Hair Division Ltd v MacMillan (Sex Discrimination : Direct) [2012] UKEAT 0033_12_1210

EAT
Hair Division Ltd v MacMillan (Sex Discrimination : Direct)
[2012] UKEAT 0033_12_1210 · 2012-10-12
[1]This is an employer’s appeal from a judgment of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Edinburgh, (Employment Judge Mr J D Young), registered on 2 March 2012 finding: “1. The respondents discriminated against the claimant by contravening s18(2) of the Equality Act 2010 and that the Respondents shall pay to the claimant the sum of £5000 by way of compensation for that contravention. 2. The claimant was unfairly dismissed by the respondents but no monetary award is made in that respect” and also awarding her sums in respect of(a) arrears of wages, and(b) holiday pay.[2]We will, for convenience, continue to refer to parties as Claimant and Respondent.[3]The Claimant was represented by Mr Egan of Unison before the Tribunal and by Mr S Moffat, solicitor-advocate, before us. The Respondent was represented by Mr K Limpert, HR Consultant, before the Tribunal and before us. Background[4]The Respondent is a limited company and its managing director is Mr A Clelland. It is engaged in the hairdressing business. The company is a wholesaler of hair and beauty products and operates a hairdressing salon in Livingston. Mr Clelland is rarely present at the salon. The Tribunal made no findings of there being any director other than Mr Clelland. In particular, there is no finding that the Claimant’s line manager, Ann Hendry, who lived with Mr Clelland and “oversaw the salon business on a day to day basis”, was a director.[5]The Claimant began working for the Respondent as a stylist at the salon on 8 March 2010. The Claimant was appointed salon manager in May 2010 and Ann Hendry hoped to be able step back from her managerial role after that. The Claimant then became pregnant. Her due date was in the week beginning 3 April 2011. On 12 August 2010, she suffered what her GP referred to as “early bleeding”. Given her due date, she was about six weeks pregnant by then. She was absent from work for 11 days. When she returned to work, she was due to have a scan the following week to ascertain whether or not her pregnancy was intact. She advised Mr Clelland and Ms Hendry of that position.[6]The scan duly took place and showed that the Claimant was pregnant. Accordingly, when Ms Hendry asked her if she was pregnant, she said “yes”. She told other employees at the salon about her pregnancy and showed them the photograph of her scan. There appears, however, to have been no evidence that she or anyone else told Mr Clelland of the scan result and the Tribunal do not find that he was told or otherwise knew of her pregnancy prior to January 2011. Their approach – as exemplified by a passage in paragraph 81(f) of their reasons – is to regard the Respondent as having knowledge of the Claimant’s pregnancy because Ms Hendry was aware of it from the time that the Claimant told her about the scan having confirmed that she was pregnant.[7]The Tribunal found that the Claimant made the following allegations about the way she was treated after she returned to work following her absence in August 2010:
“15……. “things had changed”….”
