JUDGE STEPHEN ROPERMEMBER RAZ EDWARDSMEMBER PAUL TAYLOR
Between
AF (anonymous)AppellantTHE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentin person for Appellantdid not appear and was not represented for RespondentDecision: The appeal is AllowedSubstituted Decision Notice:The Tribunal’s Decision Notice in case reference FT/EA/2025/0426, set out below, is substituted for Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice, reference IC-377493-N7P6, dated 21 October 2025, with regard to the two requests for information sent to the National Lottery Community Fund dated 13 February 2025, as more particularly described in the Tribunal’s decision below.Substituted Decision Notice
[1]The National Lottery Community Fund (the “Fund”) must make a fresh response to the two requests for information sent to it dated 13 February 2025, as more particularly described in the Tribunal’s decision below.[2]Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4 below, the fresh response must disclose any such information if it is held, or claim any relevant exemptions to disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the “Act”).[3]The Fund is not obliged to respond in accordance with paragraph 2 above if and to the extent that the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in accordance with any applicable provision of the Act. However, if the duty to confirm or deny does not arise then the Fund must cite the applicable exemption and its reasons in its fresh response.[4]The Fund may not withhold any of the requested information in reliance on section 14 of the Act.[5]The Fund must issue the fresh response within 35 days of this decision being sent to it in accordance with the directions below, or (if there is an application to appeal this decision) within 28 days after being notified of an unsuccessful outcome to such application or any resulting appeal.[6]The fresh response (and any applicable disclosure of information pursuant to paragraph 2 above) will be subject to the rights given under section 50 of the Act to make a new complaint to the Information Commissioner.[7]Failure to comply with this decision may result in the Tribunal making written certification of this fact pursuant to section 61 of the Act and may be dealt with as a contempt of court. Directions The Information Commissioner is directed to send a copy of this decision to The National Lottery Community Fund within 14 days of its promulgation. REASONS
Preliminary matters
[1]Pursuant to an Order and Case Management Directions issued by the Tribunal dated 16 January 2026, the Appellant was granted anonymity and accordingly is referred to only as ‘AF’ in this decision.[2]In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: Commissioner: The Information Commissioner (the Respondent). Decision Notice: The Decision Notice of the Commissioner dated 21 October 2025, reference IC-377493-N7P6, relating to the Requests. Dispute: The alleged dispute between the Appellant and Fund referred to in paragraph 11.a. Dransfield: The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Information Commissioner v Devon County Fund & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) and of the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Fund [2015] EWCA Civ 454. FOIA: The Freedom of Information Act 2000. Fund: National Lottery Community Fund. Internal Review Letter: The Fund’s letter to the Appellant dated 11 April 2025, giving the outcome of its internal review (referred to in paragraph 8). Requests: The two requests for information made to the Fund by the Appellant dated 13 February 2025, as set out in paragraph 5. Requested Information: The information which was requested by way of the Requests. Site: The site of the Fund’s former office.[3]Unless the context otherwise requires (or as otherwise expressly stated), references in this decision:a. to numbered paragraphs are references to paragraphs of this decision so numbered;b. to any section are references to the applicable section of FOIA;c. to the Commissioner’s “investigation” mean his investigation, for the purposes of section 50, of the Appellant’s complaint relating to the Fund’s response to the Requests.
Introduction
[4]This was an appeal against the Decision Notice, which (in summary) decided that section 14(1) applied in respect of the Requests and accordingly that the Fund was entitled to refuse them. Background to the Appeal The Requests
Background to the Appeal
[5]On 13 February 2025, the Appellant contacted the Fund and made the following two requests for information: Request 1 “I am submitting this request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) to obtain records related to the National Lottery Community Fund’s (NLCF) expenditure on legal disputes, handling of complaints, and governance decisions regarding privacy concerns and public accountability.