the open bundle). A rule 14 direction was made in relation to the closed bundle on 25 April 2025. We considered that order and concluded that it should be maintained.[72]The Tribunal has considered all this material carefully but does not consider it necessary to refer to all, or indeed most of it, in this judgement. Especially in light of the volume of documents.[73]The Appellant attended the hearing and gave oral evidence. The Appellant, who has been diagnosed with autism with Asperger’s syndrome and associated anxiety disorders, was assisted by appropriate special measures implemented as reasonable adjustments to facilitate his ability to give evidence and to make submissions. The Tribunal checked on several occasions that the Appellant was content to proceed and confirmed that he experienced no difficulties in giving his evidence or making his submissions. It is not necessary, for present purposes, to set out the detail of that evidence here. The hearing was recorded in the normal way. Preliminary Applications and Tribunal Rulings[74]At the outset of the hearing on 9 September 2025, the Appellant made a number of preliminary applications. These comprised:(i) an application for disclosure of material contained within the 3 page closed bundle;(ii) an application for the provision of a transcript of evidence given at an earlier hearing before the Tribunal in case reference EA/2022/0433, at which the Appellant stated that various admissions were made;(iii) an application for the preparation of a transcript, or an agreed transcript, of a telephone call said to have taken place between representatives of the Second Respondent and AXA; and(iv) an application that the hearing be adjourned, whether in full or on a part-heard basis, in the event that any of those applications were granted or required further steps to be taken.[75]The Tribunal heard submissions from the Appellant in support of those applications and adjourned briefly to consider its position. It confirmed that it would proceed to hear the substantive submissions and would thereafter consider whether it was necessary for the hearing to go part-heard.[76]Following the substantive submissions, the Tribunal again adjourned. Upon resuming, it gave oral rulings on each of the preliminary applications. The applications were refused and the Tribunal confirmed that there was no need for the matter to proceed on a part-heard basis. At that point, the Appellant renewed his application that the parties agree a transcript of the call recording, so that it might be provided to the Tribunal promptly before its decision was finalised. That renewed application was also refused for the same reasons set out below.[77]In determining those applications, the Tribunal had regard to the overriding objective set out in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure Rules, namely, to deal with cases fairly and justly. In particular, the Tribunal considered the need to ensure that the parties were able to participate fully in the proceedings, whilst also avoiding unnecessary delay and dealing with the case in a manner which was proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues to be determined.[78]In relation to the application for disclosure of material contained within the closed bundle, the Tribunal noted that this issue had previously been addressed by judicial direction, namely Judge Saward’s Case Management Directions dated 25 April 2026, in which it was concluded that “I am satisfied that that the redacted information in both documents is irrelevant to the appeal before the Tribunal. Communication between lawyers would be protected from disclosure by legal professional privilege. Accordingly, no order for disclosure is made…”. The Tribunal considered whether there was any proper basis upon which to depart from that earlier determination in light of the Appellant’s submissions but was not satisfied there was. In doing so, the Tribunal reviewed the material contained within the closed bundle and exercised its own independent jdugmenet as to its relevance and significance to the issues arising in the appeal. It remained satisfied that the withheld material was not relevance to the determination of the issues within its jurisdiction and that its non-disclosure did not impair its ability to determine the appeal on a sufficiently informed basis or to give adequate reasons. It further remained satisfied that the approach previously adopted appropriately balanced the competing considerations of fairness, transparency and the protection of confidential and legally privileged material, and that no further disclosure could properly be made without undermining those interests. In those circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that it would not be justified in varying that ruling and that to do so would not further the overriding objective. The application was therefore refused.[79]In relation to the application for a transcript of the earlier Tribunal hearing in case reference EA/2022/0433, the Tribunal considered that application in light of the Appellant’s submissions and the material already before it, including the written evidence of the Second Respondent. While noting the Appellant’s submissions as to the relevance of that material, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the provision of such a transcript was necessary for the fair determination of the issues arising in this appeal. Having regard to the nature of those issues and the statutory framework governing the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it concluded that the matters in dispute could properly be resolved on the basis of the existing evidence. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining such a transcript would not be proportionate and would not further the overriding objective. The application was therefore refused.[80]In relation to the application for a transcript, or agreed transcript, of the telephone call referred to by the Appellant, the Tribunal likewise considered that request in light of the Appellant’s submissions. The Tribunal took into account the Appellant’s submissions as to the relevance of that material but was not satisfied that such material was necessary in order to determine the issues falling within its jurisdiction under FOIA. The Tribunal concluded that it was able to determine the appeal fairly and justly on the basis of the material before it, and that the obtaining of a transcript would not materially assist in resolving those issues. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that it would not be proportionate, and would not further the overriding objective, to adjourn the proceedings for that purpose. The application was therefore refused.