Des Moore v The Information Commissioner & Anor [2026] UKFTT 1009 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 01009 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0376

First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Hearing Heard on: 29 June 2026

Date 13 July 2026

Information Rights

Determined on the papers

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE MORNINGTON

TRIBUNAL MEMBER CHAFER

TRIBUNAL MEMBER YATES

Between

Des mooreAppellant

INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondent

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICERespondent

Decision: The appeal is dismissed.

The Appeal was decided without a hearing as agreed by the parties and allowed by the Tribunal by rule 32(1) Tribunal Procedure (First -Tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009

REASONS

Background to appeal

[1]This appeal, dated 20 September 2024, concerns a request made by the Appellant under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOIA") for information relating to the Northern Ireland Office's Home Protection Scheme ("HPS"). The information requested comprised the total number of applications accepted under the scheme in the 2022/23 financial year, their total value, the number of applications accepted from Police Service of Northern Ireland ("PSNI") officers and the total amount paid in respect of those applications and was made on 10 November 2023 in the following terms:

“PSNI has informed me that you run the 'The Home Protection Scheme': "Please note; The reference to ‘Toughened Glass’ relates to ‘The Home Protection Scheme’ which is a scheme run by The Northern Ireland Office." 1. Please provide the total number of applications for assistance under The Home Protection Scheme you accepted in 2022/23 and their total value. 2. Please provide the number of applications from PSNI officers you accepted in 2022/23 for assistance under the scheme. 3. Please provide the total amount you paid in respect of these applications from PSNI officers.”

[2]The Northern Ireland Office ("NIO") refused the request on 1 December 2023 pursuant to section 24(1) FOIA on the basis that disclosure would be contrary to the interests of national security. Following an internal review requested by the Appellant on 6 December 2023, that position was maintained by the NIO.

[3]The Appellant complained to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 14 January 2024 and following an investigation, the IC subsequently upheld the refusal, finding that the NIO was entitled to rely on s24(1) FOIA. The Appellant now appeals against that decision.

The Issues

[4]The issues for determination by the Tribunal are:(a) whether the information requested by the Appellant falls within the scope of the exemption contained in section 24(1) FOIA, namely whether withholding the information is reasonably necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security;

(b) whether disclosure of the requested information would give rise to a real and significant risk of harm to national security, including by revealing information about the scope, operation or effectiveness of the Home Protection Scheme;

(d) the significance, if any, of the Appellant's submission that the information is high-level, aggregated statistical and financial data and that comparable information has been disclosed elsewhere without apparent harm;

(e) if section 24(1) is engaged, where the balance of the public interest lies, having regard on the one hand to the public interest in transparency, accountability and scrutiny of public expenditure, and on the other to the public interest in safeguarding national security and maintaining the effectiveness of measures designed to protect individuals at risk from terrorist attack.

The Legal Framework

[5]The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows: 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities.(1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. 58 Determination of appeals. (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.

(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based 24 National security. (1) Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national Security. (2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security

[6]It is well established that the word "required" does not mean absolutely essential. Rather, the relevant question is whether withholding the information is reasonably necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The Upper Tribunal in Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office v Information Commissioner & Edward Williams

[2021] UKUT 248 (AAC)

approved the following principles in relation to s24 FOIA:a. The term national security has been interpreted broadly and encompasses the security of the United Kingdom and its people, the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state: […].

b. A threat to national security may be direct (the threat of action against the United Kingdom) or indirect (arising from the threat of action directed against other states): […].

c. Section 24 is not engaged, unlike the majority of the qualified exemptions, by a consideration of prejudice. Its engagement is deliberately differently worded.

d. The term “required” means “reasonably necessary”: […].

e. National security is a matter of vital national importance in which the Tribunal should pause and reflect very carefully before overriding the sincerely held views of relevant public authorities: […]

f. Even where the chance of a particular harm occurring is relatively low, the seriousness of the consequences (the nature of the risk) can nonetheless mean that the public interest in avoiding that risk is very strong: […].

[7]Upper Tribunal stated that “the reality is that the public interest in maintaining the qualified national security exemption in section 24(1) is likely to be substantial and to require a compelling competing public interest to equal or outweigh it”

[8]In assessing the evidence of potential harm to national security, the Tribunal has borne in mind the well-established principle that appropriate weight should be accorded to the views of those public authorities charged with responsibility for national security matters. As the Tribunal observed in Arthurs v IC, The National Archives & MOD (EA/2016/0060) judgment concerning damage to national security engage areas in which the relevant public authority possesses particular institutional competence. The Tribunal also has regard to the guidance of the Supreme Court in R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission

[2021] UKSC 17

, in which Lord Reed emphasised the significance of both institutional competence and democratic accountability in matters touching upon national security. Whilst the Tribunal must scrutinise the evidence and reach its own conclusion, it should do so with the appropriate respect given to the Government’s views in this field.

