Now Motor Retailing Ltd v Mulvihill (Unfair Dismissal: Reasonableness of dismissal) [2015] UKEAT 0052_15_1506

EAT
Now Motor Retailing Ltd v Mulvihill (Unfair Dismissal: Reasonableness of dismissal)
[2015] UKEAT 0052_15_1506 · 2014-07-16
[27]“28. Unfair dismissal appeals to this court on the ground that the ET has not correctly applied s.98(4) can be quite unpredictable. The application of the objective test to the dismissal reduces the scope for divergent views, but does not eliminate the possibility of differing outcomes at different levels of decision. Sometimes there are even divergent views amongst EAT members and the members in the constitutions of this court.[29]The appellate body, whether the EAT or this court, must be on its guard against making the very same legal error as the ET stands accused of making. An error will occur if the appellate body substitutes its own subjective response to the employee's conduct. The appellate body will slip into a similar sort of error if it substitutes its own view of the reasonable employer’s response for the view formed by the ET without committing an error of law or reaching a perverse decision on that point.[30]Other danger zones are present in most appeals against ET decisions. As an appeal lies only on a question of law, the difference between legal questions and findings of fact and inferences is crucial. Appellate bodies learn more from experience than from precept or instruction how to spot the difference between a real question of law and a challenge to primary findings of fact dressed up as law.[31]Another teaching of experience is that, as with other tribunals and courts, there are occasions when a correct self-direction of law is stated by the ET, but then overlooked or misapplied at the point of decision. The ET judgment must be read carefully to see if it has in fact correctly applied the law which it said was applicable. The reading of an ET decision must not, however, be so fussy that it produces pernickety critiques. Over-analysis of the reasoning process; being hypercritical of the way in which the decision is written; focusing too much on particular passages or turns of phrase to the neglect of the decision read in the round: those are all appellate weaknesses to avoid. ”32. What is involved in a careful reading of the Employment Tribunal’s Reasons to see if it has properly applied the law? There tend, in our experience, to be two features which may contribute to a conclusion that the Employment Tribunal has not applied the section 98(4) test. Firstly, there may be signs which indicate that the Employment Tribunal has, in effect, made and proceeded from its own findings of fact, when it should have started with the employer’s findings and asked whether those findings were reasonable. Secondly, there may be signs that the Employment Tribunal’s criticisms of an employer apply an extremely high standard without recognising that there is a range of acceptable ways of investigating and deciding a disciplinary matter. Even if these signs appear to be present, the decision must still be read in the round in order to decide whether it is really vitiated by error.33. We have reached the conclusion that there are indeed features in the Employment Tribunal’s Reasons which demonstrate that it has not applied the section 98(4) test. We begin with the question of process. The Employment Tribunal had four main criticisms of the investigatory and disciplinary process. We will take them in turn.34. (1) The Employment Tribunal’s first criticism was that no written record was made by the investigator of the results of the investigation. We have found this criticism difficult to understand. Seven witness statements were taken during the course of the investigation. The criticism must presumably be that some running record should have been kept of what the investigator did over and above a record of the evidence he obtained or else that an investigation report should have been produced. In our experience that is to apply an extremely high standard. An experienced investigator in a very large organisation may perhaps keep such a record or produce such a report, particularly in a serious case, but it is not general practice to do so.35. It is relevant to take into account the ACAS Code , the provisions of which have statutory force (see section 207(2) of the Trade Union Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ). The relevant code, Code of Practice 1 2009 , does not in its body say that a written record of investigation is required but the foreword says that:
“Employers would be well advised to keep a written record of any disciplinary or grievance cases they deal with.” 36. There is also an ACAS Guide on Discipline and Grievances at Work . This suggests that records should include the following: the complaint against the employee; the employee’s defence; findings made and action taken; the reason for actions taken; whether an appeal was lodged; the outcome of the appeal; any grievance raised during the disciplinary procedure; subsequent developments; notes of any formal meetings. 37. This Guidance seems to us to state general practice, to which we would add that an employer is generally expected to keep a written record of what is said by any employee whose evidence is relied on in support of a disciplinary allegation. Usually (as here) it will be in statement form. 38. The Respondent appears to us to have complied with good practice as indicated by the Guide in the recording of the investigation. In particular statements were reduced to writing. We do not think the Respondent was required by general standards of good practice to have kept an investigation log or to have produced an investigation report, though this may be done by an experienced investigator in a large organisation. In our view the Employment Tribunal appears to have applied a very high standard. It does not appear in its Reasons to have considered whether there was a range of acceptable ways in which an investigation could be carried out. That was the task which it was required to perform by section 98(4). 