Flavio Fellica v The Information Commissioner [2026] UKFTT 1212 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 01212 (GRC)Appeal Number: FT/EA/2025/0444
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Hearing Heard on 22 July 2026Date 21 August 2026
Information Rights
Before
Brian Kennedy KC with Specialist Members Suzanne Cosgrave and Pieter de Waal.
Between
Flavio FellicaAppellantTHE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentFlavio Fellica as a Litigant in Person for AppellantSapna Arora, Solicitor through the ICO’s written Response to the Grounds of Appeal. for RespondentDecision: The appeal is d ismissed.REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction:

[1]This is an appeal against a Decision Notice (“DN”) issued by the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) on 6 November 2025 under reference IC-372754-B9Q2.[2]The appeal arises under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOIA") and concerns the question of whether the Commissioner correctly decided in the DN that the Certification Office ("CO") did not hold information falling within the scope of an information request made by the Appellant to the CO dated 26 December 2024. Although the appeal has generated extensive submissions, a substantial hearing bundle and a lengthy procedural history including numerous Case Management Directions, the issue ultimately requiring determination is a confined one.[3]The Appellant advised the Tribunal that the Appellant is agender and that no gendered titles, nouns or pronouns should be used when referring to the Appellant in correspondence or in this Decision. The Tribunal respects that request and has adopted gender-neutral language in this decision.

Background:

[4]Background: The CO is an independent officer, appointed by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade. The CO and their team ensure that trade unions and employers’ associations carry out their various duties.[5]On 5 May 2024 the Appellant submitted a complaint to the CO about the University and College Union ("UCU") under Section 108A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ("the Act”).[6]On 16 July 2024 the Appellant responded to a letter from the CO in which the CO had asked the Appellant to provide more details about the complaint. In the response, the Appellant summarised that the complaints involved “breaches of Union rules, procedural irregularities, and statutory obligations” by the UCU.[7]On 26 December 2024 the Appellant made the following information request to the CO:
“I am writing to kindly request a record of any correspondence between the Certification Officer and UCU, concerning my complaint, covering all levels of communication (branch, regional, and central offices).”

Officer and UCU, concerning my complaint, covering all levels of communication

[8]On 22 January 2025 the CO responded to the Appellant’s request, with the heading “Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) – Request”. It included the following:
“Thank you for your enquiry received in this office on 20 January 2025. You say in your email that you are following up on your request dated 26 December 2024. I have undertaken a search of our emails and can confirm that we have not received your request of 26 December. …I have undertaken a search of our electronic filing system and staff in the Certification Office have undertaken a search of their personal drives and any outlook folders they have access to for the period 24 May 2024 to today’s date. I can confirm that the outcome of the search is that there has not been any correspondence between the Certification Officer and the UCU at any level (branch, regional, and central offices) regarding your complaint.” your email that you are following up on your request dated 26 December 2024. I have undertaken a search of our emails and can confirm that we have not received regional, and central offices) regarding your complaint.”

have undertaken a search of our emails and can confirm that we have not received

[9]On 30 January 2025 the Appellant requested the CO to undertake an internal review of its response (emphasis is the Appellant’s, redactions are the Tribunal’s):
“Thank you for your response to my Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 26 December 2024. However, I must respectfully request an appeal of your response, as I have reasons to believe that your office has, in fact, communicated with my trade union, UCU, at any and likely all levels, regarding my complaint. Specifically, I believe that communication has taken place concerning not only concerning the complaint itself but also the key issues I have raised in my correspondence with [name redacted] including censorship, transparency, autonomy, neutrality, fairness in the branch election process, and the lack of clarity surrounding the election. The branch did not communicate whether anyone had actually been "elected” or who was elected until I raised the issue with [name redacted] on 12 December 2024, after which the branch made a communication on 16 December 2024. These concerns were outlined in my letters to [name redacted] and should be reflected in the records related to my complaint. Given this, I respectfully request that my original request be reviewed, and that a more thorough search be conducted to verify any potential communication between the Certification Officer and UCU (at all levels) on these, and all other concerning matters I have raised.”
[10]On 11 February 2025 the CO provided the outcome of its internal review, confirming its position that no information was held.[11]On 21 March 2025 the Appellant made a complaint to the Commissioner under section 50 of FOIA. The Commissioner investigated the complaint and received submissions from the Appellant and from the CO.[12]On 30 April 2025 the Appellant received from the CO a ‘Show Cause Notice’ notifying the Appellant that the CO had taken the preliminary view that the Appellant’s complaint had no reasonable prospect of success and that the CO was minded to exercise powers to strike out the complaint. It also invited the Appellant to provide written representations before a decision is taken about whether to strike out the complaint.[13]On 8 September 2025 the CO issued a decision in respect of the Appellant’s complaints against the UCU, summarised as follows:
“Upon application by Fellica (“the applicant”) under section 108A (1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”): Pursuant to section 256ZA of the 1992 Act, I strike out the claimant’s application on the grounds that the complaints, as advanced by Fellica, have no reasonable prospect of success.”
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”): Pursuant to section 256ZA of the 1992 Act, I strike out the claimant’s have no reasonable prospect of success.”

