Gary Mond v The Charity Commission for England and Wales [2025] UKFTT 103 (GRC)

[2025] UKFTT 103 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/CA/2024/0006
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Charity
Venue Heard at: Field House, London and by Cloud Video PlatformHearing Heard on: 7 November 2024 and 6 December 2024Date 6 February 2025
Before
JUDGE PETER HINCHLIFFEMEMBER SUSAN WOLFMEMBER MANU DUGGAL
Between
GARY MONDAppellantTHE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALESRespondentJoshua Winfield for AppellantEmma Hynes for RespondentDecision: The appeal is AllowedREASONS

The Disqualification Order

[1]The Appellant, Mr Mond, appeals against an order made by the Respondents (the “Commission”) on 18 April 2024 (the “Order”). The Order disqualified Mr Mond from being a charity trustee or trustee of a charity pursuant to the Commission’s powers under section 181A of the Charities Act 2011 (the “Act”). The Order provides that Mr Mond is disqualified from being a trustee and from holding a senior management position in charities.[2]The Order in its amended form states that Mr Mond (‘the person’) is disqualified “from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity under the power given in section 181A of the Charities Act 2011 (‘the Act’)” and set out the form of the order as follows:
“ORDER 1. The Charity Commission for England and Wales (‘the Commission’) is satisfied that: (a) in relation to the person, condition F of section 181A (7) of the Act, more fully described in the schedule to this Order is met. (b) the person is unfit to be a charity trustee and/or trustee for any and all charities generally. (c) it is desirable in the public interest to make this Order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally 2. The Commission therefore ORDERS that the person is disqualified from being a charity trustee and/or trustee for a charity in relation to any or all charities generally, whether registered with the Commission or not for a period of two and a half years from the date defined in paragraph 3 of this Order. 3. This Order takes effect: (a) on 30 May 2024, if no proceedings for an appeal against the Order are started before this date, or (b) where an appeal is properly made against the Order, when that appeal is withdrawn, or it is finally determined that the Order was properly made. 4. For the period of disqualification set out in paragraph 2, under s181A (3) of the Act by virtue of this order, the person is also disqualified from holding any office or employment with senior management functions in the charities they are disqualified from above. Schedule The condition(s) listed in s.181A (7) of the Act that the Commission is satisfied is met in relation to the person: F that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order.”
[3]Although the Order was dated 18 April 2024, as a result of this appeal it has yet to take effect. The Order was accompanied by an extensive statement of reasons (the “Statement of Reasons”).

The Appeal

[4]Mr Mond submitted an appeal against the Order. The Notice of Appeal set out the grounds for the appeal in some detail. The main grounds of the appeal are as follows: -4.1 Mr Mond states that there is no connection between the conduct relied on by the Commission and any of the charities with which Mr Mond has been involved, or charities generally.4.2 The Commission was wrong to conclude that it could disqualify Mr Mond as a charity trustee or trustee for a charity on the basis of the conduct on which it relies.4.3 The Jewish and Islamic communities together make up 7% of the population of England and Wales and therefore the impact of Mr Mond’s conduct on the public as a whole is likely to be minimal.4.4 The Commission have misunderstood, misinterpreted or failed to give proper weight to the social media comments by Mr Mond on which the Commission relies, or have failed to interpret these in the context in which they were made.4.5 The Commission was wrong to conclude that the social media posts referred to in the Statement of Reasons that accompanied the Order on26 September 2014 and in 2016 were Islamophobic.4.6 The two posts that Mr Mond “liked” in 2017 on Facebook referred to in the Statement of Reasons that accompanied the Order were not intrinsically controversial or offensive.4.7 The “liking” of these two posts on Facebook were not “damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities described in the Order”.4.8 The Commission was wrong to conclude that Mr Mond was culpable for failing to review his historic social media activity.4.9 Media coverage of Mr Mond’s social media posts and “likes” does not amount to “conduct by the person” i.e. Mr Mond, as required by the Act. 4.10. The Commission is wrong to characterise Mr Mond’s behaviour as reckless. 4.11 The Commission is wrong to characterise the media coverage of Mr Mond’s conduct as indicating his unfitness to be a charity trustee since this was a matter outside of his control. 4.12 The Commission was wrong to characterise Mr Mond’s conduct as being at odds with some of the objectives of the charities of which he was a trustee and, therefore, wrong to treat this as an aggravating factor. 4.13 The Commission was wrong to conclude that to take no action against Mr Mond would be an unacceptable regulatory response following his removal from all of his charity trusteeships. The resignation of Mr Mond from all the charity trusteeships that he held at the time of the media coverage of his conduct is a sufficient and proportionate response. 4.14 The Commission was wrong to conclude that Mr Mond posed any risk to the charity sector. They were also wrong to decide that disqualification is proportionate and that a lesser intervention would offer inadequate protection. 4.15 The Commission failed to demonstrate any genuine and material risk to charities generally. 4.16 The Commission was wrong to conclude that the interference of Mr Mond’s rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) was justified. 4.17 Disqualifying Mr Mond as a consequence of his social media comments and “likes” would be an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.

