TRIBUNAL JUDGE MORNINGTONTRIBUNAL MEMBER CHAFERTRIBUNAL MEMBER YATES
Between
Sarah waldronAppellantINFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentDecision: The appeal is dismissed.REASONS
Introduction
[1]This appeal dated 16 May 2024 and made by Sarah Waldron (the “Appellant”) arises following a request made by the Appellant to the British Museum under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) for information relating to its relationship with BP and, in particular, records associated with a purported “verbal agreement” said to have permitted the continuation of certain contractual benefits beyond the apparent expiry of a written sponsorship agreement.[2]The Information Commissioner (“IC”) issued a decision notice on 18 April 2024 concluding that the British Museum was entitled to rely upon section 12 of FOIA, including section 12(2), to refuse to confirm or deny whether the requested information was held, on the basis that the cost of compliance would exceed the statutory limit.[3]The Appellant appeals that decision. She appeared in person at the hearing. Neither the Commissioner nor the British Museum attended, but both had made written submissions contained within the hearing bundle.
Documents
[4]The Tribunal was provided with and took account of an open bundle of documents comprising of 208 pages and a closed bundle comprising of 20 pages of closed submissions, some of which were included in the open bundle in redacted form.[5]The Tribunal has carefully considered the documentary evidence, the written submissions of the Respondent, and the detailed oral submissions of the Appellant.
Background to Appeal
[6]The sequence of events giving rise to this appeal began on 24 February 2023, when the Appellant submitted a request to the British Museum under FOIA. In that request, she sought disclosure of “any current contract or formal agreement between BP and the British Museum, including any revisions or amendments” and additionally requested copies of any due diligence reporting undertaken in relation to BP.[7]The Museum responded on 27 March 2023, providing a number of documents. These included a sponsorship agreement dated May 2016, an amendment dated November 2020, and a series of related side-letters concerning specific exhibitions sponsored by BP. The Museum also stated that it did not hold recorded due diligence information within the scope of the request.[8]Following receipt of those materials, the Appellant wrote again on 12 April 2023 seeking clarification. In that correspondence, she expressed concern that the documents disclosed appeared to relate to a contract that had already expired. She referred specifically to the contractual term provisions, which indicated that the agreement would terminate either upon completion of the fifth sponsored exhibition or by 31 December 2023, whichever occurred sooner. She observed that the fifth exhibition had in fact closed in February 2023, and sought confirmation as to whether the contract remained current and, if so, why. She further asked whether any other contracts existed.[9]On 12 May 2023, the Museum responded to that request for clarification. It confirmed that parts of the previously disclosed agreement continued to operate. The explanation provided was that the Museum and BP had reached a verbal agreement under which BP would continue to exercise certain supporter benefits until the end of the 2023 calendar year. The Museum stated that this arrangement had been agreed in light of disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. It further confirmed that there were no other contracts or formal agreements in effect between the parties.[10]Around the same period, additional requests concerning the Museum’s relationship with BP were submitted by individuals associated with the same campaigning organisation as the Appellant, namely, Culture Unstained. One such request, dated 20 March 2023 and made by Leigh Day Solicitors, sought information relating to the status of the Museum’s sponsorship agreement with BP. The Appellant does not accept that the correspondence of Leigh Day Solicitors constituted a request under FOIA and avers that this enquiry was intended to run concurrently with the FOIA requests.[11]Another request made on 11 May 2023 by Dr Chris Garrard also of Culture Unstained, sought details and copies of correspondence, agendas, and meeting records relating to communications between the Museum and BP during the period January to March 2023, as well as internal discussions concerning the future of the relationship.[12]On 7 June 2023, the Appellant submitted the request which is central to the present appeal. That request was framed in four parts as follows: “(1) Please could you explain how this “verbal agreement” is compatible with the Contract documents you provided, for example, the Contract documents you provided, for example, clause 13.1 1 “This Agreement […] may not be modified except by an instrument in Agreement writing […] may not be modified except by an instrument in writing signed by the duly authorised representatives of the parties” signed by the duly authorised representatives of the parties” and also Section 16 on Notices, concerning ‘communications required or permitted Section 16 on Notices, concerning ‘communications required or permitted to be given by or pursuant to this Agreement’? be given by or pursuant