I felt they were annoyed with me at being pregnant.” I accept I was a spanner in the works. There was then an atmosphere with me – not as chatty – not getting a “Good Morning”. No conversation from staff. Felt uncomfortable. I thought perhaps it would go away. I felt the atmosphere with AC (Andrew Clelland) – ignored – wages were flung down. I was there to manage a team – I felt I was belittled and intimidated.””[8]They did not make any findings in fact as to whether or not those allegations were well founded. They do no more than record the Claimant’s perception.[9]Otherwise, the Tribunal found that a receptionist was employed to assist in the salon, that the Claimant agreed that it was a good idea to do so, that the Claimant did not take part in the receptionist’s appointment (the relevance of which is not apparent since they made no finding that her role entitled her to do so), that after the receptionist took up post, the Claimant was no longer given access to certain parts of the computer system (on the basis that she no longer needed access to those parts), that she suffered a nosebleed one day at which Ms Hendry said “oh no not the …..day”, that a stylist called Donna McNeish gave evidence that the atmosphere towards the Claimant was a bit “frosty” (but they make no finding as to whether or not the atmosphere was frosty), that another stylist, Abigail Burke, gave evidence that there was “an atmosphere” without further specification (but they make no finding as to whether or not there was “an atmosphere”), and that there were certain “reminder notes” relating to till shortages, a complaint about the Claimant being on lunch when the salon was busy and about lights and water heaters being left switched on. It was not clear whether or not the Claimant had been spoken to about these matters nor what their relevance was to the issues that the Tribunal had to consider.[10]The Claimant was absent from work from 28 October 2010 until 24 February 2011 when her employment terminated. Her GP certified that the reason for her absence was work related stress/nervous debility. Mr Clelland and Ann Hendry believed that her stress was not caused by the workplace but by other factors in her life namely a house move, having to live with her mother-in-law pending the move to a new house and financial matters. The Tribunal, however, concluded that the Claimant’s GP was correct; her stress was caused by the workplace. It is not clear why the Tribunal considered that it was for them to determine which of these competing views as to the cause of the Claimant’s stress was correct.[11]On 13 December 2010, the Claimant received a form MAT B1 from her GP which stated that her expected date of confinement was the week that included 3/4/11. The Claimant asserted that she had sent it to the Respondent on 13 December 2010. The Respondent disputed that; the Respondent’s position was it had not been received until 18 January 2011. The Tribunal did not resolve that conflict, taking the view that they did not require to do so [1] .[12]The Claimant did not advise the Respondent of the date on which she intended her maternity leave to begin.[13]Mr Limpert, acting on behalf of the Respondent, wrote to the Claimant by letter dated 31 January 2011 in which he stated:
“Your MAT B1 form suggests that you are expected to have a baby in the week that includes 3 rd April 2011. Unfortunately, with the exception of a mention that you might be pregnant & then going off sick for two weeks with early bleeding last August, this MAT B1 form is the first notice that you have provided that you are actually pregnant at all. The main terms under which you are employed can be found in the “Guidelines on Terms and Conditions of Employment in Salons” booklet, and this deals with maternity benefits at section 15; these conditions are in accordance with the relevant laws that provide employees with maternity leave & pay: Regulation 4 of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999 (as amended – see the Maternity and Parental leave (Amendment) Regulations 2002) – see appendix 1 for an extract of the relevant laws. As far as providing notification of your pregnancy is concerned, apart from the MAT B1 form, you have provided absolutely no notification of this, and given the expected week of childbirth, you would therefore not be entitled to maternity pay or maternity leave, as notice would normally need to have been provided no later than the end of the fifteenth week before your expected week of childbirth. Based on my calculations, this would be no later than 26 December 2010, and as your MAT B1 form was signed on 13 th December 2010, I can see no reason why this notice was not provided earlier; I therefore have to conclude that you are not entitled to either maternity pay or maternity leave.”
[14]The letter goes on to note the Claimant’s continuing absence, said to be due to work related stress; it was necessary to consider whether or not she was fit and able to perform the job for which she had been recruited. She was, accordingly, being invited to a “disciplinary hearing” on 9 February 2011. She was warned that dismissal was a possible outcome.[15]The Claimant replied by letter dated 8 February 2011 in which she refuted the assertion that she was not entitled to maternity pay/leave and stated “I will be willing to attend a review meeting with you but I require fourteen days notification”.[16]Mr Limpert responded by letter dated 9 February 2011 in which he expressed the view that the Claimant had been given sufficient notice of the meeting and that “if the meeting was adjourned until later this week or early next week you would again decline to attend, delaying progress in this matter unnecessarily”.[17]By letter dated 11 February, Mr Limpert again advised the Claimant that she was not entitled to maternity leave or maternity pay; even if she was correct in her assertion that she had sent timeous notification, it was incomplete as she had not given notice of when her maternity leave would start.[18]The Claimant was dismissed. She was given a letter dated 17 February 2011 which stated:
“ …your attendance is impacting on your performance and this remains unsatisfactory. For this reason my decision is dismiss you for serious misconduct.”
[19]There was an appendix which stated that the conclusion was that she was:
“…not able to cope with the demands of this job….the role of Manager at the salon is impacting on your health (and directly arising from that your attendance or performance) in an adverse manner.”