Legislation

[5]Section 181A of the Act gives the Charity Commission the power to issue orders disqualifying a person from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity.[6]The relevant parts of sections 181A of the 2011 Act are as follows:
“181A Disqualification orders (1) The Commission may by order disqualify a person from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity. (2) The order may disqualify a person— (a) in relation to all charities, or (3). While a person is disqualified by virtue of an order under this section in relation to a charity, the person is also disqualified, subject to subsection (5), from holding an office or employment in the charity with senior management functions. (4). A function of an office or employment held by a person (“A”) is a senior management function if— (a) it relates to the management of the charity, and A is not responsible for it to another officer or employee (other than a charity trustee or trustee for the charity), or (b) it involves control over money and the only officer or employee (other than a charity trustee or trustee for the charity) to whom A is responsible for it is a person with senior management functions other than ones involving control over money. (5). An order under this section may provide for subsection (3) not to apply— 11. (b) in relation to a particular office or employment or to any office or employment of a particular description. (6). The Commission may make an order disqualifying a person under this section only if it is satisfied that— 13. (b) the person is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity (either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order), and (c). making the order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order. (7). These are the conditions— …….”
[7]Section 181A (7) lists six conditions. In this case the Commission relied on Condition F, which is set out in the Schedule to the Order set out at paragraph2 above.[8]The following parts of sections 181B of the 2011 Act are relevant to this appeal: “181B Duration of disqualification, and suspension pending disqualification.(1) An order under section 181A must specify the period for which the person is disqualified.(2) The period – (a) must be not more than 15 years beginning with the day on which the order takes effect, and (b) must be proportionate, having regard in particular to the time when a conviction becomes spent or, where condition B applies, would become spent if it were a conviction for the relevant disqualifying offence, and to circumstances in which the Commission may or must grant a waiver under section 181 where a person is disqualified under section 178.(3) An order takes effect – (a) at the end of the time specified by Tribunal Procedure Rules for starting proceedings for an appeal against the order, if no proceedings are started within that time, or (b) (subject to the decision on the appeal) when any proceedings started within that time are withdrawn or finally determined”. (b) must be proportionate, having regard in particular to the time when a conviction becomes spent or, where condition B applies, would become spent if it were a conviction for the relevant disqualifying offence, and to circumstances in which the Commission may or must grant a waiver under section 181 where a person is disqualified under section 178. (a) at the end of the time specified by Tribunal Procedure Rules for starting proceedings for an appeal against the order, if no proceedings are started within that time, or (b) (subject to the decision on the appeal) when any proceedings started within that time are withdrawn or finally determined”.[9]Section 181B (4) of the Act also relates to the Commission’s power to suspend a person from being a charity trustee or trustee of a charity pending disqualification and section 181C of the 2011 Act sets out the procedure that the Commission must follow when making a disqualification order under section 181A of the Act.[10]Schedule 6 of the Act sets out the decisions and actions of the Charity Commission that can be appealed, the persons who can bring such an appeal and the powers of the Tribunal is deciding such appeals and includes the following: 1 Decision, direction or order 2 Appellants/applicants 3 Tribunal powers if appeal or Application allowed Order made by the Commission under section 181A. The persons are the person who is the subject of the order. Power to—(a) quash the order in whole or in part and (if appropriate) remit the matter to the Commission;(b) substitute for all or part of the order any other order which could have been made by the Commission;(c) add to the order anything which could have been contained in an order made by the Commission

Background

[11]Mr. Mond was a trustee of JNF Charitable Trust from May 2011 to February 2023, KKL Charity Accounts from February 2019 to February 2023, Board of Deputies Charitable Foundation from May 2021 to January 2022, Board of Deputies Charitable Trust from May 2021 to January 2022 and London Jewish Forum from December 2019 to January 2022. All five of these bodies are charities registered with the Commission.[12]The Commission opened an assessment case into JNF Charitable Trust on 29th December 2021 when it became aware of media reports relating to comments made by Mr. Mond on social media.[13]A review by the Commission of Mr. Mond’s social media activity identified the following: - 14.1. On 26 September 2014, Mr. Mond commented on a Facebook post published by an individual, who the Commission found to be a staunch defender of Israel and who had initiated several pro-Israel grass root groups. The post stated:
“British Parliament votes for air strikes in Iraq against Islamic State. Prominent Muslim Labour MP resigns in protest. Imagine a British Parliament with substantially greater numbers of Muslim MPs or MPs representing constituencies with Muslim voters. Britain would be hamstrung in trying to protect its essential security interests.”
In response, Mr. Mond commented:
“When this happens – and the odds are it will – the Britain that we knew will have gone forever”. 14.2. In 2016 Mr. Mond published a comment to a post on Facebook that stated: “We just have to hope that our leaders wake up to the fact that all civilisation - west and east, American, Russian, Chinese, Israeli, whatever - is at war with these evil bastards, and I have to say it, at war with Islam. And, just as Islam has lost before in history, it will lose again.”
The Tribunal was not shown the post or discussion to which Mr. Mond was responding when making this comment. 14.3. On 7th May 2017 Mr. Mond “liked” a post on a Facebook account from an individual (“PG”) based in the USA, who the Commission found to have been excluded by the Home Secretary in 2013 from entering the UK on the grounds that “her presence here was not conducive to the public good.” Her ban was widely publicised at the time. The Commission provided media reports relating to the individual including those from the BBC reporting that the individual was “one of the most outspoken US critics of Islam and co-founder of the AFDI which she says was formed to stop the “Islamization of America” and the “creeping Sharia” in her country”. The post that Mr. Mond “liked” stated: 14.4. On 5th September 2017 this individual posted on her Facebook account, in response to the results of the French presidential election:
“France has chosen to go quietly into the cold, dark night. They voted for submission over freedom. France is finished”
. Mr. Mond added a “like” to this post. 14.5. On 15 October 2021 Mr. Mond commented on the Facebook page of a then Conservative MP under a post relating to the murder of Sir David Amess MP and said: “Meanwhile, Angela Rayner has still not apologized for her “Tory scum” remarks. It’s comments like that help provoke these heinous crimes”.[15]The Jewish News published articles about this social media activity by Mr. Mond on 18 and 19 October 2021. The 18 October 2021 article dealt solely with the comment on the Facebook page of the Conservative MP on 15 October, which had prompted a response from another Deputy on the Board of Deputies of British Jews and subsequent comments. The article on 19 October referred to calls for action against Mr. Mond for bringing the Board of Deputies into disrepute. It also featured a lengthy apology from Mr. Mond for making the comments on the MP’s Facebook page and for writing it on Shabbat. On 12January 2022 the Jewish Chronicle, and Jewish News published articles about Mr. Mond’s social media activity. The article in the Jewish Chronicle referred to Mr. Mond being “suspended” from his position as Senior Vice President and member of the Board of Deputies pending an investigation. The article in Jewish News referred to him being asked to step down as deputy for the JNF UK charity, where he was a trustee and honorary treasurer. The social media posts and ‘likes’ referred to above were quoted in the two articles as being allegedly Islamophobic social media activity.[16]Mr. Mond subsequently issued a press statement in which he stated: - “I apologise for any hurt that has been caused as a result of the excavation into my Facebook activity from many years ago. However, this cannot be a justification for any attempt to silence contradictory thought”.[17]On 14th January 2022 Mr. Mond received an email from the Commission setting out matters which had been raised with them and to which they wanted his responses.[18]Mr. Mond resigned from his position as a trustee of each of the three charities connected to the Board of Deputies of British Jews as a result of the response within the Board of Deputies to the 12 January 2021 newspaper articles. In an article in the Jewish Chronicle on 20 January he included the apology set out above and defended his posts. He stated that the reference to “evil bastards” in his 2016 post set out at paragraph 14.2 above was a reference to the Islamist terrorists who had carried out the massacre at the Bataclan in November 2015.[19]Mr. Mond stepped down from his trustee positions at JNF Charitable Trust and KKL Charity Accounts on 9 February 2023.[20]On 5th July 2023 Mr. Mond received a letter from the Commission containing a proposed order and provisional reasons for his disqualification as a charity trustee for a three-year period. Mr. Mond responded to the Commission on 3rd August 2023 explaining why he did not believe that the proposed order was supported by the relevant facts or justified in law.

