Jackson v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council (Practice and Procedure : Appellate jurisdiction or Reasons or Burns-Barke) [2012] UKEAT 1247_10_1104

EAT
Jackson v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council (Practice and Procedure : Appellate jurisdiction or Reasons or Burns-Barke)
[2012] UKEAT 1247_10_1104 · 2012-04-11
[1]In Haritaki v SEEDA [2008] IRLR 945 at paragraphs 1‑13 I set out my approach to rule 3; it must be read with this Judgment. That approach has been approved by the Court of Appeal in, for example, Hooper v Sherborne School [2010] EWCA Civ 1266 and Evans v University of Oxford [2010] EWCA Civ 1240 . On the sift of this Notice of Appeal in accordance with the Practice Direction 2008, paragraph 9, HHJ Peter Clark exercised his power under rule 3(7) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules . He concluded in chambers that the case disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the appeal. Where no point of law is found, section 20 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 deprives the EAT of jurisdiction to hear the case. The Claimant was given the opportunity to amend the Notice of Appeal or to have the case heard before a Judge under rules 3(8) or (10); I am thus hearing the case on more material than was available to Judge Clark and form my own view of the appeal. The question for me is whether there are any or no reasonable grounds in the appeal. Procedural background[2]The Notice of Appeal came before

Judge Clark, who said the following:

“The prolix Notice of Appeal is largely concerned with historical Employment Tribunal interlocutory decisions (I note that an appeal went to the Employment Appeals Tribunal in 2005 and thereafter to the Court of Appeal). These matters are not relevant or capable of resuscitation in the present appeal, as to which:– (1) The Employment Tribunal were entitled to find that the Appellant was a worker, not an employee. Hence the unfair dismissal and breach of contract claims failed for want of jurisdiction; (2) The protected disclosure detriment, race and sex discrimination and victimisation claims failed in the facts. The Appellant was not believed by the fact‑finding tribunal.”
[3]The Claimant was dissatisfied, and the matter came again before

Judge Clark under rule 3(8), in which he opined as follows:

“Rule 3(7) Reasons The fact that the original Notice of Appeal was prolix is an observation, not a reason for rejecting it. I make the same comment on the fresh Notice of Appeal dated 24 November 2010. As to the fresh Notice of Appeal:– 1. It is for the Employment Tribunal to find the facts and assess witness credibility. This Employment Tribunal rejected the Appellant’s allegations of deceit levelled at the Respondent and found her not to be credible. That is a judgment for them, not the EAT which is concerned with points of law only. This Tribunal cannot retry the facts, disappointing as this may be to the Appellant (fresh Notice of Appeal, paragraph 34). 2. Nevertheless, the Appellant persists in alleging dishonesty on the part of the Respondent in relation to disclosure and in making misleading submissions below. I repeat paragraph (1) above. 3. The Article 6 right to a fair hearing applies to both parties; a point apparently made by Maurice Kay LJ at a previous Court of Appeal hearing in this litigation (paragraph 46). What is clear is that the Appellant has had every opportunity to put her case. Her difficulty is that she cannot accept the result at every stage. 4. Nothing in the fresh grounds of appeal lend me to alter my opinion expressed in the EAT letter dated 27 October 2010.”
[4]The second appeal in this case relates to costs. That too came before

Judge Clark, and he said the following:

“Costs Orders remain exceptional in the Employment Tribunal. This was an exceptional case. The litigation ran for 8 years. The Claimant is a barrister with employment law experience. It was hopeless. She made unfounded allegations of deceit against officers of the Respondent (maintained in her Grounds of Appeal – see, example paragraph 45), roundly rejected by the Tribunal of fact. The costs order was entirely justified. No error of law is raised in the Notice of Appeal (as corrected).”
[5]The Claimant being dissatisfied with that, the matter came again before

Judge Clark, who came to the following opinion:

“I refer to my comments on the fresh Notice of Appeal in PA/1247/10/JOJ. Nothing in the fresh Notice of Appeal causes me to alter my original opinion in relation to the costs appeal.”
[6]The procedural background to this case is dense and long. As the Claimant, Miss Jackson, herself says, she relies on matters put before me at an appeal against an order of the Registrar in 2005, and reference should be made to what I said there [2005] UKEAT/0283, because Miss Jackson indicates that I expressed concern for her condition, sympathy with her case and a recognition of her rights under the Human Rights Act . I am grateful for that endorsement. That case was appealed to the Court of Appeal; I do not have a copy of Maurice Kay LJ’s decision refusing permission to appeal, but I understand from certain citations from it that recognition was also given by his Lordship to Miss Jackson’s conditions.[7]This case in its procedural background contains at least six different considerations by Judges in the ET. A number of those remain the subject of controversy as far as the Claimant is concerned. In my judgment, all those are water under the bridge. The approach I take is the one that I took in Edem , approved by the Court of Appeal [2007] EWCA 394, which is that when claims are dismissed there is no utility in, and no right to have further investigation into, interim decisions of Judges.[8]The focus therefore in this case is upon the substantive decision. This case as it was ultimately articulated before the Employment Tribunal in Birmingham over nine days in 2010 before Employment Judge Hutchinson and members was of unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act (whistleblowing), detriment under section 47B as a worker, breach of contract for lack of notice, sex discrimination and race discrimination. All five claims were dismissed.[9]The Tribunal then went on to consider the Respondent’s application for costs and decided to award £10,000 under the then prevailing rule 14 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Rules 2001 . The grounds were that the Claimant had pursued claims that were misconceived and had acted unreasonably in the pursuit of those claims, made the worse by the fact that she is a barrister and is experienced in employment law matters, a fact that she asserted again before me today, saying that she was highly experienced in employment law. The facts[10]The Claimant was appointed by an agency to work for the Respondent. The term of the engagement in this trilateral relationship was for six months, but Miss Jackson did not survive even that short period. The relationship went from 1 October 2001 to 4 or 8 February 2002. The Claimant was engaged to work as a locum in employment law for the Respondent, and at the time there were a number of cases made against the Respondent for equal pay. During the course of her relationship, which was determined by the Employment Tribunal to be not one of employment but of employment by the agency, the Claimant reported to the head of legal services, Mr Curran. In that short career the Claimant made what she considered were protected disclosures. The Respondent terminated the relationship. The conclusions of the Employment Tribunal are these:
“22. For the claimant to be able to proceed with her breach of contract claim she needs to have been able to show that there was a contract between her and the Council. In our view there was a contract between Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council and Michael Page Limited and a contract between Michael Page Limited and the claimant. There was never any intention by any of the parties to enter into contractual relations between the claimant and the respondent. 23. The claimant was paid by Michael Page Limited. She did not receive any sick pay, holiday pay or other entitlements of employees of Walsall MBC including pension. If she had been employed she could have enjoyed these even if only a temporary employee. The council went through no recruitment process which would have been necessary for her to become an employee. 24. In our view this is not a case where it is necessary to imply the existence of a contract between Miss Jackson and the Council in order to give business reality to the relationship between the parties. 25. It is our view the claimant always regarded herself during her time with the Council and immediately after as being a worker. It was only at a later stage that she decided she was an employee. 26. As she was not an employee we do not have jurisdiction to deal with the breach of contract claims under the Employment Tribunal Extension of Jurisdiction (England & Wales) Order 1994. As we do not have any such jurisdiction that part of the claim fails and is dismissed.”
