Ashley Chaplin v The Information Commissioner & Anor [2026] UKFTT 1117 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0142

[2026] UKFTT 01117 (GRC)

First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Information Rights

Venue Heard at Field House, London, on 24 March 2025

Date 4 August 2026

Before

JUDGE NEVILLE

MEMBER S COSGRAVE

MEMBER S SHAW

Between

ASHLEY CHAPLINAppellant

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondent

THE CABINET OFFICERespondent

Mr A Chaplin, in person for Appellant

for First Respondent: No attendance

for Second Respondent: Mr J Anderson, counsel

Decision: The appeal is allowed in part.

Substituted Decision Notice:

Signed Date:

[1]The Commissioner’s Decision Notice under reference IC-230048-D1V9 is confirmed, save as follows. Request Part 1.2

[2]Of the documents in issue:a. Records of propriety searches: i. The exemption at section 37(1)(b) applies to the information. ii. The public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

b. Submission to Prime Minister Boris Johnson: i. As identified in the closed annex to these reasons, some of the withheld information does not fall within the scope of the request. ii. Of the withheld information in scope, the exemption at section 37(1)(b) applies. The exemption at section 40(2) additionally applies to some withheld information, as indicated in the closed schedule. iii. The name and position of the signatory must be disclosed, there being no public interest in maintaining the exemption in relation to that information. iv. Where section 37(1)(b) applies, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Where section 40(2) applies, disclosure would be contrary to data protection principles. Requests 1.5 and 1.6

[3]The Cabinet Office was not entitled to refuse to confirm or deny whether it held information of the description specified in the request. To the extent that any exemption is engaged, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny does not outweigh the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the information.

[4]The Cabinet Office must issue a fresh response to Parts 1.5 and 1.6 of the request that confirms or denies whether information within the scope of those parts is held.

[5]If, following that confirmation or denial, the Cabinet Office confirms that any information is held, it must either communicate that information to Mr Chaplin or issue a response identifying any exemption relied upon and explaining, so far as it can do so without disclosing exempt information, why that exemption applies.

[6]The Cabinet Office must comply with this substituted decision notice within 30 calendar days of the date on which this decision is sent to the parties, subject to any appeal. REASONS

Summary of decision

[1]Cressida Dick was Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis from 10 April 2017 to her resignation on 10 April 2022. She was appointed a Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire while still in service, having been named in Prime Minister Theresa May’s 2019 Resignation Honours List.

[2]This appeal under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) concerns whether the Cabinet Office should disclose some information it holds about that appointment, as well as whether it must confirm if some other requested information is held at all.

[3]We have decided:(i) that where the Cabinet Office has confirmed it holds requested information, some parts must be disclosed but other parts are exempt from the duty to disclose and may be redacted; and

(ii) that the Cabinet Office is required to confirm whether or not information is held within the scope of Parts 1.5 and 1.6.

[4]We explain our decision below. Not all our reasons can be given openly. There is a confidential schedule provided only to the respondents containing reasons that cannot be openly disclosed.

The request and response

[5]On 12 December 2022, Mr Chaplin made a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) to the Cabinet Office for the following information: 1.1. Standard procedures of oversight in the selection of Prime Minister’s Resignation Honours List, including procedural processes and guidelines or similar on considerations to be conducted in assessing suitability of applicants under this particular scheme. 1.2. In selection of candidates for the Prime Minister’s Resignation Honours List, procedures and systems that were followed in selection of candidates to be put forward, including input, advice or other from members of government, political party or other. 1.3. In the recommendation to the late Queen of former Commissioner Dick, of any minutes, notes, advisories or other in support of the recommendation of former Commissioner Dick for an award of Damehood being included in the Prime Minister’s Resignation Honours List. (Note: by this, I mean discussions, proposals and recommendations in including the former Commissioner on the list during establishment and finalization of the list). 1.4. The recommendation advisory issued to the late queen recommending former Commissioner Dick for an award of Damehood in former Prime Minister Theresa May’s Resignation Honours List. 1.5. Considering ‘politicisation’ of Met police, copies of any minutes, notes, communications or other that substantiate its consideration in the process for inclusion for award of Damehood to the former Commissioner by former PM Theresa May. 1.6. A list of all individuals who were included in the process of consideration, recommendation and decision making, including oversight, in including former Commissioner Dick in former Prime Minister Theresa May’s Resignation Honours List recommendation to the late Queen Elizabeth’.

[6]The Cabinet Office issued its response on 12 January 2023. It claimed that the information sought at Part 1.1 was exempt from disclosure under section 37(1)(b) of FOIA, relating to “the conferring by the Crown of any honour or dignity”, and denied holding any of the other requested information. Mr Chaplin requested an internal review and, after that, made a complaint to the Commissioner.