The Commission’s Response to the Notice of Appeal

[21]On 18 April 2024 the Commission sent Mr. Mond a letter informing him of his disqualification from holding a position as a charity trustee with a copy of the Order and the Statement of Reasons on which the Commission had based its decision to issue the Order. The Commission’s Response to the Notice of Appeal In its response to Mr. Mond’s notice of appeal, the Commission stated that Condition F of Section 181A (7) of the Act is met because Mr. Mond’s past conduct is damaging, or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally and in the specific charities where he used to be a trustee. The past conduct that the Commission had taken into account was the social media activities referred to above.[22]The Commission regarded Mr. Mond’s comments in his Facebook post on 26 September 2014 (the 2014 Post”) as being divisive and/or intolerant to others, particularly those of the Islamic faith. It concluded that Mr. Mond’s response could be seen to endorse the inference that is being drawn in the original comment that UK Muslims appear to lack support for the prevention of terrorism. The Commission regards these comments as anti-Muslim and/or Islamophobic and believes them to be damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally.[23]The Commission considers the comment made by Mr. Mond in 2016 and referred to in paragraphs14.1 and14.2 above (the “2016 post”) as being Islamophobic as it describes Muslims as “evil bastards” and indicates that there is a war against all of Islam (rather than a particular terrorist organisation or country). The Commission also regards this comment by a charity trustee as damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust or confidence in charities.[24]The Commission concluded that Mr. Mond’s action in “liking” the two posts on a Facebook account referred to in paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 above (the “2017 Likes”) had to be seen in the context of the vehemently anti-Muslim position of the individual operating the Facebook account. The Commission considers “liking”, and therefore appearing to support, a Facebook post written by an individual who is known to be an anti-Muslim commentator and who is banned from entering the UK because of their extreme views, as damaging, or likely to be damaging, to public trust and confidence in charities.[25]The Commission stated that Mr. Mond’s comments on the Facebook page of a Conservative MP on her post relating to the murder of Sir David Amees MP did not, on further review, satisfy condition F of Section 181A (7). The Commission noted that Mr. Mond had issued an apology for his remarks which explained that; “it was wrong of me to post my views on the comments of Angela Rayner on the Facebook page of an MP, and also very wrong of me to write the post on Shabbat. I apologise unreservedly for these actions and, going forward, I will not be making controversial statements on an MP’s post”. The Commission confirms that this conduct does not satisfy condition F and was not included in the final statement of the reasons for issuing the Order.[26]The Commission stated that as a responsible trustee, Mr. Mond should have foreseen that his conduct on social media was likely to adversely impact the charities he represented, especially considering his prominence and profile within the Jewish community. It took the view that Mr. Mond’s social media activity did result in negative press attention with a focus on his charitable roles.[27]The Commission noted that Mr. Mond had not taken any steps to consider his past conduct on social media and had failed to take any steps to address this. The Commission confirmed that it considers the making of the Order to be desirable in the public interest, in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally. The Commission regards the Order as a proportional and appropriate response to the level of risk that Mr. Mond posed to the charity sector. The Order was in the public interest.

The Appellant’s Reply to the Commissions Response

[28]Mr. Mond submitted a brief reply to the response of the Commission. He pointed out that the 2014 Post, the 2016 Post and 2017 Likes were all made prior to his appointments as a trustee of two of the charities whose charitable objects include promoting good race relations. The objects of the Board of Deputies Charitable Foundation include:
“the promotion, in any part of the world, of good race relations between the Jewish community and other members of society by working towards the elimination of racism in the form of antisemitism”
. These social media activities also pre-dated his appointment as a trustee of the London Jewish Forum, whose objects include:
“to promote racial harmony and good race relations between the London Jewish community and other religious denominations and ethic (sic) communities in London.”
Issues for the tribunal to determine:[29]The tribunal considered the submissions of the parties in the appeal and the responses to the appeal, and in the skeleton arguments received from counsel for the Commission and counsel for Mr. Mond. It was apparent at the start of the hearing that the tribunal was likely to be required to determine the following matters, amongst others: - What alleged conduct by Mr. Mond formed the basis for the Order? - Did this, or any other relevant, conduct occur and, if so, was it past or continuing? - Was Mr. Mond’s conduct damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in relation to the charities or class of charities that might be specified in such an order? - Is Mr. Mond unfit to be a trustee by reason of his conduct? If so, is he unfit to be a trustee in relation to all charities, or only some charities or classes of charity? - Is a disqualification order under Section 181A (6) in the public interest in this case? - If so, should the disqualification order relate to the holding of a position as a trustee for a charity or as a charity trustee, or should it also extend to holding an office or employment in the charity or all charities?[30]In considering this appeal the tribunal must consider the matter afresh and come to a de novo decision. The tribunal may take into account evidence which was not available to the Commission. The tribunal has the powers set out in paragraph 10 above.[31]The Commission must satisfy the tribunal that the requirements of Section 181A (6) are satisfied. If it does so, the burden of proving that an Order should not be made rests with Mr. Mond as the Appellant.

