CT Dimmock v The Information Commissioner [2026] UKFTT 477 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 00477 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/EA/2026/0064/GDPR
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Date 31 March 2026
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Before
JUDGE HARRIS
Between
CT DiMmockApplicantTHE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentDecision: The Application is struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with it and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding.REASONS
[1]These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Capsticks Solicitors LLP and Browne Jacobson LLP (together the “Solicitors”) in relation to the Solicitors’ request for letters of authority from the Applicant to obtain his late father’s medical records. The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 24 December 2025 and was dealt with under reference IC-462024-S7B3.[2]On 9 February 2026 the IC’s case officer wrote to the Applicant stating they had considered the information the Applicant provided in line with the IC’s published framework and decided not to undertake a more detailed investigation. The case officer said that the IC would record the complaint for information purposes. The letter stated that if the Applicant was unhappy then he could contact the IC and it would review the decision. They also noted that the Applicant had the right to take proceedings to court if he believed that an organisation has not handled his personal information appropriately.[3]On the same date, the Applicant emailed the case officer requesting reasons why the IC would not be progressing the complaint.[4]On 19 February 2026, the IC wrote to the Applicant again. The reviewing officer confirmed that, having carefully considered all of the information provided, the decision remained that the IC would not progress the complaint further. This was on the basis that the complaint concerned an individual who had sadly passed away and, consequently, the information in question did not constitute personal data for the purposes of data protection legislation. The reviewing officer confirmed that the case was to remain closed, but there remained the option of pursuing court proceedings. Finally, the reviewing officer also explained that if the Applicant remained dissatisfied with the way the complaint had been handled, the matter could also be referred to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). This response mistakenly referred only to Capsticks Solicitors LLP, not to the other Solicitors[5]On 25 February 2026, the reviewing officer wrote to the Applicant to apologise for the error in the original review outcome, namely having referred incorrectly to only Capstick Solicitors LLP, where the original complaint had also encompassed Browne Jacobson LLP. The reviewing officer subsequently re-reviewed the IC’s review outcome sent on 19 February 2026 and had issued an updated review outcome to also include reference to Browne Jacobson LLP.[6]On or about 17 March 2026, the Applicant again wrote to the IC to request an internal review by a senior officer at the IC who was not involved in the original response. He complained that he had not been informed of this option but asserted that he had the right to have his complaint reviewed before being referred to PHSO. He asked the IC, in summary, to confirm whether it was still its position that the Solicitors had not breached data protection legislation.[7]The IC’s reviewing officer responded on 17 March 2026 stating that an internal review does not form part of its complaints process and that if an individual is dissatisfied with decision making after a review, the next stage is to complain to the PHSO. The reviewing officer stated that the Applicant had now exhausted the review process and the IC would not be reconsidering the issues raised. They confirmed that the case will remain closed and that the IC would not enter into further correspondence in relation to the complaint. The Application[8]The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC3 dated 12 February 2026. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows:
“ICO be ordered to reopen the complaint and actually assign a real person to investigate the concerns for; Compensation to myself and disciplinary action on the offending parties. Full Statement of Reasons explaining any outcome/decision”
Full Statement of Reasons explaining any outcome/decision”[9]In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated:
“I filed complaint with the [IC] (via their online website) on 23 Dec 2025 regarding violations of my private data and misuse of my authority/false representation. On 9 Feb 2026 I received response (via email) from ICO saying they would not be taking the complaint further. However, ICO’s response seemed like an automated template, and contained no reasoning/justification whatsoever. I highly doubt they even reviewed the complaint at all as it dealt with serious private data violations by two solicitor firms (that represent major institutions like the NHS and government) whose misconduct caused me widespread financial loss, personal distress and loss of statutory rights. This is not a matter that can be given a generic response to be brushed aside. I therefore motion for ICO to be ordered to reopen the complaint and actually assign a real person to investigate the concerns for compensation to myself and disciplinary action on the offending parties. If the complaint is not to be continued, then I demand statement of reasons explaining exactly why, with legal citations to back it up, as my complaint contained appropriate legal citations and evidence, which would need an equal level of rebuttal to justify its dismissal.”