The Commissioner’s Decision Notice

[7]The Commissioner issued his Decision Notice https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/decision-notices/4029084/ic-230048-d1v9.pdf in response to the complaint on 19 March 2024, under reference IC-230048-D1V9. The Decision Notice’s conclusions can be summarised as follows:a. Part

1.1 – The exemption at section 37(1)(b) is qualified, and will only apply if the public interest in maintaining it outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. Performing this public interest balancing test, the Commissioner found that most of the information should be disclosed, but not all.

b. Part

1.2 – Contrary to its initial position, the Cabinet Office had subsequently revealed that it held three items of information in scope of this part of the request: i. A document confirming the approved honours and the reasons (citation) for each – The Cabinet Office agreed it had been wrong to withhold this information under section 37(1)(b), because it was already published on gov.uk https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/resignation-honours-2019 . ii. “Records of propriety searches by relevant vetting agencies regarding Cressida Dick, held by the Honours and Appointments Secretariat in the Cabinet Office” – The Commissioner decided that section 37(1)(b) applied to this document, together with three other exemptions: section 40(2), third party personal data; section 41(1), information provided in confidence; and, to some of the information, section 23, information relating to, or supplied by, specified security bodies. The first three of those exemptions are qualified, and the Commissioner found that the public interest favoured maintaining exemption over disclosing the information. Section 23 is an absolute exemption. iii. A submission to the Prime Minister, who by then was Boris Johnson, setting out the procedures and considerations for agreeing resignation honours lists in general, and Mrs May’s Resignation Honours list in particular – This was provided to Mr Chaplin during the investigation, subject to some redaction. The Commissioner found that section 37(1)(b) also applied to this document, with sections 23 and 40(2) also applying to some of it. Again, insofar as the exemptions were qualified, the public interest in maintaining them outweighed the public interest in disclosure.

c. Part 1.4 – During the Commissioner’s investigation, the Cabinet Office disclosed this requested information in full.

d. Parts 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 – By the time of the Decision Notice, the Cabinet Office decided to neither confirm nor deny (“NCND”) whether it held the requested information.

The Commissioner’s criticism of the Cabinet Office

(b) The Commissioner’s criticism of the Cabinet Office

[8]The Commissioner criticised the Cabinet Office’s initial handling of the request and found it to have breached sections 1(1), 10(1) and 17(1) of FOIA. The Cabinet Office had wrongly claimed not to hold information when it did, apparently failed to correctly understand part 1.2 of the request despite its clarity, had claimed that part 1.4 was exempt when there was no basis upon which to do so, and had apparently failed to make checks with No. 10 to check whether any information was held in scope. He concluded that: The inconsistent and erroneous handling by the Cabinet Office of this request, which was set out very clearly and precisely by the complainant, can have done little to instil confidence in the request handling process. Had the complainant not brought this matter to the Commissioner’s attention, the actual position as regards the extent of relevant recorded information held by the Cabinet Office would not have been ascertained, and the complainant would have been denied access to non-exempt information. That is concerning and very unsatisfactory. The Commissioner hopes that the outcome of his investigation will be of some assurance to the complainant and he will expect the Cabinet Office to learn lessons from this case and bring a tighter focus and more careful attention to the processing of such requests in future.

[9]It is right to record that criticism in this decision, together with the Cabinet Office’s apology. We also recognise, as did the Commissioner, that the Cabinet Office subsequently engaged with the investigation and this appeal. The appeal Scope of

The appeal

[10]As initially drafted, Mr Chaplin only challenged the Commissioner’s decision on Parts 1.2 and 1.6. It was agreed by Mr Anderson at the hearing that the decision on Part 1.5 should be considered as well, and we endorse that expanded scope of the appeal.

[11]The Cabinet Office did not appeal against the Commissioner’s decision that the remainder is not exempt, nor has it mounted such a challenge in these proceedings. The Tribunal is therefore only concerned with whether the Commissioner was right that a small amount of the information was exempt from the duty to disclose.

Procedure

[12]At the hearing, we had regard to a 358 page Open Bundle and a skeleton argument provided on behalf of the Cabinet Office. Mr Chaplin sought to provide some further written submissions and documentary evidence at the hearing. We accepted the submission of the written submissions but declined to allow the additional evidence. It was largely a repeat of the material we already had, and any small probative value it did have was outweighed by the disruption caused by needing to fully consider it before starting the hearing, and the wider need to enforce the integrity of case management directions on when evidence must be provided.

