Dr Robert James Abrahart v The Information Commissioner & Anor [2026] UKFTT 1222 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 01222 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0294
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Hearing Heard on: 27 May 2026Date 25 August 2026
Information Rights
Heard by Cloud Video Platform
Before
JUDGE SAWARDTRIBUNAL MEMBER SCOTTTRIBUNAL MEMBER SHAW
Between
Dr. ROBERT JAMES ABRAHARTAppellantTHE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentDEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATIONRespondentIn person (unrepresented) for Appellant for First Respondent: Did not attend for Second Respondent: Laura Shepherd, CounselDecision: The appeal is Dismissed.REASONS

Introduction and background

[1]The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) provides for a general right of access to information held by public authorities. That right is subject to exceptions and exemptions. It makes provision for its enforcement by the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) and for a right of appeal from a decision of the Commissioner to the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).[2]The Appellant has appealed against three separate decisions of the Commissioner. All concern requests for information made by the Appellant to the Department for Education (“DfE”). The appeals were heard together on two consecutive days (26 and 27 May 2026), but they have not been consolidated. The appeals bearing Tribunal references FT/EA/2024/0265 and 0247 are subject to separate decisions.[3]The appeals relate to tragic incidents where students in higher education settings have taken their own lives. The LEARN Network is a campaign group of bereaved families who launched a petition for the Government to introduce a statutory, legal duty of care in higher education. The petition was debated in Parliament on 5 June 2023. Another campaign group named “ForThe100” has continued to campaign for higher education settings to have a statutory legal duty of care. This issue has generated a number of information requests to the DfE.[4]This appeal bearing reference 0294 is made against a Decision Notice dated 17 July 2025 (“the Decision Notice”) insofar as it concerns the Appellant’s request for information made on 12 November 2024 (“the Request”). The Decision Notice also addresses a second request for information made on 19 December 2024. The Appellant has chosen not to appeal against the decision for that second request. That being so, the details of that second request are not set out in this Decision.[5]All our reasons are set out within this single, open decision.[6]The Request On 12 November 2024, the Appellant made the following request to the DfE: “Please supply copies of all documentation, correspondence, and internal communications, including emails, meeting notes, memos, and any other records, regarding the decision to apply an additional Section 40(2) exemption to FOI request 2023-0035807, submitted by [NAME REDACTED] on 3 October 2023, as per your letter dated 23 November 2023 [FOI 2023-0040494]: [LINK REDACTED] I specifically request:(1) Complete documents in full, rather than isolated sections or excerpts, including any internal communications or discussions refereeing the scope of the original request, particularly any acknowledgements or realisations that it encompassed complete email records rather than only privileged content.(2) Documentation on any evaluations, analyses, or discussions justifying the applicability of the Section 40(2) exemption, especially is this was prompted by an improved understanding of what was being asked for.(3) Records of any internal inquiries or discussions into whether this exemption should be applied based on the clarified scope of the request as understood during the internal review.” [LINK REDACTED] I specifically request: Refusal of

The Request

[7]DfE refused the Request of 12 November 2024 on 10 December 2024 relying upon the exemption in section 14(2) FOIA. Following internal review, the DfE maintained its position on 20 December 2024.[8]On 22 December 2024, the Appellant complained to the Commissioner about refusal of the Request. The complaint was allocated the reference IC-353461-X8C1. The Appellant’s complaint about refusal of the second request, that is not subject to appeal, was allocated a separate reference.