Pursuant to section 256ZA of the 1992 Act, I strike out the claimant’s

[14]On 6 November 2025 the Commissioner issued the DN which is the subject of this appeal. He determined that the CO did not hold any information falling within the scope of the Appellant’s request and that no further steps were required.

Scope of the appeal and the relevant test:

[15]Scope of the appeal and the relevant test: Under section 58 FOIA the Tribunal’s task is to decide whether the Commissioner’s DN is not in accordance with the law or, to the extent that the DN involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, whether he ought to have exercised his discretion differently. The Tribunal’s task is not to determine the merits of the Appellant's complaints against the UCU.[16]Section 1(1) FOIA provides that, subject to certain limitations and exemptions, any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request and, if that is the case, to have that information communicated to them.[17]Section 1(4) FOIA provides that the information which a public authority is required to communicate is the information held at the time when the request was received. In this case the Appellant’s information request is dated 26 December 2024. The CO responded on 22 January 2025, also referring to an enquiry from the Appellant received by the CO on 20 January 2025 and advising that the CO had not received the request of 26 December 2024. The CO’s response of 22 January 2025 also refers to ‘information you requested in your email of 20 January’.[18]Based on this documentary evidence, the Tribunal considers that the relevant date for purposes of determining whether information falling within the scope of the Appellant’s information request was held by the CO is 20 January 2025, being the date on which the CO appears to have become aware of (and therefore received) the request.[19]When determining whether or not information is held by a public authority for purposes of section 1 FOIA, the Tribunal has consistently applied the standard of balance of probabilities, i.e. whether it is more likely than not – see for example the Upper Tribunal decision in Andrew Preston v The Information Commissioner & C.C. West Yorkshire Police [2022] UKUT 344 (AAC).[20]We have determined the matter afresh and have considered not only the material that was before the Commissioner when the DN was issued, but also additional documentary evidence and materials, the Appellant’s witness statement, and submissions placed before the Tribunal by both parties.

Grounds of Appeal:

[21]Grounds of Appeal: The Tribunal is grateful to the Appellant for the clarity with which this appeal has been presented, both in writing and orally at the hearing. The Appellant’s final Statement of Issues assisted us in identifying the issues in dispute. Our conclusions in relation to them are addressed below.[22]There are two principal components to the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal: First, the Appellant asserts that a series of factual findings may be made as evidence that information falling within the scope of the Appellant’s information request was held by the CO when the request was received. Second, the Appellant challenges the Commissioner’s assessment of the adequacy of searches that were made by the CO (and the adequacy of a record of those searches) before the CO responded to the Appellant’s information request.

Findings sought by the Appellant:

[23]Findings sought by the Appellant: In summary, the Appellant invited the Tribunal to find:(1) that the Show Cause Notice dated 30 April 2025, sent from the CO to the Appellant and copied to the UCU, constituted correspondence between the CO and UCU concerning the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU;(2) that the answer provided by the CO to the Commissioner during the Commissioner’s investigation (namely that no recorded information within the scope of the request had ever existed) was thereby shown to be inaccurate;(3) that a subsequent statement by the Chief Executive of the CO asserting that no correspondence had taken place between the CO and the UCU was similarly shown to be inaccurate;(4) that the Appellant's complaint against the UCU had already been accepted by the CO at the time when the Appellant’s information request was made, and that the complaint was undergoing ‘active substantive processing’ before the information request was made;(5) that the chronology of matters raised by the Appellant during 2024 supported an inference that communications had occurred between the CO and the UCU relating to the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU;(6) that the chronology of events relating to subsequent UCU election matters similarly supported such an inference; and(7) that, in relation to the question of whether the existence of UCU meetings and correspondence pre-dating the Appellant’s information request meant that discussions between the UCU and the CO must have occurred, the Commissioner applied the wrong test and should have applied the civil standard of balance of probabilities instead of ‘absolute proof’.[24]As can be seen from the above, some of the findings sought by the Appellant were advanced not on the basis of direct factual evidence but on the basis of inferences which the Appellant invited the Tribunal to draw. We have considered both the facts relied upon by the Appellant and the inferences which the Appellant submits should be drawn from them.[25]We address each of the Appellant’s propositions below with a view to assessing the Appellant’s case that information falling within the scope of the information request was held by the CO at the relevant time, having taken into account all of the evidence and submissions relied upon by the Appellant both in writing and orally at the hearing. Findings 1–3: The Show Cause Notice and alleged contradictions:[26]Findings 1–3 put forward by the Appellant may be taken together. They arise from the Appellant's reliance upon the CO’s Show Cause Notice dated 30 April 2025 (copied to the UCU) and subsequent communications during 2025. The Appellant submits that those materials constitute correspondence between the CO and the UCU concerning the complaint made by the Appellant to the CO, and that they contradict the Commissioner’s conclusion that the CO did not hold any correspondence between it and the UCU relating to the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU.[27]The Tribunal accepts that the Show Cause Notice constitutes correspondence from the CO sent to the Appellant and to the UCU concerning matters raised by the Appellant about the UCU. However, the Show Cause Notice post-dates the date of the CO’s receipt of the Appellant’s information request by several months. As one would expect, the question considered by the Commissioner during his investigation and in his DN was whether on the balance of probabilities the CO held information within the scope of the Appellant’s request at the time when the request was received, not several months afterwards. That is the correct approach.[28]The CO’s response to the Commissioner that “No recorded information falling within [the] request ever existed’’ was provided on the same basis, i.e. with reference to whether relevant information was held at the time when the request was received on 20 January 2025.[29]Accordingly, the Tribunal does not accept the Appellant’s contention that the existence of the Show Cause Notice dated 30 April 2025 shows that the answer provided by the CO to the Commissioner during the Commissioner’s investigation was inaccurate.[30]For the same reason the Tribunal does not accept the Appellant’s contention that it was inaccurate for the Chief Executive of the CO to state (in November 2025) that no correspondence had taken place between the CO and the UCU. That statement was made with reference to the position that prevailed when the CO responded to the Appellant’s information request and is consistent with the CO’s first response to that request in January 2025 that “there has not been any correspondence between the Certification Officer and the UCU at any level.”[31]We therefore do not make Findings 1, 2 or 3 as advanced by the Appellant insofar as they are relied upon by the Appellant as evidence that the CO held information within the scope of the Appellant’s information request at the time when the request was received. Finding 4: Whether the Appellant’s complaint to the CO had been accepted and was being actively processed at the time of the information request :[32]In support of the Appellant’s case that information within the scope of the Appellant’s request was held by the CO, the Appellant invites the Tribunal to make a finding that the complaint against the UCU had already been accepted and undergoing “active substantive processing” by the CO at the time when the information request was received. This assertion is central to the Appellant's Statement of Issues and to the submissions made by the Appellant at the hearing.[33]The Appellant's argument proceeds upon the proposition that by the end of 2024 (when the Appellant’s information request was made) the complaint made to the CO against the UCU in May 2024 had already advanced beyond any preliminary stage and was undergoing substantive assessment by the CO. On this premise the Appellant then submits that, if that proposition is correct, the absence of communications between the CO and UCU at the time when the Appellant’s information request was received in January 2025 becomes inherently implausible.[34]We have scrutinised these propositions against the entirety of the documentary evidence, including the documents on which the Appellant relies. We have examined in particular:(a) the documents describing the CO's statutory processes for dealing with applications for complaints under the Act, including the relevant provisions of the Act;(b) the repeated distinction drawn in the evidence between an application to make a complaint to the CO and a complaint accepted by the CO for determination;(c) correspondence that existed before the date of the Appellant’s information request;(d) the Show Cause Notice dated 30 April 2025;(e) the CO’s strike-out decision dated 8 September 2025; and(f) explanations given by the CO as to when communication with a respondent union might be expected to occur following receipt by the CO of a complaint against that union.[35]Having considered the materials together, we are unable to accept the Appellant's contention that substantive processing of the Appellant’s complaint to the CO had commenced before the date when the Appellant’s subsequent information request was received by the CO.[36]First, the relevant provisions of the Act permit:(a) A person who claims that there has been a breach of the rules of a trade union (relating to specific matters) to apply to the CO for a declaration to that effect;(b) The CO to regulate the procedure to be followed on any application or complaint made to them (except in relation to matters as to which express provision is made by or under an enactment); and(c) The CO at any stage of proceedings on an application or complaint made to the CO to order the application or complaint to be struck out on the grounds that it has no reasonable prospect of success or is otherwise misconceived.[37]This framework clearly anticipates a staged approach which involves receipt by the CO of an application for a declaration relating to alleged breaches of trade union rules; an assessment of the application by the CO with a view to determining whether it may be accepted (or refused); the ability at any stage to strike out the application; or alternatively the ability to make enquiries with a view to determining whether to make or refuse the requested declaration.[38]The provisions require the CO to ensure that an application is determined within six months of it being made, but only so far as this is reasonably practicable.[39]In response to the Commissioner’s enquiries, the CO explained:
‘As a matter of routine, the Operations Manager would only contact the respondent union once the complaint had been accepted by the Certification Officer for determination. i.e. it has been assessed as having been received in time, was within the CO’ powers to adjudicate on and the complaint had been set out in a manner that the union would be able to understand it. [The] FOI request was received in the CO by email on 20 January 2025. At the relevant time, [the] complaint about the respondent union had not yet progressed beyond the initial enquiry stage assessing if the complaint was within the CO’s powers to determine.’
[40]This is consistent with an email sent from the CO to Appellant on 20 December 2024 (6 days before the date of the Appellant’s information request) advising:
“As I’ve stated in previous correspondence to you, I am currently conducting an initial assessment of your complaints to determine whether they can be taken forward for determination by the CO.Where we assess that a complaint can proceed to a hearing, the law empowers the CO to determine whether or not a rule (or rules) that fall under her jurisdiction were breached as alleged.”
[41]It is also consistent with a letter from the CO to the Appellant dated 21 January 2025 (i.e. the day before the CO’s response to the Appellant’s informant request) advising that, in respect of the four parts of the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU:(a) One was out of time;(b) One required more information to be provided to the CO; and(c) The CO’s initial view was that the remaining two were not covered by the CO’s powers (and the CO invited the Appellant’s views as to why they should not be struck out).[42]This correspondence is consistent with the CO’s explanation to the Commissioner that, at the time when the CO received the Appellant’s information request on 20 January 2025, the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU had not yet progressed beyond the initial enquiry stage. The correspondence does not support the Appellant's contention that the complaint had already been accepted by the CO or that it was undergoing ‘active substantive processing’ at the time when the CO received the Appellant’s information request.[43]We also consider it significant that the documentary evidence consistently distinguishes between the stage where an application is made to make a complaint to the CO and the stage where a complaint is accepted by the CO for determination (or, to use the Appellant’s phrase, under ‘active substantive processing’. The distinction between applying to make a complaint, acceptance of the complaint and determination of the complaint is not a semantic one. It reflects the staged approach which is anticipated under the relevant statutory framework. It is also consistent with the explanation given by the CO to the Appellant and with the explanation given by the CO to the Commissioner, the accuracy of which the Tribunal has no reason to doubt.[44]We have also considered the evidence concerning the CO’s customary practice, specifically with reference to the scope of the Appellant’s information request i.e. records of correspondence between the CO and the UCU concerning the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU. The documents before us repeatedly indicate that communication from the CO with a union would ordinarily arise only after a complaint has been accepted for determination. We have no documentary evidence demonstrating that this stage had been reached in respect of the Appellant’s complaint by 20 January 2025 when the Appellant’s information request was received. On the contrary, as evidenced by the CO’s correspondence with the Appellant in December 2024 (and by the CO’s subsequent explanation to the Commissioner), at the time when the information request was received the CO was conducting an initial assessment of the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU to determine whether the complaint could be taken forward for further determination. The evidence shows that the complaint had not yet progressed beyond this initial enquiry stage.[45]The CO’s Show Cause Notice dated 30 April 2025 and the CO’s strike-out decision dated 8 September 2025 also do not support the Appellant's case that it must be inferred from those documents that the complaint made to the CO against the UCU had already been accepted and was undergoing ‘active substantive processing’ by the CO at the time when the Appellant’s information request was received by the CO in January 2025. While subsequent developments relating to the Show Cause Notice and the strike-out decision demonstrate that consideration was given by the CO to the matters raised by the Appellant before those documents were issued later in 2025, they do not demonstrate (or provide any basis for an inference) that the Appellant’s complaint had been accepted or substantively processed at the time when the informant request was received in January 2025. On the contrary, we find they support the conclusion that, at the time when the information request was received, the Appellant’s complaint remained subject to an initial assessment by the CO. This conclusion is also consistent with the CO’s correspondence to the Appellant around that time (December 2024 and January 2025) as referred to above.[46]Having tested the factual premise, propositions and inferences upon which the Appellant's case depends, we are not satisfied that they are supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not make Finding 4 as advanced by the Appellant.[47]We find instead that, at the time when the Appellant’s information request was received by the CO, the Appellant's complaint to the CO against the UCU was in a preliminary assessment process and had not been accepted for substantive determination. This provides a coherent and evidence-based explanation for the CO’s response to the Appellant’s information request that, following a search of its records, it held no record of any correspondence between the CO and the UCU regarding the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU. In circumstances where that complaint was under initial assessment in the staged approach that is customarily adopted by the CO in its processing of complaints, the absence of information within the scope of the Appellant’s information request at the relevant time is neither surprising nor inherently implausible.