[13]We were also provided with a Closed Bundle prepared by the Cabinet Office, containing the two outstanding documents held to be in scope of part 1.2; further evidence in support of the Cabinet Office’s case on the public interest balancing test required in relation to the rest of the request; and a complete version of Ms Brunton’s witness statement, the copy in the Open Bundle having been redacted. We outlined this to Mr Chaplin at the start of the hearing. Carefully considering the principles set out in Browning v Information Commissioner

[2014] EWCA Civ 1050

, we considered it appropriate to confirm pursuant to rule 14(6) that the Closed Bundle could continue to be provided to the Tribunal without being disclosed to any other person save the Commissioner. We can only decide whether the requested information is exempt by looking at it ourselves, and providing it to Mr Chaplin would defeat the purpose of the appeal. Likewise, the public interest in maintaining exemption from the duty to confirm or deny if information is held can only be properly explored by considering all the relevant evidence.

[14]We have nonetheless been anxious to ensure that Mr Chaplin receives a fair hearing. No material has been closed that could not properly be open, and as much detail on its nature has been given to him as possible. We considered it necessary to hold a short closed session during the hearing, from which everyone but those attending on behalf of the Cabinet Office were excluded. This enabled us to scrutinise the respondents’ cases in accordance with our inquisitorial function. Mr Chaplin was given the opportunity beforehand to alert us to any particular issues he would like addressed, and after the conclusion of the closed session a gist was given to him so that he could make any necessary submissions.

[15]At the hearing, we first heard oral evidence from Mr Chaplin who confirmed his witness statement. We then heard evidence from Clare Brunton, Deputy Director within the Honours and Memorialisation Secretariats and Secretary to the House of Lords Appointments Commission. She was cross-examined by Mr Chaplin and asked questions by members of the Tribunal.

How the Tribunal approaches the appeal

[16]In Information Commissioner v Malnick

[2018] UKUT 72 (AAC)

, at [45] and [90], it was confirmed that the Tribunal exercises a full merits appellate jurisdiction. We make any necessary findings of fact and decide for ourselves whether the provisions of the Act have been correctly applied. The proceedings are inquisitorial save that we are entitled to respect the way in which the issues have been framed by the parties. We address matters as they stood on 12 January 2023, the date of the Cabinet Office’s response: Montague (Information rights - Freedom of information - public interest test, qualified exemptions)

[2022] UKUT 104 (AAC)

at [62]-[63].

[17]Section 1(1) of FOIA imposes a duty on public authorities to confirm or deny whether requested information is held. If it is, section 1(2) imposes a duty to disclose that information to a requester. A provision of Part II of FOIA may exempt information from either duty. The exemption at section 23 is absolute, meaning that no duty under FOIA can arise in respect of information to which it applies. For the other exemptions in issue, in determining whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information, the relevant factors are aggregated across the exemptions: DBIT v Information Commissioner

[2023] EWCA Civ 1378

. That public interest balancing test applies to each of the duty to confirm or deny and the subsequent duty to disclose the information; when considering the former we have paid no regard to whether the information is in fact held or (if it is) its content.

The distinction between ‘political’ and ‘service’ honours lists

[18]An important context to the appeal is the difference between the work undertaken by the Cabinet Office for Prime Minister’s Resignation Honours Lists and the work undertaken for the King’s Birthday Honours, New Year Honours and other “service” honours lists.

[19]Given our eventual conclusions on the appeal, it is appropriate to set out the full explanation given by Ms Brunton in her witness statement: 17. The Operations Team, in which the majority of staff in the Secretariat work, is divided into a Nominations Team which processes and validates public honours nominations; and an Honours Team, which supports each honours round for the New Year and King’s birthday lists. Each honours round starts 6 months before an honours list is published. There are ten independent sectoral committees, comprised of an independent chair and a majority of independent members. These committees assess citations submitted for consideration by either the Secretariats Nominations Team or by other government departments, agencies and similar bodies. Once the independent committees have met, the Main Honours Committee meets to scrutinise the whole list and also parallel honours lists produced by the Ministry of Defence for military personnel and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for overseas nominees. Probity checks are made on nominees. The Prime Minister and HM The King’s approval is sought to offer an award and nominees are then “sounded” (offered an honour) to see if they wish to accept. A final list of recipients is then submitted for the Prime Minister and HM The King’s formal approval. Honours lists are published at the new year (usually in late December) and on the occasion of The Sovereign’s Official Birthday in June. 18. The Secretariat also holds responsibility for vetting political honours lists for probity and propriety. As noted at paragraph 15, the Prime Minister can put forward political honours nominations at any time. The reasoning behind such nominations is a matter for the Prime Minister. Unlike honours which are considered in the New Year and Birthday rounds, political honours are not considered by the independent committees. The Honours Secretariat conducts probity and propriety checks and submissions are provided to the Prime Minister giving an assessment. Any wider due diligence checks for good standing and suitability are primarily for the Prime Minister. The vetting process for resignation Honours 19. The Honours Secretariat undertakes the vetting process for the resignation honours list. Proportionate probity and propriety checks are in place and are designed to protect the integrity of the honours system as far as possible by proactively identifying information which may affect a nominee’s standing and reputation. Checks may vary according to the nominee’s service and background. 20. […] This includes checks with relevant government departments and agencies including:(a) ACRO for Criminal records;