[20]The Claimant appealed. She alleged she had been discriminated against because she was pregnant. Her appeal was not successful. By letter dated 4 March 2011, she was advised:
“ …your pregnancy is entirely unrelated to your absences for work related stress and therefore your pregnancy has no bearing on the decision to dismiss.”
[21]The contract of employment under which the Claimant was employed included the following provisions:
“15.4 You are entitled to Maternity Leave providing you have submitted to the Employer a Certificate of Confinement (issued by your doctor or midwife) by the fifteenth week before the expected date of birth that confirms your pregnancy and the expected week of childbirth and when you wish to commence the Maternity Leave ………. 15.4.3 The Maternity Leave will commence: - 15.4.3.1 In accordance with the written notice given by you to the Employer to comply with this Section 15.4 ………”
Read together, we are satisfied that these terms make it clear that notification of the three matters referred to (fact of pregnancy, due date of confinement and date that the employee wishes to commence maternity leave) requires to be given in writing. The Tribunal’s Reasoning[22]The Tribunal’s reasons are complex and we have not found them easy to follow. The following, however, seems clear.[23]First, the Tribunal considered whether or not the Claimant was discriminated against by being treated unfavourably because of her pregnancy ( Equality Act 2010 s.18(2)(a)). They concluded that she was and that that was because of: · The Claimant having said that she was regarded as a nuisance [2] ; · The Claimant having said that she was someone who had “thrown a spanner in the works” was supported by the ‘upset to the Respondent’s plans’ [3] ; · The Claimant’s responsibility having been eroded [4] ; · The Respondent having denied that the Claimant’s absence was workplace stress [5] ; · The Respondent’s denial of the fact of the Claimant’s pregnancy [6] ; · The Respondent’s denial of statutory maternity leave (to which she was entitled) “based on that false denial” [7] ; · The Respondent’s denial of statutory maternity pay (to which she was entitled) “based on that false denial” [8] ; · The belief that matters should be dealt with as misconduct requiring a disciplinary hearing [9] ; · The Respondent’s refusal to adjourn the disciplinary hearing [10] ; and · The Respondent’s failure to engage with the Claimant [11] .[24]In the light of those factors, the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant had made out a prima facie case that she had been discriminated against because of her pregnancy. Although the Tribunal do not so state, we assume that, at paragraph 82, they are considering whether or not there are facts from which they could decide in the absence of any other explanation that the Respondent contravened the prohibition against discrimination in s.18(2)(a) of the 2010 Act, as required by s.136(2).[25]The Tribunal then proceed to reject the Respondent’s explanation that the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was that she had been absent from work for a lengthy period (111 days absence in total). Trying to understand the reasoning process of the Tribunal as best we can, that seems to have been because Mr Clelland was deemed to have knowledge of the Claimant’s pregnancy once Ann Hendry knew of it, because he knew that she was being told she had no right to maternity pay/maternity leave when that was not right, because he knew that there had been no engagement with the Claimant, because he knew that she had been refused an adjournment of the hearing and because overall there had been deliberate disengagement.[26]Turning to s.18(2)(b) of the 2010 Act, the Tribunal required, for the purposes of that sub-section, to consider whether or not the Claimant was discriminated against by being treated unfavourably because of illness suffered by her as a result of her pregnancy. They appear to have had those provisions in mind at paragraph 86. There they state: “While the respondents maintained that the absence from work was the real reason for dismissal and even accepting that , the Tribunal could not accept that this was divorced from the fact of the claimant’s pregnancy. [12] ” (Our emphasis)[27]They then conclude that if the Claimant had not become pregnant her employer’s attitude to her would not have changed, she would therefore not have suffered workplace stress, she would therefore not have been absent from work and she would therefore not have been dismissed. Thus:
“Underlying the eventual dismissal and at the root of it was the claimant’s pregnancy.”