[81]The Tribunal then considered the Appellant’s application that the hearing be adjourned, whether in full or on a part-heard basis. In light of its conclusions in relation to the applications set out above, the Tribunal was not satisfied that any adjournment was necessary to secure the fair determination of the appeal. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was able to proceed to determine the appeal fairly and justly, having regard to the material already before it and the scope of its jurisdiction. The Tribunal therefore concluded that an adjournment would not be justified and would not further the overriding objective. The application was accordingly refused and the Tribunal indicated that the hearing would proceed.[82]At the conclusion of the hearing, following the Tribunal’s indication that its decision would be reserved, the Appellant made a further application seeking directions for the preparation of a transcript of the telephone call referred to above. The Tribunal was not satisfied that such a transcript was necessary or proportionate for the reasons already provided. That application was therefore refused.[83]For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal was satisfied throughout that the refusal of these applications did not prevent it from determining the appeal fairly and justly on its merits, having regard to the material before it and the statutory framework within which the appeal fell" Scope of Hearing[84]The Tribunal has sympathy for the Appellant. We recognise that he has experienced a prolonged and difficult history in his dealings with AXA and with the Financial Ombudsman Service. He has described a sequence of events involving repeated flooding of his former home, significant financial loss, destruction of property, contested litigation, subsequent insolvency proceedings, and the stresses and frustration that have accompanied his efforts to obtain redress. He has also explained that he is a vulnerable individual with health conditions, and that his interactions with public bodies have taken place against that background. It is therefore fully understandable that he feels aggrieved and that he has sought information which he believes may shed light on the processes applied to his complaint and the way it was handled.[85]However, this Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is strictly limited. We are only permitted to consider whether the Information Commissioner’s decision—upholding the Financial Ombudsman Service’s reliance on section 14 of FOIA—was in accordance with the law. The Tribunal is not empowered to investigate, resolve, or adjudicate upon many of the wider issues raised by the Appellant.[86]In particular, we do not have jurisdiction to determine: · The merits of the Appellant’s underlying dispute with AXA, including the causes of the flooding incidents, the conduct of the insurance claims, the adequacy of AXA’s investigations, or any allegations of misleading conduct or improper behaviour during the civil proceedings. This is not relevant, save to the limited extent it provides necessary context that directly informs the FOIA analysis (for example, to explain the subject matter of a request or its public interest value). We note that the earlier directions by Judge Moan (dated 30 September 2024) explicitly directed that the Tribunal would not be adjudicating on the dispute between the Appellant and Second Respondent, the Tribunal would simply be looking at the exemption claimed). · The correctness, fairness, or lawfulness of the Financial Ombudsman Service’s handling of the Appellant’s complaint, including whether it should have been accepted earlier, whether it was investigated properly, or whether its dismissal was unlawful or procedurally flawed. · Whether the Appellant’s case should be reopened by FOS, or whether any Ombudsman’s decision was valid, defective, or capable of reconsideration. These are matters falling within the statutory scheme governing FOS, not within FOIA. · Any data protection issues, including whether FOS complied with its obligations under the UK GDPR or the DPA 2018 when responding to subject access requests, redacting documents, or handling personal data. · Allegations of fraud, misconduct, collusion, discrimination, harassment, or improper motives on the part of AXA, FOS, or any individual members of their staff, except to the limited extent that such matters may inform the FOIA issues—namely, whether the authority’s reliance on section 14 was justified. · Complaints about FOS internal processes, governance, or regulation, unless directly relevant to the question of whether information sought under FOIA should have been disclosed.[77]Our task is therefore much narrower than the Appellant understandably wishes it to be. We must confine ourselves to the specific questions raised by the FOIA requests that are the subject of the Commissioner’s decision notice, and to the Commissioner’s assessment of those requests under section 14. Evidence going to the content, purpose, manageability, proportionality, and public interest value of the requests will generally be relevant.[78]The Tribunal’s jurisdiction in a FOIA appeal is appellate over the Commissioner’s decision notice. It does not exercise an original jurisdiction to direct how the public authority should handle the Appellant’s underlying complaint to FOS, nor does it sit as a general supervisory body over the authority’s substantive functions beyond FOIA.[79]Nothing in this decision should be taken as minimising the seriousness of the difficulties the Appellant has faced, nor as expressing any view on the merits of the underlying dispute or the conduct of other bodies. It reflects only the statutory limits within which the Tribunal must operate.[80]For completeness, we address here, the Appellant’s submissionthat the Commissioner failed to take relevant considerations into account by declining to investigate whether FOS followed its own procedures, thereby not ascertaining the necessary facts and instead accepting FOS’s untested assertions. The Appellant argues this amounted to an inadequate and biased inquiry—treating what FOS “felt” as determinative—when, on his case, proper investigation of procedure and evidence was essential to assessing the FOIA issues.[81]The Tribunal finds that the Appellant’s submission proceeds upon a misapprehension of the statutory remit of the Information Commissioner under section 50 of FOIA. The Commissioner’s task is to determine whether a request for information has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of Part I of FOIA. It is not part of the Commissioner’s function to adjudicate upon, or to supervise, a public authority’s compliance with its separate sectoral procedures or merits-based decision making outside FOIA.