Ian Driver v Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 690 (GRC)

[2025] UKFTT 00690 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0184
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE MORNINGTONTRIBUNAL MEMBER SAUNDERSTRIBUNAL MEMBER PALMER-DUNK
Between
Ian driverAppellantINFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentApplication for Permission to AppealDecision: The Application is refused.Date 2025-06-13

Decision given on: 13 June 2025

[1]The Appellant has applied on 23 February 2025 to appeal the Tribunal’s decision FT/EA/2024/0184 (the “Decision”) in which the Tribunal refused the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Information Commissioner provided in a Decision Notice dated 26 March 2024. The Tribunal unanimously concluded, in agreement with the Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice, that Thanet District Council had correctly applied regulation 12(5)(e) of the Environmental Information Regulations when refusing to comply with the Appellant’s request for information.[2]The application for permission to appeal is refused because the Grounds of Appeal do not disclose an arguable error of law on the part of the Tribunal.[3]Rule 42 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (the “GRC Rules”) sets out the requirements for an application for permission to appeal. R.42(5)(b) provides that such an application must identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision which is the subject of the prospective appeal.[4]In accordance with r.43(1) of the GRC Rules, I have considered the Decision. I am not satisfied there was an error of law in the Decision. The grounds of appeal do not disclose any such error and instead amount, in substance, to a re-argument of the facts which the Tribunal fully considered before reaching its conclusions as set out in the Decision.[5]In R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [9], the Court of Appeal summarised the main points of law which will frequently be applicable in practice when considering permission to appeal:
“i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome (“material matters”); ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters; iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters; iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters; v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter; vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings; vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.”
[6]In the same case, the Court of Appeal confirmed at [11] that the standard of perversity was a “demanding concept…[which] embraced decisions that were irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense…[and] also included a finding of fact that was wholly unsupported by the evidence, providing always that this was a finding as to a material matter.”[7]The Court of Appeal also emphasised at [13] – [15] the caution which must be applied before concluding that a Tribunal had failed to provide adequate reasons. The Court of Appeal cited the judgment of Lord Phillips MR in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605; [2002] 1 WLR 2409 where the then Master of the Rolls held at [19] that:[8]“[I]f the appellate process is to work satisfactorily, the judgment must enable the [appeal court] to understand why the [Tribunal] reached [its] decision. This does not mean that every factor which weighed with the [Tribunal] in [its] appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the [Tribunal]'s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which [it] resolved them explained. It is not possible to provide a template for this process. It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the [Tribunal] to identify and record those matters which were critical to [its] decision. If the critical issue was one of fact, it may be enough to say that one witness was preferred to another because the one manifestly had a clearer recollection of the material facts or the other gave answers which demonstrated that his recollection could not be relied upon.”[9]This position is reflected in the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024. Specifically:[10]“[6] Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.[11][7] Stating reasons at any greater length than is necessary in the particular case is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate court or tribunal and is therefore inconsistent with the overriding objective. Providing concise reasons is to be encouraged. Adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter.”[12]Tribunal has understood the Appellant’s case but has rejected it as set out in the Decision.[13]The Appellant’s reasons for requesting permission to appeal are that the Tribunal placed too little weight and/or failed to take into account the arguments made by the Appellant at the appeal hearing. I have carefully considered all of the Appellant’s points before deciding to refuse to grant permission to appeal.[14]The Appellant considers that the Tribunal had not properly understood the relationship between the requested information and environmental emissions, nor had the Tribunal properly considered the current emissions being generated by Brett Aggregates and any likely increase of these emissions. The Appellant further considers that the Tribunal did not consider the information already available in the public domain and the lack of competition faced by Brett Aggregates and the Appellant’s perceived ‘reduction of harm’ to Brett Aggregates legitimate economic interests. This is simply not the case. I would refer again to the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024 detailed above which provides “Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided”[15]The Decision was a quintessential finding of fact by the Tribunal. There is no dispute about the law applied by the Tribunal. All of the reasons provided by the Appellant effectively consist of re-argument of the same facts or points relied upon by the Appellant both in oral submissions and within the bundle of documents provided to the Tribunal prior to the hearing but which did not persuade the Tribunal when it reached the Decision. None of the grounds disclose any error of law on the part of the Tribunal.[16]The Tribunal was under no obligation to refer to every single piece of evidence mentioned by the parties and indeed, to do so would be disproportionate and contrary to the overriding objective. It is not arguable that the Tribunal’s assessment was irrational or that it neglected to consider any material evidence. The purpose of an appeal to the Upper Tribunal is not to reargue the facts or the weight to be attributed to the evidence as the Appellant seeks to do.[17]The Tribunal’s decision was not based on any misleading information or incorrect evidence. The Tribunal had all of the evidence available to it and considered the evidence in full. There is nothing within the Appellant’s application which would have led the Tribunal to make a different Decision.[18]The Appellant has therefore not identified any arguable errors of law in his grounds of appeal. Accordingly, the application for permission to appeal is refused. The Appellant may renew his application to the Upper Tribunal. Signed Judge Peri Mornington Date: 11 June 2025