[28]It followed from that, according to the Tribunal, that the Claimant had suffered discrimination. That is, the Tribunal adopted a causative approach to the issue they had to determine. For the purposes of s.18(2)(b) they do not appear to have rejected the Respondent’s explanation of their reason for dismissing the Claimant. Indeed, as we note above, they appear to have been content to proceed on the basis of a hypothesis that it could be accepted that the Respondent’s reason for dismissing the Claimant was her long term absence from work.[29]The Tribunal considered the conflicting decisions by this Tribunal in the cases of Larner and Fraser , to which we refer below, and concluded that an employee’s failure to give notice of desired leave dates [13] was not fatal to a claim for holiday pay in respect of leave not taken in the year before the year in which employment is terminated. The award of holiday pay was in respect of three weeks’ leave not taken in 2010. In making the award, the Tribunal had regard to the fact that the Claimant had been absent through illness from October 2010.[30]Turning to SMP, although there was no claim for SMP included in the Claimant’s form ET1 and although no such claim appears to have been made on her behalf at the hearing, the Tribunal decided that she had been entitled to SMP, that it had not been paid to her in full (she had apparently received some payments directly from the DWP) and that the balance amounted to unpaid wages. That was because the definition of “wages” in section 27(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 , includes SMP.[31]The reason why the Tribunal considered that the Claimant was entitled to SMP was that, in their view, the Claimant had not required to give notice in writing to the Respondent of the three matters set out in reg 4 of the 1999 Regulations, that Ann Hendry had been told of the Claimant’s pregnancy before the fifteenth week before her due date of confinement and that although the Claimant had not advised anyone of the date she intended to start her maternity leave, that did not matter, because reg 4(4)(a) provided an exception to the reg 4(4)(1)(a)(iii) requirement. The Tribunal’s conclusion thus seems to have been that timeous intimation of the date when the employee intends her maternity leave to begin was not a pre-requisite to entitlement either to the right to SML or, accordingly, to the right to SMP. The Relevant Law Statutory Maternity Leave and Statutory Maternity Pay[32]Provided a woman in employment complies with the requirements of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999 (“the MPL Regulations”) she is entitled to take maternity leave (“SML”) [14] and she may be entitled to receive maternity pay (“SMP”) [15] .[33]Insofar as relevant, the MPL Regulations provide:
“4(1) An employee is entitled to ordinary maternity leave …..provided that she satisfies the following conditions – (a) no later than the end of the fifteenth week before her expected week of childbirth, or, if that is not reasonably practicable, as soon as is reasonably practicable, she notifies her employer of – (i) her pregnancy; (ii) the expected week of childbirth; and (iii) the date on which she intends her ordinary maternity leave period to start, and (b) if requested to do so by her employer, she produces for his inspection a certificate from (i) a registered medical practitioner, or (ii) a registered midwife, stating the expected date of childbirth. …………….. (2) Notification under paragraph (1)(a)(iii) ….. (a) shall be given in writing if the employer so requests…… …………… 6(1) Subject to paragraph (2), an employee’s ordinary maternity leave period commences with the earlier of – (a) the date which ………she notifies to her employer in accordance with regulation 4 as the date on which she intends her ordinary maternity leave period to start…….and (b) the day which follows the first day after the beginning of the fourth week before the expected week of childbirth on which she is absent from work wholly or partly because of pregnancy. (2) Where the employee’s ordinary maternity leave period has not commenced by virtue of paragraph (1) when childbirth occurs, her ordinary maternity leave period commences on the day which follows the day on which childbirth occurs.”