Decision Notice

[9]Decision Notice The Commissioner decided that the DfE was entitled to rely on section 14(1) (vexatious requests) to refuse both requests. No steps were required to be taken.[10]The position taken by the Commissioner was that he had recently issued another decision notice on a similar complaint concerning another request made by the Appellant to the DfE (IC-353447-X6G7). A copy of this decision notice dated 6 June 2025 was in the bundle. In that case, the Commissioner found the DfE was entitled to refuse the Request as vexatious under section 14(1) FOIA. This was in circumstances where the request was about DfE’s submission to the Commissioner regarding the investigation of a complaint made by another person.[11]The Commissioner considered the Request to be very similar to the circumstances in IC-353447-X6G7. Both concerned DfE’s handling of requests made by other people, although the underlying subject matter is connected to matters raised by the Appellant.[12]In the earlier complaint, the DfE had described how it considers that the Appellant and co-campaigners have attempted to ask for the same withheld information in different ways. The DfE had explained how several requests were also made for redacted and anonymised copies of previously withheld information. In that case, the DfE gave examples of repetitive requests made in short timescales.[13]The Commissioner considered that the Request has the same purpose of trying to re-visit previous DfE refusals of requests submitted by someone else and trying to obtain exempt information by asking for it in different ways.[14]The Commissioner found that the volume and frequency of these requests had placed a cumulative burden on DfE when it had previously provided information and explanations on the same or similar subjects.[15]Over time, the Commissioner considers that the Appellant’s requests have ‘drifted’ away from the initial purpose towards trying to access information they have been told they cannot have. It is ‘vexatiousness by drift’.[16]The Requests were simply an attempt to undermine DfE’s refusals, which is an abuse of the FOIA process.[17]The overall subject matter of student welfare in higher education has a strong public interest. The Commissioner does not see how requests seeking information on how DfE has formulated its FOIA responses would increase the public’s understanding of the issue or have wider public interest.

Grounds of Appeal

[18]Grounds of Appeal By Notice of Appeal dated 4 August 2025, the grounds of appeal in summary are: 18.1. No proper determination was made by the Commissioner on whether section 14(2) was engaged, as relied upon by DfE. That exemption remains live. To apply, the DfE must have previously complied with an earlier request either by disclosure or lawful refusal. The DfE pointed to the third-party request, but that was not a request by the Appellant. 18.2. A previous request must be identical or substantially similar in wording, scope and subject matter. No detailed comparison was undertaken, Instead the Commissioner relied on thematic overlap and inferred motive. He wrongly conflated the content of a response with the terms of a request. The required legal test of similarity was not met. 18.3. The repeat request must be made by the same person who made the original. 18.4. A reasonable interval must have passed since the previous request. The condition only arises if the first three conditions are met, which they are not. The Decision Notice offers no analysis of timing. 18.5. Section 14(2) contains a closed and exhaustive list of four statutory conditions. They cannot be expanded to include assumptions or conjecture about motive, purpose or intent. 18.6. The Commissioner introduced section 14(1). He must demonstrate clear contemporaneous evidence that the DfE itself applied section 14(1) to the specific request. He must respect the DfE’s original grounds for refusal. The context must be assessed as it existed on the submission date, 12 November 2024, and not apply later developments. 18.7. There was a failure to consider the serious and legitimate purpose of the Request into the integrity of the DfE regarding an issue the Commissioner had not previously investigated or addressed. The Commissioner ignored this purpose. 18.8. The 44 requests identified by the Commissioner is false and vastly inflated. 18.9. The Decision Notice fails to apply the four-fold test in Dransfield of burden, motive, value and harassment, based on objective evidence and clear public interest balancing. 18.10. Section 14(1) is being used as a retrospective sanction and deterrent instead of applying it is a legal exemption based on the merits of the specific request. 18.11. The Commissioner should have first considered whether a substantive exemption applied before upholding a refusal under section 14(1).[19]The remedy sought is for the Tribunal to find that neither exemption applies and either require disclosure or direct a fresh refusal notice that complies with FOIA.

Commissioner’s Response

[20]Commissioner’s Response The Commissioner opposed the appeal and stood by the Decision Notice. He submitted that in all the circumstances of this case the Request was vexatious further to the binding case law set out by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner & Devon County Council [2015] EWCA Civ 454 (and which did not depart from the Upper Tribunal findings in Information Commissioner v Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC)).[21]Alongside his response, the Commissioner provides a copy of his own non-statutory guidance about section 14 FOIA.