[82]Insofar as the Appellant contends that the Commissioner “misdirected himself” by stating that it was not his remit to examine whether FOS followed its own procedures, that contention is not made out. The Commissioner was correct to delineate his jurisdiction in this way. The lawfulness or propriety of FOS’s conduct under its own statutory scheme (including any alleged noncompliance with DISP or internal case handling requirements) is a matter for the mechanisms provided by that scheme or, where appropriate, public law remedies; it is not a matter to be determined in a FOIA complaint or appeal.[83]The Tribunal accepts that the assessment under section 14 FOIA (vexatious requests) is holistic and contextual. However, the relevant context is confined to matters that bear upon the character and effects of the requests themselves, including their serious purpose and value, the burden and disruption that compliance would entail, the tone and history of the requester’s communications, and the overall proportionality of requiring a response. That contextual inquiry does not oblige the Commissioner, nor this Tribunal on appeal, to determine whether the public authority (FOS) acted lawfully or unlawfully in domains that fall outside FOIA.[84]The Appellant’s further proposition, that if FOS acted unlawfully or improperly, a higher volume of correspondence or requests “may be reasonable,” and that the Commissioner’s refusal to adjudicate such matters rendered the section 14 determination irrational, conflates distinct legal questions. Whether FOS complied with its own procedural obligations is a separate question from whether, judged by FOIA criteria, the cumulative impact of the Appellant’s information requests was disproportionate, harassing, or otherwise met the threshold for vexatiousness. Proportionality under section 14 is assessed by reference to FOIA’s purposes and limits and does not depend upon establishing non-FOIA unlawfulness. Even if they made errors/acted improperly in their assessment/analysis, it is not our role to ‘review’ or analyse this. We have our own full merits jurisdiction. We undertake our own assessment below.[85]For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal will have regard to background facts to the limited extent they illuminate FOIA relevant factors, such as the purpose and public interest value of the information sought or the practicability of compliance. That limited consideration does not, however, extend to determining the merits of the Appellant’s underlying dispute with AXA, adjudicating upon the correctness or fairness of FOS’s handling of that dispute, or directing whether any FOS decision should be reopened. Those matters are beyond the scope of FOIA and this appeal.[86]We further note that the Appellant makes various allegations against the Commissioner, such as allegations of bias and complaints about the way he investigated the case. We make it clear, that the Tribunal’s role is not to question how the Commissioner investigated. We are reviewing the evidence and making our own decision, and we may agree or disagree with the Commissioner’s decision. Discussion and Conclusions[87]In accordance with section 58 of FOIA, our role is to consider whether the DN was in accordance with the law. As set out in section 58(2), we may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. This means that we can review all of the evidence provided to us and make our own decision.[88]The Tribunal has considered the suggested list of factors set out in the Dransfield case and the overall circumstances of the case. i. The Burden Imposed on the Public Authority[89]As in Dransfield, the burden on the public authority can be a determinative factor, though not the only one, and we adopt that approach here.[90]We have considered the Appellant’s submissions disputing FOS/ICO figures. He characterises these as exaggerated, unsubstantiated or caused by FOS delay, and says the ICO accepted “bare assertions” supported, in his view, by only limited samples, principally two email chains—which he says did not evidence the claimed impact. He also says any apparent volume was a product of necessary chasing where deadlines were missed. We address the principal strands below. Volume/Raw Counts[91]The operational evidence relied on in the DN is compelling. As recorded in the DN, FOS reported receiving:• 69 FOIA/internal review items and 160+ emails from the Appellant by September 2022;• a further 59 FOIA requests, 25 internal reviews, 3 SARs, and 150+ additional communications thereafter;• between November 2022 and March 2023, 200–300 emails, increasing to 800–900 emails in total by March 2023, with many emails sent in rapid succession and copied widely.[92]According to the DN, FOS also stated that this volume resulted in periods during which email queues were overloaded, temporarily and materially affecting its capacity to send and receive mail.[93]The qualitative burden was equally significant: many requests required coordinated searches across multiple departments (IT, HR, legal, operations, security), and FOS estimated that just one set of requested internal guidance materials would require approximately 25 hours of work and the involvement of approximately 39 senior staff members. These figures are drawn from the DN and FOS submissions.[94]The Appellant disputes the raw counts and characterises them as overstated.[95]At D991 of the Respondent’s Bundle, Table 1 (FOS request schedule) lists the requests for information between 27 January 2020 and 1 June 2023. They are very detailed and specific, we accept that they are accurate, bearing in mind that the Appellant has not stated which, if any of these, are inaccurate. There are 110 requests listed during that period – that is a substantial number. Of course, we are only considering the 32 addressed in the DN, but the wider context and history are relevant.[96]It is evident from the contemporaneous correspondence between the Appellant and FOS that there was a substantial volume of communication. For example, in the email at A103, the Ombudsman Leader states:
“When I last got in touch with you, I let you know that we have an unreasonable behaviour policy. I explained that it isn’t helpful for you to continue sending emails regarding your case, and it isn’t helpful to call our helpline. You have exhausted our processes at the Financial Ombudsman Service and we cannot help you further. I also made it clear that if we consider your behaviour to be unreasonable then we will need to consider how we communicate with you going forwards. Since then you’ve sent hundreds of emails to our Service, directed to hundreds of people who work here, the vast majority of whom have had nothing to do with your case. You’ve also continued to call our helpline… Your excessive contact places an unacceptable burden on our ability to do our job and help other customers.”