(b) HM Revenue and Customs who provide information regarding tax ratings in a high/medium/low format;

(d) Internet searches on individuals. 21. […] For the purposes of the Honours Secretariat’s vetting function, the Secretariat does not play any part in assessing the suitability of individuals nominated for a resignation honour. Nor does the Secretariat or the Cabinet Office recommend any individuals for a resignation honour. The Secretariat has no right of veto in relation to the resignation honours list and has no say in the number of individuals nominated. Those are matters for the departing Prime Minister to determine. 22. Advice about specific nominees is outlined in a submission to the Prime Minister and usually covers specific issues uncovered during vetting checks and includes the same level of detail as would be provided to the independent committees. […] 23. Following the vetting process, the Honours Secretariat will submit the resignation honours list to the Prime Minister for approval. The Prime Minister will then submit the approved list to His Majesty the King, for final approval and conferral of the honours.

[20]This accords with part of the Cabinet Office internal documentation disclosed to Mr Chaplin: Nominations (in the form of a name, brief citation, date of birth and address) should be forwarded to the Honours and Appointments Secretariat as early as possible, to allow the usual probity checks to be carried out. This involves the normal checks by Government departments and agencies, including the police and HMRC. Whilst general public profile/due diligence checks are primarily for the Parties in this context, the Secretariat will undertake such checks and highlight any areas of concern to the Chair of the Main Committee and the Cabinet Secretary where appropriate/necessary. and part of the submission to Prime Minister Boris Johnson disclosed (with redactions) pursuant to Part 1.2: 11. In line with standard practice, all honours nominees contained in the resignation list have been subject to [text redacted, section 40(2)] a range of vetting checks, including with HMRC, [text redacted, section 37(1)(b)]. Since the controversy surrounding the 2016 Resignation List, the independent Parliamentary and Political Service Honours Committee and Main Honours Committee have played no role in the process for exceptional political honours, including Resignation and Dissolution Lists. This reflects their past concerns about being invited to consider nominations only on the basis of propriety, and not on the basis of merit. At publication, we will make clear that these nominations are in the gift of the former Prime Minister, and have not been through the independent process responsible for the main lists at New Year and the Queen’s Birthday.

[21]This all provides an open acknowledgement that the checks, and the only checks, done for political honours is the probity and propriety vetting Ms Brunton describes. While there was some discussion in oral evidence of the difference between probity and propriety, nothing turns on it. What matters is that the Secretariat does not assess suitability, or what the submission above calls ‘merit’. It does give advice based on the output of vetting, as explained by Ms Brunton’s witness statement at para 22, above. Everything else is a matter for the Prime Minister and their staff rather than the Cabinet Office.

Meaning of the requests

[22]As the decision notice under appeal sets out how Mr Chaplin had addressed the information he intended be caught by his requests, we next address the meaning of the relevant Parts. Requests are to be interpreted objectively, while still taking into account the context in which they are made. We note the Commissioner’s guidance that where a request is capable of more than one objective meaning, the public authority’s duty under section 16 to provide advice and assistance will be triggered and it must revert to the requester to ask for clarification.

[23]In the present case, we consider that some of the essential context in understanding Mr Chaplin’s request was known to the Cabinet Office but not to Mr Chaplin, being the nature and limits of its role in a resignation list as set out above. This can be illustrated by Part 1.6. The word ‘recommendation’ could refer to the type of recommendation of a recipient made to the Prime Minister in service awards lists, advice given to the Prime Minister arising from vetting checks in resignation lists, or to the Prime Minister’s formal recommendation to the Queen that an honour be awarded. Mr Chaplin framed his requests by reference to what he understandably assumed might happen in the process: consideration, recommendation, assessment of suitability, and oversight. The Cabinet Office’s evidence is that, in the resignation honours context, its role is much narrower. It does not assess the merit or suitability of nominees. It undertakes probity and propriety checks and provides advice arising from those checks. The reasons for the nomination remain a matter for the outgoing Prime Minister.