DfE’s Response

[22]DfE’s Response The DfE also opposed the appeal. In summary: 22.1. The broader context of this case is a petition to Parliament to impose a statutory duty of care on higher education institutions following the suicide of a number of students in higher education. The petition was debated by Parliament in June 2023. The Government response stated that higher education providers already have a general duty of care not to cause harm to their students by the university’s own actions. Since then, campaigners, including the Appellant, have sent FOIA requests to DfE for legal and policy information that was used in developing the government’s response. 22.2. The Appellant has made at least 30 FOIA requests, which are summarised in an annexed table. They show the nature and number of requests from the Appellant and the extent to which they overlap with request already made. The DfE considers that they meet the high threshold of vexatiousness in accordance with the objective standard in Dransfield. 22.3. The underlying request to this appeal was made by a different requester. Details are provided but the personal data is not repeated in this decision. The original request of 3 October 2023 was for: “… appropriately reacted and anonymised copies of every item that was withheld from [NMAE REDACTED] under section 42 of the FOI Act on the 31st of August 2023.” 22.4. The request of 3 October 2023 related to an earlier request from yet another requester made on 31 August 2023 for: “… all information you hold on any Common Law duty of care owned by higher education providers to their students, that was used to generate your response to a recent parliamentary petition calling for a statutory duty of care in higher education. This may include electronic and paper records, drafts, emails, letters, notes, minutes of meetings, material downloaded from the internet, advice, correspondence, photographs and sound or video recordings.” 22.5. The Appellant himself is not rude or abusive. In fact, his emails are always civil. However, the requests are vexatious due to the manner in which they are large in volume, overlap, and disrupt DfE’s activities by tying the department up in responding to so many overlapping requests. The test in section 14(1) is met. 22.6. It is further submitted that as the DfE had already complied with the requests made by the previous requesters, the test in section 14(2) FOIA is met. As that test is made out, the DfE says that the Commissioner cannot have misapplied section 40(2). The Tribunal is entitled to consider both section 14(1) and (2).

Appellant’s reply

[23]The Appellant’s reply is summarised as below: 23.1. The Appellant had deliberately appealed the Request of 12 November 2024 because it was “a clean section 14(2) refusal”. Grouping it with the Appellant’s later request of 19 December 2024 does not change that fact. 23.2. The DfE’s account omits key documents and presents an incomplete or misleading sequence. The Appellant sets out his version of the timeline of events. 23.3. It is wrong in law and fact to say the Request was the same as previous requests. 23.4. Section 14(2) only applies to subsequent identical or substantially similar requests from the same requester, and only where the authority has complied with that earlier request. The identity of the requester is determinative. 23.5. In any event, the requests are not remotely similar. The previous requests sought substantive information about policy content. The Request sought the internal review records of how those internal review records were handled. They served wholly different purposes. The previous requests concerned what information the DfE holds, whereas the Appellant’s Request concerned whether the DfE complied with FOIA. 23.6. That categorical distinction matters. The threshold for section 14(2) is whether compliance would involve -re-supplying the same material again. The Request could not be satisfied by re-issuing anything already provided to the Appellant or anyone else because it was directed at a different class of records. If the records exist, they remain undisclosed. 23.7. The DfE offers no measure of similarity or comparison. 23.8. The reliance on ‘drift’ and volume/burden’ misapplies Dransfield. In that case, ‘drift’ referred to straying into irrelevant subject matter. The Request was a precise inquiry into whether an internal review had in fact been conducted and into apparent inconsistencies in the DfE’s handling of the that review. 23.9. On ‘volume’ the DfE gave a written assurance on 15 August 2024 [N.B. the letter provided is dated 12 August 2024] that future request would be treated on their merits. On ‘burden’ the DfE case has shifted. It is grossly unfair to be left in the dark as to the DfE’s case on this point. 23.10. The DfE’s argument that managing the Appellant’s correspondence has become disruptive is not a statutory test. 23.11. The Annex mixes two categories of request: process/compliance requests and policy/content requests. It includes withdrawn requests. It is repeated that section 14(2) cannot apply to different requesters nor where a later request seeks different categories of records. 23.12. The factual context in Dransfield was very different where after years of correspondence there was no further useful information or relevant information likely to be obtained. 23.13. Dransfield recognised that even if a requester is motivated by persistence or annoyance, it does not make the request vexatious if it aims at disclosure of important information. Legal Framework[24]Section 1 FOIA provides a right of access to recorded information held by public authorities. It provides: General right of access to information held by public authorities (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.[25]That right is subject to several exemptions, one of which is section 14. The relevant provisions are: Section 14 FOIA:Vexatious or repeated requests (1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious. (2). Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request. … Role of the Tribunal[26]The role of the Tribunal is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice is in accordance with the law, or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of discretion, whether he should have exercised it differently. The Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the Decision Notice was based (section 58(2)). This means that we may review all the evidence provided to us (even if that evidence was not before the Commissioner) and make our own decision on the merits.[27]As set out by the Upper Tribunal in NHS England -v- Information Commissioner and Dean [2019] UKUT 145 (ACC) "The First-tier Tribunal ‘exercises a full merits appellate jurisdiction and so stands in the shoes of the IC and decides which (if any) exemptions apply...". It does not mean that we can consider matters falling outside the scope of the Request.