(emphasis added)[97]This correspondence provides direct evidence that, whatever the exact numerical totals, FOS was experiencing a very high level of contact, both in terms of volume and breadth. It demonstrates that the Appellant’s communications had become sufficiently extensive that FOS considered them to be impeding its ability to manage its ordinary workload. We have not been directed to any response disputing the numbers in that email.[98]The volume of communication is further evidenced by the contemporaneous correspondence reproduced in the internal reviews, which consistently records the high frequency and breadth of the Appellant’s contact with FOS over the relevant period. For example, the internal review dated 9 September [2022] states:
“Since January [2022] you have made a total of around 63 Freedom of Information requests. In 2022 alone you have made 51 FOIA requests, and some requests for an internal review. Not counting internal reviews, your requests for information equates to around 25% of the total requests made to our Service in 2022. Of your 63 requests, 47 were made after our Service’s dismissal of your complaint against AXA in February 2022. Furthermore, some of these requests stem from our responses to your requests for information and include a number of follow up requests, meta requests and some repeat requests of the same Discovery content notes before we have reviewed our handling of your original request for the same content. As well as follow‑up and meta requests, your requests for information also generate a substantial amount of follow up correspondence and email traffic, for example in the months of July, August and the first week of September the data protection mailbox alone received 47 emails from you, these emails consisted of new requests and other emails concerning the processing of your requests. Responding to these emails diverts a considerable amount of resources and places a burden on our members of staff, both those who are directly and not directly responsible for responding to your freedom of information requests. This matter of substantial follow‑up requests and correspondence reflects the interactions you have had with other departments in our service…”
(emphasis added).[99]Similar points were made in the other two internal reviews. Of note, the internal review dated 21 March 2023 states:
“This pattern of substantial follow‑up correspondence has been ongoing within the Data Protection team for over a year, and mirrors what we have seen in other departments in our Service.”
[100]Even if we are wrong about this and the precise totals are overstated, the pattern is clear: a high‑frequency, wide‑ranging set of requests and follow‑ups over a relatively short period, which required coordination across several FOS functions (IT, HR, Operations, Legal, Security) and diverted staff time. On any reasonable view of that pattern, the resource impact was significant. We note that the Appellant acknowledges, in his representations at paragraph 20 (pg C681), that “in that particular month, I had to send approximately 17 emails to various departments within the FOS in 2021 – including Casework, Data Protection, Freedom of Information and more – addressing a range of matters”. At paragraph 36 of the same, he states: “Despite my diligent efforts to contact multiple departments within the FOS, including the Data Protection Team”.[101]For completeness, we observe that even if the specific estimate, that reviewing one set of guidance would require approximately 25 hours and the involvement of around 39 senior staff, were put to one side, we would nonetheless find that the coordinated searches and senior‑level review needed across multiple directorates to address the portfolio of requests amounted to a manifestly unjustified diversion of resources. In short, even disregarding all detailed metrics (such as the 69/59 counts or the 25‑hour/39‑staff estimate) and proceeding solely on the basis that there was sustained, multi‑topic, cross‑departmental correspondence requiring significant review and redaction, we would still conclude that the resource burden alone meets the Dransfield threshold. The section 14(1) outcome would therefore remain unchanged.[102]We have also considered the email chains provided by FOS. They rely on them to demonstrate the cumulative burden created by the Appellant’s correspondence. They state it demonstrates that the Appellant was raising multiple requests, follow-ups and complaints in close succession, often over one or two days, with cross-referenced topics, large volumes of text, and wide distribution lists. The FOS stated that this pattern placed a significant burden on the team, contributed to missed or delayed responses, and made it difficult to keep pace with incoming correspondence. By contrast the Appellant asserts the opposite. He maintains that the same emails demonstrate that FOS itself behaved fraudulently towards him, that he was correct to challenge its conduct, and that the content of his correspondence was justified by the seriousness of his concerns.[103]We recognise the strength of the Appellant’s feelings and the context in which he wrote those emails. However, the Tribunal’s task under section 14(1) is not to resolve the underlying dispute about FOS’s case handling or the truth of any allegation made in those emails, but to assess their effect and the practical burden they imposed.[104]We have examined the email chain at C602 onwards. That chain shows multiple messages sent in close succession, often raising several distinct issues within the same email, including complaints about staff conduct, and wide-ranging criticisms of FOS’s handling of his case. The chain also contains repeated cross referencing to earlier correspondence and broader allegations that individual staff members had acted dishonestly, improperly or in bad faith—mirroring the themes identified elsewhere in the bundle. In this chain the Appellant asserts, for example, that FOS staff had misled him, withheld information, acted unlawfully, or engaged in predetermined or corrupt decision making. The Appellant maintains that the emails at C602 onwards prove that he was right to “hold the FOS to account” for what he characterises as fraudulent or improper behaviour. We fully accept that these statements were made against the background of many years of distress, litigation, and frustration, and that the Appellant considers them justified. However, the Tribunal’s task is to assess the effect of the correspondence, not the truth of the allegations. When viewed cumulatively, the chain at C602 onwards supports FOS’s description of the practical difficulties it experienced: the frequency and density of messages, the volume of follow-ups, the wide circulation of emails, and the accusatory nature of some of their content. Taken together, these features contributed materially to the workload and disruption described in the DN and are relevant to our assessment under section 14(1). Causation – FOS’ delay or evasion[105]When considering causation, we have considered the Appellant’s submission that the volume was driven by FOS delay or evasion. We accept that some follow‑ups and corrections may have been prompted by delays or the Appellant’s wish for accuracy or clarification. However, the statutory route when an authority misses FOIA deadlines is a section 50 complaint to the ICO — not a multiplication of new requests and mass‑copied emails. The DN expressly notes that point at paragraph 58.