to this Agreement’? If the contract had been amended If the contract had been amended why were records of this not disclosed in response to my original request? response to my original request? (2) Please could you provide what records do exist of this variation to the contract being proposed, and of an contract being proposed, and of an agreement being made. This should include the details of who [was] involved in agreeing it, when it was agreed, include the details of who [was] involved in agreeing it, when it was agreed, what was agreed and how it was recorded. I imagine what was agreed and how it was recorded. I relevant material could imagine relevant material could include, but may not be limited to: email records involving include, but may not be limited to: email records those with the involving those with the authority to make the agreements or those who may have to authority implement it; to make the agreements or those who may have to implement it; records of telephone calls and notes from these calls; briefing papers records of or telephone calls and notes from these calls; briefing papers or discussion documents; notes from internal meetings or from meetings discussion documents; notes from internal meetings or from meetings with BP, and records on any corporate support BP, data management systems. and records on any corporate support data management systems. (3) Please provide records of how this variation to the agreement (3) Please provide records of how this variation to the agreement was communicated internally in order for the supporter communicated benefits to continue to be internally in order for the supporter benefits to continue to be exercised. (4) Please could you confirm if any other “verbal agreements,” or any other agreements not previously disclosed, agreements exist between the Museum and BP; not previously disclosed, exist between the Museum and BP; relating to relating to(a) this contract, its extension or renewal, or(b) any potential new or different contracts between the Museum and BP”
relating to relating to
[13]On 5 July 2023, the Museum issued a refusal notice in response to that request. It did not confirm whether the requested information was held. Instead, it relied on section 12(2) of FOIA, stating that the cost of complying with the request would exceed the appropriate limit. It further explained that it had aggregated the Appellant’s request with other requests made within a period of 60 working days by individuals linked to the same organisation pursuant to section 12(4) FOIA. The Museum took the position that those requests concerned the same or similar subject matter, namely its relationship with BP, and that they formed part of a coordinated series of enquiries. On that basis, it concluded that it was entitled to rely on section 12(2) without complying with its s.1(1) obligation to confirm nor deny whether it held the requested information in that to ascertain whether information was held would exceed the appropriate cost limit.[14]The Appellant sought an internal review on 31 August 2023, challenging both the application of section 12 and the decision to treat her request dated 7 June 2023 as a new request rather than as part of the ongoing review of the original February request. She contended that the requests should not have been aggregated and that the Museum had not adequately explained or justified its cost estimate. The Museum conducted an internal review and, on 26 September 2023, upheld its original decision. It maintained that the aggregation provisions were properly engaged, that the cost of compliance would exceed the statutory limit, and that it was therefore entitled to rely on section 12(2).[15]Following its refusal of the request under section 12, the Museum advised the Appellant and those associated with Culture Unstained that requests should be made more concisely, that the number of requests submitted within a 60-working-day period should be reduced, and that where multiple individuals were seeking information on the same subject, they should coordinate their requests to minimise the likelihood of aggregation under the Fees Regulations. The Museum also indicated that a fresh request could be submitted after the expiry of the 60-working-day period and suggested that any future request should be narrower in scope. Although the advice provided was general rather than request-specific, the Commissioner concluded that it was sufficient to satisfy the duty to provide reasonable advice and assistance under section 16.[16]The Appellant then brought a complaint to the IC on 3 November 2023 under section 50 FOIA. During the course of the IC’s investigation, the Museum provided detailed submissions as to the scope and scale of the searches that would be required in order to determine whether relevant information was held. These submissions included descriptions of the systems in which records were stored, the number of staff and departments whose records might need to be searched, and the results of sampling exercises using various search terms. The Appellant was not provided with those details at the time of the refusal, but they were subsequently made available through the investigation process.[17]Further correspondence between the IC and the Museum took place in February and March 2024, culminating in the issuance of the IC’s decision notice on 18 April 2024.
