“I immediately started my job search and went for numerous interviews and second interviews, but after several months the money was running out, and I couldn’t pay my rent. I lost my home and was forced to move in with my daughter, in Horley, Surrey. It was a very difficult time and I became severely depressed. I was already stressed from the treatment that I had received at ADP, and it was particularly worrying as I had only just begun to pick myself up after recovering from breast cancer. Losing my job was really the last straw. I just couldn’t handle another battle at that time.” 24. While the Claimant now refers in her Notice of Appeal to other evidence that she says she gave at the hearing about her depression, where she asserts that she advanced it as the prime reason for not bringing her claim sooner, this was not contained in her witness statement. Her assertion is also disputed by the Respondent. There are no notes of evidence before me (no notes have been asked for) and there is therefore no basis upon which I could accept the Claimant’s assertions as to what else was said below in this respect. 25. In addition, I note that there was no medical evidence placed before the Employment Judge as to the Claimant’s state of health, indicating how this may have affected her over the period with which the judge was concerned, or how it was relevant to her failure to submit her ET1 in time. That the Claimant was very distressed at the time of the hearing is clear, because the judge made reference to it in her judgment (paragraph 10), having observed this for herself at the hearing. The burden was, however, on the Claimant to provide evidence in support not only of ill-health but also of a causative link between her medical condition and the delay in bringing her claim in time. 26. It goes without saying that I have real sympathy for the Claimant, given the serious illness she describes in her witness statement. However, in my view Ms McKinley is seeking to elevate paragraph 2 of her witness statement to evidence of a causative link, which it plainly is not, in particular given the other things said in that statement. The evidence as to the Claimant’s health, such as it was, was before the Employment Judge and she had regard to it. The fact that she does not refer to it expressly in her reasons is, in my judgment, not an error of law. Rather, it is indicative of the limited weight she considered was to be attached to it, given the state of the evidence generally. As Mr Edwards observes, at paragraph 15 the judge did make a general finding as to this Claimant’s ability to bring the claim. 27. In relation to the grievance, it is correct that delay caused by a C laimant awaiting completion of an internal procedure may, in some circumstances, be a relevant factor to be considered in deciding whether to grant an extension of time. See, for example, the case of Apelgun-Gabriels v London Borough of Lambeth[2002] ICR 713 . Ms McKinley draws attention to paragraph 10.1 of the ET1 and to what she categorises now as a genuine mistake, or a misunderstanding by this Claimant as to the viability of the handling of her grievance as an act of discrimination and, in particular, an act of victimisation. She submits that the Employment Judge should have had regard to this and should have referred to it expressly in her judgment. 28. However, although this was a suggestion advanced in the ET1, it was not advanced by the Claimant in her evidence. While I accept, as Ms McKinley submits, that some allowance should be made for the fact that the Claimant was a litigant in person, this Claimant was clearly able to advance articulately what her case was, including her arguments about delay. It is clear that this point was not advanced in this way by the Claimant at the hearing. To the extent that she seeks now to advance, as an explanation for delay, something that was not advanced in evidence before the Employment Judge, this is a matter which the EAT cannot have regard to on appeal. 29. In the Claimant’s witness statement, the evidence given in relation to the grievance was as follows. The Claimant told the head of HR, Kevin Ball, on14 August 2012 that she was going to start Tribunal proceedings, and on 16 August he advised her that it would be in everyone’s interest if they followed the grievance procedure before engaging the legal system. Over the next two weeks, she sought legal advice, and the solicitor advised her to do as Mr Ball suggested. On 29 August she submitted her grievance and on 19 September she learned that it had been rejected. She considered appealing and consulted the solicitor, who suggested that she appealed. She then decided to submit a Tribunal claim. However, her claim was not submitted until 30 November, more than two months after her grievance was rejected, in circumstances where this Claimant was plainly alive to the possibility of a claim, on her own account, by mid-August and stated that she had sought legal advice. 30. Ms McKinley fairly concedes that there was an unexplained time gap between the rejection of her grievance, her consideration of whether to appeal, and the ultimate lodging of her ET1 on 30 November. Clearly, the judge had regard to the history of events after the Claimant’s dismissal. She referred expressly to that history in her judgment and dealt in particular with the grievance at paragraph 7. 31. Thus, in relation to the specific factors now relied upon, namely the Claimant’s ill-health and the relevance of the grievance, these were both raised at the hearing. The judge had regard to the evidence about them, such as it was, and to the way in which reliance was being placed upon them at the hearing, rather than as they are now being articulated on appeal. 32. Mr Edwards accepts that the other, generic factors referred to by Ms McKinley, such as the balance of hardship, prejudice, and the possibility of a fair trial, although not raised specifically below, should always be in the judge’s mind. But, he submits, there is no obligation upon a Tribunal to refer to them specifically in the judgment where, as in this case, they are considered either to be of neutral evidential value, or to be outweighed by other, important factors which were specifically raised and canvassed in evidence and in submissions before the Tribunal. I accept that submission. There is no necessity for the Employment Tribunal to follow a formulaic approach and set out a checklist of the variety of factors that may be relevant in any case, in particular where no reliance has been placed on any of them, or where other factors have been addressed in the evidence as being of greater significance. In this case I consider that the judge adequately explained the reasons for her decision not to extend time on the evidence she heard. 33. For these reasons, I consider that the first three grounds of appeal are not well-founded. 34. In her fourth and final ground of appeal, Ms McKinley submits that the judge made findings which were legally perverse. She submits, first, that the finding at paragraph 15 that the Claimant had the knowledge, the expertise and the ability to bring the claim was perverse. However, in my view the Claimant does not begin to surmount the high hurdle that she must cross in pursuing this challenge. The Respondent’s submissions below, based on the evidence which had been adduced, were that given the Claimant’s background in HR, her obvious knowledge of Employment Tribunals and her ability to access the Internet, it was not just and equitable to extend time. The Employment Judge plainly accepted this submission, as she was entitled to. The Claimant cannot now go behind this finding or successfully mount an argument, as she seeks to do in her Notice of Appeal, that this evidence was not adduced, or that the evidence adduced was something different. This is a clear finding by the judge, after hearing the evidence, on matters which were plainly relevant to the exercise of her discretion. 35. Secondly, Ms McKinley challenges as perverse the finding, at paragraph 16, that the references claim “simply could not succeed”