[24]There is no real dispute about the meaning of Part 1.2. It asks for information showing the procedures and systems actually followed for this resignation honours list. On the other parts:a. Part 1.5 i. To address Part 1.5, we were referred to its context as shown by other Parts. We therefore briefly address Part 1.3 without it forming part of the operative appeal. Part 1.3 asks for “minutes, notes, advisories or other in support of the recommendation” of Cressida Dick for a damehood, including “discussions, proposals and recommendations” during establishment and finalisation of the list. We construe that request as capable of covering two categories of material. The first is material generated by the ordinary resignation honours process and provided to, or for, the serving Prime Minister in connection with submitting the list to the Sovereign. The second is material going beyond that ordinary process, such as documents positively supporting, advocating, assessing, or discussing the merits of Cressida Dick’s inclusion. ii. The first category substantially overlaps with Part 1.2, because it concerns the procedures and systems actually followed, including the vetting material and the submission to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet Office has now identified that material. The second category forms the subject of the Cabinet Office’s case on NCND. iii. Part 1.5 is narrower. It asks for material substantiating consideration of the “politicisation” of the Metropolitan Police in the process for inclusion of Cressida Dick. Objectively, that is a request for any record showing that this issue was substantively considered as part of the process.

b. Part 1.6 i. Part 1.6 asks for a list of individuals included in the process of “consideration, recommendation and decision making, including oversight” in including Cressida Dick. In context, that is not a request for every official whose name appears on a circulation list, nor every person involved in administering the honours system generally. It is a request for those involved in any substantive consideration, recommendation, decision-making or oversight concerning Cressida Dick’s inclusion. Again, the Cabinet Office’s evidence is that, apart from the ordinary administrative and vetting process, there was no Cabinet Office assessment of suitability or merit and no Cabinet Office recommendation that she receive the honour.

[25]This interpretation is consistent with the way the appeal was argued. Mr Chaplin’s real complaint is not that the Cabinet Office has failed to disclose private vetting material for its own sake. It is that he wishes to know whether the process contained any meaningful consideration of the propriety of conferring a political honours-list damehood on a serving Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, and who undertook any such consideration. We consider this a key plank of the public interest in disclosure.

Section 37 – Honours

[26]As both the Commissioner and the Cabinet Office argue that the appeal can be dismissed by reference to sections 37(1)(b) and 37(2) alone, we address this exemption first. Engagement Principles

Engagement

[27]Section 37 relevantly provides as follows: 37 – Communications with Her Majesty, etc. and honours(1) Information is exempt information if it relates to – […] (b) the conferring by the Crown of any honour or dignity.

(2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by virtue of subsection (1).

[28]In Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Morland

[2018] UKUT 67 (AAC)

at [18], the term “relates to” was described as follows: …Case law has established in the FOIA context that “relates to” carries a broad meaning (see APPGER v Information Commissioner and Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2016] AACR 5 at paragraphs 13-25). In UCAS v Information Commissioner and Lord Lucas [2015] AACR 25 at paragraph 46 the Upper Tribunal approved the approach of the FTT in the APPGER case where it said that “relates to” means that there must be “some connection” with the information or that the information “touches or stands in relation to” the object of the statutory provision. Thus the terms “relates to” and “any” both point to the breadth of the statutory language, which in turn suggests that the exemption covers both potential future honours as well as currently extant honours.

Consideration

[29]The parties agree that all information requested “relates to” the conferring by the Crown of any honour or dignity. We agree. Each part of the request relates to either the preparatory steps taken to the formal conferral of this specific damehood, or what the Commissioner’s relevant guidance https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/foi/freedom-of-information-and-environmental-information-regulations/communications-with-his-majesty-and-the-awarding-of-honours-section-37/ calls “the policies and procedures that underpin the process”.

Public interest factors

[30]While intending no disrespect to the parties’ industry in putting forward their respective evidence and arguments, we shall only refer to them where necessary to explain our assessment. We have carefully taken into account everything provided to us. We now set out the general public interest factors arising on both sides of the balance, both where the Cabinet Office has confirmed that information is held but seeks to withhold it, and where it relies on section 37(2) to neither confirm nor deny that information is held.

Factors that support maintaining the exemption

[31]The respondent’s submissions echo the decision in Morland at [20] that the purpose of section 37(1)(b) is to “ensure candour and protect confidences in the entire process of considering honours, dignities and medals”. They argue that the honours system rests on the ability of those involved to offer assessments, information, and views freely and frankly. That candour is said to depend upon a clear expectation that internal deliberations, working notes, and communications will remain confidential. The Cabinet Office emphasises, as reflected also in the Decision Notice, that the need for a confidential “safe space” is not confined to the personal deliberations of Ministers but extends to the operational functions performed in preparing and scrutinising honours lists. The concern put forward is that disclosure, or even the act of confirming or denying that a particular category of information exists, may inhibit full and candid engagement by those required to provide information or advice in future cases.