The Issues

[28]The Issues The main issue for the Tribunal to decide is whether the Commissioner was wrong to decide that the Request for information was vexatious under section 14(1) of FOIA or whether the Commissioner ought to have exercised any use of discretion differently.

The Hearing

[29]The Hearing The hearing was conducted by online video (CVP). The Tribunal was satisfied this was a fair and just way to conduct the proceedings.[30]The Appellant was unrepresented. The DfE was represented by Counsel. Mindful of the imbalance, the Tribunal afforded the Appellant considerable leeway in his questioning of the DfE’s witness and gave him direction when matters strayed off point.[31]The Commissioner notified the Tribunal in advance that he did not intend to appear or be represented at the hearing. He relies instead upon his Decision Notice and his response to the appeal. In reaching our conclusions on the grounds of appeal, the Tribunal has considered the written material relied upon by the Commissioner.[32]The Tribunal received an open bundle of around 1029 pages, a supplemental bundle of 7 pages, and a Closed bundle. For all three appeals, an Authorities bundle of 653 pages was provided and a supplemental Authorities bundle from the Appellant. Both the Appellant and the DfE provided a skeleton argument.[33]There was no gist of the Closed bundle. Counsel for the DfE confirmed at the start of the hearing of the three appeals that there is no withheld information within the Closed bundle for appeal reference 0294. It was subsequently confirmed in open session that the Closed bundle consists of unredacted copies of two emails (dated 13 May 2025 and 21 May 2025) that appear in the open bundle at pages B116-B150.[34]Prior to the hearing, the Tribunal gave permission to the DfE to substitute Elizabeth Franey as a witness in place of Caroline Bicknell at the hearing of these appeals due to the retirement of Ms Bicknell who had provided a witness statement. With the consent of the Tribunal a redacted witness statement was submitted by Ms Franey. The redactions concern updates on other appeals brought by the Appellant, which do not shed light on the position at the time the DfE refused the Request. Those matters do not assist the Tribunal in its decision in this appeal.[35]Ms Franey attended the hearing and provided oral evidence, which was subject to cross-examination by the Appellant.

Evidence heard

[36]Evidence heard The Appellant In summary, the Appellant explained that the Request was a natural follow on from request 0247 for records generated during the DfE’s reconsideration and internal review processes culminating in an internal review outcome letter dated 23 November 2023. The Request was refused under section 14(2) FOIA as a repeated request despite the request seeking later-created internal review and handling records, which did not exist at the time of the earlier requests relied on by DfE.[37]The Commissioner had recognised in the Decision Notice that the Request could properly be interpreted more broadly than the earlier correspondence relied upon by the DfE concerning section 40(2) FOIA. This distinction is central to the present appeal.[38]The Appellant considers the principal issues to be:(i) whether a request for later records, after the request made by the original requester, can properly be categorised as vexatious or repeated;(ii) whether section 14(2) can apply when the original request was made by someone else; and(iii) whether DfE ever properly considered the Request for the handling of records, as much of its analysis focusses on the broader context and campaign narrative rather than the actual records requested.[39]The Request should be considered at the relevant time rather than later developed narratives. Without that approach the reasoning in Dr Yeong-Ah Soh v Information Commissioner & Imperial College London [2016] UKUT 0249 (AAC) would similarly collapse.[40]The Appellant further relies upon RS v The Information Commissioner and North East Derbyshire District Council[2015] UKUT 0568 (AAC) (“Stürmer”) as authority that the assessment must proceed on the contemporaneous facts and circumstances existing at the time of the request and refusal.[41]Once the analysis ceases to focus on the Request itself, section 14 risks becoming detached from the statutory question posed by FOIA and instead becomes a broader mechanism for existing scrutiny by a particular requester. That is not what Parliament intended when enacting section 14.[42]In the interests of brevity, other points already made by the Appellant in written submissions are not repeated here.