Documents

[9]The Tribunal was provided with and took account of an open bundle of documents comprising of 99 pages and a closed bundle comprising of 14 pages comprising of the closed submissions of the Second Respondent.

[10]The Tribunal has carefully considered the documentary evidence, and the written submissions of the Appellant, Respondent and Second Respondent.

The Home Protection Scheme

[11]The evidence before the Tribunal establishes that the HPS is a threat-led protective scheme operating in the context of the continuing threat posed by Northern Ireland-related terrorism. The scheme is intended to provide security measures for individuals who are assessed to face a heightened risk from terrorist activity because of the public functions they discharge. Those functions include roles connected with law enforcement, the administration of justice, government and the maintenance of democratic institutions.

[12]The Tribunal accepts that the scheme exists as one component of a wider protective framework designed to mitigate risks arising from a continuing terrorist threat. The evidence demonstrates that there have been terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in Northern Ireland in recent years, including attacks directed at police officers and other public servants. The Appellant did not seriously dispute that such threats continue to exist, although he challenged the proposition that disclosure of the requested information could materially affect those risks.

The Appellant’s Case

[13]The Appellant's principal submission is that the information requested is of a highly aggregated nature and does not identify any individual, address, security measure or operational capability. He contends that the NIO's objections depend upon speculation rather than evidence.

[14]The Appellant argues that disclosure of annual application numbers and expenditure figures would reveal little, if anything, of practical value to hostile actors. In his submission, the figures are too general to assist terrorists in identifying protected individuals or in planning attacks. He further submits that much more sensitive information concerning policing and security matters is already publicly available and that the NIO has failed to explain in a convincing manner how the particular information sought could realistically be used to undermine national security.

[15]The Appellant also relies upon the fact that information relating to other schemes has been disclosed in the past. He submits that the absence of any demonstrated harm following those disclosures undermines the NIO's contention that disclosure in the present case would generate a genuine risk.

[16]Finally, the Appellant places considerable weight on the public interest in transparency. He argues that expenditure from public funds should generally be open to public scrutiny and that disclosure would permit informed debate about the operation, scale and cost of the HPS.

[17]The Tribunal has considered these submissions carefully. They are not frivolous. The information sought is not operational intelligence, does not identify individual beneficiaries and, at first sight, may appear relatively innocuous. It was therefore necessary for the Tribunal to examine with particular care whether the asserted harms are genuine and whether they are sufficiently connected to the specific information requested.

The NIO’s Case

[18]The Second Respondent's case is that the Home Protection Scheme is a threat-led protective security scheme which provides security measures to individuals assessed to be at significant risk of terrorist attack because of the functions they perform in public service. The NIO submits that the scheme operates against the background of a continuing threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism, which was assessed at the time of the NIO response as either ‘Substantial’ or ‘Severe’ i.e. that an attack is either likely or highly likely, and that disclosure of the requested information would reveal details concerning the scale and extent of protection afforded under the scheme. It is to be noted that at the time of the request, the terrorism threat was assessed as ‘Severe’. Since 30 April 2026, the threat level has once again been raised to ‘Severe’, meaning that an attack is highly likely. It is clearly the case that the threat levels are volatile and changeable.

[19]It argues that information concerning the number and type of successful applications would enable conclusions to be drawn about the level of protection available to particular groups, whilst information concerning expenditure could, when combined with publicly available information about security measures, provide insight into the nature and extent of those measures.

[20]The NIO contends that disclosure would therefore assist hostile actors in assessing the scheme's capabilities and limitations, could assist them in making strategic decisions about target selection and attack planning, diminish the deterrent effect which uncertainty provides, and thereby create a risk to national security. It is on that basis that the NIO maintains that the information is exempt under section 24(1) FOIA and that the public interest favours maintaining the exemption.

Discussion

[21]The Tribunal has considered the open evidence and submissions of the parties together with the closed material provided by the Second Respondent. In reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal has sought, so far as possible, to explain its reasoning in open form. However, there are aspects of the Tribunal's assessment informed by closed evidence which cannot be elaborated upon further without undermining the very interests which the exemption is designed to protect.

[22]The Tribunal accepts that some elements of the NIO's reasoning involve a chain of inferences. However, that fact does not render the argument speculative. National security assessments frequently require consideration of how information may be used by those motivated to exploit it. The Tribunal's task is not to ask whether harm is certain to occur but whether there is a real and significant risk that disclosure would undermine national security interests.

[23]In the Tribunal's judgment, the Appellant's submissions tend to evaluate each requested figure in isolation. That approach overlooks the cumulative significance attributed to the information by the NIO. The question is not whether a single numerical figure directly identifies a protected individual. Plainly it does not. The question is whether disclosure would contribute to a broader understanding of the structure, reach and effectiveness of a protective security scheme operating in response to a terrorist threat, described as ‘mosaic disclosure’. The Tribunal is satisfied that it would.