[106]The Appellant accepts that the Commissioner has jurisdiction under section 50 FOIA but maintains that the existence of this route did not remove his entitlement or, in practice, his need to keep corresponding with FOS where he believed FOIA or SAR duties were not being met. He says that, at least for SAR matters, the ICO Helpline told him to exhaust FOS procedures before the ICO could investigate; on his case, continued “chasing” and sending clarifications or corrections were justified and should not be treated as unreasonable or vexatious.[107]We have taken those submissions into account, including the Appellant’s explanation that the pattern of contact reflected his attempts to secure compliance rather than an improper purpose.[108]Even accepting the Appellant’s account that, in SAR contexts, he was advised to exhaust FOS procedures, that advice sits within a framework where the appropriate recourse for continuing FOIA delay is section 50. It does not justify expanding the volume, breadth and distribution of correspondence to the point that it has the oppressive effect described in the contemporaneous record. The DN evidences that, by early 2023, the pattern had become high‑frequency and wide-distribution in a manner that, viewed objectively, caused operational strain. That is decisive for the section 14(1) analysis, which focuses on effect.[109]We do not doubt the Appellant’s frustration if internal engagement felt unproductive. But section 50 is the statutory safeguard Parliament provided to protect requesters in the face of non‑compliance. The Commissioner’s reliance on section 50 as the proportionate route where deadlines are missed was, in our view, orthodox and correct, and it weighs against the reasonableness of further scaling up direct contact.[110]As already noted, the Appellant disputes the DN’s metrics. We have considered that dispute elsewhere in this decision. To reiterate, even if the precise numbers are treated as approximate, the pattern the Commissioner recorded, namely rapid cadence, wide copying to about 200 addressees, multi‑topic follow‑ups, and system impact, is sufficient to meet the Dransfield threshold on resources. The section 14(1) outcome would therefore be the same.[111]To be clear, we do not criticise the Appellant for seeking to vindicate his information rights; nor do we suggest bad faith. We have read and understood his reasons for direct chasing and his account of Helpline advice. Nevertheless, having taken those points into account, our conclusion is unchanged: for the period under review (2022–early 2023), the cumulative effect of the number, tempo, breadth and distribution of the Appellant’s FOIA‑related correspondence placed a manifestly disproportionate burden on FOS. In that context, the proportionate route where delays persisted was a section 50 complaint, not further escalation in volume or reach of direct contact. Accordingly, the Appellant’s section 50 submissions do not change our view on the application of section 14(1) in this appeal. Cause does not convert the volume/rapidity/breadth into a proportionate FOIA use once the cumulative resource impact has become manifestly disproportionate. Causation – Communication style[112]We have considered with care the Appellant’s explanation that his communication style, including the need to send clarifications, corrections, reminders and more detailed messages, is significantly influenced by his Asperger’s and Autism diagnoses. He explains that these conditions affect how he processes information, how he interprets communication, and why he sometimes feels compelled to send follow‑up messages or corrections. He also expresses concern that FOS may have misunderstood these features of his disability and treated them as evidence of vexatious intent rather than as behaviour associated with Autism Spectrum Disorders.[113]We wish to make clear that we do not treat these submissions lightly. We recognise that disability can affect communication patterns, that some individuals may need to write in greater detail or send follow‑up messages to ensure accuracy, and that such behaviour should not, without more, be equated with unreasonableness. Nothing in our assessment should be taken as a finding that the Appellant acted with improper motive, or that behaviour arising from his conditions is itself vexatious.[114]However, even taking these matters fully into account and making allowances for them, they do not alter our conclusion under section 14(1). The statutory test requires the Tribunal to assess the effect of the requests and associated correspondence on the public authority at the time they were made, rather than the Appellant’s intentions or the reasons why he felt compelled to communicate in the way he did. FOIA s.14(1) is concerned with impact, burden and proportionality, not fault or blame.[115]In the present case, the contemporaneous evidence shows that—irrespective of motive—the volume, breadth and rapidity of the correspondence placed a substantial and sustained burden on FOS resources. The DN records that the frequency of emails, often sent in rapid succession and copied widely, contributed to operational disruption, including a period in which FOS’s inbound email queues became overloaded. FOS’s internal correspondence also shows they experienced the level of contact as overwhelming (e.g., A103, where FOS states the Appellant had sent “hundreds of emails… directed to hundreds of people”, creating an “unacceptable burden”).[116]We fully accept that some aspects of the Appellant’s communication behaviour may be related to Autism Spectrum Disorder, including the need to correct errors or seek clarity, and we have taken this into account. Nevertheless, the question for us is whether, in its cumulative effect, the pattern of FOIA requests and associated correspondence had become, objectively, a manifestly disproportionate and inappropriate use of the FOIA mechanism. Having weighed all the evidence, including the Appellant’s explanation, we conclude that it had.