The Hearing

[32]Mr. Winfield, on behalf of Mr. Mond, opened the hearing by raising a preliminary matter. Mr. Winfield referred to Article 10 (2) of the Convention, which states that the right of freedom of expression: - “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”[33]Mr. Winfield pointed out that the Commission had in their Decision Review and Final Decision dated 11 April 2024 concluded that, in satisfying the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention, it relied on the economic wellbeing of the UK and the protection of health and morals. In the Commission’s Response to the Notice of Appeal, referred to above, it referred to the Statement of Reasons that accompanied the Order as setting out the justification for interfering with Mr. Mond’s Article 8 and 10 Convention rights. The Statement of Reasons stated that the legitimate aim in making the Order is: ” for the economic well-being of the country (by preserving public trust and confidence in the charitable sector).”[34]Mr. Winfield stated that it was only in the Commission’s skeleton submissions received on 5 November 2024 that the Commission sought to rely on the “protection of the reputation or rights of others” as the basis upon which Mr. Mond’s freedom of expression can be qualified. Mr. Mond objected to this alteration of the Commission’s position. Mr. Mond had a fundamental right to know the case he has to meet in this hearing. It is obvious that the Commission has always known that it had to satisfy one of the conditions in Article 10 (2) of the Convention. It had sought to change its position from relying on the economic wellbeing of the UK to relying on the protection of health and morals or the protection of the reputation and rights of others too late. Mr. Winfield regarded this as a serious matter for Mr. Mond. The hearing had already been adjourned once, and it was inappropriate to have another adjournment. Mr. Mond sought time to submit further submissions in response to the late change in the Commission’s case and also reserved his right to claim additional costs.[35]Ms. Hynes, on behalf of the Commission, rejected Mr. Winfield’s arguments and referred to the Commission’s Statement of Reasons, which had justified the interference with the Article 10 Convention rights on the basis that preserving public trust and confidence in the charitable sector was necessary for the economic well-being of the country. In any event, Ms. Hynes wished to continue with the case for the appeal and was in a position to present arguments in full at the hearing.[36]The tribunal adjourned the hearing in order to consider Mr. Winfield’s request. Following the brief adjournment the tribunal agreed that it would consider further written submissions in relation to the legitimate aims that could and were being relied upon by the Charity Commission under Article 10 (2) of the Convention. This decision was overtaken by the need for the hearing to continue on a second day. The delay before the second day and the time available on the second day permitted Mr. Winfield to make considered submissions on the application of the Convention rights to this appeal.[37]The tribunal received two witness statements. One from Mr. Mond and another from Mr. Roake, the Assistant Director, Investigations and Compliance at the Commission. Mr. Roake’s statement was submitted and accepted, and no questions were asked upon it.[38]Mr. Mond was questioned by Ms. Hynes on behalf of the Commission and by members of the tribunal. Mr. Mond gave details of his professional and employment background. He also clarified that he had been a Conservative party member for 47 years and had twice stood as a parliamentary candidate and had been a councilor on behalf of the Conservative Party for six years. He had sat on the advisory board of the Conservative Friends of Israel for 17 years[39]Mr. Mond agreed that he had held the five charity trustee positions on the dates set out by the Commission. He stated that his first charity trustee role was as a trustee of the JNF Charitable Trust. The appointment as a trustee of KKL arose as part of his role with the JNF. He had been a member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews for many years. When he was elected as an honorary officer of the Board of Deputies, he was expected to assume the trustee role at the charities connected with the Board of Deputies. He was subsequently asked to be a trustee of the London Jewish Forum.[40]Mr. Mond clarified in response to questions that he had become better known through his role at the Board of Deputies. His role there was, in part, political. He was put there by a minority of members and elected to his role as a senior vice president (i.e. an honorary officer) in order to give balance to the organisation. He accepted that he had become known as an outspoken deputy. He did not think he had become prominent in his role until May 2021, when he had been elected to the senior vice president role.[41]In May 2022 he had formed the National Jewish Assembly. This seeks to represent the views of the Jewish people to the Government. He has since then given talks on the media, including GB News, Talk Radio and less frequently on the BBC and Sky. He stated that he had addressed UK politics, but also matters relating to Israel and to antisemitism in the UK and elsewhere.[42]In his witness evidence Mr. Mond referred to the 2014 Post. He stated that the Commission had been wrong to characterise this as Islamophobic. He believed that the Commission had initially viewed the post without the final sentence being considered. Mr. Mond stated that his intention was to demonstrate a concern about Islamist fundamentalism and not Islam generally. In his evidence Mr. Mond stated that he would refer to ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or ‘political Islam’ if he were writing the comment now. The comment that he made about a post relating to a prominent Muslim Labour MP resigning in protest was intended as a comment about political Islam and not Islam generally. He retains his view that this is a matter of real concern. However, he does not have an “anti-Muslim bone in his body”.[43]With regard to his 2016 Post, Mr. Mond stated that the Commission had also wrongly characterised this as Islamophobic. His comment has been referred to by the Commission without reference to the original post. The original post makes it clear that the context for his post was the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13th November 2015. Mr. Mond stated that the reference to “evil bastards” in this post was a reference to the Islamist terrorists who had carried out the massacre at the Bataclan in Paris in November 2015. He now accepted that the part of his post that stated that civilisation was “at war with Islam” was inappropriate and open to misinterpretation. He said that he should have referred to Islamism or fundamentalist Islam or political Islam. However, in 2016 it was not so common to use the terms ‘Islamism’, ‘political Islam’ or ‘fundamentalist Islam’ and so his comment just spoke about Islam. He again totally rejected any anti-Muslim sentiment.[44]Mr. Mond was asked if he accepted that this comment was not appropriate. He replied that he did insofar as it could be taken to refer to Islam generally. However, he thought that, if read in context, there was no problem with what he wrote as it was in response to the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015.[45]Mr. Mond stated that the 2017 Likes were not in themselves controversial or offensive. He stated that he was unaware of much of the background in relation to the individual on whose Facebook account he added the ‘likes’ and on which the Commission had based their view. Mr. Mond said that he did not remember what was on the screen at the time that he “liked” these posts. In response to questions, Mr. Mond indicated that he thought only three options existed in responding to comments on Facebook in 2017, of which a ‘like’ was one. There are now more choices available on Facebook.