[1]Legal Expenditure and Resources Please provide a breakdown of:a. The total amount of public funds spent by NLCF on legal disputes and litigation between 2014 and 2025.b. The specific budget allocated for handling legal claims and complaints over the past ten years.c. A detailed breakdown of legal expenses incurred in handling disputes with private individuals, including external legal counsel costs, in-house legal team costs, and settlement payments made between 2014 and 2025.d. The number of legal disputes initiated by NLCF against private individuals or external entities over the past ten years. Any financial justifications or assessments regarding the decision to litigate rather than resolve disputes through alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 2. Resources Allocated to Complaint Handling Related to [the Site] a. Please provide details regarding any complaints, disputes, or internal concerns raised in relation to [the Site] (where NLCF was based), specifically: b. The number of internal meetings held from 2014-2019 to discuss privacy, legal, or neighbour-related complaints concerning the operational impact of NLCF’s office at [the Site]. c. The time spent by staff (internal legal team, facilities management, or senior executives) handling complaints related to neighbour concerns and privacy issues. d. Any internal emails, reports, or communications referencing neighbour- related issues from the office at to [the Site].e. The cost of any measures undertaken in response to neighbour complaints, including legal consultation, privacy mitigation efforts, or settlement costs.f. A timeline of decisions regarding privacy-related mitigation strategies, including any internal assessments of installing frosted glass or other privacy barriers. 3. Internal Communications and Decision-Making Regarding Visual Intrusion and Privacy Concerns a. Copies of any internal correspondence (emails, memos, meeting notes, legal opinions) related to privacy complaints made by residents neighbouring to [the Site]. b. Any legal or risk assessments conducted regarding the potential for legal action due to privacy concerns from neighbouring properties. c. Any internal documents discussing whether NLCF was advised to mitigate privacy issues earlier but chose not to act. d. Any records showing why privacy measures (e.g., frosted glass) were delayed until 2019 despite prior complaints. 4. Governance & Complaint-Handling Policies a. Copies of NLCF’s official complaints-handling policies in place between 2014-2025. b. Any internal whistleblowing reports or concerns raised by staff regarding governance failures. c. Details of any external audits or oversight assessments conducted on NLCF’s complaint-handling practices over the past ten years. d. A breakdown of public complaints received between 2014 and 2025, including: e. The total number of complaints logged each year. f. The number of complaints that proceeded to legal action.g. The number of complaints resolved via settlement or alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 5. Records of Meetings and Costs Incurred Handling My Complaint a. How many internal and external meetings were held regarding neighbour disputes and complaints about the building’s glass design? b. How much money was spent on legal consultation, external law firms, and internal management time related to handling my case? c. Copies of meeting agendas and minutes discussing handling of the privacy complaints at [the Site]. d. Any discussions regarding my complaint specifically, including legal strategy considerations or risk assessments regarding litigation. 6. Governance Justifications for Litigation Against Private Individuals a. A list of all legal claims initiated by NLCF against private individuals from 2014-2025, specifying the nature of the disputes. b. Any cost-benefit analysis justifying litigation instead of early resolution. c. Any internal legal discussions on whether prolonged legal fights were justified from a public governance perspective.” Request 2 “1. Internal Communications Regarding the Decision to Refuse Further Engagement Please provide: All internal emails, memos, and meeting minutes from 2024–2025 that discuss the decision to refuse further correspondence with me, including but not limited to discussions between senior management, legal teams, and complaints-handling officers. All communications between NLCF’s complaints team and senior leadership discussing their final stance on my case. Any internal guidance documents used to justify the refusal to engage. Any discussions about potential reputational risks or regulatory consequences in relation to my complaint. 2. Internal Justification for Declaring My Claim “Without Merit” Please provide: Any legal assessments, risk assessments, or internal reviews discussing why my claim was deemed “without merit” in both the January and February 2025 letters. Copies of any emails, reports, or legal opinions used as a basis for making this determination. Any discussions with external legal counsel or DCMS regarding how to respond to my claim. 3. Communications Regarding the Handling of My Previous Correspondence & Complaints All internal discussions about how to handle my complaints from 2014 to 2025. Any complaints-handling policies that applied to my case. Any internal reviews conducted regarding ongoing disputes with neighbours at [the Site]. Copies of any past internal emails regarding meetings with me or discussions about my concerns. 4. Internal Discussions on Legal Cost Recovery Strategy All internal communications regarding legal cost recovery strategies against private individuals. Any cost-benefit analysis discussing the financial impact of pursuing legal action against complainants. Any past cases where NLCF sought cost recovery from individual complainants.”[6]The Fund responded on 13 March 2025. It refused the Requests, citing section 14(1), giving reasons under the headings of “Repeated Nature of Correspondence”, “Disproportionate Burden on Resources”, “Intent to Harass or Pursue a Personal Grievance”, “Abuse of FOIA as a Legal Discovery Mechanism” and “Ongoing Pattern of Disruption”.[7]By letter dated 14 March 2025, the Appellant contacted the Fund requesting an internal review.[8]The Fund responded with the outcome of its internal review on 11 April 2025, upholding its position.[9]The Appellant complained to the Commissioner on the same date about the Fund’s response to the Requests.[10]The Commissioner subsequently issued the Decision Notice.