[117]Importantly, the finding under section 14(1) is not a judgement about the Appellant’s character, nor does it mean that his concerns were without foundation. It simply reflects the fact that—even allowing for his disability‑related communication needs—the volume and frequency of his FOIA‑related correspondence, during the period under review, exceeded what the public authority could reasonably be expected to manage under the statutory scheme. For those reasons, the disability‑related explanations, while fully acknowledged, do not change our view on the application of section 14(1) in this appeal. Averaging the totals[118]We have considered the Appellant’s submission that the headline totals should be “averaged” over a long period (since c.2008 or, alternatively, from 2010/2014/2015/2019), yielding a modest annual rate, and that “160+ emails” equates to only 3–4 per week. However, the relevant period for this appeal is the concentrated phase addressed in the DN (2022 to early 2023). The contemporaneous record shows rapid, clustered activity (multiple FOIA/internal reviews, high‑frequency emails, cross‑referenced topics, wide distribution lists) during that narrow window, not a steady low‑level average over a decade. It is that concentration—not historic averages—that drove the Commissioner’s conclusion on burden and impact. Email queue overload[119]The Appellant denies the “email queue overload” allegation. He maintains there is no separate documentary log proving that his emails overloaded FOS systems and characterises the overload claim as another unverified assertion adopted by the ICO. While there is no such standalone log in the bundle, one is not required. The standard of proof in this Tribunal is the balance of probabilities. Taking the evidence cumulatively (as set out below), we find on the balance of probabilities that there was email‑queue overload as recorded in the DN. Subject Access Request (SAR) timeline[120]We have considered the Appellant’s submission that his increased contact from December 2021 is explained by a Subject Access Request lodged in 2020, only answered in April 2021, with continuing access difficulties thereafter; on his case, this context justifies follow‑ups and reminders rather than evidencing vexatiousness. However, section 14(1) requires a time‑specific assessment of the effect of the 2022/early‑2023 requests and associated correspondence. The contemporaneous record relied upon by the Commissioner describes a concentrated pattern of high‑frequency, wide‑scope contact and resulting operational impact in that period. The SAR timeline, even taken at its highest, does not displace those findings for the purposes of the section 14(1) test. Alleged “daily” contact[121]The Appellant states that allegations of “daily” or “near‑daily” contact are unparticularised and overstated. The DN, however, does not base its conclusion on a single label; it relies on multiple converging features: quantity, tempo, spread (approximately 200 recipients), system effect (queue overload), and breadth (multi‑topic, multi‑team). Even if “daily” were replaced with “very frequent”, the cumulative, time‑compressed pattern recorded in the DN still demonstrates a manifestly disproportionate burden during the relevant period. Summary[122]We recognise that the Appellant does not accept the raw counts or the inference of disruption drawn from them and that he provides context for why he pursued follow‑ups. Notwithstanding those objections, we find that the contemporaneous operational account relied on by the Commissioner—covering the number, breadth and rapidity of the requests and emails, the multi‑team involvement, and the email‑queue overload—is sufficiently evidenced on the materials before us and was reasonably capable of supporting the DN’s conclusion on section 14(1). FOS was entitled to provide this evidence and the ICO was entitled to rely on it. In any event, this Tribunal determines this matter afresh and reaches the same conclusion. We find the information provided relating to this issue both credible and persuasive.[123]We find that the cumulative burden was substantial. The contemporaneous record shows sustained volume and rapidity, and a qualitative burden from requests spanning multiple teams, together with evidence that for a period FOS’s inbound email queues were overloaded, affecting routine operations. Even allowing for the Appellant’s explanations and personal circumstances, the objective effect on resources was disproportionate.[124]In conclusion, we have given weight to the Appellant’s personal circumstances and the sincerity of his motivations; however, the objective effect on FOS was nonetheless very substantial. FOIA does not require an authority to manage an indefinitely escalating workload of this nature. The resource consequences were exceptional and caused the ongoing diversion of staff from statutory functions. We find that the burden factor is strongly made out. Even standing alone, it would justify reliance on section 14(1), consistent with the Upper Tribunal in Cabinet Office v IC & Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC). ii. The Motive of the Requester[125]The Appellant states that his motive was transparency, accountability, and correcting procedural injustice. He relies heavily on: · the March 2024 admission regarding excessive redaction of a call recording. · internal guidance showing dismissal decisions are not necessarily final. · his belief that FOS actions required scrutiny.[126]The Appellant submits that these demonstrate a proper, rather than vexatious, motive.[127]The Tribunal wholeheartedly accepts that the Appellant’s motives were not malicious nor malign. The materials and submissions reflect his genuine wish to test the robustness of FOS procedures.[128]However, Dransfield recognises that motive must be considered objectively as part of a holistic assessment, and that a requester may pursue FOIA rights in a manner that becomes inappropriate even without improper intent.[129]The Tribunal finds that the dominant purpose of the requests was the Appellant’s dissatisfaction with the handling and dismissal of his underlying FOS case and his continuing efforts to challenge or reopen that decision, despite repeated notifications that all FOS processes were exhausted.[130]The Appellant explains that his requests were necessary. He further emphasises that FOS processes were not exhausted. The Tribunal does not determine the merits of FOS’s casework but notes even if some dismissal decisions can be revisited in principle, FOIA cannot be used as a mechanism to pursue a reconsideration whether the authority had repeatedly stated that its processes are closed. FOIA is not a mechanism to reopen Ombudsman decisions or compel the authority to revisit its final determinations. FOIA is not designed to function as an appeal mechanism or a vehicle for challenging a concluded outcome. Even where a person has legitimate concerns, FOIA cannot be used to secure what amounts to an indirect reconsideration of the authority’s decision.