DfE’s evidence

[43]DfE’s evidence Whilst not the author, Ms Franey confirmed that the witness statement of Ms Bicknell is true to the best of her knowledge and belief. Ms Franey had not personally dealt with this particular Request.

Findings and Discussion

[44]Findings and Discussion The Request of 12 November 2024 was the Appellant’s 19th request for information made to the DfE. The 18th request is subject to appeal reference 0247, which was heard by the Tribunal on the previous day (i.e. 26 May 2026). Both requests involve a request for information made by another requester.[45]The main thrust of the Appellant’s case had originally been brought on procedural grounds. Not only was the veracity of the Commissioner’s investigative process challenged in the Decision Notice but also the quality and impartiality of decision-making within an earlier decision. The Tribunal observes that the Commissioner has broad discretion to investigate as he sees fit. It is beyond the scope of this decision to explore the adequacy of the Commissioner’s investigation. The Commissioner made a decision as required by section 50(2) FOIA and served notice of his decision on the Appellant under section 50(3). The Tribunal is not reviewing the Commissioner’s decision but considering the application afresh. We have proceeded on that basis.[46]From the outset, the DfE argued that section 14(2) FOIA was applicable as the Request was repetitive. The Appellant is critical of DfE for not revisiting the section 14(2) exemption when invited to do so by the Commissioner on 6 May 2025 whilst investigating the complaint. As part of this appeal, we are not conducting a review of the DfE’s processes. Other mechanisms exist for that purpose.[47]The Commissioner’s Decision Notice upheld the refusal under section 14(1) rather than 14(2) FOIA. In reaching that view, the Commissioner was not confined to a consideration of section 14(2). He could consider any other potential exemptions. The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Commissioner and in doing so, can likewise consider other exemptions. At the hearing, the Tribunal heard from the Appellant and the DfE in relation to both subsections.

Section 14(2) FOIA

[48]Section 14(2) FOIA We start with section 14(2), the wording of which is important:
“Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person…”
[emphasis added].[49]During cross-examination of Ms Franey, the DFE’s witness, it was established at the hearing that the Appellant had not made the same or a substantially similar request to the DfE before. That was agreed as a matter of fact.[50]The argument was advanced by Counsel for the DfE that the Request (being the 19th) was substantially similar to the 18th request, which is the subject of appeal 0247. Counsel described it as a “collateral attack” on the DfE’s response to previous requests. A flaw in this argument is that whilst the requests in appeals 0247 and 0294 ask for information pertaining to an earlier request of 3 October 2023, they seek different information. The request in 0247 seeks all material provided by the DfE to the Commissioner (except legally privileged information) following the DfE’s refusal of the 3 October 2023 request. This Request in 0294 seeks all documents on the DfE’s internal review of the 3 October 2023 request limited to its decision to rely on the section 40(2) exemption. It is the requests that must be substantially similar, and they are not.[51]Counsel’s argument was developed further along the lines that the obligation to respond to the Request can be obviated by section 14(2) through the “concept of agency” or “acting in concert” because of requests from fellow campaigners. Ms Franey was unable to identify any substantially similar requests from other campaigners, and our attention is not drawn to any within the bundle. Even if there were, Counsel acknowledged that no caselaw exists to support this proposition. As a matter of statutory construction, we are unattracted to this novel line of argument. The wording of section 14(2) is clear that the subsequent request must be made by “that person “. It can only mean the person who made an earlier request. As a matter of fact, it was not. Even if “that person” could be another person acting by agency or concert, the evidence does not support any such other person/s having in fact previously made substantially similar requests.[52]We find that section 14(2) does not apply.