[46]Mr. Mond was asked if he knew something about what the author of the Facebook page (“PG”) was talking about in her comments. He stated that “he was fairly happy that he knew what PG was talking about”. He was a strong supporter of freedom of speech and remained so. He regarded the ability to run advertisements as a freedom of speech issue. Mr. Mond believes that he should not have to do hours of research in order to “like” a post. He stated that he had not become aware until later that PG was banned from entering the UK because of the threat that she posed to public order because of her anti-Muslim rhetoric.[47]Mr. Mond was asked if he would “like” posts about freedom of expression by political Islam. He stated that he might if the freedom of expression was on behalf of Muslims rather than political Islam.[48]Mr. Mond was asked how he had become aware of the Facebook page of PG. He stated that his wife, who is American, had said that he might like PG’s Facebook page as her friend had mentioned it to her.[49]Mr. Mond stressed that he was not anti-Muslim. He gave the example of how at Pesach, or Passover, when he gathered with friends and family this year, a young Muslim woman who is a friend of his daughter had attended, and of how he worked with Muslim colleagues.[50]Mr. Mond referred to his comments on Facebook following the death of Sir David Amess MP referred to at paragraph 14.5above. It was stated on his behalf that the Commission had decided that this comment was not conduct falling within condition F of Section 181A (7). It was submitted that the tribunal should give appropriate weight to that decision and not consider his comment as relevant in deciding whether to make the Order. Furthermore, the post was not offensive to any section of the public and Mr. Mond had made the full apology in respect of the post that is set out at paragraph 25 above. This apology was reported in a Jewish News article after the post had been publicised in the media.[51]In his evidence at the hearing, Mr. Mond stated that he had been forced to make this apology and that the posts had offended a number of the deputies at the Board of Deputies of British Jews. In particular, the fact that he had posted on Shabat had been a cause of concern. His view now with regard to the substance of his post is that he would not change what he had said at the time.[52]Mr. Mond submitted that the Commission was wrong to imply that his failure to review his historic social media activity, or to foresee the impact that his activities might have on a charity of which he was a trustee, was conduct that might fall within condition F. Mr. Mond’s evidence was that the publicity that had been given to his historic social media posts and “likes” arose due to political differences within the Board of Deputies. He had been elected as a Senior Vice President of the Board of Deputies and had topped the poll in that election. However, he was not liked by others within the Board of Deputies. The Board of Deputies is left leaning, and Mr. Mond was a prominent Conservative. He suggested that 40 deputies out of over 150 did not like him and had talked to the Jewish News with a view to publicising matters that would be to his detriment. He had initially refused to resign from his positions on the Board of Deputies and its related charities. However, a vote of confidence had been called in him and he was told that no-one would work with him. He had therefore been asked to resign and chose to do so. In his view the contents of two posts and two “likes” made some years ago would not have led a reasonably minded person to require him to resign from the Board of Deputies, which should represent a range of views within the Jewish community.[53]Mr. Winfield, on behalf of Mr. Mond submitted that the Commission had provided no evidence to support its assertions that the impact of the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes would be substantially detrimental to any of the charities of which Mr. Mond was a trustee, or to charities generally. He stated that three posts and two “likes” over a seven-year period is not concerted activity.[54]The conduct on which the Commission seeks to rely, i.e. the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes, do not, Mr. Winfield stated, demonstrate Mr. Mond’s unfitness to be a charity trustee. The Commission is seeking to hold Mr. Mond to an unreasonably high standard in finding him to have been reckless in his conduct and in failing to foresee the consequence that it may have.[55]Mr. Winfield submitted that the making of the Order is not desirable to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally. The link between the conduct and charity is tenuous. Mr. Mond took reasonable steps to minimize the adverse impact of the conduct once it had been reported. The Commission had produced no evidence to support its assertion that Mr. Mond acting as a charity trustee would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the sector.[56]Ms. Hynes submitted on behalf of the Commission that this was a low-level disqualification case; that the conduct the Commission had relied upon in applying Section 181A and concluding that the criteria for a disqualification order were met was the making of the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes by Mr. Mond. The Commission does not rely on the media reporting of these as being part of the conduct. However, the potential for the posts to be damaging or likely to be damaging if media attention was given to them, would have been apparent. Ms. Hynes stated that the potential for damage was not an issue of evidence; the tribunal can decide whether conduct is “damaging or likely to be damaging” and tribunals have not in the past required evidence of actual damage. The case of Ioannou v the Charity Commission (CA/2021/0006) in the first-tier tribunal established that conduct need only affect a small group of the public for it to be relevant. The Commission also believe that the case of Zakir Naik v Charity Commission 9CA/2020/0006) is relevant. This is one of the few cases in which condition F of Section 181A (7) of the Act has been considered and, in this case, very serious, albeit mostly historic, statements made by a charity trustee in breach of the broadcasting code and the UK’s Unacceptable Behaviour policy had led to the tribunal upholding an order disqualifying Dr Naik from being a charity trustee.[57]The Commission stated that it was sufficient that the conduct that the Commission relied upon in applying condition F was not de minimis. In this appeal the 2014 Post and 2016 Post could be seen as Islamophobic. At best these posts were unclear. The Commission had taken account of Mr. Mond’s apology for his comments and had reduced the period of disqualification as a consequence.[58]The Commission found that Mr. Mond’s failure to do anything about his social media history was relevant. His lack of care and thought contributed to the conduct on which the Commission had based its decision to impose the Order. The Commission noted that Mr. Mond had set his Facebook profile to public and used his own name in commenting on social media. Mr. Mond’s position within his community meant that he should have been aware that his views were likely to be noteworthy.[59]Ms. Hynes submitted that the conduct by Mr. Mond met the statutory test of unfitness set out in Section 181A (6) of the Act. It was sufficient that Mr. Mond had been reckless in his conduct.[60]Ms. Hynes stated that the disqualification order was “desirable in the public interest in order to protect the public trust and confidence in charities”. The tribunal should have regard to the nature and seriousness of the conduct in coming to a view on whether this requirement had been met. The public reporting of Mr. Mond’s comments meant that it is in the public interest for the Order to be maintained. Ms. Hynes did not regard the fact that Mr. Mond had resigned as a trustee and no longer wished to be a trustee of charities as a reason for the disqualification order not to be maintained.[61]The Commission said that it had issued the Order in this case as it was the only sanction, or the minimum sanction, that it could apply in the circumstances. Whilst Mr. Mond and his advisors had referred to other possible sanctions, such as a warning, this was not possible under the Act as a warning only applies where there has been misconduct or mismanagement. Other sanctions required Mr. Mond to be a trustee, and he had resigned from these positions.