[131]FOIA operates within a statutory framework deliberately designed by Parliament to be light touch and resource constrained. Public authorities receive finite funding for administering FOIA, and Parliament has not imposed a duty to divert substantial staff time or budgets into bespoke investigations, reconstructions of events, or wide-ranging analysis in response to individual requests. FOIA requires disclosure only of recorded information held, not the creation of new material, explanatory narratives, or detailed investigatory work. The statutory assumption is that authorities will meet their FOIA duties within ordinaryoperational capacity, alongside their core statutory functions. It follows that the regime cannot realistically support the broader fact finding, systemic review or casework reassessment the Appellant seeks. To require a public authority to commit significantly more time, personnel or funding than Parliament has provided for FOIA administration would be to stretch the Act beyond its intended scope.[132]Accordingly, although the Tribunal does not find an improper motive, the purpose of perpetuating a closed dispute supports a finding of vexatiousness when combined with the extreme burden and volume of communications.[133]Again, we understand the Appellant’s submission that the March 2024 developments tend to vindicate his concerns, in particular the acknowledgement of excessive redaction is important to him and may explain why he pursued certain lines of enquiry. We have taken them into account as part of the overall picture, insofar as they help us to understand what he was seeking to explore and why. We have treated those developments as contextual material to the extent that they shed light on what he was seeking to explore. Our statutory task under section 14(1), however, is to assess whether the requests were vexatious at the time they were made. Later events may illuminate the background but cannot recharacterise the nature, pattern or effect of the earlier requests for the purposes of this test.[134]By mid-2022, FOS had communicated that its processes were concluded and would not be reopened. Persisting thereafter with a high frequency, wide scope FOIA strategy to press for reopening transformed FOIA’s use into a surrogate appeal route, which section 14(1) is designed to prevent. That remains so even if some later material appears to support aspects of the Appellant’s concerns. iii. Value or Serious Purpose of the Request[135]The Appellant submits that the requests were of broader importance, raising issues about FOS training, internal guidance, and the publication of decisions—topics that connect with wider public interest themes highlighted by Dispatches (2018) and parliamentary commentary.[136]We recognise that several subjects raised by the Appellant do have a potential public interest dimension, particularly around organisational transparency.[137]However, public interest is not a trump card, and a request with some public interest may still be vexatious when its cumulative impact is excessive. The ICO found, and we agree, that the incremental public value of compelling responses to the entire collection of requests was modest when weighed against the significant burden.[138]Much information about FOS processes is already publicly available, and some of the Appellant’s requests—for example, concerning internal desk standards or stylistic drafting conventions—were matters of minimal wider value and unlikely to materially advance public understanding, they were highly specific issues relevant only to the Appellant’s own case.[139]While we acknowledge that the Appellant raised issues of genuine concern to him, and potentially of wider interest, we find that the value factor ultimately sits on the Respondents’ side in the statutory balancing exercise; the Tribunal finds that any public value was substantially outweighed by the burden and disruptive effect of the requests. We conclude that the incremental public interest of compelling responses to the entire collection of requests does not outweigh the disproportionate resource impact, expressly cross referencing the earlier burden findings. This simply tightens the proportionality bridge between sections. iv. Any Harassment or Distress Caused to Staff[140]The Appellant emphasises that it was never his intention to cause distress. He explains that his communication style is influenced by disabilities, and that any intensity in tone or frequency was driven by the perceived need to correct misunderstandings or highlight urgent issues.[141]We accept unequivocally that the Appellant did not intend to harass staff. He has lost his home and was subsequently made bankrupt, both of which he feels his applications to FOS ought to have prevented. He believes he has endured more than a decade of unnecessary and stressful ongoing litigation, compounded by approximately 15 years of hardship. It is unsurprising that, at times, he felt intensely distressed and frustrated. We also acknowledge that his disabilities, including the effects of Asperger’s and Autism, are likely to have heightened the emotional impact of these experiences. Such conditions can affect how an individual processes stress, interprets communication from others, and responds to perceived inaccuracies or omissions, often leading to a greater need for clarity, repetition, and detailed or corrective communication. We accept that these factors would have contributed to the tone and frequency of his correspondence and have taken them fully into account.[142]The question under Dransfield, however, is the objective effect of the requests and related communications.[143]We have considered the material at B227, where FOS records examples of the Appellant’s correspondence and the impact of its tone on staff. In that passage the FOS states that “you have sometimes asked for information as a vehicle to make critical statements about service. This correspondence goes beyond the level of criticism that a public authority or its employees should reasonably expect to receive.” The example given at B227 includes the Appellant’s request of 25 March 2022, where he sought centrally held information about “the steps that an Ombudsman Manager ought to take should he find that the investigator has lied to, misled, or cheated the consumer… pretended to properly investigate the case but in fact did not do so and has instead arrived at a corrupt and predetermined view irrespective of the facts, merits, FOS internal guidance and the law.” Comparable themes appear in the emails referenced at B263–264, in which the Appellant’s correspondence includes repeated allegations of dishonesty, corruption, evasion and systemic wrongdoing by FOS staff. We fully acknowledge that these statements were made in the context of the Appellant’s longstanding distress, hardship and sincerely held belief that he had been treated unfairly, and that his disabilities may have affected how he expressed himself, including a heightened need to challenge perceived inaccuracies and seek clarification. However, under section 14(1) the Tribunal must assess the objective effectof the communications rather than their intention, and the tone evident in the correspondence at B227 and B263–264 formed part of the cumulative pattern experienced by FOS. When considered alongside the volume, frequency and wide distribution of the communications, these features materially contributed to the burden and disruptive impact which underpins our conclusion on vexatiousness.