Findings 5 and 6: Contextual and temporal evidence:

[48]Findings 5 and 6: Contextual and temporal evidence: In support of this appeal the Appellant also places substantial reliance upon what the Appellant describes as ‘temporal evidence’ comprising chronological correspondence and events surrounding the CO’s response to the Appellant’s information request. We accept that the chronology of surrounding circumstances may, in an appropriate case, provide relevant circumstantial evidence of whether information requested from a public authority is likely to be held by it on a balance of probabilities.[49]More specifically, the Appellant says that the chronology of matters raised by the Appellant with the CO during 2024 supports an inference that communications occurred between the CO and the UCU before the Appellant’s information request was received by the CO; and that events relating to subsequent UCU election matters similarly support such an inference.[50]The Appellant relies in particular on the fact that a letter was sent from the Appellant to the CO on 16 July 2024 with further details of the Appellant’s complaint against the UCU including alleged hostility, discrimination, a marginalising environment and censorship; the fact that a UCU local branch meeting was subsequently organised; the fact that the Appellant raised concerns about UCU elections with the CO’s Operations Manager on 12 December 2024; and the fact that a UCU local branch communication about this was issued on 16 December 2024. The Appellant asserts that this sequence of events strongly suggests that ‘internal CO discussion or coordination’ occurred and makes it implausible that the UCU local branch would have organised meetings or issued communications without any contact between the CO and the UCU relating to the Appellant’s complaint.[51]It would be unsafe for the Tribunal to infer from those events that internal discussions or coordination within the CO or contact between the CO and the UCU relating to the Appellant’s complaint occurred before the Appellant’s information request was received by the CO. There can be many explanations for the events that the Appellant refers to. While the inference drawn by the Appellant is one possibility, we conclude that it is by no means a certainty or more likely than not. The Tribunal also considers that if the Appellant is correct to infer that contact occurred between the CO and the UCU relating to the Appellant’s complaint, it does not mean that on the balance of probabilities recorded information about correspondence between the CO and the UCU concerning the Appellant’s complaint existed when the Appellant’s information request was received.[52]Accordingly, the Tribunal does not make Findings 5 and 6 as advanced by the Appellant. Finding 7: The reference to "absolute proof" in the DN:[53]Related to Findings 5 and 6, we accept the Appellant's criticism of the Commissioner’s DN to the extent that it determined that events relied upon by the Appellant pre-dating receipt of the information request by the CO ‘is not absolute proof that discussions between the union and the Certification Office must have occurred’. ‘Absolute proof’ is not the relevant or appropriate test to apply for determining on the balance of probabilities whether requested information is held by a public or authority.[54]However, while the Commissioner’s reference to ‘absolute proof’ is unfortunate and potentially confusing, when read in context the Tribunal is satisfied that it was not material to his decision. The reference was made in relation to the Appellant’s reliance on certain events as evidence that discussions between the CO and the UCU must have occurred. It was not a reference to the test applied by the Commissioner to determine whether information within the scope of the Appellant’s request was held by the CO. This is apparent from the finding subsequently made in the DN that ‘on balance, given the timing of the request the Certification Office did not hold any information relevant to the request.’ (Our emphasis.)[55]Read fairly and in full context, we are satisfied that the Commissioner understood and applied the correct legal test in determining the key issue in the DN.