Section 14(1) FOIA

[53]Section 14(1) FOIA The Appellant described the Commissioner’s finding on section 14(1) to have come “out of the blue”. It was totally unexpected. That may well be so, but the Commissioner was entitled to look at any exemption. The fact that the DfE did not advance an argument on section 14(1) before these appeal proceedings, does not in itself diminish the validity of such argument. Nor is the DfE confined to the case made in the refusal notice. The Tribunal is looking at the matter afresh.[54]FOIA does not define what is meant by ‘vexatious’. It is apparent from the wording of section 14(1) that it is the request that must be vexatious, not the Appellant.[55]The Upper Tribunal gave guidance in Information Commissioner v Devon County Council and Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC), as upheld and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Council [2015] EWCA Civ 454. As noted by Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal, the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one: “…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious” [68].[56]The Upper Tribunal’s decision in Dransfieldprovides more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. The ultimate question is: “is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?” [43]. In the context of reviewing the Commissioner’s Guidance, the Upper Tribunal highlighted “the importance of adopting a holistic and broad approach to the determination of whether a request is vexatious or not, emphasising the attributes of manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests” [45]. Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal also emphasised that a “rounded approach” is required [69].[57]Overall, the purpose of section 14 is to “protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA” (Upper Tribunal at [10]).[58]In Craven v ICO & Department for Energy and Climate Change [2015] EWCA Civ 454 the Court of Appeal accepted “there is no warrant for reading section 14 FOIA as subject to some express or implied qualification that a request cannot be vexatious in part because of, or solely because of, the costs of complying with the current request.” [85].[59]This has subsequently been confirmed in Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC), in which the Upper Tribunal stated, having considered the relevant case law: “The law is thus absolutely clear. The application of section 14 of FOIA requires a holistic assessment of all the circumstances. Section 14 may be invoked on the grounds of resources alone to show that a request is vexatious. A substantial public interest underlying the request for information does not necessarily trump a resources argument. As Mr Armitage put it in the Commissioner’s written response to the appeal (at §18):• . In deciding whether a request is vexatious within the meaning of section 14(1), the public authority must consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious.• . The burden which compliance with the request will impose on the resources of a public authority is a relevant consideration in such an assessment.• . In some cases, the burden of complying with the request will be sufficient, in itself, to justify characterising that request as vexatious, and such a conclusion is not precluded if there is a clear public interest in the information requested. Rather, the public interest in the subject matter of a request is a consideration that itself needs to be balanced against the resource implications of the request, and any other relevant factors, in a holistic determination of whether a request is vexatious.” [27][60]We have not treated the guidance in Dransfield as formulaic or a checklist. We use it as a helpful steer for framing this decision.