The Decision Notice
[11]In the Decision Notice, the Commissioner referred to various points made by the Fund regarding its position that the Requests were vexatious, including with reference to its statements that:a. The Requests arose directly from a dispute between the Fund and the Appellant, concerning the proximity of the Site to the Appellant’s residential property and related privacy issues.b. It considered that the Dispute was resolved in 2019, after the Fund had installed privacy measures at the Site (namely, frosting on its windows).c. After the Dispute was apparently resolved, the Appellant had subsequently (and on several occasions) indicated an intention to pursue the matter through the courts.d. Within the Requests, there appeared to be an expectation of disclosure of the Fund’s own legal advice regarding the Appellant’s prospects of success regarding the Dispute, which would be exempt under section 42 (legal professional privilege).e. The Requests formed part of a wider pattern of correspondence, including multiple Subject Access Requests, repeated challenges to responses, and escalation to other bodies. The cumulative effect had been a disproportionate and unjustified burden on the Fund, often accompanied by unacceptable behaviour towards the Fund’s employees.f. It recognised the importance of transparency and, where appropriate, compromise in resolving disputes. The Fund had previously attempted to engage with the Appellant regarding the Dispute, but each engagement had been followed by harassment, abuse, a lack of engagement by the Appellant, further demands and subsequent challenges.g. This persistent pattern, including “repeated” appeals to the Commissioner and the Fund’s “parent department” appeared designed to exert pressure on the Fund to engage in relation to the Appellant’s claims regarding the Dispute (which the Fund considered are wholly without merit).[12]The Decision Notice also recorded the Fund’s views that:a. taken together, the Appellant’s conduct and the scope of the Requests have caused disruption and distress to employees and form part of a broader campaign; andb. in that context, there were no reasonable steps which it could have taken to refine the Requests or partially disclose information without perpetuating the same cycle of dispute.[13]The Decision Notice recorded that the Appellant denied the Fund’s claims that the Requests are repetitive, burdensome, or made to harass staff. It also referred to the Appellant’s views that (amongst other things):a. the Requests concern legal expenditure, privacy complaint governance, and internal communications regarding the Site, and that these were matters of clear public interest;b. no evidence had been provided to substantiate claims of burden or disruption; andc. the Fund failed to comply with its duty under section 16 to assist them in refining the Requests.[14]The Decision Notice recorded the Commissioner’s views that:a. the Requests may have a value to the Appellant but the Requested Information had limited wider public value;b. the motive behind the Requests appeared to be to re-open a matter which was resolved six years previously and to put pressure on the Fund to resolve the Dispute through payment of compensation to the Appellant;c. the Requests are voluminous and responding to them, alone, would without doubt cause a burden to the Fund but they are the latest element of a long running correspondence with the Appellant which had been burdensome for the Fund and its staff to deal with;d. the Appellant’s past inappropriate behaviours against the Fund’s staff would have caused staff a good deal of nuisance, agitation and distress - and re-opening the Dispute which the Fund’s staff would have considered closed many years ago would also cause staff to feel burdened and harassed;e. he saw no reason to doubt the veracity of the Fund’s account of the Appellant’s behaviours, and the effect of these on its staff;f. the Appellant gave every indication in 2019 that they were satisfied that the Fund had frosted its windows and that they considered that the matter was closed; andg. using FOIA six years later to harass the Fund and as a way to exert pressure on it to achieve a particular outcome regarding the Dispute was an entirely inappropriate use of FOIA.[15]The Commissioner concluded that such value as the Requests have to the Appellant were significantly outweighed by the factors of motive, burden, and harassment to the Fund’s staff. The Commissioner therefore determined that the Requests were vexatious and that the Fund was entitled to rely upon section 14(1) to refuse them.[16]The Commissioner also noted in the Decision Notice that, in respect of the Appellant’s view that the Fund failed to comply with its duty under section 16, a public authority has no duty to offer an applicant advice and assistance in relation to a request which it considers to be vexatious.[17]The Decision Notice did not require the Fund to take any further steps. The appeal The grounds of appeal
The appeal
[18]The Appellant’s grounds of appeal argued that the Decision Notice was wrong for the following reasons:a. Procedural unfairness: The Commissioner made adverse findings about alleged harassment, distress and behavioural patterns without contacting the Appellant, disclosing the allegations and without giving any right of reply.b. Reliance on untested and contradictory assertions: The Fund provided inconsistent accounts of the Appellant’s FOIA history and conduct. The Commissioner accepted those assertions without verification and ignored earlier correspondence from the Fund confirming that the Appellant had submitted only a limited number of requests.c. Failure to consider relevant evidence: The Commissioner accepted the Fund’s claims about window frosting and resolution of the Dispute in 2019, despite documentary evidence from the landlord and managing agents of the Site confirming that no formal application was ever made and the frosting was not authorised.d. Omission of key proportionality evidence: The Commissioner failed to consider photographic evidence showing the Fund’s staff photographing the interior of the Appellant’s home, which explains the purpose, value and legitimacy of the Requests and should have been included in the assessment of them as vexatious.e. Misapplication of section 14(1): The Commissioner did not apply the purposive and holistic test required by Dransfield, and relied solely on alleged motive, burden and harassment without assessing the value or public-interest context of the Requests.f. Irrational reasoning: The Commissioner stated there was “no reason to doubt” the Fund’s account despite contradictions, missing documents, incomplete chronology, and evidence inconsistent with the Fund’s representations.[19]The Appellant expanded on these points in additional submissions supporting their grounds of appeal. The Appellant stated that, in summary, they challenged the Decision Notice on the basis that the Commissioner misapplied section 14(1), reached irrational findings of fact and failed to conduct a fair and lawful investigation.
The Commissioner’s response
[20]In his response, the Commissioner opposed the appeal, relying generally on the Decision Notice as setting out his findings and the reasons for those findings.
The Tribunal’s powers and role
[21]The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 58, as follows: “(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers—(a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or(b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may Review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.”.[22]In summary, therefore, the Tribunal’s remit for the purposes of the appeal was to consider whether the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Decision Notice was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts. Essentially, the Tribunal is empowered to undertake a ‘full merits review’ of the appeal before it (so far as the Decision Notice is concerned).