[34]Thus, maternity leave normally starts on the date provided by the employee to her employer. If, however, she is absent from work wholly or partly because of her pregnancy at any time during the four week period prior to her due date of confinement, her maternity leave must start from that date. That will be so irrespective of whether the date previously intimated by her as her chosen start date is later than that. For example, if her due date of confinement is 1 March and she has intimated to her employer that she intends to start her maternity leave on 14 February but then she is absent due to pregnancy related illness on 7 February, her maternity leave starts from that date. Similarly, if childbirth occurs earlier than the date intimated to her employer as the start of her maternity leave, the same approach applies. Thus, if, for example, she has intimated to her employer that she intends her maternity leave to begin on 14 February but her baby is born early, on 1 February, her maternity leave will start on 2 February irrespective of her intimated start date. Reg 6 does not provide an exception to the requirement for a woman to give notice under reg 4(1)(a)(iii) of the date she intends to start her maternity leave. It does not mean that an employee who fails to comply with that requirement to give notice gets the benefit of a ‘second bite at the cherry’ in the circumstances referred to in reg 6(1)(b) and (2). Rather, these provisions give the employer the benefit of there being imposed on the employee a start date earlier than that which she previously chose if she is absent through pregnancy related illness within four weeks of her due date of confinement or gives birth earlier than that intended date.[35]We turn to the matter of SMP. Since April 2005, overall responsibility for the administration of SMP has been with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”). The responsibilities passed to HMRC included those formerly conferred on the Board of the Inland Revenue under the Statutory Sick Pay and Statutory Maternity Pay (Decisions) Regulations 1999 (“the 1999 Regulations”) the provisions of which include:
“2. – (1) An application for the determination of any issue arising as to, or in connection with, entitlement to statutory sick pay or statutory maternity pay may be submitted to an officer of the Board by – ……….. (b) the employee concerned. (2) Such an issue shall be decided by an officer of the Board only on the basis of such an application or on his own initiative. 3.– (1) An application for the determination of any issue referred to in regulation 2 above shall be made only in writing, in a form approved for the purpose by the Board, or in such other manner, being in writing, as an officer of the Board my accept as sufficient in the circumstances. (2) Where such an application is made by an employee, it shall – (a) be delivered or sent to an office of the Board within 6 months of the earliest day in respect of which entitlement to statutory sick pay or statutory maternity pay is in issue; (b) state the period in respect of which the entitlement to statutory sick pay or statutory maternity pay is in issue; and (c) state the grounds ( if any) on which the applicant’s employer has denied liability for statutory sick pay or statutory maternity pay in respect of the period specified in the application.”
[36]The 1999 Regulations were considered by this Tribunal in the case of Taylor Gordon & Co Ltd v Timmons UKEAT/ 0159/03/RN where a tribunal had decided that there had been an unlawful deduction from wages because, in their assessment, the employee had been entitled to statutory sick pay which he had not received. Mr Recorder Luba QC concluded that the tribunal had had no jurisdiction to do so:
“43. I am quite satisfied that the submissions made by Mr Brennan for the Appellant Company are correct. An analysis of the statutes and regulations relating to SSP shows that the appropriate authorities for the determination of disputes as to entitlement are the statutory authorities, i.e. the officers of the Board of the Inland Revenue (and on appeal the Commissioners). The jurisdiction they have is, in my view, an exclusive or exhaustive jurisdiction. I accept the submission that the inference to be drawn from the words of section 8(1) of the 1999 Act is that that Act prescribes a complete code for the determination of such disputes. I further accept the submission that it would lead to potential inconsistency and otherwise unsatisfactory consequences if first instance decisions on entitlement to SSP were to be made by Employment Tribunals rather than by the single statutory authority, the Board of the Inland Revenue. The possibility for inconsistency in decision-making is obvious and it is highly unlikely that the legislature envisaged that there would be two parallel schemes under which disputes as to entitlement to Statutory Sick Pay might be resolved. 44. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal Chairman erred. He had no jurisdiction to entertain this employee’s complaint that he was not being paid his Statutory Sick Pay.”