[32]This point is linked to a broader submission that confidentiality is not incidental, but structurally central to the functioning and integrity of the honours system. The respondents rely on the statutory scheme itself, which protects honours‑related information for sixty years, as reflecting a legislative judgment that this category of information is peculiarly sensitive and must be shielded if the system is to work effectively. They submit that any encroachment upon that sphere of confidentiality risks undermining confidence in the process and could weaken the propriety‑checking mechanisms that rely upon the willing and cooperative participation of individuals and agencies. The respondents also stress the need to preserve the honours system from external pressure, lobbying or speculation, arguing that public visibility of internal workings would expose those who participate to risk of unwelcome attention, second‑guessing or interference. In their submission, the effectiveness of propriety checks depends on their being conducted in a protected space in which officers can express concerns or flag issues without anticipating later disclosure.

[33]Where the Cabinet Office relies on section 37(2), it further argues that confirming or denying whether particular material is held would, in itself, communicate information that falls within the exemption. In their view, acknowledgement of the existence or non‑existence of records relating to discussions, advisories, or deliberations about a specific nomination would permit inferences to be drawn about the degree and nature of internal scrutiny undertaken. Because the confidentiality of honours processes is said to extend not only to the content of deliberations but also to whether and how deliberations occurred, the respondents contend that the NCND response is necessary to prevent circumvention of the protection the exemption is intended to afford.

[34]The Cabinet Office additionally submits that the public‑interest value in the withheld or unconfirmed material is limited. They state that the information falling within the exemption would not shed light on why a particular individual was nominated, since the reasons for nomination are a matter for the nominating Prime Minister and not for the Cabinet Office. To the extent that the withheld material is administrative or procedural in nature, they argue that its disclosure would contribute little to public understanding of the nomination process, while nonetheless involving a significant intrusion into protected deliberative space. Finally, the Cabinet Office points to what it describes as a long‑standing expectation of confidentiality held by individuals involved in the honours process. It argues that disturbing that expectation would risk a “chilling effect”, with the potential to alter the nature or quality of information provided in future, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of an essential constitutional process. Factors put forward as supporting the public interest in favour of confirmation or denial that information is held, or disclosure of information that is held

[35]Mr Chaplin has a personal interest in seeking the information. His husband, Gerhard Venter, was found dead in Regent’s Park on 1 September 2018 and an inquest ruled that the death was suicide. Mr Chaplin has never accepted that verdict, nor does he accept that the agencies involved, including the Metropolitan Police, have been open or candid with him about the circumstances of Mr Venter’s death. His present requests form part of his continuing efforts to investigate those circumstances for himself, and he also expresses concern about the transparency of the process by which an honour was conferred upon an individual whom he believes may bear (at the least) institutional responsibility.

[36]Mr Chaplin argues that the nomination of a serving Metropolitan Police Commissioner engages powerful public‑interest considerations relating to the independence of policing, public trust in law‑enforcement institutions, and the constitutional importance of ensuring that operational policing is free from political favour or influence. He argues that an honour conferred upon a sitting Commissioner through a political honours list has the potential to give rise to perceptions of politicisation, and that such perceptions can only be addressed by a clear account of what processes were undertaken, by whom, and according to what standards. In his submission, confirmation or denial that the Cabinet Office holds information about discussions, minutes, advisories or other forms of consideration is necessary to provide the public with clarity as to whether the relevant aspects of propriety were examined at all.

[37]This importance, he argues, is heightened still further by the resignation honours lists differing significantly from the standard honours system, lacking the independent committees, published membership, and established safeguards that exist for King’s Birthday, New Year and other service honours. He argues that this relative opacity heightens the public interest in transparency because the public otherwise lacks reliable insight into how political honours are scrutinised before being placed before the Sovereign. He contends that the narrowness of the Cabinet Office’s role, and its emphasis on propriety checks alone, increases rather than diminishes the need for public understanding of the nature and extent of those checks, particularly where the subject of the honour occupies a high‑profile public office. In this sense, he contends that disclosure (or at least confirmation of what information exists) contributes directly to informed public debate on the use of political honours, including whether reforms may be warranted.

[38]It is further submitted that transparency serves as a safeguard against error, misunderstanding or misuse of the honours mechanism. Mr Chaplin maintains that knowledge of what information is held, what checks were undertaken and by whom, would allow the public to understand the basis upon which the honour was processed, and to scrutinise whether appropriate diligence was exercised. He argues that the public interest in accountability is particularly acute where the honour concerns a senior public‑service officeholder and where the downstream effects of perceived political favour could affect public confidence in policing. In his view, disclosure of the processes followed, or confirmation that they were engaged, would assist in verifying whether the expectations set out in the Cabinet Office’s own description of resignation‑list procedures were actually met.