Mode of hearing
[23]The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal Panel and the Appellant joined remotely (the Appellant joining by telephone). The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.[24]The Commissioner did not attend the hearing and was not represented, having previously indicated that he was content to rely on the documentation in the appeal in his absence.[25]There were no interruptions of note during the hearing.
The evidence and submissions
[26]The Tribunal read and took account of an open bundle of evidence and pleadings. The open bundle included a witness statement given by the Appellant.[27]All of the contents of the bundles, including all of the submissions of the parties (as well as the Appellant’s submissions during the hearing) were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles The statutory framework General principles
The relevant legal principles
[28]Section 1(1) provides individuals with a general right of access to information held by public authorities. It provides: “Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.”.[29]In essence, under section 1(1), a person who has requested information from a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing whether it holds that information. If the public authority does hold the requested information, that person is entitled to have that information communicated to them. However, those entitlements are subject to the other provisions of FOIA, including some exemptions and qualifications which may apply even if the requested information is held by the public authority. Section 1(2) provides: “Subsection (1) has effect subject to the following provisions of this section and to the provisions of sections 2, 9, 12 and 14.”.[30]Accordingly, section 1(1) does not provide an unconditional right to be told whether or not a public authority holds any information, nor an unconditional right of access to any information which a public authority does hold. The rights contained in that section are subject to certain other provisions of FOIA, including section 14.
Section 14 – vexatious or repeated requests
[31]Section 14(1) provides: “(1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.”.[32]The term ‘vexatious’, used in section 14(1), is not defined in FOIA but has been interpreted by case law, to which we briefly refer below.
Section 16 – duty to provide advice and assistance
[33]Section 16(1) provides:
“It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it.”
.
Relevant case law
[34]We turn now to case law regarding the term ‘vexatious’ in section 14(1). As we have noted, it is not defined in FOIA but guidance on applying that term has been given in case law. We do not set out details of the case law but (as we mention below) it is helpful to refer, in our following discussions, to the following four broad issues or themes which were identified in Dransfield as being of potential relevance when deciding whether a request is vexatious:a. the burden (on the public authority and its staff);b. the motive (of the requester);c. the value or serious purpose of the request; andd. any harassment or distress (of and to staff).[35]It is also important to note that it has been made clear that those four issues or themes are not exhaustive and are not intended to create a formulaic checklist, and that a holistic approach needs to be taken in assessing whether a request is vexatious. It was stated by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield that: “…all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA.”.[36]Accordingly, the Tribunal should adopt a rounded approach, taking into account all the relevant factors, in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a particular request is vexatious. Discussion and findings The scope of the appeal/the Tribunal’s remit
Discussion and findings
[37]As we have noted, some of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal (and well as their subsequent submissions) related to the Commissioner’s investigation, including the Appellant’s views regarding procedural unfairness and regarding the Commissioner not taking relevant evidence into account and reaching irrational findings of fact.[38]The scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is as set out in paragraph 21 (and summarised in paragraph 22) and, in essence, relates to the lawfulness of the Decision Notice. Accordingly, other issues are beyond the Tribunal’s powers to determine and fall outside of the scope of the appeal.[39]Therefore the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (and consequently the scope of the appeal) does not extend to matters regarding the conduct of the Commissioner’s investigation prior to the issue of the Decision Notice. Put another way, the Tribunal does not conduct a judicial review of the Commissioner’s activities. It is therefore outside of our remit to consider, or make any finding in respect of, the Commissioner’s conduct of his investigation - and accordingly we have not addressed below any of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal insofar as they relate to that.[40]However, as we have noted, the Tribunal may review any relevant findings of fact in the Decision Notice and may come to a different decision regarding those facts. Essentially, the Tribunal is empowered to undertake a ‘full merits review’ of the appeal before it (so far as the Decision Notice is concerned). That is what we have done.[41]We would also briefly comment that the Appellant’s notice of appeal referred to a potential outcome that their complaint be remitted back to the Commissioner for a fresh investigation. Where an appeal succeeds, the Tribunal has no powers to remit matters back the Commissioner for reconsideration but only to substitute the Commissioner’s decision notice.