[37]We note that the respondents sought a review of the tribunal’s decision and one of the grounds on which they did so was that the tribunal had erred in determining the claimant’s entitlement to SMP as they had no jurisdiction to do so. The tribunal did not accept those submissions. One of the reasons they gave was that the 1999 Regulations “….did not enable an appointed officer of the Board to make an award against the particular employer in the way in which a Tribunal can issue an enforceable award.” [16] However, a compulsitor does exist. Under and in terms of s.113A(6) of Social Security Administration Act 1992 , an employer who refuses to pay SSP or SMP after the appointed officer has made a decision, is liable to suffer a penalty up to a current maximum of £3,000. On the issue of jurisdiction, we agree with Recorder Luba QC. For the reasons he gives, it seems plain that Parliament cannot have intended that HMRC’s jurisdiction be other than an exclusive one. Further, we cannot see that any distinction fall to be drawn between SSP and SMP. The code for determination of disputes must apply as much to SMP as it does to SSP and it is one which excludes the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal. We would add that the fact that, for the purposes of considering whether or not there has been an unlawful deduction from wages the term “wages” is defined by the 1996 Act as including SMP does not show that jurisdiction exists. It means that an issue as to whether or not an employee did in fact receive SMP from her employer can be decided by an Employment Tribunal. It does not, however, mean that the separate issue of whether or not, under the relevant social security legislation, a woman was in fact entitled to SMP in the first place, can be decided in that forum. Equality Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”)[38]As we have already observed, the Tribunal required to apply the provisions of sections 18 and 136 of the 2010 Act, the provisions of which, insofar as relevant, are:
“18 – Pregnancy and Discrimination: Work cases (1) This section has effect for the purposes of the application of Part 5 (work) to the protected characteristic of pregnancy and maternity. (2) A person (A) discriminates against a woman if, in the protected period in relation to a pregnancy of hers, A treats her unfavourably – (a) because of the pregnancy, or (b) because of illness suffered by her as a result of it. …… 136 Burden of Proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.”
[39]The term “court” includes the Employment Tribunal.[40]In Martin v Lancehawk Ltd UKEAT/0525/03 Rimer J, as he then was, considered the relevant predecessor provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and reviewed the authorities . Having done so, at paragraph 12, he observed that the critical issue that a tribunal required to consider, when determining whether or not a woman was dismissed “on the ground of her sex”, was “ why” the woman was dismissed and at paragraph 22, he said that it was “essential to enquire why the employer acted as he did” because once answered, that question “will usually show whether or not there has been any unlawful discrimination”. These observations can, we consider, equally be applied to the provisions of section 18(2) of the 2010 Act. It follows that it is not enough to show that there is a causal chain linking the employee’s pregnancy and her dismissal. It must also be shown that the employer’s reason for dismissing the woman (conscious or unconscious) was either her pregnancy or an illness suffered as a result of her pregnancy. Holiday Pay[41]Is a dismissed employee entitled to holiday pay for leave which she could but did not take (or request) in the leave year prior to that in which she was dismissed? If such an employee was prevented from taking her paid annual leave because she was sick, the answer is now clear; she is entitled to receive payment on termination of her employment for the paid annual leave which she had, for that reason, been prevented from taking: NHS Leeds v Larner [2012] EWCA Civ 1034 in which Mummery LJ, at paragraph 1, stated the issue under consideration by the Court of Appeal as being:
“In what circumstances is a worker, who has not taken paid annual leave in the relevant leave year because of absence from work on long-term sick leave, entitled to a payment in lieu?”
Furthermore, her entitlement does not depend on whether or not she has given notice under reg 15 of the Working Time Regulations 1998 .[42]In Larner , the Court of Appeal resolved the doubt that had arisen as to what was the correct answer to that question: Fraser v Southwest London St George’s Mental Health Trust UKEAT/0456/10; NHS Leeds v Larner [2011] UKEAT/0088/11. The ratio of Larner does not, however, apply where the employee was not prevented from taking her paid annual leave by sickness. Counsel for Ms Larner conceded in the Court of Appeal that where a sick worker recovers and returns to work a reg 15 notice be served to trigger the leave entitlement (paragraph 87). The circumstances in Larner were that claimant had been absent due to sickness for the whole of the previous leave year. Mummery LJ seems to have proceeded on the basis that the concession was correct. The position thus seems to be that if the worker or employee was at work during the relevant leave year for a period which at least matched her annual leave entitlement and had not requested leave during that period, then no entitlement to holiday pay arises after the end of that leave year. The Appeal Entitlement to SMP/SML[43]Mr Limpert had two