[11]The claim of automatic unfair dismissal failed because the Claimant was not an employee. The Tribunal turned to her claim of detriment during the course of employment. She was entitled to assert this claim as a worker , and it was not necessary for her to be an employee, but this failed on six levels, summarised in paragraphs 31‑38. The relationship was not terminated because of any known disclosure by the Respondent. She failed to identify a legal obligation owed by the Respondent, she did not make the disclosure to a prescribed person, and the Tribunal was not satisfied that any of the allegations was made in good faith.[12]As to the race discrimination claims, the Tribunal dismissed those with sex discrimination summarily on the grounds that persons of the different sex and ethnicity would have been treated the same. The appeal[13]The Claimant appeals against those findings. She has produced very substantial grounds of appeal, and today presents to me an argument that is described as a second statement of the Appellant, of 34 pages. I have listened most carefully, having read the relevant documents, and reminded myself of the circumstances. The principal issue advanced by the Claimant in respect of the liability Judgment against her is that her human rights have been denied and that the deceit of the Respondent should be shown up at a public hearing. I reject that on the grounds that there has been a full hearing of the Claimant’s claims. Her civil rights have been vindicated. Her civil right is to a fair hearing before a tribunal: Article 6. The Claimant’s approach is to continue to criticise the Respondent for deceit, matters which were before the Employment Tribunal and which were dismissed. The Claimant’s claim continues to be that the Respondent was deceitful and exercised subterfuge, and indeed colluded with the Employment Tribunal.[14]I regard these grounds of appeal as having no merit whatsoever. The Tribunal looked carefully at the law relating to employment status and came to a judgment that was open to it. This was a perfectly natural tripartite agency relationship; the Tribunal addressed the relevant authorities (see the heading “The Law” in the Judgment). As to disclosure, the Tribunal was bound to dismiss the section 103A claim, since the Claimant was not an employee and entitled to protection of unfair dismissal, and in respect of her employment detriment claim the six layers of decision‑making by this Tribunal all point against the Claimant. She must succeed on all of these in order to win her case, and the Tribunal found against her on all of them on the basis of cogent evidence. Put simply, the Claimant’s treatment was not to do with her making any protected disclosure.[15]As to the race and sex discrimination claims, with respect I regard those claims as fanciful. They were articulated long after the Claimant left the relationship, and, for the same reasons as the Tribunal, I would see no merit in them. The burden of proof was not shifted by the Claimant to the Respondent in respect of those claims, which were to do with the dismissal of a named comparator of a different ethnic status and male, which the Tribunal rejected on the basis of the facts. The claim that the Claimant was discriminated against for organising a Christmas meal was dismissed on cogent reasoning by the Employment Tribunal. Costs[16]I turn, then, to the costs application. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that costs should be awarded because there was no legal basis for the claims the Claimant was making. It is my sad duty to record that there is considerable force in the Tribunal’s Judgment against the Claimant. Being a barrister means that she should be alert to weaknesses in her case. A barrister specialising in employment law and asserting her knowledge is particularly open to scrutiny. The Tribunal considered that whether or not the claim was made by a barrister it had no substance, and the costs warnings given by the Respondent in advance should have been heeded. In its judgment, the Employment Tribunal found the Claimant brought the proceedings and conducted them vexatiously, abusively, disruptively and otherwise unreasonably. She made unsubstantiated allegations that persisted up to the date of the Tribunal hearing, and, I would add, up to today. Some ten years after the relationship ended, she fails to pay attention to the orders of the court. The Tribunal criticised the Claimant for making scandalous allegations against the Respondent and the Tribunal; that is a matter of judgment for the Employment Tribunal.[17]The Court of Appeal in three cases recently has looked at the approach of the Employment Tribunal to costs (see Barnsley v Yerrakalva [2011] EWCA Civ 1255 , Dean & Dean v Dionissiou-Moussaoui [2011] EWCA Civ 1331 and Arrowsmith v Nottingham Trent University [2011] EWCA Civ 797 ). In all of these cases the Court has been at pains to point out that these are matters for an Employment Tribunal to resolve and will rarely be disturbed on appeal, notwithstanding the actual outcome in the Yerrakalva case. My approach to costs is described in the Court of Appeal in Arrowsmith ; I see no error in the award of costs in this case, and I would therefore dismiss the application in respect of the costs hearing as, again, having no merit whatsoever, which means that there will be no further action on either of these appeals. Conclusion[18]I repeat what I said when Miss Jackson was last before me, which is that this Judgment will obviously be a great disappointment to her. She has presented her case carefully to me today both orally and in writing. Nevertheless, this long campaign by the Claimant, as described in those words by the Tribunal, must come to an end. The applications are dismissed and with them the underlying appeals.