[144]The mass copying of emails to large recipient lists, the volume of correspondence, the tone of some messages that FOS staff perceived as strongly worded, and the organisational impact form a coherent picture of conduct that had a harassing effect on staff.[145]FOS contemporaneously advised the Appellant that contact levels were unreasonable and restricted further communication. The Tribunal accepts that the volume and rapidity of emails caused distress, disruption and pressure on staff.[146]We do not doubt the Appellant’s sincerity or the challenges he faces. Nevertheless, even with those factors firmly in mind, the impact on staff and systems supports the ICO’s assessment that this factor was engaged.[147]This factor therefore provides some support for the section 14(1) conclusion, though our finding is expressly about effect, not intent. Harassment is not a necessary element for s.14(1) but is a supporting factor in the holistic balance. v. The Overall Circumstances of the Case[148]We accept that the Appellant has raised serious and thoughtfully presented concerns. However, when we step back and assess the material holistically, as section 14(1) requires, the cumulative picture remains decisive.[149]We find on the balance of probabilities (and based on the evidence before us):a. The Appellant submitted 32 FOIA requests to FOS between February and December 2022, all relating to FOS’s handling of his complaint against AXA. They were often multipart and broad, seeking internal guidance, Discovery content, training materials, call handling/recording procedures, IT storage data, a broadcast copy of Dispatches, and information about decision publication. These were accompanied by a significant volume of follow-up correspondence, clarifications and related emails during 2022 and early 2023.b. These were part of a series of requests made between 27 January 2020 and 1 June 2023. In total there 110 requests during this period.c. Contemporaneous records show that, during this period, FOS received large quantities of communications from the Appellant, including FOIA requests, internal review requests, subject access requests, and other emails. The evidence indicates that messages were sometimes sent in rapid succession and, on occasions, copied to broad distribution lists. The Appellant did not accept all of FOS’s figures, but the overall pattern of sustained and high volume contact was established on the materials before the Tribunal.d. We find that responding to these requests would have required coordinated work across several FOS departments and placed significant operational pressure on the organisation, including a temporary backlog in its email systems.e. We conclude that the Appellant’s sincere dissatisfaction with FOS’s handling of his complaint does not alter the fact that FOIA was being used inappropriately to perpetuate a dispute wholly outside FOIA’s statutory function.f. The Appellant’s communication style and frequency were influenced by his personal circumstances, including diagnosed Autism/Asperger’s and associated anxiety disorders. He was motivated by genuine concerns and acted in good faith. However, some requests/emails used accusatory terms about staff conduct and were sent in large batches to extensive distribution lists; the tone and pattern showed that the objective effect of the correspondence, regardless of intention, was a significant demand on FOS’s resources.g. There is no evidence that the Appellant intended to cause disruption or distress and that he believed his requests were necessary. Nonetheless, on the basis of contemporaneous documentation and the parties’ evidence, the combined volume, breadth and tempo of the requests and related emails placed a substantial and sustained burden on FOS during the period covered by the DN.h. Many requests were closely connected to the Appellant’s continuing wish to revisit or understand the handling of his underlying complaint, which FOS had already indicated was closed, and that while some topics had potential wider interest, a significant proportion related specifically to his own case.[150]The Tribunal therefore finds that the burden imposed was exceptional, and that this factor weighs strongly in favour of section 14(1).[151]We add that, even if all the Appellant’s concerns about the handling of his AXA complaint, the internal processes followed by FOS, and the accuracy of material disclosed to him were assumed to be entirely correct, this would not alter the outcome under section 14 FOIA. The statutory question before the Tribunal is confined to whether the character, scale and cumulative effect of the Appellant’s information requests and associated correspondence, during the period addressed in the DN, amounted to a disproportionate and unreasonable use of FOIA. The test under section 14(1) is concerned with the impact of the requests on the public authority’s resources, not the underlying merits of any grievances or allegations. Even taking the Appellant’s account at its highest and fully recognising why he felt compelled to seek clarity and transparency, the evidence demonstrates that the volume, breadth and frequency of the requests imposed a very substantial burden on FOS. That burden would not materially alter our assessment under s.14(1). Accordingly, those wider matters, even if assumed in his favour, do not displace the Tribunal’s conclusion that FOS was entitled to rely on section 14(1).[152]When all factors are taken together: volume, persistence, complexity, purpose, value and effect, the cumulative picture supports the Commissioner’s conclusion that section 14(1) was properly engaged. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the Decision Notice is upheld.[153]As one final note, we wish to acknowledge the considerable care, effort and detail the Appellant has brought to his submissions. This decision is not a judgment on the merit or sincerity of his concerns about FOS. It reflects only FOIA’s statutory limits and the need for public authorities to manage substantial resource burdens reasonably. Signed Date: Judge Kiai 20 March 2026 Pursuant to rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules, paragraphs 74-83 were added to the determination on 7 May 2026.