The IC Decision Notice
[18]In his Decision Notice (“DN”), the IC considered whether the British Museum had been entitled to rely on section 12 FOIA to refuse the Appellant’s request and, in particular, whether it was lawful to aggregate multiple requests pursuant to section 12(4) and to rely on section 12(2) to neither confirm nor deny whether information was held.[19]The IC identified a series of requests made between February and June 2023, including requests by the Appellant and others associated with Culture Unstained, all relating to the Museum’s relationship with BP. Applying section 12(4) FOIA together with the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (“the Fees Regulations”), the IC concluded that most of those requests could properly be aggregated. He found that they concerned the same or similar information and appeared to have been made in concert or as part of a coordinated campaign. One request, dated 12 April 2023, was accepted to be an internal review rather than a fresh request and was not included, but this did not affect the overall outcome.[20]In assessing whether the cost limit was exceeded, the IC considered the evidence provided by the Museum as to the work required to determine whether information was held. This included explanations of how relevant records were stored across multiple systems and teams, and the results of sampling exercises using keyword searches. The IC accepted that those searches generated a substantial volume of material and that reviewing that material would require time well in excess of the 18-hour limit prescribed by the Fees Regulations.[21]On that basis, the IC was satisfied that the cost of confirming or denying whether information was held would exceed the appropriate limit. He therefore concluded that section 12(2) FOIA was engaged and that the Museum was entitled to refuse to confirm or deny whether it held the requested information.[22]Finally, the IC addressed section 16 FOIA and concluded that the Museum had provided reasonable advice and assistance. Although the advice was general, it was considered sufficient in the context of multiple overlapping requests, including suggestions that requests be narrowed and coordinated to avoid aggregation.[23]The IC therefore upheld the Museum’s position and did not require any further steps to be taken.
Appellant’s Submissions
[24]The Appellant advances a sustained challenge to the Commissioner’s decision on the basis that it fails properly to scrutinise the British Museum’s reliance on section 12 FOIA and, in particular, the conclusion that section 12(2) was engaged. Her grounds of appeal are directed both to the methodology underpinning the cost estimate and to procedural shortcomings which, she submits, materially affected her ability to engage with the request process.[25]The Appellant’s case is that the cost estimate accepted by the Commissioner was fundamentally flawed because it was derived from an unduly broad and indiscriminate search strategy. She submits that the Museum relied on generic search terms, including “benefits”, “corporate supporter”, and “discount”, which were not confined to the specific subject matter of her request. In her submission, those terms would inevitably capture large volumes of material relating to other corporate sponsors and unrelated activities of the Museum, thereby inflating the volume of results and the time said to be required to review them. She argues that, by adopting such wide search parameters, the Museum effectively generated the very burden upon which it then relied to justify refusal.[26]The Appellant contrasts that approach with what she describes as a reasonable and proportionate alternative methodology. She submits that the Museum should have utilised more targeted searches, for example by combining terms such as “BP” with “benefits”, “agreement”, or “extension”. In her contention, such searches would have focused the exercise directly on the contractual relationship in issue and would have significantly reduced the number of documents requiring review. She maintains that there is no adequate explanation in the Commissioner’s decision notice as to why such an approach was not adopted, or why broader terms were said to be necessary. She submits that the IC accepted the Museum’s evidence at face value, without sufficient critical analysis of the assumptions made, particularly as to the choice of search terms and the representativeness of the sampling exercises.[27]The Appellant further submits that the Museum’s reliance on section 12(2) was misplaced because it could and should have been able to confirm that no relevant information was held (if indeed this was the case) without the need for an extensive search exercise. She argues that the subject matter of her request i.e. the making of a verbal agreement extending a significant commercial arrangement, would, if documented at all, involve a limited number of senior individuals and would reasonably be expected to exist in identifiable locations, such as the email accounts of those directly involved. In her submission, the Museum’s position that it would be necessary to conduct wide-ranging searches across numerous departments and systems in order to determine whether such information was held is implausible and unsupported by evidence.[28]In this context, the Appellant emphasises that her argument is not whether the information is held, but rather that the work required to establish whether information is held has been exaggerated. She submits that a proportionate and targeted inquiry would have enabled the Museum to at least confirm or deny whether the information was held within the cost limit prescribed by the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004.[29]The Appellant also relies upon an alleged inconsistency in the Museum’s subsequent conduct, namely that a later request, said to be substantially similar in scope, resulted in the disclosure of only a very limited amount of material. She submits that this undermines the credibility of the earlier assertion that determining whether information was held would involve reviewing thousands of documents and require in excess of 100 hours’ work. In her contention, this discrepancy casts serious doubt on the reliability of the cost estimate accepted by the Commissioner.[30]A further ground of appeal concerns the Museum’s compliance with its duty under section 16 FOIA. Section 16 FOIA requires a public authority to provide reasonable advice and assistance to a requester. The duty is intended to help applicants formulate or refine requests, particularly where a request may otherwise be refused under section 12 on cost grounds.