Human Rights Issues in this Appeal

[62]Mr. Winfield submitted on behalf of Mr. Mond that the Order amounted to an unjustified interference with Mr. Mond’s freedom of expression. Mr. Winfield referred the tribunal to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”). Section 6 provides, so far as is relevant: (1). it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. … (3). in this section “public authority” includes – (a). a court or tribunal, and (b). any person certain of whose functions are functions of a “public nature”[63]Mr. Winfield submitted that the tribunal must interpret section 181A of the Act in a manner which is compatible with Convention rights. One of the Convention rights is freedom of expression. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights states as follows:
“FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1. Everyone has a right to freedom of expression………………. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
[64]Mr. Mond submitted that the Order is clearly an interference with Mr. Mond’s rights under Article 10 (1). In order to justify restricting Mr. Mond’s freedom to express himself, the Commission must justify the Order under one of the purposes listed in Article 10 (2). To do so the Commission must present proper evidence. Mr. Mond submitted that none of the justifications upon which the Commission relies in the case fall within any of the grounds in Article 10 (2). In any event, even if some level of sanction were justified, the exercise of the restriction in the Order would be disproportionate because the conduct was spontaneous rather than a considered expression and, as such, the European Court of Human Rights decision in Raichinov v Bulgaria (2008) 46 EHRR 28 establishes that a more indulgent approach should be adopted to such spontaneous expression. Furthermore, the Commission should have adopted a less intrusive or onerous means of achieving its aim. In this case the Commission, it was submitted, could have given Mr. Mond an official warning under Section 75A of the Act when it first became aware of the conduct. Once Mr. Mond had resigned all of the charity trusteeships, the making of the Order was not necessary to achieve the effect that the Commission desired.[65]Mr. Winfield referred the tribunal to the case of Vogt v Germany (1996) 21 EHRR 205. In this case it was found that the decision by the German government to dismiss Ms. Vogt from her post as a secondary school teacher by reason of her being a member of the German Communist Party was made for reasons that were not sufficient to establish convincingly that it was necessary in a democratic society. The action was therefore disproportionate to the legitimate aim of requiring a duty of political loyalty from civil servants that the German government was pursuing.[66]Mr. Winfield relied on the decision in Kelly v BBC [2001] Fam 59 (Fam) in support of his submission that the Commission required evidence in order to support a conclusion that any of the criteria within Article 10 (2) applied, or could be relied upon, in making the Order.[67]Mr. Winfield explained that the Commission had in its Statement of Reasons relied upon the “economic wellbeing of the country” in order to justify the making of the Order and the restrictions on Mr. Mond’s freedom of expression. This is not one of the categories provided for in Article 10 (2). He submitted that the Commission had also sought to rely on “health and morals” in order to establish the basis for the Order. This was raised in correspondence and was referred to in the Decision Review carried out by the Commission. Mr. Winfield said he now understood that the Commission was relying upon the “protection of the reputation or rights of others” in order to justify the restriction on Mr. Winfield’s Article 10 Convention right. Mr. Winfield submitted that the Commission could not change the basis upon which Mr. Mond’s right to freedom of expression was restricted in this manner without producing evidence establishing the need for the restriction and that the restriction was proportionate. In deciding what was proportionate, the Commission should, as should the tribunal, take account of the spontaneous nature of Mr. Mond’s expression. It was argued that Mr. Mond’s “likes” are spontaneous expressions that are akin to speech.[68]It was accepted on behalf of the Commission that Mr. Mond’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression were infringed by the Order disqualifying him from holding a position as a charity trustee. The Commission stated that its powers to disqualify are “prescribed in law” in the Act and specifically in Section 181A. The Commission took the view that its powers to restrict freedom of expression are exercisable if it is “necessary in a democratic society”. The protection of charities and the charitable sector is a pressing social need that could make such restrictions necessary. Ms. Hynes, on behalf of the Commission, confirmed that the legitimate aim that the Commission is seeking to pursue in making the Order is “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”. In this case it is the protection of the reputation and rights of charities in the charitable sector. The Commission’s statutory objectives are set out in Section 14 of the Act, and these include an objective of maintaining public confidence in charities and objectives in respect of compliance and accountability. These are legitimate aims which the Commission seeks to achieve when exercising its powers.[69]Ms. Hynes stated that unlike other Convention rights, Article 10 carries with it duties and responsibilities. The Vogt v Germany case establishes that such duties may fall upon individuals holding positions in society. Ms. Vogt was a teacher. Mr. Mond was a charity trustee. Mr. Mond was and is a prominent person, whose opinions were likely to be noteworthy and influential. The Commission pointed out that Mr. Mond had himself clarified, deleted, and apologised for some of his social media conduct. His conduct did cause a hostile adverse media reaction, and a charity asked him to step down from his trustee role.[70]The Commission accepted that case law supports the proposition that oral statements may be treated differently from those written after careful consideration and the Raichinov case supports this conclusion. In this case the posts made by Mr. Mond were in writing and have remained online for years. Mr. Mond could have edited or deleted them at any time, but he did not do so.[71]The Commission believes that the disqualification of Mr. Mond is proportionate. The conduct was serious enough to attract a sanction, and a disqualification of only two and a half years is a minimal period. The Commission’s options to impose sanctions on Mr. Mond were limited after he had resigned from his trusteeships. It has no power to give advice or a warning in these circumstances. The only statutory sanction open to the Commission was a disqualification. Disqualification is for a limited period and does not have life-long effects unlike that in the Vogt case. The Commission noted that Mr. Mond appears to be able to be a successful commentator, a leader of a noteworthy organisation and a prominent figure in the Jewish community notwithstanding the disqualification. In all the circumstances, the Commission does not accept that it has interfered impermissibly with Mr. Mond’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression.[72]The period of disqualification is two and a half years, and the Commission regards this as proportionate when reflecting the facts of this particular case. This falls into the lowest band set out in the Commission’s own formal explanatory statement of how it will exercise its power to make a disqualification order. Two and a half years is in the middle of the lowest band. The Commission pointed to aggravating factors in respect of Mr. Mond’s conduct as being that his conduct was contrary to the objects of two of the charities for which he was a trustee and that the conduct continued over a lengthy period. The Commission recognised that mitigating factors include Mr. Mond’s deletion of the posts and “likes”, the clarification that he issued to the press and his unequivocal apology.

Findings of Facts

[73]There was considerable agreement between the Commission and Mr. Mond regarding the key facts that are relevant to this appeal. There is no dispute that the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes and the 15 October 2021 comment on the Facebook page of a then Conservative MP relating to a Labour MP were made by Mr. Mond in the terms and on the dates set out above and on the web pages referred to above. The parties also agreed upon the circumstances in which the posts and “likes” became the subject of media comment. The circumstances in which Mr. Mond resigned from his charity trustee positions, or left his charity trustee positions at the expiry of his term, were also agreed.

Unanimous Findings of Fact

[74]The tribunal has considered the evidence provided by Mr. Mond and by the Commission, the extensive bundle of papers and documents provided in advance of the hearing and the submissions of Mr. Winfield and Ms. Hynes and has come to the following unanimous conclusions in relation to matters of fact: - The comment on 15 October 2021 on the Facebook page of a then Conservative MP relating to a Labour MP and referred to at paragraph 14.5 above is not a comment likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally. It would appear to a casual reader to be a party-political jibe. The Tribunal finds as a matter of fact, that even if the reader was aware that the comment was made by a charity trustee and found it distasteful, it is unlikely the comment would affect a reader’s view of the charity sector. - The 2017 Likes are unobjectionable in themselves. In particular the “like” added to a comment deploring the outcome of the French presidential election is a purely political statement that charity trustees should be permitted to make without concerning themselves with whether the public will think more or less of them. Most members of the public are quite capable of distinguishing someone’s ability to be a trustworthy trustee of a charity and their personal political views. - It is not clear that the 2017 Likes are from a charity trustee without further investigation. - The “likes” were made by Mr. Mond on a website that was open to the public, as such this is conduct of a type that is capable of damaging public trust and confidence in charities generally or any particular charity, or classes of charity. - The tribunal considers that “liking” something on Facebook in the period in which the 2017 Likes took place could be regarded as casual and carrying little significance by the majority of readers on Facebook. The lack of significance attached to such casual and spontaneous reactions is relevant in determining what damage may arise if the person submitting the” like” is known to be a charity trustee. Clearly the comment that is being “liked” is crucial in determining the significance of the conduct. If the comment is illegal or is unambiguously offensive, such that a reasonable person casually observing the page could not have misunderstood it and its author’s intention, then the person making the “like” must accept responsibility for any diminution in public confidence and trust that arises. That is not the case with the two “likes” referred to above. - The Commission, like the journalists who reported on Mr Mond’s social media activity, focused on the extreme views of the Facebook author whose comments were ‘liked’ by Mr Mond. The risk of damage to public trust or confidence from the 2017 Likes only arises if they imply support for other content on PG’s Facebook page or for PG and her activities and motivation. Mr Mond explained that he looked at the Facebook page because his wife thought he may be interested in it. PG’s Facebook page is a platform for her Islamophobic views, which are extreme enough to cause her to be refused permission to enter the UK by the Home Secretary in 2013. This suggests to the tribunal that someone who knew Mr Mond well thought that anti-Islamic views would be of interest to him. However, the evidence does not support a conclusion that most people seeing the 2017 Likes would regard Mr Mond as indicating support for all of PG’s views or aims.[75]The tribunal finds on the basis of the evidence and submissions in this appeal that Mr. Mond is a politically active individual and has been politically active for many years. He is clear that his role in the charities of which he was a trustee and the community in which he is active both arose from his activities in seeking to represent and pursue a particular political viewpoint. The tribunal finds, as a matter of fact, that some criticism of his conduct, and possibly some press coverage, was motivated by partisan views of political opponents.[76]The tribunal finds that Mr. Mond behaved responsibly in resigning from certain of his trustee positions once he was asked to do so in the light of the publicity that was given to his posts and “likes”, which were deemed to be damaging by some of his erstwhile charity colleagues and certain Jewish publications.[77]The 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes which forms the basis for the Commission’s decision to impose the Order were made in the course of a seven-year period reviewed by the Commission. The conduct was therefore infrequent. It would have been hard for casual readers to make a connection between these elements of Mr Mond’s social media activity. Nevertheless, as the press articles in which the 2014 Post, 2016 Post, the 2017 Likes were reported evidences, a search of the social media activity of Mr Mond readily revealed these comments and “likes”.