Consideration: the material confirmed to be held

[39]As we explained at the hearing, and Mr Chaplin readily acknowledged, it is no part of this Tribunal’s function to investigate his husband’s death or the actions surrounding it, nor to decide on the appropriateness or propriety of this particular award. Moreover, the duties arising under FOIA are ‘motive blind’, being concerned with the public interest in disclosing the requested information to the world at large rather than the individual requester.

[40]Nonetheless, Mr Chaplin’s concerns do illustrate an aspect of the public interest in transparency. An honour is an official gesture by the state that quite literally honours an individual. It is a system plainly capable of attracting public concern over its potential to be corrupted. The Cabinet Office refers to the need for the system to command public confidence. We need hardly set out the well-known examples where recipients of honours are later discovered as being dishonourable; in our view, this is the most likely way in which public confidence may be damaged. When awarded to someone in a position like the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, the discharge of whose public duties touch on matters of preservation of life and public security, the interest in public accountability and transparency is all the higher. We need not set out any assessment of Mr Chaplin’s other arguments other than to record that we broadly agree with them. There is, in general, a high public interest in confirmation whether information relevant to the integrity of the honours system is held, and disclosure of such information that is.

[41]We likewise consider that the Cabinet Office’s arguments have merit, and the vetting process described by Ms Brunton will often require that particular information is withheld. The public interest in disclosure identified above concerns public assurance as to the fact and the nature of vetting performed. Disclosure of all the information gathered in that process and communicated to the Prime Minister would have the potential to give rise to the consequences put forward by the Cabinet Office and set out above.

[42]The position concerning NCND is not so straightforward. Ms Brunton’s evidence was that the vetting of probity and propriety she describes is undertaken for all resignation lists. Cabinet Office documentation to that effect has been disclosed. If a request for information relating to such vetting were made in bare terms, for example for “all information relating to the probity and propriety vetting of Cressida Dick”, then confirmation that such information is held would simply tell the requester that the expected procedure had been followed. Denial that such information is held would tell the requester that no such vetting had been undertaken, contrary to usual practice.

[43]At the other end of our spectrum of hypothetical requests, we can conceive of requests where confirmation or denial would be revelatory and attract the public interest considerations put forward by the Cabinet Office. The list of checks made, such as with ACRO, HMRC, the Electoral Commission and internet searches, was not expressed as being exhaustive. The personal circumstances of a particular nominee, or the results of the usual checks, might indicate that checks with other bodies or individuals are appropriate. This leaves the Cabinet Office open to fishing expeditions, for example if requests are made for the results of checks with particular individuals publicly known to be associated with a nominee. Confirmation might reveal that the individual had been approached and had responded. Applying NCND across all requests of that type, even if they would not be revelatory by themselves, may support its effectiveness against such inferential disclosure.

[44]The same can be said about requests concerning particular lines or topics of enquiry. This would provide a clear window into the nature of the vetting conducted, its results, and have the chilling effect feared by the Cabinet Office. This is much more likely to arise in the context of ‘service honours’ rather than as a result of the type of vetting checks performed in the present context, but the potential for the concern to arise in the latter cannot be excluded.

Part 1.2: Records of propriety searches

[45]Item 2 comprises the record of propriety and vetting checks in respect of Cressida Dick. We have considered the withheld material for ourselves. It is directly connected with the conferral of an honour and section 37(1)(b) is plainly engaged.

[46]There is a real public interest in knowing that checks were undertaken. That interest is heightened in this case because the honour was conferred on a serving Metropolitan Police Commissioner through a resignation honours list, a route that is, by its nature, more closely associated with political and personal service than the ordinary honours rounds. We also accept Mr Chaplin’s point that public confidence in policing requires particular sensitivity to any perception of political favour.

[47]But that public interest is substantially met by the disclosure already made: the Cabinet Office has confirmed the general nature of the checks, the fact that due process was followed, and the limited nature of the Secretariat’s role. Considering the records for ourselves, they contain nothing that could meaningfully contribute to an understanding of why Cressida Dick was nominated. They are entirely consistent with the Cabinet Office’s open case on their purpose. The public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Part 1.2: Submission to Prime Minister Boris Johnson

[48]Item 3 is the submission to the then Prime Minister concerning Theresa May’s resignation honours list. Much of it has already been disclosed. We agree with the Commissioner and the Cabinet Office that some redactions remain justified. In particular, material concerning individual nominees, handling issues arising from their personal circumstances, and material attracting section 40(2), may properly be withheld. Disclosure of those passages would intrude into the confidential assessment of individual nominees and would contribute little to public understanding of the issue raised by this appeal.