The burden imposed on the public authority by the request

[61]The burden imposed on the public authority by the request The burden may be inextricably linked with a previous course of dealings between the parties. As set out as paragraph [29] of Dransfield, the Upper Tribunal said: “…the context and history of the previous request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor”.[62]We can look at the burden of the Request in the light of other requests made by the Appellant and related correspondence, up to the point at which the DfE responded to the Request. We have disregarded any matters that took place after the response to the Request, save insofar as they may shed light on the true purpose and circumstances at the relevant time (as per paragraphs 72 and 101 of Dr Yeong-Ah Soh v IC and Imperial College London [2016] UKUT 0249 (AAC)).[63]The Appellant suggested he had been “left in the dark” over the case being advanced by the DfE on ‘burden’ because its position had changed upon Counsel being instructed. It is a matter for each party how they choose to argue their case. Counsel prepared the DfE’s response to which the Appellant replied. The Appellant was on notice of the case being made for the DfE and took the opportunity to raise counter arguments at the hearing. We are content that the appeal process has been fair.[64]Like any public authority the DfE will have limited resource to address FOIA requests. With the Request will come burden especially when considered in the context of earlier requests. The time taken in dealing with the Appellant’s requests, will be taking staff away from other tasks.[65]Even though the Request had not been made by the Appellant before and it concerned internal review records created after the original request was made, those factors do not prevent the Request from being treated as vexatious. The Appellant is also correct that numbers alone do not make a request vexatious. Plainly, the nature of the Request must be considered, and the context will also be relevant.[66]This was a specific and relatively narrow request. The Appellant assumes that the Higher Education Team of the DfE had minutes falling within the ambit of his Request and finding them “would have been trivial”. Whilst it may not have been difficult or taken the DfE long to identify the information and provide a response, this was the Appellant’s 19th request to the DfE for information under FOIA. Those requests were made over a 6-month period starting on 24 May 2024. It is undisputed that the requests also generated correspondence from the Appellant as he expressed dissatisfaction with the DfE responses. Each request and associated correspondence had to be reviewed, and time taken in responding.[67]On 12 August 2024 the DfE had written to the Appellant assuring him that future FOIA requests would be “treated on their merits”. The Appellant is critical of the DfE for failing to mention this letter in the appeal. As the Appellant states, the DfE answered further requests after that date in August 2024. This illustrates that the DfE was indeed treating each case on its merits. It does not contradict the DfE’s case that Request 19 was burdensome, as the Appellant suggests. Each request needed to be considered on its merits, and it was appropriate to consider preceding requests.[68]The Appellant further submitted that if the DfE had become over-burdened, it should have said so and the requests could have been spaced out. That submission is telling as it indicates the requests were never going to stop however the DfE responded. That aside, the fact remains that the Appellant had been told by the DfE by letter dated 21 June 2024 of the impact of his requests after receiving 14 requests under FOIA from the Appellant “in a very short period”. In that letter the DfE explained how it had already provided the Appellant and his co-campaigners with a significant amount of information. It included previous responses to FOIA requests, as well as detailed and considered replies to 38 letters from the Appellant personally since November 2023. Where information could not be provided, reasons had been given and, if relevant, exemptions under FOIA applied. The letter of 24 June 2024 went on to say:
“Unfortunately though, the burden on the Department from these requests is significant and disrupting our ability to progress other work, particularly in relation to student mental health...”
[69]The pattern of regular requests and volume of material had been significant. That continued with this 19th Request. The resultant cumulative burden placed upon the DfE will have been substantial. The motive of the requester[70]Although FOIA is motive-blind, the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield observed that “what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority”. [34][71]Quite rightly, there has been no suggestion whatsoever that the issue of student suicide in higher education is anything other than a matter of the most serious kind. By the Appellant’s own admission, the Request is about something else. The Appellant says that the Request was motivated by a desire to clarify how the Commissioner’s refusal was decided. He maintains that any similarity between the Request and any other requests is limited to subject matter in the broadest thematic sense.[72]The Appellant’s requests had begun by seeking information on the duty of care owed by higher education institutions to their students. The requests were made to obtain information to assist in securing a change in the law as reflected in the parliamentary petition in which the Appellant was involved. By the time of Request 19 the Appellant’s focus had turned to the DfE’s handling of requests.[73]The Appellant states that he sought records of the DfE’s internal review because the handling of that review appeared irregular. Notably, this was not the Appellant’s own request. That earlier request of 3 October 2023 sought copies of the legal advice relied upon by the DfE to formulate its response to the parliamentary petition. That information had been refused in a request made on 11 July 2023 by yet another requester. The 3 October 2023 request was also refused and the Commissioner’s decision that the information was exempt from disclosure under section 42 FOIA (legal professional privilege) was upheld on appeal to this Tribunal by Decision given on 29 July 2025 ([2025] UKFTT 00903 (GRC)).[74]It was put to the Tribunal by Counsel for the DfE that the Appellant was probing its processes on how it deals with legal professional privilege, being the ground used to refuse the earlier request. The Appellant disputes that was his motivation. Only he will know. The Tribunal accepts that the Appellant’s motivation was as he says. As acknowledged, his motivation had changed to one of scrutiny of DfE’s processes. It was no longer focussed on the same matter that he started with.