Whether the Requests were vexatious
[42]We turn now to the question of whether the Requests were vexatious for the purposes of section 14(1). We first note that we consider that it was appropriate for the two Requests to be considered together in the Decision Notice, given that both were sent to the Fund on the same date and generally related to the same subject matter. We have accordingly considered both Requests together in our decision, as though the Requested Information was the subject of a single request.[43]In our opinion, consideration of all four of the broad themes outlined in Dransfield is helpful, as part of our broad assessment as to whether the Requests were vexatious in all the circumstances, and given the references to those themes in the Decision Notice. We have accordingly commented on those four themes below, addressing some of the specific points in the Decision Notice which we have referred to.[44]However, we should stress that we have not been constrained or confined in any way by considering those four themes. On the contrary, we have adopted a holistic approach, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances, and we have been mindful that the fundamental consideration was whether or not the Requests were, essentially, a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA. Burden[45]As stated in Dransfield, the present or future burden on a public authority may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings with the person making the relevant request for information.[46]In this case, the Fund’s position (reflected in the Decision Notice) was that the Requests arose directly from the Dispute. This was not disputed by the Appellant; indeed (as we address below) the Appellant accepted that the Requests were made for reasons connected to (but not exclusively about) the Dispute, but the Appellant did not agree that the Dispute was resolved in 2019.[47]As noted in Dransfield, when considering the context and history of the previous course of dealings between a requester and the public authority, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests can potentially be particularly relevant factors in assessing whether a request can properly be characterised as vexatious.[48]The Decision Notice recorded the Fund’s view that the Requests form part of a wider pattern of correspondence (linked to its views that there was a broader “campaign”), the cumulative effect of which constituted a disproportionate and unjustified burden on the Fund. The wider pattern of correspondence was stated to include multiple Subject Access Requests, repeated challenges to responses, escalation to other bodies and repeated appeals to the Commissioner and to the Fund’s “parent department”.[49]Whilst the bundle contained copies of correspondence between the Appellant and the Fund, there was no further evidence before us supporting the Fund’s assertions regarding the nature and extent of the wider pattern of correspondence or the alleged ‘campaign’. By way of (non-exhaustive) example, we were not provided with a schedule or chronology of such correspondence or the wider course of dealings/alleged campaign. Likewise there was no witness statement or other supporting evidence setting out the impact which the course of dealings, or the alleged engagement of third parties, had on the Fund or its resources.[50]In respect of the reference to the “repeated” appeals to the Commissioner (in paragraph 26 of the Decision Notice), there was no evidence before us from the Commissioner regarding such alleged repeated appeals (or complaints) to him. The Appellant stated that they had made two Subject Access Requests to the Fund; one in 2019 and one which was more recent to (and preceding) the Requests. The Appellant accepted that they had made a complaint to the Commissioner regarding one of the Subject Access Requests, as they considered that the Fund’s response was incomplete (citing the example of an email being disclosed but not the attachment to it). The Appellant also stated that, apart from the Requests, they had made no other FOIA requests to the Fund and that the only other ‘appeal’ to the Commissioner had been regarding the Fund’s response to the Requests.[51]The Fund accepted, in the Internal Review Letter, that the Appellant had “submitted only a limited number of formal FOIA requests”. It was not clear what “number” of FOIA requests the Fund was referring to, but we only saw evidence of the two Requests (made on the same date). The Internal Review Letter also stated, however, that the Fund: “…has been subjected to sustained, direct, and increasingly inappropriate correspondence from you over a prolonged period. Prior to the Fund’s departure from [the Site] in 2020, there was extensive correspondence between yourself and our employees, some of which was deemed abusive and inappropriate. The records have already been disclosed to you in response to your recent Subject Access Request (SAR).”.[52]The Appellant’s evidence, which we accept, was (in essence) that they had made the Requests shortly after the most recent Subject Access Request, thinking that it was prudent to do so for the purposes of making a claim relating to the Dispute (see our further comments in paragraph 69). In our view, the fact that the Appellant made a Subject Access Request relatively close to the time of the Requests should not be taken into account as a material contributing factor to the issue of ‘burden’. This is partly based on our comments in paragraph 69, but also our other comments regarding burden.[53]Also, as we have noted, the Appellant accepted that they had made two Subject Access Requests to the Fund (one of which was made many years earlier, in 2019). There was no evidence before us, however, to support the Fund’s view that the Appellant had made “multiple” Subject Access Requests. In our view, given that the Appellant had a statutory entitlement to request access to their personal data and that only one such request was made close to the time of the Requests, little weight should be given in the appeal to the burden associated with the Subject Access Requests.[54]With regard to the Requests themselves, we agree with the Commissioner’s view in paragraph 38 of the Decision Notice that responding to them, alone, would cause a burden to the Fund. However, there was no evidence before us from the Fund regarding the extent of that burden (in other words, how difficult or time-consuming it would be to respond to the Requests). For example, at face value, it appears to us that much of the Requested Information could potentially be exempt under section 40(2) or (as the Fund itself suggested) section 42 – although we stress that we make no finding in that regard; rather we make this point merely to illustrate that it is difficult for us to ascertain the extent of the burden based purely on the wording of the Requests/the apparent extent of the Requested Information. We also do not know how much of the Requested Information is held by the Fund, or the extent to which the Fund could readily ascertain whether or not it holds the Requested Information. In the absence of such evidence, we consider that we cannot conclude that the burden relating to the Requests alone would be such that it would support a conclusion that they would be vexatious.