[24]Further, the ordinary meaning of giving "information" is conveying facts. In the course of the hearing before us, a hypothetical was advanced regarding communicating information about the state of a hospital. Communicating "information" would be "The wards have not been cleaned for the past two weeks. Yesterday, sharps were left lying around". Contrasted with that would be a statement that "you are not complying with Health and Safety requirements". In our view this would be an allegation not information.[25]In the employment context, an employee may be dissatisfied, as here, with the way he is being treated. He or his solicitor may complain to the employer that if they are not going to be treated better, they will resign and claim constructive dismissal. Assume that the employer, having received that outline of the employee's position from him or from his solicitor, then dismisses the employee. In our judgment, that dismissal does not follow from any disclosure of information. It follows a statement of the employee's position. In our judgment, that situation would not fall within the scope of the Employment Rights Act section 43.[26]The Tribunal based its conclusion that Mr Geduld was dismissed because, through his solicitor's letter of 4 February 2008, he made a protected disclosure. In our judgment the letter sets out a statement of the position of Mr Geduld. In order to fall within the statutory definition of protected disclosure there must be disclosure of information. In our judgment, the letter of 4 February 2008 does not convey information as contemplated by the legislation let alone disclose information. It is a statement of position quite naturally and properly communicated in the course of negotiations between the parties. Disclosure[27]Even if we are wrong in our conclusion that the Employment Tribunal erred in holding that the letter of 4 February 2008 disclosed information within the meaning of the ERA, we consider whether the Employment Tribunal erred in considering whether the letter of 4 February 2008 amounted to or contained a disclosure within the meaning of the section. The natural meaning of the word "disclose" is to reveal something to someone who does not know it already. However section 43L(3) provides that "disclosure" for the purpose of section 43 has effect so that "bringing information to a person's attention" albeit that he is already aware of it is a disclosure of that information. There would no need for the extended definition of "disclosure" if it were intended by the legislature that "disclosure" should mean no more than "communication". […][29]It is not unusual that solicitors are asked to write on behalf of employees. If an employee is feeling badly treated, the solicitor may write to say that the employer is in breach of contract. There may be allegations over allocation of work or that the employee has been overlooked for a promotion. The solicitor may say, "If the situation does not improve, we have advised our client that he can resign and claim constructive dismissal". In those circumstances, in our judgment, no protected disclosure is made in such a letter. Similarly, if the individual met the employer without the intervention of the solicitor and made the same points, there would be no protected disclosure by that employee to the employer. ”24. The distinction drawn in Cavendish is between mere allegation or assertion or statement of position on the one hand and the conveying of facts on the other. It is, however, clear from Cavendish , and in my judgment in any event plain, that the facts conveyed may relate to an omission (“the wards have not been cleaned for the last two weeks”) just as they may relate to a positive action (“sharps were left lying around”).25. In my judgment the Employment Judge was plainly entitled to conclude that the letter date 15 October conveyed facts. It is, I think, sufficient if I deal with the question of the probationary period. The letter states that there had been no feedback during the probationary period; no consultation with the person recruited to carry out the HR function; no consultation with the director, just a single meeting at the end of the probation period with no plan of action and no idea how long the probation period would last. The letter backs up the lack of communication with facts about a failure to ask her to prepare a preliminary report on a matter within her remit and by giving details of the only email which was ever sent to her about changes to her role.26. The letter goes far beyond simply making an allegation or stating a position. It sets out the factual basis of her complaint in considerable detail. It is true that to a significant extent the letter asserts omissions, taking for granted the known fact that MFS has extended her probationary period when it had no contractual right to do so; but as I have said conveying facts for the purposes of the whistle‑blowing provisions plainly includes conveying facts about what has not been done as well as about what has been done.27. Once granted that the letter contains information the question then becomes whether the information is such that in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure it tends to show that MFS has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which MFS subject. That is the statutory test and Tribunals are wise to follow the statutory wording.28. In my judgment the Employment Judge was right not to strike out the claim. Once granted that the letter conveyed “information” the remaining elements of the test required the Tribunal to consider what Miss Crawford believed; why she believed it; and whether it was reasonable for her to believe it. These are matters which require evidence. There could be no sensible striking out on those questions. Her case is that she believed MFS to have committed a serious breach of contract. Whether she believed that and whether she had reasonable grounds for thinking that the facts which she disclosed tended to show it are matters which must be decided at a hearing. I, therefore, conclude that the Employment Judge was plainly correct not to strike out the claim. 29. The Employment Judge has, however, given no significant reason at all for not ordering a deposit. It is true that the solicitor for MFS might have asked for reasons at the time (see Bansi ). It is also true that the reasons need not have been at any great length, but some reasons setting out the Employment Judge’s conclusion as to why, in her judgment, the case had or had not satisfied the “little prospect of success” test was required. Granted then that the Employment Judge’s reasons were deficient in this respect, the question becomes: What should the Employment Appeal Tribunal do? 30. Mr Reade urges me that it is plain beyond argument that the claim had little prospect of success. I reject that submission. It seems to me that the letter sets out material which is capable of supporting a belief that her employers had treated her in a way in which amounted to a breach of contract. On established principles where a point can be decided either way it is not for the Employment Appeal Tribunal to take upon itself the task which Parliament has entrusted to the first instance Employment Tribunal. The matter should therefore be remitted – and that is also a convenient course because, as I have said, there will, in any event, have to be a hearing before the Employment Tribunal to determine the application for permission to amend. 31. As I leave the appeal, I would observe that underlying it is a feature of whistle-blowing law known to both sides. It is the decision of the Appeal Tribunal in Parkins v Sedexho Limited [2002] IRLR 109 to the effect that a complaint by an employee conveying information tending to show a breach of his/her own contract of employment is sufficient to fall within s.43B. This decision followed from the wording of s.43B itself. There is no basis for excluding such a breach from the provision. Until recently, however, it did mean that many cases which ordinary members of the public might not intuitively describe as whistle‑blowing would, subject to the controls of reasonable belief, good faith and causation, fall within the grasp of the legislation. Parliament has not repealed Parkins but it has introduced into the legislation an overriding requirement that the worker must have a reasonable belief that the disclosure is made in the public interest: see section 43B(1) as amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 , s 17, as from 25 June 2013. That requirement, however, was not in the legislation in October last year and is not applicable to this case. 32. I have a choice as to whether to remit this matter to the same Employment Judge or not. I will not make an order remitting it to the same Employment Judge simply for pragmatic reasons. I do not consider that it requires to be heard by the same judge. There is very little practical advantage in doing so since the Employment Judge on the next occasion will have a significant number of further matters to address. It will, therefore, be remitted on the basis that it may be heard by any Employment Judge. There is no embargo on the same Employment Judge hearing it, nor is there any requirement to do so.