39. (2) The Employment Tribunal’s second criticism of process was that there were no interviews with two workers whose workstations were adjacent to the Claimant. Nor was there an interview with the Claimant himself. So far as the interview with workers is concerned, this appears to us to be a fair criticism. We can see that an Employment Tribunal, applying the correct test, could well find that the Respondent’s investigation fell below a reasonable standard in failing to interview such workers. So far as a failure to interview the Claimant is concerned, the ACAS Code does not mandate such an interview and there is, in our experience, a range of practice. The Employment Tribunal has not, as it should have done under section 98(4), considered whether the procedure adopted in this case fell within the range of such practice. 40. (3) The Employment Tribunal’s third criticism was that the Claimant was not shown Mr Meacock’s statement. The Employment Tribunal seems to proceed on the basis that this must be unreasonable and unfair. It is, however, not necessarily so. The Code says that statements should “normally” provide copies of any written evidence (paragraph 9). The Guide says that in certain circumstances, for example to protect a witness, the employer might withhold some information. So, applying section 98(4), there may be circumstances in which it is reasonable to withhold a particular statement so long as the employee knows the case he has to meet - see Hussain v Elonex . In this case the Respondent gave in evidence a specific explanation for deciding to withhold Mr Meacock’s statement. The Employment Tribunal’s task was to evaluate, pursuant to section 98(4), whether the Respondent’s course of action fell within the range of reasonable responses. There is no recognition of that task in its Reasons. 41. (4) The Employment Tribunal’s fourth criticism was that statements were given to the Claimant anonymously. Again the Employment Tribunal seems to proceed on the basis that anonymise witness statements must be unreasonable and unfair. Again, it is not necessarily so. See Linfood Cash and Carry v Thomson [1989] IRLR 235 and Asda Stores v Thomson . Again, the Respondent gave its explanation for anonymising statements. The Employment Tribunal has not mentioned it or evaluated it against the standard laid down by section 98(4). There is a further point concerning these statements. The Employment Tribunal said that “the Claimant had no means of challenging the content of those statements.”
This conclusion by the Employment Tribunal appears to us to be without foundation. The Claimant could and did challenge the content of the statements, in particular in the quite lengthy written reply which he produced before the disciplinary hearing. 42. We have therefore concluded that the Employment Tribunal has not applied the section 98(4) test in its criticisms of the disciplinary process. It has largely relied on these criticisms in reaching its conclusion that the dismissal was unfair. 43. We turn then to consider the Employment Tribunal’s reasoning concerning the substantive allegations of bullying and consumption of alcohol. Part of the Respondent’s case related to the Claimant’s treatment of Mr Meacock. All the witnesses said that the Claimant treated him poorly and shouted at him. The Employment Tribunal said that this did not itself constitute bullying and that the Tribunal chose:
“… to accept the Claimant’s explanation that in a noisy workshop raising one’s voice is sometimes the only way of being heard.” 44. But this was not the correct approach. The statements taken by the Respondent did not accept that it was appropriate for the Claimant to shout at Mr Meacock. The correct approach for the Employment Tribunal was to find what the Respondent’s conclusion was on this matter and why and then to ask whether the Respondent’s conclusion was reasonable. 45. On the question of alcohol consumption it is difficult to see how the Employment Tribunal reasoned at all. The Respondent had witness statements attesting to the Claimant’s visits to the public house and alcohol consumption, in particular three witnesses who stated expressly that he smelled of alcohol after lunch. One would expect to find in the Employment Tribunal’s Reasons consideration of the question whether it was reasonable for the Respondent to consider these statements honest and reliable and to accept them. This reasoning is not present. The Employment Tribunal appears to rely on its criticisms of the flawed investigation alone. 46. In paragraph 34 of the Employment Tribunal’s Reasons it said that if the Respondent had carried out its procedures diligently it would have discovered “the unreliability of the allegations made against the Claimant”
. Mr Watson criticises this finding as indicative of a substitutionary mindset and perverse. If it was intended by the Employment Tribunal to found part of its reasoning for the finding of unfair dismissal, this remark would indeed have been indicative of a substitutionary mindset. However, paragraph 34 appears to us to be dealing with issues of Polkey and contributory fault. We must confess that it is not easy to understand how the Employment Tribunal so discounted the witness statements of the Respondent’s witnesses that it made no finding at all under the Polkey doctrine; but that is not an issue for us today. 47. Standing back, we consider that the Employment Tribunal, while correctly stating that it must apply the standard of the reasonable employer, did not do so in respect of its criticisms of the Respondent’s disciplinary process. Some of its criticisms are, to our mind, insupportable and some demonstrate no recognition of a “range of reasonable responses” test. Moreover, insofar as it stated any conclusions on the question whether the Respondent had a reasonable belief in the Claimant’s misconduct, it started from its own view of the facts. 48. The Employment Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the breach of contract claim for wrongful dismissal is extremely brief. It stated a conclusion with no reasons at all. It seems to have thought that its conclusion on wrongful dismissal was bound up with the unfair dismissal decision. In our judgment the wrongful dismissal claim must also fall with the unfair dismissal claim in the circumstances of this case. 49. It follows that the appeal must be allowed. This is not a case where the Employment Appeal Tribunal can substitute a conclusion of its own. The matter will be remitted for re-hearing before a freshly constituted Employment Tribunal. This should hear the matter entirely afresh, reaching its own conclusions on the question of unfair dismissal, Polkey , contributory fault, and wrongful dismissal.

Cited in 1 later judgment