The strike-out application

[10]The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 16 March 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).[11]The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 19 and 20. These stated as follows:a. The IC accepts that his initial response to the Applicant’s complaint did not explain the reasons why the IC was taking no further action in respect of the Applicant’s complaint. However, the IC has since provided the Applicant with reasons for his decision in correspondence dated 19 and 25 February 202 6. Specifically, both of these communications confirmed that where an individual had sadly passed away, this is not considered personal information for the purposes of data protection legislation (see Campbell v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2019] 1 WLR 2337 at [32] – which held that a third party cannot exercise rights of access to personal data on behalf of a person who is deceased, given that this is a personal right. Similarly, adopting the reasoning from that decision, equally on the facts of this case, data protection legislation has no applicability).b. 20.Accordingly, the IC submits that he has now taken steps to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA 2018, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section of the 166(2) DPA 2018.[12]I directed on 19 March 2026 that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 8 April 2026 under Rule 8(4).[13]The Applicant provided a response to the strike-out application on 23 March 2026, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows:a. The IC’s response dated 9 February 2026 was generic and did not refer to any specific issues and had no personal identifiers at all. The Applicant believes this response was generated by AI and contends that AI should not be used to by the IC to do his investigations as this would breach section 96 of DPA 2018. The Appellant says that this breach “renders their original outcome null and in need of redoing”.b. The Applicant says he filed the Application to get the IC to respond appropriately to his complaint. He stated that he has the right under section 165 DPA 2018 to have the IC take appropriate action in response to complaint including investigating to the extent appropriate. He responded to the IC’s comment that the Tribunal is forward looking in making decisions under section 166 rather than concerned with past outcomes by stating that “this should not be a backdoor into being able to leapfrog over foundational stages in a complaint that have not been properly discharged.”c. The Applicant states that he never expressly requested a review, as he was waiting for the first stage of the original outcome to be discharged before proceeding to review. He said the IC’s responses dated 19 and 25 February 2026 were “an abuse of process in doing something they were not instructed to do, using it to give appearance of compliance at tribunal, effectively allowing them to leapfrog over the review stage while trying to solidify their flawed original outcome.” He says that the IC effectively skipped a stage of its own complaints process.d. Failure to specifically address issues that are material in nature or misapplying law to those issues constitutes an error of law which can justify an application to the Tribunal.e. He was not the executor of his father’s estate so could not have had any legal authority to grant to the Solicitors.f. The IC refusing to answer his questions which he says are central to the whole complaint is, he says “obstructive and improper conduct by the sole regulator of data law whose job it is to weigh in on such things, especially when it involves large organisations in positions of public trust”.g. He states “to grant the respondent’s strikeout request would set a very concerning precedent to allow the ICO (and any other institution) to fob-off their duties by being able to issue any response they wish (no matter how irrelevant or incorrect) in a system of creative interpretation of procedure rather than meaningful determination of their remit”. Legal framework[14]Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:
“Orders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - a. fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b. fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c. if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner - d. to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e. to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.” a. fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b. fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c. if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. d. to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e. to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”
[15]The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1)(a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166. It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.[16]Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that:
“(4) If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166, and (d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”
[17]In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - "…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals."[18]Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327, paragraph 57 - "The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination...”.[19]Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2023] EWCA Civ 1141) – “For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint.” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).[20]The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.” (paragraph 33).[21]The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC), noted at paragraph 60 that “it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” In considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick “when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”[22]Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows:
“However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”
Discussion and conclusions[23]The first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 9 February 2026 with a further response on 19 and (in its corrected version) 25 February 2026 following a review. I consider that the response dated 9 February 2026 was in fact an outcome to the complaint, because provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint.[24]Even if I am wrong on this, I am satisfied that when taken together with the responses dated 19 and 26 February 2026, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.[25]It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint. In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.[26]The outcomes sought by the Applicant include an order that the IC reopen his complaint and reinvestigate it, as well as compensation to be paid and disciplinary action to be taken against the Solicitors. He also takes issue with the reasons provided by the IC and seeks further full reasons for any outcome or decision.[27]The Tribunal has no power under section 166 to order the payment of compensation; this must be sought by civil action. Similarly, the Tribunal cannot under section 166 order the IC to take disciplinary action against any persons.[28]The outcome sought by the Applicant is also, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision. In an application under section 166, the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.[29]Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcomes sought by the Applicant are not within the Tribunal’s power to grant under section 166 DPA 2018.[30]The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.