Neena Patel v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2026] UKFTT 1150 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 01150 (GRC)Case Reference: FT.D.2026.0269
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Date 12 August 2026
Transport
Heard by Cloud Video Platform
on: 21 July 2026
Before
JUDGE MCMAHONJUDGE ARNELLTRIBUNAL MEMBER ROANTREE
Between
NEENA PatelAppellantREGISTRAR OF APPROVED DRIVING INSTRUCTORSRespondentThe Appellant appeared on her own behalf (supported by her daughter). for AppellantMr Andrew Heard. for RespondentDecision: The appeal is Dismissed. The Respondent’s decision of 12 February 2026 is confirmed.REASONS

Background

[1]This is an appeal against a decision of the Respondent of 12 February 2026 to remove the Appellant from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors (“the Register”). The grounds for the Respondent’s decision were, in summary, that the Appellant received six penalty points for a speeding offence and failed to notify the Respondent within seven days of the conviction as required. Accordingly, the Respondent considered the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to be an Approved Driving Instructor (“ADI”).[2]The Appellant was first entered on the Register on 12 March 2024. The Respondent received a notification from the DVLA that, on 07 January 2026, the Appellant had accepted a fixed penalty notice and received a conviction for an offence of (SP30) exceeding the statutory speed limit on a public road on 05 September 2025. The Appellant was convicted of speeding at 51mph on a road, with which the Appellant was familiar, very close to her home, that was limited to 30mph. The Appellant received six penalty points and a £200 fine for the offence.[3]The Respondent wrote to the Appellant on 14 January 2026 to give notice that he was considering removing her name from the Register. The Appellant made representations on 19 January 2026 and 03 February 2026.[4]On 12 February 2026 the Respondent notified the Appellant that he had concluded the Appellant’s name should be removed from the Register but that this would not take immediate effect.[5]The hearing was conducted by Cloud Video Platform. All parties joined remotely. The Tribunal decided it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

The legal framework

[6]References in this decision to a ‘section’ are references to the applicable section of The Road Traffic Act 1988.[7]Section 123(1) prohibits the giving of paid instruction in the driving of a motor car unless the name of the person giving instruction is entered in the Register, or they are the holder of a current licence issued under section 129.[8]Entry and retention in the Register is subject to conditions. Most relevant in this appeal is the requirement for a person to be, and to continue to be, a “fit and proper person” pursuant to sections 125(3)(e) and 127(3)(e). The Respondent may therefore remove a person’s name from the Register pursuant to section 128(2)(e) if they have ceased to be a “fit and proper person”.[9]The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out in section 131. The Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit (section 131(3)). When making its decision, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Respondent and takes a fresh decision on the evidence available to it, giving appropriate weight to the Respondent’s decision as the person tasked by Parliament with making such decisions.[10]The Respondent has the burden of showing that a person does not meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.[11]In Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 at paragraph 30, the Court of Appeal described the “fit and properperson” condition as follows:
“..the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval…It seems to me that the maintenance of public confidence in the register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutiny effectively, including consideration of the implications of any convictions of an applicant or a registered ADI. This is why there are stringent disclosure requirements.”

The appeal

[12]The Appellant challenged the Respondent’s decision and submitted she remained a fit and proper person for entry on the Register. Within a statement provided with her Notice of Appeal the Appellant submitted that there were mitigating circumstances which meant her name should not be removed from the Register. These can be broadly summarised as follows:a. she was experiencing difficult personal circumstances around the time the offence was committed;b. the commission of the offence was an isolated, uncharacteristic incident;c. she had a previously exemplary driving career and her conduct and record demonstrated she was a responsible and trustworthy ADI;d. she had taken steps since the incident to improve safety; ande. receiving six penalty points did not on its own demonstrate that she was no longer a fit and proper person and removing her name from the Register was disproportionate.[13]The Respondent provided a very detailed Response statement resisting the appeal. In summary he submitted:a. speeding presents a significant risk to road users and in committing such an offence the Appellant had not displayed the level of commitment to road safety or responsibility that would be expected from an ADI;b. the SP30 offence carries a range of penalties, and the imposition of six penalty points reflected more serious offending;c. the assessment as to whether someone is a fit and proper person extends beyond instructional ability alone and whilst there was no evidence that the Appellant committed the offence during the course of instruction, ADIs are expected to demonstrate exemplary driving standards at all times;d. the Respondent was required to maintain public confidence in the Register a requirement that extended beyond the interests of an individual ADI and to allow the Appellant to remain on the Register would diminish public trust and confidence in the integrity of the Register;e. the failure of the Appellant to notify the Respondent of the conviction within the required timeframe was an aggravating feature;f. having weighed all the relevant factors, the Respondent considered the Appellant was not a fit and proper person and, therefore, the removal of her name from the Register was necessary and proportionate.

The evidence

[14]Oral evidence and submissions were received from both parties.[15]The Appellant provided a bundle with her Notice of Appeal containing 38 numbered pages and an additional document containing evidence relating her son’s health. The Respondent also provided a Bundle containing 35 numbered pages. All of the written and oral evidence and submissions of both parties was considered by the Tribunal.