[49]We do not, however, accept that every remaining redaction is justified simply because it appears within a submission relating to honours. Section 37(1)(b) is broad, but breadth of engagement is not the same as strength of public interest in maintaining the exemption. Generic process material, statements of convention, and the identity of senior office-holders acting in their official capacity carry a materially weaker claim to confidentiality. Where such information does not reveal the personal circumstances of nominees, the substance of vetting results, communications with the Sovereign, or security-related material, the balance favours disclosure.

[50]A minor exception to the above is the name of the signatory to the submission. They are a senior civil servant within the Cabinet Office and no proper basis has been identified as to why their name should be withheld.

Consideration: Section 37(2) NCND for 1.5 and 1.6

[51]The decisive feature of this appeal is the Cabinet Office's evidence concerning the limits of its role. Its case is that, in the context of resignation honours, it does not assess merit, suitability or political implications.

[52]As set out above, we have interpreted Part 1.5 as requesting material substantiating consideration of the “politicisation” of the Metropolitan Police in the process for inclusion of Cressida Dick, which means any record showing that this issue was substantively considered as part of the process. Yet if the issue was considered as part of the process, then this would be inconsistent with the Cabinet Office’s stated role in resignation honours. Its evidence is that the Secretariat undertakes probity and propriety checks. It does not assess the suitability or merit of a resignation honours nominee. It does not recommend that a person should receive a resignation honour. It has no veto. The decision whether to nominate rests with the outgoing Prime Minister. The decision whether to submit the list rests with the serving Prime Minister, subject to the conventional approach described in the evidence.

[53]That evidence has two consequences. First, where Mr Chaplin’s requests capture material generated by the ordinary vetting and submission process, the Cabinet Office has already confirmed that such material is held and has identified it under Part 1.2. It cannot sensibly maintain NCND for that same category of material under other parts of the request 1.5 or 1.6. We reject that confirmation would be revelatory.

[54]Second, where the requests seek material going beyond the ordinary process, such as records of a Cabinet Office assessment of Cressida Dick’s suitability, records of consideration of politicisation of policing, or a list of persons involved in substantive consideration or recommendation of her inclusion, confirming or denying whether such material is held would not reveal the content of a protected honours deliberation because, on the Cabinet Office’s own case, such deliberation is not part of the process it undertakes. Hypothetical advice stating “including a serving police officer in resignation honours risks politicising the police” is outside the work done by the Cabinet Office on resignation honours.

[55]The Cabinet Office’s concern is that confirmation or denial may enable inferences to be drawn. In our view, the only reasonable inference to draw from a denial would be that the system is working as the Cabinet Office says it does. That supports rather than undermines public confidence in the honours system, for example by providing reassurance against the concerns discussed at paragraph 40 above. The only reasonable inference to draw from confirmation that such information is held would be that the system is not working as the Cabinet Office says it does. No case has been put forward as to why concealing such matters would be in the public interest.

[56]Nor do we accept that this conclusion undermines confidentiality across the honours system more generally. The resignation honours process is materially different from the New Year and Birthday honours process. The latter involves independent committees and a different structure of assessment. Our reasoning is confined to the particular process and the particular requests in this appeal.

[57]Section 37(2) is engaged, but the public interest in maintaining NCND does not outweigh the public interest in confirmation or denial.

The other exemptions

[58]Given our conclusions on section 37, it is unnecessary to address the other exemptions at any length. We are satisfied that section 40(2) applies to personal data within the vetting records and nominee-specific passages. Disclosure under FOIA is disclosure to the world. The individuals concerned would have a strong and legitimate expectation that the content and outcome of checks undertaken for honours vetting would remain confidential. There is no sufficient public interest in disclosure of the personal content of those checks to make such disclosure fair or lawful.

[59]To the extent that section 40(5) was relied upon as a basis for NCND, it adds nothing material on the facts of this appeal. A confirmation or denial framed at the level required by our substituted notice would not disclose personal data; any personal data contained in information held can be considered, if necessary, under section 40(2) at the disclosure stage.

[60]We are also satisfied that section 41 applies, where information was provided by third parties in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. The public interest in disclosure does not justify overriding that confidence. The public interest lies in disclosure of the process and, where appropriate, confirmation of what categories of information are held, not in disclosure of the confidential substance of vetting returns. There is no need to consider section 23. Signed Date: UTJ Neville 3 August 2026 (sitting as a Judge of the FtT)