[24]The evidence demonstrates that the HPS is not a universal scheme but a selective one. Information concerning the number of admissions and the levels of expenditure would permit conclusions to be drawn about the scale of protection available. The Tribunal accepts the NIO's submission that knowledge of the extent of the scheme is itself capable of having operational significance for those seeking to attack public servants.

[25]The Tribunal also considers that expenditure data is capable of revealing more than the bare fact of public spending. In circumstances where the broad types of security measures available under such schemes are publicly known, expenditure figures may permit the drawing of inferences about the nature, extent and sophistication of those measures. The Tribunal does not consider those inferences to be fanciful.

[26]The Appellant criticises the lack of concrete evidence demonstrating previous harm from comparable disclosures. Whilst that submission has some weight, the Tribunal does not regard it as determinative. Section 24 is inherently concerned with the prevention of risk. Public authorities are not required to wait until harm has materialised before protective action may be justified.

[27]The Tribunal has also considered the Appellant's comparator arguments. We do not consider that they significantly assist him. The existence of disclosures in other contexts does not establish that disclosure in this context would be harmless. In fact, the previous disclosures, whether intentional or not, have increased the risk from additional disclosures by hostile actors adding information to be considered in the mosaic assessment. The relevant assessment must be undertaken having regard to the particular information requested, the particular scheme involved and the current security environment at the time of the request.

[28]The Appellant accepts that disclosure of the requested information could increase the knowledge available to those intent on carrying out terrorist activity. In his submissions he acknowledges that "I accept that the requested information would increase a terrorist’s knowledge ... one can never be certain what the total effects of releasing information into the public domain will be". However, the Appellant contended that any such increase in knowledge would be marginal and that the NIO had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently direct or significant link between disclosure of the requested aggregate information and the harm asserted. His position was that the risks identified by the Respondents were speculative, overstated and insufficient to justify withholding information relating to the scale and cost of a publicly funded scheme.

[29]Having considered the open and closed evidence together, the Tribunal is satisfied that the causal connection advanced by the NIO has been established. The Tribunal finds that disclosure would be capable of providing hostile actors with information concerning the scope and characteristics of a protective security scheme designed to address a current terrorist threat. We are satisfied that the resulting risk is real rather than hypothetical.

[30]We therefore conclude that withholding the information is reasonably necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security and that section 24(1) is engaged. The Public Interest Test

[31]The Tribunal turns to the public interest balance. There is undoubtedly a significant public interest in disclosure. Public expenditure should normally be open to scrutiny. Disclosure would enhance transparency, enable public debate concerning the allocation of resources and promote accountability in the operation of government security programmes. The Tribunal agrees with the Appellant that these are important considerations and they attract genuine weight.

[32]The Tribunal also accepts that the information sought is not intrinsically sensitive in the same way as operational intelligence, threat assessments or personal data relating to those protected by the scheme.

[33]Against those factors stands the public interest in safeguarding national security. That public interest is of the highest order. It encompasses not only the protection of the State and its institutions but also the protection of individuals, and the families of those individuals, whose public functions expose them to a threat of terrorist violence.

[34]The Tribunal has also taken into account that a degree of information concerning protective security arrangements and related schemes is already in the public domain, including material identified by the Appellant. Whilst that existing information contributes to the public understanding of such schemes, it correspondingly reduces the incremental public interest benefit to be derived from further disclosure in this case. Conversely, the Tribunal accepts that additional disclosures may be combined with information already available, thereby increasing the potential for inferences to be drawn regarding the scope and operation of the Home Protection Scheme. In those circumstances, the Tribunal considers that the public interest is not served by placing officers or other protected individuals at increased risk, or by increasing the anticipation of harm directed towards them, where such consequences could undermine the effectiveness of measures intended to safeguard national security.

[35]The Tribunal considers that where a real risk to national security has been established, substantial weight must be afforded to the maintenance of the exemption. The severity of the potential consequences is a relevant factor even if the likelihood of those consequences cannot be quantified with precision.

[36]Having balanced the competing considerations, the Tribunal is satisfied that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The transparency benefits identified by the Appellant are important, but they do not outweigh the strong public interest in preserving the effectiveness of a scheme intended to protect individuals threatened by terrorism.

Conclusion

[37]The Tribunal concludes that section 24(1) FOIA is engaged. Disclosure of the requested information would create a real risk of harm to national security by providing insight into the scale, operation and effectiveness of the Home Protection Scheme and by reducing uncertainty surrounding the protection afforded to potential targets of terrorist activity.

[38]The Tribunal further concludes that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

[39]The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Signed Judge Mornington Date: 30 June 2026