Adequacy of searches:

[56]Adequacy of searches: The second principal component of the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal relates to criticisms concerning the Commissioner’s assessment of the searches that were undertaken by the CO and of the CO’s record of the searches that were made.[57]The Tribunal accepts that cases where a public authority asserts that it does not hold requested information require careful scrutiny and examination. The relevant question is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s conclusion on the balance of probabilities that information within the scope of the request was not held at the time when it was received by the CO.[58]The Tribunal agrees with the Commissioner’s submission in response to the appeal that the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal are essentially an expansion on the submissions provided by the Appellant to the Commissioner during the Commissioner’s investigation, each setting out different reasons why the Appellant is of the view that the searches conducted by the CO were insufficient. The Tribunal also agrees with the Commissioner that each of the Appellant’s Grounds was referenced and assessed in the DN, and that the Appellant has not provided any additional evidence or persuasive submissions demonstrating that the Commissioner erred in his assessment. In particular, we find no reason to disagree with the Commissioner’s determination that:[59](a). In view of the size of the CO, it was not unreasonable to verbally ask staff to conduct the relevant searches on their computers, including shared folders and outlook folders. (b). The search terms used were not insufficiently broad or inappropriate. (c). Despite the Appellant’s concern about using a surname for search purposes due to the potential risk of misspelling, this was not the only search term used and it is more likely than not that the full set of search terms that were used by the CO would have identified relevant results from email accounts and shared folders. (d). The locations where staff of the CO searched were adequate, and since any information within the scope of the request would have been recent it is unreasonable (and we would add disproportionate) to also require a search of archived folders and back-up accounts in addition to searches of email accounts, shared folders and the CO’s complaints database (which, on the evidence, is the only place where information about complaints made to the CO is stored). In respect of the CO’s record of searches undertaken, the Tribunal accepts that sound records management practice may favour detailed audit trails and written records of searches made by a public authority before it responds to an information request. However, neither FOIA nor the authorities relied upon by the Appellant require a public authority to create or retain contemporaneous documentary records of every search undertaken in response to an information request. As referenced in the Commissioner’s DN, as a matter of good practice it is recommended to keep a record of searches carried out, the areas of the organisation searched and the staff who were consulted, but it is not mandatory to do so. Nor is it required of public authorities as a matter of routine to provide documented evidence of searches or logs of search results.[60]The Tribunal is satisfied that sufficient information was retained by the CO and provided to the Commissioner concerning the search methodology that was used by the CO; the systems and locations that were searched; and the search enquiries that were undertaken. The Tribunal is also satisfied that on the basis of that information it was reasonable for the Commissioner to conclude on the evidence that the searches conducted were proportionate and that on a balance of probabilities the CO did not hold information within the scope of the Appellant’s request at the time when the request was received.

Conclusion:

Conclusion

[61]Having assessed the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal, the Tribunal does not consider that the Commissioner’s DN is not in accordance with the law or that, to the extent that the DN involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, he ought to have exercised his discretion differently.[62]It follows that the appeal is dismissed. Brian Kennedy KC 17 August 2026.