[31]The Appellant submits that the advice and assistance provided to her was generic and inadequate, and failed to engage with the substance of her request. She states that she was not given any meaningful guidance as to how her request might be refined so as to fall within the cost limit. In particular, she emphasises that she was not informed of the nature of the searches the Museum considered necessary, nor of the factors contributing to the cost estimate.[32]The Appellant places particular weight on the fact that no cost estimate or detailed explanation was provided at the time of refusal. She submits that she only became aware of the basis on which the Museum had calculated the cost during the course of the IC’s investigation. In her submission, this deprived her of a fair opportunity to engage constructively with the Museum and to reformulate her request in a way that might have rendered it manageable. She argues that, had she been informed at the relevant time that the breadth of the search terms or the scope of the request was driving the cost, she would have been willing to limit the request, for example by specifying particular individuals, date ranges, or narrower subject matter.[33]The Appellant therefore contends that the IC erred in concluding that the duty under section 16 had been satisfied. She submits that the provision of general advice about making requests more concise, or coordinating requests within an organisation, does not meet the statutory requirement where it does not meaningfully assist the requester to obtain the information sought.[34]Finally, the Appellant challenges the aggregation of requests under section 12(4). She questions whether the IC sufficiently examined whether the various requesters were genuinely acting “in concert or in pursuance of a campaign,” or whether the similarity of subject matter alone was taken as determinative. However, her primary focus remains on the reasonableness of the cost estimate and the adequacy of the Museum’s engagement with her request.[35]Taken together, the Appellant’s submissions amount to a contention that the Commissioner’s decision rests on an insufficiently critical acceptance of the Museum’s evidence, that the cost limit has been engaged by an overly expansive and unjustified search methodology, and that the procedural protections afforded to requesters under FOIA, particularly section 16, have not been properly observed.
Respondent’s Submissions
[36]The Respondent resists the appeal and relies upon the reasoning set out in the DN, maintaining that the IC’s conclusions were correct in law and should be upheld. It is submitted, first, that the British Museum was entitled to aggregate the relevant requests pursuant to section 12(4) FOIA and the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004. The Respondent contends that the requests were made within the relevant period of 60 working days, concerned the same or similar subject matter, namely the Museum’s relationship with BP, and were made by individuals connected to the same organisation such that they appeared to be acting in concert or in pursuance of a coordinated campaign.[37]The Respondent further submits that the Commissioner was entitled to accept the Museum’s evidence as to the scope and extent of the searches required to determine whether information was held. It is argued that the nature of the request necessitated searches across a range of systems and custodians, including multiple departments and senior staff, and that relevant information, if held, could exist in various formats. In that context, the Respondent maintains that the use of broader search terms was reasonable, as limiting searches to references explicitly containing “BP” would risk failing to identify material described in more general or indirect terms.[38]In relation to the cost estimate, the Respondent contends that the Museum’s methodology, including its sampling exercises, provided a rational and evidentially sufficient basis for concluding that the work required would exceed the statutory limit. The IC states that he was entitled to find that the estimate was sensible, realistic, and supported by cogent evidence which suggested that a full search would take in excess of 350 hours and a targeted search in excess of 130 hours. On that basis, the Respondent submits that section 12(2) FOIA was properly engaged, since the cost of determining whether information was held would itself exceed the limit prescribed by the Fees Regulations.[39]Finally, the Respondent submits that the duty to provide advice and assistance under section 16 FOIA was fulfilled. While the advice given was general in nature, it is contended that it was reasonable in the circumstances, particularly given the volume and overlap of requests. The Respondent further argues that there is no requirement under FOIA for a public authority to provide a detailed cost breakdown at the time of refusal, and that the absence of such detail does not undermine the lawfulness of the decision.
Legal Framework
[1]The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows: 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities.(1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. 58 Determination of appeals. (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based[12]Exemption where cost of compliance exceeds appropriate limit. [...] (2) Subsection (1) does not exempt the public authority from its obligation to comply with paragraph (a) of section 1(1) unless the estimated cost of complying with that paragraph alone would exceed the appropriate limit. [...] (4). The [Minister for the Cabinet Office] may by regulations provide that, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, where two or more requests for information are made to a public authority— (a)by one person, or (b)by different persons who appear to the public authority to be acting in concert or in pursuance of a campaign, the estimated cost of complying with any of the requests is to be taken to be the estimated total cost of complying with all of them.[16]Duty to provide advice and assistance.(1) It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it.(2) Any public authority which, in relation to the provision of advice or assistance in any case, conforms with the code of practice under section 45 is to be taken to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation to that case. 40. The Tribunal has had regard to the principles set out in Randall v Information Commissioner and Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (EA/2007/0004), namely that a section 12 estimate must be sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence. The Tribunal has also considered the authorities relied upon by the Appellant concerning section 16 FOIA, namely Roberts v Information Commissioner (EA/2008/0050) and All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner and Ministry of Defence [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC).