submissions in relation to SMP and SML. First, the Tribunal were wrong to make an award of SMP. They had no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the Claimant was entitled to it or indeed whether or not she was entitled to SML. Even if they did have jurisdiction, their interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the MPL Regulations was erroneous; they failed to take account of the fact that the Claimant’s contract required her to give written notification of the three matters specified in reg 4(1) and they misunderstood reg 6 which did not provide an exception to the rule about notification. Secondly, since they had no jurisdiction to determine these issues, the Tribunal had erred in approaching their determination of the discrimination issue on the basis that the Respondent had wrongly denied the Claimant SML and SMP. That had been a key issue in their thinking when determining whether or not there had been discrimination.[44]In common with all his submissions, Mr Moffat’s response on this matter was very limited, very brief and failed to engage with the points at issue. He suggested that the reference in the narrative part of paragraph 5.2 in the Claimant’s ET1, to the Claimant having been informed that she was not entitled to SMP and SML amounted to a claim for SMP and, that being so, the Tribunal were entitled to determine it. He did not make any submissions in respect of the Taylor Gordon case save to state that it concerned a claim for SSP not SMP. He said he could not give any specific reason as to why we should depart from the reasoning of Recorder Luba QC. Sex Discrimination[45]The Tribunal had failed to address and answer the question of why the Respondent dismissed the Claimant in circumstances where it had been made clear that they said that the reason was her long term absence from work. It was not enough that they had determined that there were circumstances which were indicators of discrimination. The Respondent had provided a non-discriminatory explanation but the Tribunal did not deal with that.[46]Mr Limpert referred to the fact that one of the matters that had influenced the Tribunal when deciding the discrimination issue was that the Respondent had denied the Claimant’s request to adjourn the disciplinary hearing. However, on their own findings and a consideration of the letters referred to, she had not made a request for adjournment. This point was not pressed by Mr Limpert and he was, we think, right not to do so. Whilst one reading of the letters supported the view that no adjournment was actually sought, the sense of the correspondence does seem to have been to the effect that the Claimant was looking for the hearing to be at a later date and one of which she would be given fourteen days notice.[47]Mr Limpert also referred to the Tribunal having approached matters on the basis that Mr Clelland knew of the Claimant’s pregnancy prior to January 2011 but there was no evidence on which that finding could be based.[48]Mr Moffat submitted that the Tribunal were entitled to conclude as they did, on the evidence before them. He did not address the specific issues raised.[49]Regarding the adjournment point, nothing, he said, turned on that. Holiday Pay[50]Mr Limpert submitted that the Tribunal had fallen into error. They had misdirected themselves as to the relevant law. Whilst the Court of Appeal in Larner had decided that where an employee is unable to take annual leave because sickness has prevented them from doing so, they are entitled to holiday pay when their employment is terminated, this was not such a case. The Claimant began working for the Respondent in March 2010 and had had time available to her when she was not sick during which she could have, but did not, take annual leave.[51]Mr Moffat submitted that the Tribunal had properly directed themselves. They had been entitled to rely on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Larner . Perversity[52]Mr Limpert submitted that there were perverse features to the Tribunal’s judgment. First, there was, he said a contradiction between the Tribunal approaching matters on the basis that the Claimant had become unwanted once she had become a “spanner in the works” because, given that she had not given the requisite notice to entitle herself to SML, she would not be absent from work due to pregnancy. He referred to the Tribunal having said that they were not sure why the reminder notes were referred to in the evidence but their purpose had been explained during the evidence. He finally relied on the Tribunal having proceeded on the basis that Mr Clelland knew of the Claimant’s pregnancy despite their own findings about the rarity of his visits to the salon.[53]Mr Moffat said there was nothing wrong with a manager wanting to step back from direct involvement. On being specifically asked about the matter, he accepted that the knowledge of a manager is not the same as the knowledge of a corporate employer, but it was, he said, inconceivable that Ms Hendry had not told Mr Clelland about the Claimant’s pregnancy. He did not, however, point to any finding in fact that she had done so or to any reference by the Tribunal to there having been evidence to that effect. Discussion and Decision[54]We are readily persuaded that we should uphold this appeal.[55]The following were essential building blocks in the Tribunal’s reasoning:(i) that the Respondent had wrongly denied that the Claimant’s illness was “workplace” stress;(ii) that the Respondent had falsely denied having knowledge of the Claimant’s pregnancy prior to receipt of the form MATB 1 in January 2011;(iii) that, based on that false denial, the Respondent denied that the Claimant was entitled to SML when she was so entitled;(iv) that based on that false denial, the Respondent denied that the Claimant was entitled to SMP when she was so entitled.