[55]The Commissioner also commented in paragraph 38 of the Decision Notice that the Requests are the latest element of a long running correspondence with the Appellant which had been burdensome for the Fund and its staff to deal with. We accept that there had been correspondence between the Appellant and the Fund regarding the Dispute over a long period of time (albeit not to the extent alleged by the Fund as we have commented). Again, however, there was no relevant evidence before as to the nature and extent of such alleged burden.[56]In our opinion, the Fund’s position that the Requests were vexatious was more influenced by the identity of the Appellant and the Fund’s view of the Appellant’s motive for making the Requests (which we comment on below), rather than the burden of the Requests together with other correspondence. Our view is based, in part, on the lack of evidence from the Fund regarding the alleged burden but also based on our assessment of the nature and content of relevant material before us. For example, the Internal Review Letter stated: “Whilst the FOIA provides a right of access to public information, it does not provide an opportunity for individuals to… attempt to intimidate, manipulate, or extract information for the purposes of advancing legal claims. When considered in the broader context of your conduct, your recent FOIA requests represent an improper misuse of the legislation.”.[57]In our view, the above illustrates that the Fund took exception to the Appellant making the Requests for the purposes of seeking to take further steps regarding the Dispute. Given the absence of any evidence to support the Fund’s view about the Appellant’s conduct (which we refer to further below), we find that the Fund’s assertion that the Requests were a misuse of FOIA was based almost entirely on the ongoing nature of the Dispute. The Fund’s view, in the extract above, of the “broader context”, as well as the Fund’s other comments in the Internal Review Letter (noted above) that it had been subjected to “sustained correspondence” from the Appellant over a prolonged period, was evidently relating to the Dispute.[58]Moreover, the Fund’s view (as noted in paragraph 26 of the Decision Notice) was that the Appellant’s correspondence appeared designed to exert pressure on the Fund to engage in relation to the Appellant’s claims regarding the Dispute. The Fund was also concerned (as noted in paragraph 14 of the Decision Notice) about the Appellant’s apparent expectation of disclosure of the Fund’s legal advice regarding the Dispute. The contents of the Internal Review Letter which we have set out in paragraph 68 also clearly show that the Fund considered that the Requests were made either as retaliatory for the Fund’s refusal to engage in early dispute resolution and/or to put pressure on it regarding the Dispute.[59]For the above reasons, we find that there was little evidence to support the Fund’s views about the burden of the Requests and the Appellant’s prior correspondence. In contrast, we consider that the evidence indicated that the Fund was aggrieved because the Appellant was not willing to drop matters regarding the Dispute and that this was a material factor in its view that the Requests were vexatious (see also our comments in paragraph 93).[60]For all of the reasons we have given, we conclude that there was no material burden associated with the Requests, including taking into account the Appellant’s prior correspondence. Motive[61]As we have noted, the Decision Notice referred to the Fund’s view that the Dispute had been resolved in 2019 and this was also relevant to its position that there was harassment and distress to staff when the Appellant made contact later regarding the Dispute (which we refer to below). Essentially, the Fund considered that the Appellant had improper motives in making the Requests, which were related to its views that the Appellant was engaged in a campaign (including the Requests) designed to exert pressure on it to engage in relation to the Appellant’s claims regarding the Dispute.[62]The Appellant did not agree that the Dispute had been resolved in 2019, but we understand why the Fund considered that it had been. The Appellant had sent an email to the Fund dated 2 December 2019 which expressed gratitude for the installation of privacy measures (frosting on its windows) at the Site, referring to this as a “swift and conclusive solution” and stating that the Appellant looked forward to “good neighbourly relations”. However, the Appellant’s evidence was that there were other issues relating to the Dispute. For example, as referred to in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, the Appellant had concerns regarding the Fund’s staff photographing the interior of the Appellant’s home. The Appellant also stated that there had been bullying and harassment of them by the Fund’s staff (which we refer to below).[63]Consequently, whilst the Appellant’s email dated 2 December 2019 expressed gratitude for resolving their privacy concern by way of the installation of window frosting, it does not necessarily follow that this meant that the Appellant was satisfied with all aspects of the Dispute. The Appellant’s reference, in that email, to “good neighbourly relations” could be seen as a conciliatory statement, but again does not necessarily mean that the Appellant was content with everything (even though the Appellant also stated in that email that they had deleted their photographs/ correspondence regarding the Fund).[64]In any event, the Appellant also gave evidence to the effect that other issues had since come to light regarding the frosting of windows at the Site (including the point made in their grounds of appeal regarding documentary evidence from the landlord and managing agents that the frosting was not authorised).[65]Moreover, as recorded in paragraph 13 of the Decision Notice, the Fund informed the Commissioner that the Appellant had, subsequent to the alleged resolution of the Dispute in 2019 (and on several occasions), indicated an intention to pursue the Dispute through the courts. This, of course, is consistent with the Appellant’s view that the Dispute had not been resolved in 2019.