Majority Findings of fact

[78]After considering all of the evidence and submissions in this appeal, the majority of the tribunal has come to the following conclusions in relation to matters of fact: - The 2014 Post can only be read as a statement that an increase in the number of Muslim MPs and MPs representing constituencies with Muslim voters would adversely affect Britain’s ability to protect its essential security interest and will lead to an irrevocable change in Britain. Were the word “Muslim” to be replaced by “Jewish” in the post that Mr Mond is responding to, the statement would clearly be antisemitic in so far as it assumes that all Jews have the same political views or goals and that these are contrary to Britain best interests. The same view of the Muslim community is equally prejudiced. Mr Mond is a politically engaged individual and would have been aware, if he viewed the comment objectively, that presenting all members of a large religious group in the UK as having the same political views and goals and of being a threat to the country’s interests is inaccurate and objectionable. - The 2016 Post, as written, presents Islam as a threat to the whole of civilisation. On the evidence before it, the tribunal accepts Mr Mond’s evidence that the reference to “evil bastards” was to the terrorist who carried out the massacre at the Bataclan in Paris. However, the comment distinguishes between “these evil bastards” and “Islam” and says that our leaders must realise that we are at war with both. The 2016 Post, as written, is Islamophobic.[79]The 2014 Post and 2016 Post were capable of being damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or the charity of which the person making them is a trustee, if readers know or became aware that the person making them was a charity trustee.[80]The tribunal finds that 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes are in aggregate capable of damaging the charities of which Mr. Mond was a trustee given the apparently anti-Islam views he expressed and that Mr. Mond was a trustee of charities with a religious basis and in some cases, of charities with an express object of promoting religious tolerance. It notes that Mr. Mond has vehemently denied that these are his views. Mr. Mond has sought to distinguish clearly between his views with regard to Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam or other terms that describe the impact that certain members or groups within the Islamic faith may seek to achieve and his views of Muslims as individuals and of Islam as a religion. The tribunal is inclined to accept Mr Mond’s evidence on this point. The 2014 Post and 2016 Post were written in categorical terms, but were written on the spur of the moment. If Mr Mond’s views of Islam were as strong as they appear from these two comments, it might be expected that other evidence of such views would have emerged over a seven-year period given Mr Mond’s profile and his willingness to comment on social media and speak in public. However, no such evidence was submitted and Mr Mond submitted that his social media activity was limited during this period.[81]The tribunal concludes that the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes were likely to cause legitimate concern in the minds of objective readers regarding Mr. Mond’s hostility to Islam. The two posts, in particular, draw general conclusions about the Muslim community generally from, in one case, the action of one MP and in the second case, from an atrocity committed by fundamentalist Islamic terrorists.