Issues before the Tribunal
[41]The issues for the Tribunal to determine are:a. Whether the requests were lawfully aggregated under section 12(4) FOIA and the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004;b. Whether section 12(2) FOIA was properly engaged so as to justify the refusal to confirm or deny whether information was held and;c. Whether the British Museum complied with its duty to provide reasonable advice and assistance under section 16 FOIA.
Discussion and Conclusions
[42]The Tribunal has carefully considered all the evidence before it, including the documentary record, the written submissions of the Respondent, and the detailed oral submissions made by the Appellant. The Tribunal also bears in mind that neither the Commissioner nor the British Museum attended the hearing, and therefore particular care has been taken to ensure that the Appellant’s arguments have been fully explored and fairly tested.[43]In relation to aggregation, the Tribunal is satisfied that the IC was entitled to conclude that the requests were properly aggregated under section 12(4) FOIA. The requests in question were made within the relevant time period and clearly concerned the same overarching subject matter, namely the Museum’s relationship with BP. The Tribunal also accepts that the Commissioner was entitled to conclude that the requesters appeared to be acting in concert or in pursuance of a campaign, given their association with Culture Unstained and the coordinated nature of the requests. Whilst one of the requests was properly excluded from aggregation, the remaining requests were sufficient to engage the provision.[44]The Tribunal has considered whether the Commissioner was entitled to conclude that the British Museum had reasonably relied upon section 12(2) FOIA. In considering whether section 12 is engaged, the Tribunal recognises that the burden lies upon the Respondent to establish that the cost of determining whether information is held would exceed the appropriate limit and the Tribunal has applied the approach set out in Randall v Information Commissioner and Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (EA/2007/0004), namely that a public authority's estimate need not be exact but must be “sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence”.[45]A substantial part of the Appellant’s case is directed at the methodology underpinning the Museum’s estimate, and in particular the use of what she characterises as overbroad search terms. The Tribunal accepts that this submission was articulated with clarity and specificity. The Appellant identified, in particular, the use of terms such as “benefits” and “corporate supporter” without restriction, and she argued that this inevitably resulted in the identification of a large volume of material unrelated to BP. The Tribunal accepts that this criticism has force to the extent that broad search terms will, in many contexts, generate a wider pool of results.[46]However, the Tribunal is not persuaded that this establishes that the Museum’s approach was unreasonable or unrealistic. The Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s submission that the purpose of a search methodology in the FOIA context is not merely to minimise the number of results, but to ensure that all potentially relevant information is identified. In circumstances where internal communications may refer to a corporate relationship in generic terms rather than by naming the sponsor directly, the Tribunal considers it reasonable for a public authority to adopt search terms which capture such usage. The Appellant’s proposed alternative, namely restricting searches to terms combining “BP” with other keywords, may well reduce volume, but it carries a real risk of excluding relevant material described in more general language. The Tribunal does not consider that FOIA requires a public authority to adopt a search strategy which prioritises speed or convenience at the expense of completeness.[47]The Tribunal has also considered the Appellant's submission that it was unclear whether the cost estimate relied upon by the Museum had been generated at the time of the request or only subsequently during the Commissioner's investigation. The Tribunal does not consider that the evidence supports the suggestion that the estimate was entirely retrospective. In particular, the Museum's submissions to the Commissioner explain that, when the request was first received, the Information Governance Team met with relevant stakeholders and undertook an informal sampling exercise to identify the likely volume of records that might fall within scope. The Museum recorded that those discussions indicated that significant volumes of emails and other records were potentially relevant. Whilst the more detailed calculations and breakdowns appear to have been provided during the Commissioner's investigation, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Museum had undertaken a contemporaneous assessment of the likely burden of compliance and that the estimate ultimately relied upon was not created solely for the purposes of the Commissioner's investigation.[48]The Tribunal also notes that the request of 7 June 2023 was framed in particularly broad terms. The Appellant sought not only records of the alleged verbal agreement itself, but also any information relating to its proposal, discussion, implementation and communication within the Museum. The request expressly referred to a wide range of potential record types, including emails, records of telephone calls, notes of calls, briefing papers, discussion documents, records of internal meetings, records of meetings with BP and records held on corporate supporter management systems. The request further stated that the information sought “may include, but is not limited to” those categories. In the Tribunal’s view, the breadth of the wording used supports the Museum’s position that a substantial search exercise would have been required in order to determine whether information was held and reinforces the reasonableness of the estimate accepted by the Commissioner.