[66]Correspondence from the Appellant prior to the Requests were clear that the Appellant wished to take matters forward regarding the Dispute and related matters. In our view, it was incongruous that the Fund argued that a relevant factor in treating the Requests as vexatious was that the Fund and its staff considered that matters had been resolved many years earlier. Plainly, by the time of the Requests and the Fund’s reliance on section 14 in refusing them, the Fund was aware that matters were not resolved.[67]Regardless of the above, we consider that the Commissioner gave too much weight in the Decision Notice to the Fund’s view that the Dispute was resolved as a factor supporting the conclusion that the Requests were vexatious.[68]The Internal Review Letter stated: “We also note, and can evidence, that your FOIA requests were submitted almost immediately after our Legal Team declined to enter into early dispute resolution with you, having determined that your legal allegations are without merit. This timing is highly indicative of a retaliatory act, arguably to exert pressure, cause disruption, or frustrate the Fund’s operations. We will not be coerced or pressured into entering early dispute resolution through the misuse of FOIA…”.[69]We disagree with the above views of the Fund regarding the purpose of the Requests. The Fund had made it clear to the Appellant that it would not entertain any early dispute resolution regarding the Dispute. The Fund also had clearly stated that it considered that there was no merit in the Appellant’s claims regarding the Dispute and that it would defend any legal proceedings issued in respect of it. The Appellant’s evidence was that they therefore wanted to take formal legal action at this point and consequently made the Requests. When questioned about this during the hearing, it became apparent that the Appellant considered, in essence, that making the Requests was a prudent thing to do in order to assist them in respect of their legal action. In our view, this was a reflection that the Appellant did not have relevant knowledge of the disclosure rules and process in the context of litigation (which is understandable, based on their evidence that they were not legally represented). The Appellant also gave evidence that legal proceedings had since been initiated in connection with the Dispute.[70]The Fund’s submissions to the Commissioner, during his investigation, expressed concern that the Requests appeared to be an attempt to use FOIA as a substitute for civil disclosure and (as we have already mentioned) that the Appellant appeared to be expecting disclosure of the Fund’s legal advice. The Fund referred to the Commissioner’s guidance to the effect that seeking disclosure for litigation purposes is not an appropriate use of FOIA.[71]As we have noted, the Decision Notice recorded the Commissioner’s views that (in summary) the motive behind the Requests appeared to be to re-open the Dispute and to put pressure on the Fund to resolve the Dispute, which the Commissioner also stated was an “entirely inappropriate” use of FOIA.[72]Those views of the Commissioner appear to relate to the Fund’s view that the Dispute had been resolved previously, as well as its submissions about the Appellant seeking civil disclosure. We addressed above the issue of the Fund’s view that the Dispute had been resolved previously. In respect of the comments regarding the Appellant’s motive in seeking civil disclosure, in our view it is inappropriate to interpret the Appellant’s motive too negatively, given our comments above that the Appellant did not fully understand the disclosure rules and process in the context of litigation.[73]The Appellant also gave evidence that the purpose of the Requests was not limited to their desire to seek information relevant to their intended legal claim, but was also linked to their wider concerns about the conduct of the Fund and its staff (in connection with the Dispute). They stated that their concerns were related to certain alleged actions (bullying and harassment) of the Fund’s staff towards them. We do not specify here the details of the Appellant’s allegations (apart from the matter we have already referred to regarding the alleged photographing of the interior of the Appellant’s home), but in our view the Appellant genuinely held their concerns. We address some of the Appellant’s concerns further in paragraph 77.[74]Paragraph 25 of the Decision Notice recorded the Fund’s view that it recognised the importance of compromise in resolving disputes and that it had previously attempted to engage with the Appellant regarding the Dispute. As we have stated, we understand why the Fund considered that the Dispute was resolved in 2019. We also recognise that the Appellant had subsequently made further demands or challenges regarding the Dispute, but in our view it was open to the Appellant to do so (and not to simply accept the position put to them by the Fund). Clearly, both the Fund and the Appellant have different views regarding the subject matter of the Dispute and its merits, but we consider that that is simply a reflection of the nature of disputes.[75]We saw no evidence to support a view that the Requests were based on any malice or that there was any other improper motivation on the part of the Appellant in making the Requests. Whilst the Appellant may have been mistaken in their understanding about using the Requests to seek information which would be disclosed in the context of a legal claim in respect of the Dispute, we find that there was nothing untoward regarding the making of the Requests.[76]In summary, for all of the above reasons, we consider that there was a genuine motive behind the Requests. Linked to those reasons, we also find that the Commissioner was wrong to view the Requests as being used to exert pressure on the Fund regarding the Dispute and we accordingly also disagree with his conclusion that that was an entirely inappropriate use of FOIA. Value or serious purpose[77]As we noted in paragraph 73, the Appellant gave evidence that the purpose of the Requests was not limited to their desire to seek information relevant to their intended legal claim, but was also linked to their wider concerns about the conduct of the Fund and its staff, with reference to certain bullying and harassment allegations. In respect of those wider concerns, the Appellant stated that they had become aware of an Independent Inquiry commissioned by the Government regarding bullying at the Fund and that they had had similar experiences. The Appellant accordingly considered that there was wider public interest in aspects of the Requested Information, regarding transparency and accountability.[78]We have set out our finding that the Appellant’s concerns (including those in the preceding paragraph) were genuinely held and were relevant to their motivation in making the Requests. We also find that some of the concerns go beyond a personal interest regarding the Dispute and have wider public interest.