Discussions and conclusions

[16]At the hearing the Appellant expanded on her written submissions in relation to the background context of personal difficulties she had experienced in the months leading up to the commission of the SP30 offence. The Appellant was very apologetic and clearly regretful of her actions and submitted that this isolated incident should not outweigh her otherwise excellent record. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant’s remorse was genuine. The Appellant also stressed the impact that removal of her name from the Register would have on her ability to provide financially for herself and her family.[17]The Appellant accepted that she had committed the SP30 offence. She suggested that she should have considered contesting the charge as she believed that she may have been travelling at 40mph rather than 51mph but accepted she had pleaded guilty to committing the offence.[18]In reaching our decision we have undertaken a proportionality assessment. The Respondent is required to maintain the integrity of the Register to protect the public and driving instruction pupils from ADIs who do not meet the statutory requirements and to maintain public confidence in the Register. As in the Appellant’s case, this includes removing from the Register, the names of those whom the Respondent assesses has ceased to be ‘fit and proper’ persons. Removal of a name of an ADI from the Register is not mandatory and in determining whether to exercise their statutory powers to do so, the Respondent, and the Tribunal on appeal, must have due regard to any relevant circumstances or considerations.[19]The Tribunal had sympathy with the difficult personal circumstances the Appellant had been experiencing in the months leading up to the commission of the speeding offence and acknowledged the impact removal of her name from the Register would have on her and took this into account when reaching its Decision. The Tribunal also accepted and had due regard to the Appellant’s submissions that she had reflected on the incident and taken steps that she considered would increase road safety going forward. However, when assessing whether an Appellant remains a fit and proper person to have their name entered onto or remain on the Register is not simply a matter of assessing whether the Appellant will commit further offences.[20]ADIs are held to a higher standard than ordinary motorists. The Respondent has the duty of ensuring that only those of appropriate standing have their names entered onto or remain on the Register. The public has the right to expect that those who are registered as ADIs adhere to the highest standards of motoring, which they themselves should be teaching to their pupils. A substantial level of trust is placed in ADIs by pupils, parents and the public in general. If an ADI who has not demonstrated a keen regard for road safety and compliance with the law is permitted to remain on the Register this may diminish the standing of the Register and public confidence in it.[21]The Appellant committed the SP30 offence in a liveried vehicle displaying the name of the Driving School to which she is affiliated. It will have been apparent to members of the public, who may have witnessed the commission of the offence or the Appellant’s subsequent interaction with a police officer at the side of the road, that the Appellant was an ADI. We consider that this would likely diminish public trust and confidence, in not only the specific driving school but other ADIs and the Register as a whole.[22]When asked at the hearing the Appellant stated she had not made a conscious decision to speed. However, during her evidence, she stated several times that she was rushing and was running late for a staycation due to unexpectedly having to take care of her mother-in-law. Whilst we have sympathy with the unfortunate position the Appellant found herself in on that day, we find that the Appellant made a conscious decision to drive in an unsafe manner by choosing to drive either in excess of the speed limit; or in circumstances in which she was distracted and unable to afford sufficient attention to driving. We find as an ADI the Appellant should have been aware of the inherent risks posed by either course of action.[23]The Tribunal attached significance to the fact that the Appellant was familiar with the location of the offence that was very close to her home.[24]Further, whilst there is no rule that stipulates that the Respondent must remove an ADI from the Register upon that person accruing six penalty points, the endorsement of six points is a factor which carries significant weight in favour of finding that an ADI has ceased to be a fit and proper person. The Tribunal took account of the fact that the Appellant has been convicted of a single offence and heard no evidence to dispute the Appellant’s submissions that prior to this incident they have held a clean driving licence for many years. The Tribunal also accepted the Appellant’s evidence that the offence did not arise whilst acting in professional capacity as an ADI. However, the imposition of six penalty points reflects that this was a serious offence within the range of offending behaviour covered by the SP30 charge. A criminal court has adjudged the Appellant’s offence to be so serious as to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty points available for such an offence. This is not a case of one charge of driving marginally above the speed limit. We therefore find that the particulars of the Appellant’s offence and the endorsement of six penalty points for a single offence weighs in favour of finding that the Appellant has ceased to be a ‘fit and proper’ person.[25]The Appellant was, at all material times, a relatively newly qualified ADI. Dependant on circumstances this may be a factor which weighs on either side of an assessment of a person’s suitability to have their name remain on the Register. However, we consider that an ADI of any level of experience, and indeed all licensed road users, must be expected to appreciate the requirement to comply with speed limits and the risks to other road users in failing to do so. It is a fundamental requirement which is not mitigated on this occasion by the Appellant’s relative inexperience as an ADI. We find that the commission of this offence by the Appellant less than 18 months after their first entry to the Register demonstrates a concerning lack of understanding and awareness as to the high standards expected of those whose names are entered on the Register.[26]The Appellant accepted she had not notified the Respondent of the conviction within the required time frame. When asked about this at the hearing she said she was not aware that she was required to do so. We do not find a purported lack of knowledge to be a reasonable explanation for failure to comply. The Appellant’s unfamiliarity with this requirement shows a lack of appreciation for a key regulatory obligation and the professional standards expected of ADIs.[27]Overall, for the above reasons, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Appellant had ceased to be a ‘fit and proper’ person to have her name retained on the Register. We conclude on balance that it is proportionate to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register and the Respondent’s decision correct. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.