[56]However, regarding (i), on their own findings, the Respondent did not deny that the Claimant was ill and that her illness was stress related. What was not accepted was that the cause of that illness was the workplace.[57]Regarding (ii) the Tribunal imputed Ann Hendry’s knowledge to Mr Clelland. They erred in so doing. She was not the ‘mind’ of the company; there are no findings that she was a director. Nor were there any findings to the effect that she told Mr Clelland that the Claimant’s pregnancy had been confirmed or that he was present when she showed the image of her scan to other employees – to the contrary, they found that he was rarely at the salon.[58]Regarding (iii), for the reasons we explain above, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the Claimant was in fact entitled to SMP. We also conclude that the Claimant was required by her contract of employment to give notice in writing to her employer of the three matters referred to in reg 4(1) of the MPL Regulations; its terms are plainly to that effect. The Tribunal were, accordingly, in error in proceeding on the basis that the Claimant did not have to give written notice. Further, we consider that they fell into error in their analysis of reg 6 of the MPL Regulations. The correct interpretation of those provisions is, we consider, as explained in the “Relevant Law” section above. They cannot be relied on so as to relieve an employee of the consequences of not having given timeous notification. Regarding (iv) the same considerations apply.[59]We are satisfied that these matters were regarded as so fundamental to the Tribunal’s reasoning that their conclusion that the Claimant was discriminated against cannot stand. Further, their conclusion that the claim was well founded insofar as based on section 18(2)(a) was not, on their findings, open to them at all. The reason for that is that to discriminate against a person because of their pregnancy, the alleged discriminator requires to have knowledge of the pregnancy and, as we have explained in paragraph 57 above, the Tribunal were not entitled, on their findings in fact, to conclude that Mr Clelland had the requisite knowledge.[60]We would add that we cannot be satisfied that the Tribunal actually got to the stage of addressing section 136(3) certainly in relation to the section 18(2)(b) part of the claim. Whilst it seems clear that they considered that there were factors from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn, the Respondent’s explanation that the dismissal was simply because of long term absence is not dealt with. In particular, it is not rejected as, for instance, lacking in credibility or reliability.[61]Turning to holiday pay, the Tribunal’s award cannot, we consider, stand either. Whilst their approach to the issue of whether or not an employee who is wholly absent from work on account of sickness must give notice of leave dates so as to secure a right to holiday pay if the employment comes to an end is correct, this was not a case where, throughout the leave year in respect of which the award was made, the Claimant was unable to take annual leave due to sickness. On the Tribunal’s findings in fact, there were almost seven months available to her during which she was not unable to take leave due to sickness absence but did not do so. Thus, we agree with Mr Limpert that Larner did not apply. Disposal[62]We will pronounce an order upholding the appeal. We have given careful consideration to the question of whether or not we are able to determine the Claimant’s claims rather than order a remit. Whilst, once the Tribunal’s erroneous considerations are removed from their list of factors pointing to discrimination, that which is left would appear to be but a thin case, it would not be appropriate for us to decide whether the necessary discriminatory inference can be drawn. There is also the problem of proper consideration not having been given to the Respondent’s explanation of the reason why they dismissed the Claimant. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that there does require to be a remit and also that, in all the circumstances, it ought not to be to the same tribunal. Our order will, accordingly, provide for a remit to a freshly constituted Employment Tribunal. [1] See paragraph 81(i) p.27 of the Tribunal’s reasons. [2] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29 lines 30 -1. [3] This would appear to be a reference not to any plan of Mr Clelland’s but to Ann Hendry’s plans to step back from her front line role. [4] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29 line 33. [5] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29 line 34. [6] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29 line 34-5. [7] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29 line 35 -6. [8] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29, line 36. [9] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29, line38. [10] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29, line39. [11] Tribunal’s reasons paragraph 82, p.29, line40. [12] Tribunal’s reasons p.31 lines 5 -7. [13] See: Working Time Regulations 1998 reg 15. [14] Employment Rights Act 1996 sections 71 and 73. [15] See: Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 . [16] See: Review judgment and reasons dated 2 May 2012, paragraph 26.