[79]To be clear, we make no finding regarding the merits or validity of the Appellant’s concerns, save for our view that the Appellant’s motive in seeking the Requested Information was linked to a genuine belief in those concerns and that there is accordingly some value and purpose (and associated public interest) in the Request.[80]As we have referred to, the Decision Notice recorded:a. the Appellant’s views that Requests related to matters of clear public interest, including concerning legal expenditure;b. the Fund’s view that it recognised the importance of transparency.[81]We agree that there is a public interest in transparency, particularly having regard to the Fund’s expenditure in dealing with the Dispute and related matters. In our view, the Commissioner did not adequately take into account the fact that public money had been spent in dealing with the Dispute and the level of expenditure could be of wider public interest. We also consider that there is a wider public interest in transparency and accountability regarding the Appellant’s allegations of bullying and harassment.[82]For the reasons we have given, we consider that the above matters signify a wider public interest which goes to the value and purpose of the Requests and militates against a finding that they were vexatious. Harassment or distress[83]As we have noted, paragraph 25 of the Decision Notice recorded the Fund’s view that it had previously attempted to engage with the Appellant regarding the Dispute. That paragraph also stated that that each such attempted engagement had been followed by harassment and abuse from the Appellant. However, we saw no evidence of such alleged harassment or abuse.[84]As we also noted, the Fund’s view that the Dispute had been resolved in 2019 was also relevant to its position that there was harassment and distress to staff when the Appellant made contact later regarding the Dispute. Again, however, we saw no evidence of such alleged harassment or distress.[85]The Decision Notice also recorded the Fund’s statements (in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Decision Notice, respectively) that:a. there had often been “unacceptable behaviour” by the Appellant towards the Fund’s employees; andb. it holds additional evidence of instances of unacceptable behaviour by the Appellant.[86]Again, there was no evidence before us of any such alleged unacceptable behaviour by the Appellant. Paragraph 19 of the Decision Notice stated that the Commissioner had “noted and taken account of those behaviours but won’t reproduce them in this notice”, but the Commissioner also did not provide any evidence in the appeal regarding such alleged behaviours which he stated he had taken account of.[87]As we have also noted, the Decision Notice recorded the Commissioner’s views that:a. (in connection with the Dispute) the Appellant had sometimes expressed their dissatisfaction in unacceptable ways;b. the Appellant’s past inappropriate behaviours against the Fund’s staff would have caused staff a good deal of nuisance, agitation, and distress;c. re-opening the Dispute would cause staff to feel burdened and harassed;d. the Appellant used FOIA to “harass” the Fund.[88]However, there was no evidence before us to demonstrate how such conclusions could be justified.[89]Paragraph 21 of the Decision Notice stated that the Commissioner “sees no reason to doubt the veracity of the Fund’s account of the Appellant’s behaviours, and the effect of these on its staff”. In contrast, based on the information before us, we consider that the Commissioner had no evidence to support the Fund’s account of the Appellant’s behaviours or the alleged effect of those on its staff, and accordingly that he should not have reached the conclusions which he did.[90]In summary, we saw no evidence of any offensive, threatening or other inappropriate language or behaviour on the part of the Appellant in their dealings with the Fund. Likewise, there was no evidence before us (including no statements from any members of the Fund’s staff) that any individuals were harassed or distressed as a result of the Requests or the Appellant’s other correspondence.[91]We therefore find that there was no harassment of, or distress to, any individuals in connection with the Requests or the Appellant’s wider dealings with the Fund. Summary[92]There is a high hurdle to satisfy in considering whether a request for information is vexatious under section 14(1). In this case, for the reasons we have referred to, we conclude that the evidential hurdle has not been met in order to support a conclusion that the Requests were vexatious.[93]We recognise that, in the context of considering whether a request is vexatious under section 14, the identity of the requester can (insofar as it is linked to the relevant themes from Dransfield) be relevant. Likewise, we acknowledge that the motive behind a request for information, together with the relevant course of dealings (including where the public authority considers that there is an unjustified complaint or campaign), can be relevant factors in concluding that a request is vexatious. However, as we have noted, in this case we find that the Fund’s position that the Requests were vexatious was largely influenced by its views in respect of the Dispute and the Appellant continuing to pursue matters relating to it. Likewise, we consider that the Commissioner gave disproportionate weight to those issues in the Decision Notice.[94]We have set out our finding that there was no evidence of any material burden associated with the Requests, including taking into account the Appellant’s prior correspondence. It follows from that finding, and our findings regarding ‘motive’, the ‘value or serious purpose’ of the Requests and ‘harassment or distress’, that we disagree with the Commissioner’s view in the Decision Notice that there was insufficient value in the Requests such that they were significantly outweighed by the factors of motive, burden and harassment to the Fund’s staff.[95]In summary, taking into account all of the circumstances, for all of the above reasons, we consider that the Requests did not constitute a disproportionate and inappropriate use of FOIA and accordingly we find that the Requests were not vexatious for the purposes of section 14(1).
Final conclusions
[96]For all of the reasons we have given, we find that the Decision Notice involved an error of law in concluding that the Fund was entitled to refuse the Requests pursuant to section 14(1).[97]We therefore allow the appeal and we make the Substituted Decision Notice as set out above. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 12 July 2026 99. Judge of the First-tier Tribunal