The value or serious purpose of the Request

[75]The value or serious purpose of the Request Regard should be had to the inherent value of the request, specifically “does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought?” [38], albeit that a lack of apparent objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own.[76]The Appellant submits that the whole purpose of the Request is about accountability and scrutiny. Of course, those things are important, and we accept that holding a public authority to account is not of itself a meaningless exercise. The question arises is to what extent the Request objectively has value or serves the stated purpose.[77]As noted above, the Request stems from an earlier request made by a co-campaigner. The Tribunal recognises the importance of public accountability, but it was for the individual concerned to pursue matters further if discontent with the response they had received from the DfE upon internal review. Indeed, by the time of the Appellant’s Request, the previous requester had not only complained to the Commissioner but had also appealed to this Tribunal. The Appellant was asking for information about a process undertaken by DfE in a matter that was already subject to a statutory process and where the request was being considered afresh.[78]The existence of a legitimate process available to that other individual did not debar the Appellant from seeking more information. However, the serious purpose had diminished from the core issue of student suicide to why the DfE decided to make the decision that it did upon internal review on some else’s request.[79]Obtaining further information on why the DfE chose to rely on a section 40(2) exemption in the request of 3 October 2023 may be of interest to the Appellant, but it is unlikely to be of much wider public interest.

Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff

[80]Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff There is no suggestion that the DfE’s staff were caused harassment or distress in dealing with the Appellant’s requests. The DfE describes the Appellant himself as “always civil”. A finding of harassment or distress is not a prerequisite for concluding that a request is vexatious.[81]‘Vexatiousness by drift’ The Appellant argues that ‘vexatiousness by drift’ is being applied retrospectively as it was never raised by the DfE until these proceedings. It was a finding made by the Commissioner (at paragraph 42 of the Decision Notice). It is not a new matter, and the Tribunal is able to consider it.[82]The Appellant considers that the DfE has misunderstood and misapplied the meaning of the term ‘vexatious by drift’ in the context of Dransfield. The Court of Appeal at paragraph 37 of Dransfield used the term ‘vexatiousness by drift’ where “later requests have become disproportionate to whatever the original inquiry was”.[83]The Appellant seeks to distinguish the Request from others he made earlier to DfE related to the duty of care to students in higher education institutions. However, having regard to the history of requests made by the Appellant, it is evident that by the time of Request 19, the line of enquiry had evolved, but it cannot be divorced from the long line of previous requests. It would be artificial to do so given the broader history of requests. This was not an isolated request, but one closely following Request 18 (in appeal ref 0247) in a pattern of requests that had turned to DfE’s handling of requests. The Request had drifted away from the starting point. It was no longer directly about the core issue of student suicide in higher education but how the DfE handled a request made by someone else. This was a request that had become distant from the Appellant’s starting point. It had become about scrutiny of DfE’s processes. This falls squarely within the type of scenario envisaged in Dransfield.

Other matters

[84]Other matters From the information before the Tribunal, the DfE had tried to help the Appellant. It explained in its refusal letter of 10 December 2024 how the review panel in question had advised that section 40(2) should also be referenced in its response to the requester as the withheld information contains personal data. This was then reflected in the response given to that person. The DfE also set out how it had already recently explained to the Appellant the use of the section 40(2) exemption in a response to another of his requests on 22 October 2024. The relevant extract of the letter was quoted. From the explanation given, the DfE obviously had considered the individual Request. It would not have stated why section 40(2) was raised upon internal review in the earlier case, if that were not so.[85]Whilst the Appellant may feel that he is being treated as vexatious rather than the Request, that is not supported by the evidence. The refusal letter of 10 December 2024 explicitly stated that the Appellant, as an individual, was not being labelled as ‘vexatious’. Thus, it was recognised by the DfE that it must look at this 19th Request rather than the individual who made it.

Conclusion

[86]Conclusion We acknowledge that there is a high hurdle in establishing that a request is vexatious. In this instance, taking a holistic approach as advocated in Dransfield, we consider that the high bar was crossed. As discussed above, there was substantial burden from the number and pattern of requests. That burden had become serious and disproportionate by the time of Request 19. The motive had changed from how it started to scrutinising matters of process, and the serious purpose had diminished. The culmination of factors which when taken together in the round cause us to conclude that there was vexatiousness by drift when Request 19 was made.

Overall Conclusion

[87]Overall Conclusion The DfE was wrong to rely upon section 14(2) FOIA. However, the Commissioner was not wrong to conclude that section 14(1) was engaged because the Request was vexatious. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed. 119. Examples of different types) Quash Decision Notice IC-384903-D6V9 IC-401829-R1Z6, Signed: Judge Saward Date: 17 August 2026

Cited in 1 later judgment