[49]The Tribunal has considered whether the Appellant has demonstrated that a more targeted search would in fact have brought the exercise within the 18-hour limit. While the Appellant asserts that this would be so, the Tribunal notes that no evidential basis has been advanced for quantifying the extent to which the volume of material would be reduced. In contrast, the IC had before him evidence derived from sampling exercises indicating that even searches undertaken within narrower parameters generated substantial volumes of material requiring review. The Tribunal considers that the IC was entitled to regard that evidence as providing a rational basis for the estimate.[50]Turning to the Appellant’s submission that the Museum could have confirmed that no information was held quite easily, the Tribunal does not accept that this proposition is made out on the evidence. Indeed, section 12(2) expressly recognises that the cost of determining whether information is held may itself exceed the statutory limit.The Tribunal accepts that a public authority cannot simply assert that no information is held without undertaking a level of inquiry sufficient to support that conclusion. The question, therefore, is whether the inquiry required in order to reach that conclusion would itself exceed the appropriate limit. In the present case, the Tribunal considers that the IC was entitled to accept that, in light of the dispersed nature of the Museum’s records and the number of individuals potentially involved, a non-trivial search exercise would be required even to establish whether relevant information existed. The Appellant’s submission that such an agreement would necessarily be recorded in a small number of obvious locations remains an assertion rather than a demonstrated fact and does not displace the evidence relied upon by the IC.[51]The Tribunal has carefully considered the Appellant's reliance upon her later request of 18 October 2023. The Tribunal accepts that the later request covered substantially the same subject matter as the request presently under consideration and that the Museum ultimately responded substantively, disclosing a limited amount of information consisting principally of a single email. The Tribunal accepts that this apparent inconsistency formed a legitimate basis upon which the Appellant questioned the reasonableness of the Museum's earlier estimate and the Commissioner was correct to consider that argument. However, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the later response demonstrates that the original estimate was unreasonable. The fact that a subsequent search ultimately identified only a limited amount of information does not of itself establish that the earlier estimate of the work required to identify, locate and review potentially relevant material was flawed. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner was entitled, on the evidence before him, to conclude that the Museum's estimate remained sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence notwithstanding the outcome of the later request.[52]The Tribunal turns finally to the issue of advice and assistance under section 16 FOIA. The Appellant submits that she was not provided with meaningful guidance nor did the Museum engage in any dialogue as to how her request might be refined, and places particular weight on the fact that she was not provided with a cost estimate at the time of refusal. The Tribunal accepts that the advice provided by the Museum was general in nature and did not engage in detail with the specific content of the request. However, the statutory duty is one of reasonableness, not of optimal or ideal assistance. The Tribunal is satisfied that, viewed in the round and in the context of the requests being made, the Museum discharged its obligations under section 16. The Museum explained that multiple requests concerning the same subject matter were being aggregated, advised that requests should be made more concisely and with a narrower scope, suggested that individuals associated with the same campaign coordinate their requests, and indicated that further requests could be submitted after the expiry of the relevant 60-working-day period. The Museum also acknowledged that greater assistance could have been provided initially. Section 16 requires reasonable advice and assistance, not the provision of ideal or exhaustive guidance in every case. Having regard to the nature of the requests, the volume of overlapping correspondence concerning the Museum’s relationship with BP, and the information ultimately provided to the Appellant during the internal review process, the Tribunal is satisfied that it was reasonably open to the Commissioner to conclude that the requirements of section 16 had been met.[53]Drawing these strands together, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner approached the matter on the correct legal basis and was entitled, on the evidence before him, to conclude that the requests were correctly aggregated and that the cost of determining whether information was held would exceed the appropriate limit. The Tribunal does not consider that the Appellant has demonstrated any material error of law or fact in that conclusion. Whilst the Tribunal acknowledges the care and persistence with which the Appellant has advanced her case, and the legitimate questions she raises about the underlying subject matter, those considerations do not displace the statutory framework within which this appeal must be determined.[54]Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the appeal must be dismissed. Signed Judge Mornington Date: 15 July 2026