Findings of Law

[82]In the light of the findings of fact set out above, the tribunal concludes that the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes referred to above constituted, for the purposes of Section 181A (7), conduct by Mr. Mond. Such conduct is past conduct and was not in relation to a charity.[83]Section 181A (6) of the Act requires an order disqualifying a person under the section to be based upon a judgment that past conduct is “likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order”. As such it is not required that evidence of actual damage to public trust and confidence is proven in the course of determining this appeal. It is sufficient that the tribunal determines that such conduct is, or was, likely to be damaging.[84]The tribunal heard submissions in relation to whether or not the conduct needed to be known to the public if the subject of the order was to be judged to have conducted themselves in a way that was likely to be damaging. The tribunal accepts Mr. Mond’s submission that exposure of content by the media is not in itself conduct that should be attributed to Mr. Mond. However, the fact that conduct takes place on a platform accessible to the public, and which may therefore become known, is sufficient to engage Section 181A (7) condition F. The Act sets out that an order disqualifying a trustee can be justified if conduct is “likely” to be damaging to public trust and confidence. This permits the possibility that conduct may only have such effect if and when it becomes known, or more widely known.[85]The test set by condition F of Section 181A (7) sets a low threshold for relevant conduct: it is sufficient that it is likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence. The majority of the tribunal finds that Mr. Mond’s conduct in making the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes was capable of damaging public trust and confidence in charities generally or in certain charities or classes of charity in the event that it became known that he was a charity trustee.[86]Section 181A (6) of the Act imposes two further conditions that need to be satisfied before an order disqualifying a person under that Section can be made. These are firstly, that the person is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity, either generally or in relation to the charities or class of charity specified or described in the order and secondly, that the making of the order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order.[87]In considering whether the conduct of Mr. Mond establishes that he is unfit to be a charity trustee and whether it is desirable in the public interest that he be disqualified as a trustee in circumstances where the conduct solely relates to the expression of views or opinions in a public forum, the tribunal has taken into account the Convention rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression, and the general legal principle of proportionality. The tribunal considers that any legal analysis of what is unfit or desirable in the public interest under the Act must take account of the Convention rights of Mr Mond and of any other individual or charity affected by this decision. We have reached a decision on this basis.[88]The tribunal considers that it is in the interests of the charity sector as a whole to be able to recruit and retain trustees from across the whole community and with different strengths, skills, views and personalities. Setting a high bar in terms of conduct could help to protect public trust and confidence in charities, but if it means there are not enough trustees who will volunteer, or that those who do volunteer lack diversity or breadth of experience, interest, personality or attitude, it could be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally in the longer term. It is likely that a thriving charity sector capable of providing the full breadth of the public benefit that can be achieved under charity law in England and Wales will benefit from charity trustees with a wide range of personalities and capabilities.[89]Mr. Mond is, from his evidence, a man of strong views on political and religious matters. He is keen to express himself in public, both on social media and more recently in broadcasting. Such an approach carries risk in terms of appropriate conduct. However, it is easy to see how the charity sector may benefit from the involvement of people with strong motivation and an ability to motivate others in pursuit of legitimate objects. Requiring all charity trustees to have the personality or maturity such that they always express themselves publicly in considered and measured terms could deprive the charity sector of committed and effective trustees with a passion for particular charitable goals and an ability to communicate that passion spontaneously. Individuals who are fit to be charity trustees must be capable of operating within the constraints of charity law and the law generally, but these constraints must permit people with different personalities and attributes to become trustees.[90]Mr. Mond has the right to freedom of expression. It is clear from Article 10 of the Convention and from the Human Rights Act 1998 that this right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities. However, Article 10 (2) states that the exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of health or morals and for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The tribunal is clear that the Commission is able to impose a disqualification order under s.181A of the Act that will have the effect of restricting freedom of expression where this is necessary for the protection of the reputation of the charity sector or individual charities or the rights of charities either generally or by class or individually. The tribunal is aware that any such restriction must be a proportionate means of achieving the aim of supporting the provision of public benefit by protecting public trust and confidence in charities and that an individual judgement on any such restriction should be made taking into account the particular circumstances of the case.[91]The tribunal concludes that the making of the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes over a seven-year period is not the conduct of someone who is unfit, in its ordinary English language meaning, to be a charity trustee or trustee for charities generally. The social media activity is very limited in number and scope, its profile is low, the connection between the posts and ‘likes’ is not obvious and they do not present any obvious connection with any charity or charities generally. The 2017 Likes were added to comments that were not, in themselves and in isolation, offensive. Mr Mond acted responsibly in agreeing to step down from charity trustee positions when asked to do so once the potential for damage to the sector or to the charities of which he was a trustee became apparent. The tribunal finds that Mr Mond’s conduct in making the 2014 Post, 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes over a period of many years does not justify a conclusion that he in unfit to be a charity trustee.[92]The tribunal finds that making the Order is not desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally. Mr Mond’s conduct consists of two comments and two likes on social media made spontaneously over a seven-year period, which the majority of the tribunal find would be perceived as anti-Islam. He explained the background behind the content he was responsible for and which was deemed by others to be offensive, immediately after it was drawn to his attention. He apologised for the offence caused by his comment and resigned as a charity trustee when asked to do so. If such conduct is found to be a basis for a disqualification order, and is applied more generally in the charity sector, it risks setting too high a bar for charity trustees and adversely affecting public trust and confidence in the charity sector by putting off individuals who may be effective trustees in pursuing some part of the full range of charitable objectives permitted by charity law. Individuals with a history of social media use, who may now, or in the future, have the capability and integrity to be effective and responsible charity trustees, but who have a very limited history of spontaneous, low-profile comments on social media that might be perceived by the broader public to be offensive when viewed later and in aggregate should not always be deterred from taking up trustee roles. In coming to this view, the tribunal is mindful that the public’s own experience of social media may cause them to have less regard to isolated and spontaneous historic posts and ‘likes’ with the potential to be perceived as offensive or wrong.

Conclusion

[93]In all of the circumstance of this appeal, the tribunal finds that Mr Mond’s conduct on social media on which the Commission relied in making the Order was capable of damaging public trust and confidence in charities of which he was a trustee, but for the reasons set out above, was not sufficient in itself to establish that he is unfit to be a charity trustee or that it was desirable in the public interest for the Order to be made.[94]The tribunal has the power to substitute for all or part of the Order any other order which could have been made by the Commission. The tribunal notes that Mr. Mond represents, as a trustee, charities with a particular religious background and that he was commenting on matters or issues that related to another religion. We have considered if it would be appropriate on the facts of this appeal to disqualify Mr Mond from being a trustee of charities with religious or social cohesion objects. A charity that has a trustee known to have made comments that might reasonably be construed as Islamophobic may encounter problems. This may either be because its reputation suffers by the association and it loses support and the ability to pursue its objects, or because it gains support from the association and the charity finds itself being steered toward activities or statements that do not provide a public benefit or meet its charitable objectives and/or which may harm public trust in that charity or charities generally.[95]The tribunal finds that the making of an order in different terms that disqualifies Mr Mond from being a trustee of charities with religious or social cohesion objects is not necessary and proportionate in the circumstance of this appeal. He appears to have understood that his 2014 and 2016 Posts, as written, had the potential to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities of which he was a trustee. He has been at great pains to explain that what he meant to say is different from what he did say and has taken this stance since the posts and ‘likes’ were publicly reported in 2022. He has also consistently sought to deny that he is Islamophobic. Some years have passed since the 2017 Likes and the tribunal was not provided with any evidence of any subsequent public statements or acts by Mr Mond that are offensive to religions or communities other than his own. He has acted responsibly in stepping down from all charity trustee roles. In all of the circumstance the tribunal finds that it is not necessary or proportionate to substitute for all or part of the Order any other order which could have been made by the Commission.[96]The tribunal considered whether it should quash the Order and remit the matter to the Commission. On balance, it regards this as unnecessary given the conclusions that it has come to in this decision. The tribunal is able to determine this appeal.[97]The tribunal conclusion in this appeal is made on the basis of the particular facts of this case and the evidence and the submissions heard in the course of this appeal. No broader conclusion about social media use by charity trustees is intended. The 2014 Post, the 2016 Post and the 2017 Likes are not condoned nor excused. However, they are not, in the overall circumstance of this appeal, sufficient evidence in themselves of unfitness to be a charity trustee, nor are they sufficient to establish that a disqualification order is proportionate or desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally or in certain charities or a class or classes of charity that may specified or described in a modified order.[98]In coming to this decision, the tribunal has placed great weight on the limited and spontaneous nature of Mr. Mond’s problematic social media conduct. Nothing in this decision should prevent the Commission from considering the whole of Mr. Mond’s social media and broadcasting comments and conduct, including the past conduct considered in this appeal, if subsequent public statements that he makes lead it to consider his fitness to hold a position as a charity trustee and whether it would be in the public interest for him to do so.

The Decision

[99]The tribunal concludes in the light of the findings of facts and findings of law set out above that the Order should be quashed as a whole.[100]The appeal is allowed and the Order is quashed as a whole. Signed Date: 4 February 2025 Peter Hinchliffe Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal