Chief Constable Of West Midlands Police v Gardner (Disability Discrimination : Reasonable adjustments) [2011] UKEAT 0174_11_1910

EAT
Chief Constable Of West Midlands Police v Gardner (Disability Discrimination : Reasonable adjustments)
[2011] UKEAT 0174_11_1910 · 2011-10-19
[1]We have been asked to consider two appeals. The first is by the West Midlands Police against a decision of the Tribunal at Birmingham of 25 January 2011, in what we shall call the liability hearing. The second is by the former police officer concerned, Mr Gardner, against the decision reached on the remedies hearing by the same Tribunal on 19 August 2011.[2]In its liability decision the Tribunal dismissed claims that the police had directly discriminated against the Claimant under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and rejected claims of harassment. It accepted, however, that the police force had failed to comply with its duty to provide a reasonable adjustment for the disability of the Claimant and had thereby discriminated against him under ss.3A(2) and 4 of the 1995 Act .[3]The essential facts are these, so far as the Tribunal recite them. The Claimant injured his knees, principally his right knee, whilst on operational duties on 4 February 2006. At that time he had been working just over 20 hours per week by arrangement with the force. There followed a series of operations on his knees and periods when, in consequence of those operations or their aftermath, or the condition of his knees, the Claimant was absent from work.[4]The Tribunal reasons contain a detailed history, much of which was relevant to the decisions made on the other claims which were dismissed, which do not feature in the argument before us. We can summarise, therefore. There were a number of referrals by the police force to its occupational health medical advisers. Consistently, those advisers reported that the Claimant was fit for office-based light duties but should not be exposed to confrontational or similar duties, nor to prolonged sitting.[5]The three doctors who reported suggested that he would in due course be fit to return to full-time working of an operational kind. That was inconsistent with the view which had been expressed to the Claimant by his own medical advisers, including a consultant, Mr Learmonth, who regarded his loss of function as permanent, such that he should be retired to office duties only.[6]Suffice it to say that ultimately, but after the relevant dates with which we are intimately concerned, the matter was referred to a police medical appeal board which, on 28 August 2008, said this:
“The Board’s view is that Mr Gardner’s knee problems lead to a disability which is permanent. This will render Mr Gardner from being unable to carry out operational duties including confrontational work, running and walking anything other than short distances. We consider that Mr Gardner is fit for the other duties of a police officer, such as control room, administrative work, gathering of prosecution evidence, monitoring CCTV surveillance. We consider that he could do such duties for the same hours that he is contracted currently with the police and full time work if appropriate adjustment consistent with the DDA were applied. It is up to the police authority to decide if Mr Gardner can continue to be employed on his contracted hours with the physical restrictions as stated above. The Board considers that Mr Gardner is permanently disabled from carrying out the normal duties of a police officer.”
There were three consultant medical practitioners on the Board, two physicians and one orthopaedic surgeon.[7]One of the difficulties which the Tribunal had to face, though it does not itself record it as such, was that the parties were agreed that the Claimant was disabled by the time the matter had come before the Tribunal. That had been in contention earlier, since the police had not recognised the permanence of his condition until knowing the result of the police medical appeal board, and the unanimous consultant opinion it expressed, to which we have referred.[8]However, the parties were not specific about precisely what the disability was. Before the Tribunal it was accepted between the parties that the disability was a knee condition. That knee condition was not identified. The functional effects of it were not spelt out. The Claimant’s claims that he also suffered from a back problem, and his claim to have suffered consequences in terms of stress or depression, were not part of his accepted disability, though they too might have had functional significance.[9]The difficulty to which this might give rise is apparent if one considers s.l of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 . In its relevant part, it provides:
“1 (1) A person has a disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.”
[10]Disability is thus defined for the purposes of the Act by the effect which the physical impairment concerned has on the ability to carry out normal day to day activities. When considering the question of reasonable adjustment, the substantial and long-term adverse effect on ability to carry out normal day to day activities is likely to be central. Without understanding what the effect on normal day to day activities actually is, it can become impossible to know what adjustment is necessary or reasonable.[11]The facts of this case demonstrate, as we shall show, how important it is for a Tribunal when considering any case in which the effects of the disability may not be entirely obvious, and where there may be a dispute about the nature of an adjustment which it is reasonable to have to make in respect of the functional effects of that disability, to have a clear idea of that which it is of which the disability consists.[12]The Claimant, after making various attempts to return to work, and after various measures had been taken by the police to help him to do so, found himself at the end of 2007 being off work. He arranged with the police to return to work on 17 January 2008 for limited hours. The intention was to progressively increase hours over some time till reaching the 20 hours or so that he had previously worked.[13]The agreement was that he would be assisted in coming to work by being taken in a taxi. At work, he would be free to move around, presumably to relieve the stiffness in his knees, though that is not identified specifically as a reason, and the hours were to be flexible between 10.00am and 2.00pm.[14]Having returned to work on 17 January 2008, he worked until 25 February 2008 when he submitted a grievance complaining that the police had not made appropriate adjustments throughout 2007 and that there were inappropriate short-term adjustments then in place. Three days later he reported sick and did not, thereafter, return to work. He ultimately resigned on 4 February 2009. The Tribunal Decision[15]The Tribunal reached its decision, having set out the facts and having examined much of the medical history but without, as we have noted, clearly identifying what the consequences of the disability were for the Claimant in terms of what he could or could not do, and what difficulties it caused him at work. The pattern of its decision is as follows.[16]First, at paragraph 138, it identified the issues it had to determine. So far as relevant to the claim which it ultimately accepted, the Tribunal asked in respect of the first issue which had been identified by the police, and which the Tribunal considered encapsulated the issues the Claimant also wished it to decide:
“Was a provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of the Respondent (hereinafter PCP) that a police officer was required to work at a West Midlands site in a temporary role.”
[17]It found that provision to have been applied. It regarded an appropriate comparator as being an officer without a disability working at his or her post. Then, and critically, it turned to the questions of disadvantage and adjustment. It did so in respect of the law which it had earlier set out and which it is appropriate for us to set out now.[18]Under s.3A(2) of the 1995 Act :
“3A 2 […] a person […] discriminates against a disabled person if he fails to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments imposed on him in relation to the disabled person.”
[19]S.4A is headed “Employer’s Duty to Make Adjustments”. It reads:
“4A 1. Where (a) a provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer; or (b) any physical feature of premises occupied by the employer, places the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled, it is the duty of the employer to take such steps as it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to have to take in order to prevent the provision, criterion or practice, or feature, having that effect.”
[20]That is amplified by s.18B which reads:
“18B (1) In determining whether it is reasonable for a person to have to take a particular step in order to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments, regard shall be had, in particular, to - (a) the extent to which taking the step would prevent the effect in relation to which the duty is imposed; (b) the extent to which it is practicable for him to take the step; (c) the financial and other costs which would be incurred by him in taking the step and the extent to which taking it would disrupt any of his activities; (d) the extent of his financial and other resources; (e) the availability to him of financial or other assistance with respect to taking the step; (f) the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking; (g) where the step would be taken in relation to a private household […]”
[21]Returning to its conclusions, the Tribunal identified the answer to the question “if so, did the above PCP place the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled and, if so, how?” as being:
“The nature of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the Claimant was his inability to consistently work at a West Midlands site even in a temporary role. This placed him at the disadvantage of being at risk of having his contractual pay reduced and, ultimately, removed.”
[22]As to the question, or issue, “if so, was it a reasonable step in all the circumstances of the case for the Respondent to have to take in order to prevent the PCP from having the above effect to permit the Claimant to perform his police duties from home?” the answer to this was at paragraph 141:
“141. The reasonable step asserted by the Claimant is set out succinctly at page 306 of the bundle, namely his request that his working practice becomes remote working so that he can operate between the workplace and a home office.”
[23]The Tribunal were there, in our view, setting out the reasonable step for which the Claimant argued. It was his assertion which they were there reporting, not the Tribunal’s conclusion. That is evident, as we read the decision, from the words with which the next paragraph, 142, begins:
“142. In deciding whether this was a reasonable step to take the Tribunal has assessed the situation at various dates […]”
(emphasis added)[24]Paragraph 141 refers to page 306 of the bundle which was before the Tribunal. Earlier in its decision, the Tribunal had made reference to the same page - in paragraph 48, the Tribunal recited, as part of its description of the facts, the terms of one of four letters which the Claimant had written on the same date to his employer in October 2007. Curiously, though written on the same date, these letters were inconsistent one with another. But in the fourth, the Claimant said:
“Remote working I have today returned to duty with a disability and in need of workplace adjustment. Among the limitations are a daily 2 hour time limit (including travel, mobility restrictions and the need for control and self regulation of my environment and activity). Additionally I have to manage the time of day that I will be able to work as the after effects of pain relief taken during the night can affect my ability to work in the mornings. I request that my working practice becomes remote working so I can operate between the workplace and the home office.”
[25]He then set out benefits of this, which did not directly deal with his condition, save to say that by minimising travel it would help to ensure that his condition would not worsen.[26]It is the argument of Mr Scott, who appears for the Claimant to resist the appeal, that by saying what the Tribunal did at paragraph 141 it was reflecting the fuller and longer version which is set out at paragraph 48 and derives from one of the four letters of October 2007. That is where the phrase, operating “between the workplace and the home office” comes from.[27]He maintains that we should read the Tribunal’s decision as endorsing that part of that letter as the Tribunal’s own view of the Claimant’s condition and its effects, namely that the Tribunal were there accepting that it was, by reason of his disability, necessary for the Claimant to manage the after effects of pain relief. Mr Scott’s submission is that what placed the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in having to go to a West Midlands site to work, albeit on a temporary basis, was the unpredictability of his pain management regime and its effects upon him. Some mornings he would simply not be able to work or to get to work. His attendance would be unpredictable. All that could be remedied by working largely, or partly, from home.[28]Working “between the workplace and a home office” would, on this approach, be spending part of the time at either, the choice depending upon the state in which the Claimant’s pain then was, and was deliberately kept flexible so that he, being in the best position to manage it, could do so. Mr Scott asks us to conclude that that is what the Tribunal understood and was saying that it regarded as the aspects of the Claimant’s disability that put him at the substantial disadvantage which an adjustment should be designed to rectify.[29]The Tribunal, at paragraphs 143 through to 145, dealt with occasions earlier than the occasion in 2008 when the Claimant had attempted return to work. It did not consider that it was reasonable for the police force to accede to the request for remote working at any of those stages. There is no challenge to those findings.[30]In paragraph 146, however, the Tribunal said this:
“146. By 28 February 2008 the managed return to work had failed and the Claimant had again reported sick. At no stage after that point did the Respondent revisit the Claimant’s earlier request to be considered for remote working. It is significant that there are contemporaneous documents indicating that the Occupational Health Service had doubts about the genuine nature of the Claimant’s restrictions. It was suggested that he be subjected to surveillance. He was not recognised as having a disability. On 17 January 2008 it was asserted that the Claimant was reluctant to return to work. This assertion was made despite the fact that at that stage the Claimant was engaged in a managed return. On 1 February 2007 Chief Superintendent Coall had asserted that the problem with the left knee should be seen as a separate issue.”
[31]The Tribunal said the police had made a number of assumptions which had influenced the approach it adopted after February 2008 which was in effect not to accede to the request for remote working.[32]Paragraph 146 did not deal with any answer as to the nature of the adjustment in respect of which, in the words of the statute, it was the duty of the employer to take steps which it was reasonable for him to have to take in order to prevent the provision, criterion or practice or feature having the effect, i.e. the effect of placing the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage.[33]This issue of reasonable adjustment was returned to by the Tribunal at paragraph 147. This requires recitation in full:
“147. It is material that Chief Superintendent Holmes refers to Mrs Turner actively pursuing home working option. He would not have done so had no such option been available in principle. Although counsel for the Respondent enjoins the Tribunal to be cautious about the documentation produced by the Claimant which makes reference to home working, a number of these are documents placed in the public domain by or on behalf of the Respondent. One was being advanced by the Respondent in pursuit of an award which it won. In addition to those general documents the Tribunal has received specific evidence about three individuals working from home. The Respondent has been able to accommodate their needs. The Tribunal accepted that there are security issues around home working but a force the size of the Respondent, endorsing as it does the principles of home working, should have been able to allocate sufficient unprotected material to enable the Claimant to pursue the option of remote working as part of a managed return to his contracted part-time hours. Other smaller forces have home working policies in place and it is no defence for the Respondent to assert that no formal policy exists and that accordingly home working cannot be a reasonable adjustment. The failure of the Respondent to consider remote working from a home base after February 2008 represents a failure to make that reasonable adjustment. Rather than revisiting the option of remote working once the Claimant had demonstrated he was unable to return to work at a West Midlands site the Respondent chose to concentrate its energies on resisting the Claimant’s application under the H1 process [that we understand to be a reference to the medical process under which an ill-health pension may be offered to police officers] . That application was provoked by the failure of the Respondent to acknowledge the extent of the Claimant’s restrictions. It was the only avenue left to the Claimant.”
[34]At paragraph 148, the Tribunal went on to consider what would have occurred if the Respondent had offered that reasonable adjustment, after February 2008. It did so, because there had been evidence that the Claimant had become dissatisfied with the way in which he had been dealt by his employer. It identified that he would have been considered fit to carry out the duties identified by the medical appeal board in its conclusions. The difference would be that he would have been carrying out that work remotely. The consequence, it found, would be that he would not have left police service early, and he would have continued working remotely. The submissions[35]We would like to record our gratitude to both counsel, for the clarity and quality of their submissions on this part of the appeal. They have displayed much of the focus which is important in presenting issues to an Appeal Tribunal. For the police Appellant, Mr Basu, who appeared below (as Mr Scott did not), argued that in the conclusions to which we have referred the Tribunal had simply assumed that the postulated adjustment was reasonable and, in doing so, had missed what were essential steps in the necessary analysis.[36]It had wrongly, he submits, found that a failure to consider remote working (see the wording in paragraph 147) was, itself, a breach of a s.4A duty. It had failed to have explicit regard to the s.18B factors, to which it was mandatory for a Tribunal to pay regard. It had failed to identify the nature and extent of any substantial disadvantage (as emphasised in Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] ICR 218 ), misunderstood the nature of the s.4A duty, failed to explain how the Tribunal thought that the Claimant could carry out the duties (for which the medical appeal board had found him fit) by remote working, had wrongly taken into account the circumstances of three other officers who had, it was accepted by the Tribunal, been working remotely, since those circumstances were not comparable to those of the Claimant, had assumed that suitable work should have been available for the Claimant (rather than asking what particular work was available, in particular given the confidential nature of much police work), had wrongly concluded that the Respondent’s defence to the issue of reasonable adjustment was to assert that because no formal home working policy existed, therefore home working was not an adjustment reasonably to be made (and that if that were rejected, then the adjustment claim was well-founded) and finally, that it had focused on irrelevant considerations, such as the thought processes and motives as referred to at paragraph 146, as we have reported in part.[37]Those arguments, as it seems to us, cover a number of areas but centrally they require a focus by this Tribunal upon the reasons why the Tribunal found that there had been a failure to make a reasonable adjustment.[38]In Environment Agency v Rowan at paragraph 27 is said:
“In our opinion an Employment Tribunal considering a claim that an employer has discriminated against an employee pursuant to section 3A(2) of the Act by failing to comply with the section 4A duty must identify: (a) the provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer, or (b) the physical feature of premises occupied by the employer, (c) the identity of non-disabled comparators (where appropriate) and (d) the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the Claimant. It should be borne in mind that identification of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the Claimant may involve a consideration of the cumulative effect of both the 'provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer' and the, 'physical feature of premises' so it would be necessary to look at the overall picture. In our opinion an Employment Tribunal cannot properly make findings of a failure to make reasonable adjustments under sections 3A(2) and 4A(1) without going through that process. Unless the Employment Tribunal has identified the four matters we have set out above it cannot go on to judge if any proposed adjustment is reasonable. It is simply unable to say what adjustments were reasonable to prevent the provision, criterion or practice, or feature, placing the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage.”
[39]Mr Basu argues that the Tribunal does not explain why it considered that home working was a reasonable adjustment. It does not say what it was about the work which the Claimant had been doing in January and February 2008, that gave rise to a substantial disadvantage.[40]It was not sufficient simply to say it was his knee condition. Mr Basu pointed to what might be thought the most obvious consequences of such a condition. First, there might be some difficulty in mobility and associated difficulties in using private or public transport to get to work. That, he said, could not sensibly have caused substantial disadvantage here because, the employer had provided a taxi, so that the Claimant could travel without needing to work the pedals of his own car, and without being exposed to the difficulties of travelling in the crowded spaces often afforded by public transport and, indeed, was allowed to work at a time which was outside the notorious Birmingham rush hour.[41]Second, he noted that there was evidence which it is accepted before us was before the Tribunal, to the effect that the Claimant had, whilst off sick as a police officer in May 2008, used his own car to make visits to clients in performance of an insurance-related business which he pursued for personal profit though still in police service. He points to this not so much to deride the Claimant for it, though he does - and we ignore that part of his submissions as irrelevant to the issues we have to decide - but relevantly to submit that, that evidence being before the Tribunal, it is difficult to understand what feature of transport to work or mobility the Tribunal had particularly in mind as causing substantial disadvantage without the Tribunal identifying it. Use of his own car could not have been unreasonably difficult.[42]Third, it might be that the arrangements at work needed to be such that the Claimant’s knee joints did not stiffen. That would require a focus upon the nature of the condition and its precise consequences in terms of function and effect. But in any event his condition had not, submits Mr Basu, caused him any obvious problem in 2008 when, as the Tribunal reported at paragraph 65, there were in place measures such that he could regularly move away from his workstation. A workplace assessment said that he had identified that a more active role might lead to better management of his condition.[43]If the reason why home working was the adjustment to be made, rather than other adjustments at work which, following on from the police medical assessment board decision, had been offered (though un-specifically) by the police, was the need to avoid the stiffening of joints, or to be more active, then that is not expressed by the Tribunal.[44]Mr Basu, in his submissions, did not deal with that which Mr Scott identified as the feature of the Claimant’s disability which in fact (he submitted) caused the disadvantage, namely his difficulties with pain management and control and the lingering effects of palliative medicine upon his waning performance.[45]We, for our part, would simply observe at this point that we understand from the circumstances, as generally described by the Tribunal, why it was that Mr Basu might not have appreciated that that was in the mind of the Tribunal. It simply did not say so. It might not be thought the most obvious of consequences arising out of a knee condition, otherwise unelaborated.[46]Allied to the submission that there was no material from which he could identify precisely what the adjustment was required to remedy, and why it would be reasonable for the employer to have to make it, Mr Basu drew attention to the precise wording of s.4A to raise a question of statutory interpretation. He argued that the words “reasonable […] for him to have to take in order to prevent […] that effect” included the words “to have to” in front of the word “take”. If the issue had simply been what steps were reasonable, the words “to have to” would not be present. They must have a function. Mr Basu submitted that the purpose was to emphasise the compulsive nature of the duty. It was to be read as “to be obliged to take”. For his part, Mr Scott argued that the words did not import an obligation, as Mr Basu submitted. More naturally in context, they emphasised the necessary nature of the adjustment which it was reasonable to take.[47]We do not consider that it is necessary for the resolution of this appeal that we resolve this issue of statutory interpretation. Our inclination would be to favour the approach urged by Mr Scott, for these reasons. First, the section imposes a duty on the employer. It would be otiose to require that the employer had a duty and then separately oblige him to discharge it. The word “duty” is simple enough.[48]Second, it seems to us in context that “to have to” is directed towards the necessity for the adjustment. To say that it must be necessary does not mean to say that an employer can argue that he had no duty to make a postulated adjustment by pointing to the fact that there might be another adjustment which would have the same effect, thus demonstrating that the postulated one was not “necessary”, and thus it was not obligatory for the employer to make it: the emphasis of the section is upon achieving a result, that is, achieving an adjustment which prevents either the PCP, or the feature of the premises, or the mixture of the two which is raised in the claim, having the effect which is so damaging to the disabled person - that is putting him at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with person who are not disabled. But nonetheless the phrase does emphasise that the focus of a Tribunal is not upon steps which might be desirable in some general sense, but upon those which are necessary as steps towards a particular end.[49]As to Mr Basu’s other submissions, he argues that what was said at paragraph 146 set out a number of complaints about the way in which the police had dealt with the Claimant. This, he said, was irrelevant to the question which was being considered, that is, one of reasonable adjustment. For that purpose he relied upon a judgment of this Tribunal in Royal Bank of Scotland v Ashton [2011] ICR 632 , which drew attention to the fact that the Act where it speaks of making adjustments is concerned with outcome and not with the process by which the outcome is reached. He refers in particular to paragraph 22 of that decision, though in our view paragraph 24 better sums up the point:
“24. So far as reasonable adjustment is concerned, the focus of the Tribunal is […] an objective one. The focus is upon the practical result of the measures which can be taken. It is not - and it is an error - for the focus to be upon the process of reasoning by which a possible adjustment was considered. As the cases indicate, and as a careful reading of the statute would show, it is irrelevant to consider the employer’s thought processes or other processes leading to the making or failure to make a reasonable adjustment. It is an adjustment which objectively is reasonable, not one for the making of which, or the failure to make which, the employer had (or did not have) good reasons.”
[50]Mr Scott, in his skeleton argument, related this part of the discussion to the potential consideration by the Tribunal of the reversal of the burden of proof, which we cannot accept, given that at paragraph 146 of its discussion that was not an issue before the Tribunal. It was here considering the question, and explicitly considering the question, of reasonable adjustment.[51]Nor does the Tribunal deal with whether the adjustment was or was not reasonable in any other sense. But in the context here of this case, as distinct from the case before the Tribunal in Ashton , we do not think that the Tribunal was resting its decision upon what it said at paragraph 146. The Tribunal’s decision generally is discursive. It was making observations which, in our view, were not of relevance to its ultimate conclusion, but which do not, in our view, demonstrate that that conclusion was necessarily in error of law.[52]As to Mr Basu’s argument that the wording of the Tribunal indicated an error where it said “the failure of the Respondent to consider remote working […] represents a failure to make that reasonable adjustment” because what the Tribunal there identified was not a failure to provide home working, but a failure to consider providing it, we say this. In viewing an Employment Tribunal decision, the whole of it must be taken into account. Words must be read in context. A decision such as the present is not, and is not meant to be, the product of elaborate and careful draughtsmanship. When taken as a whole it conveys to us, and we consider would convey clearly to the parties, that what the Tribunal had in mind was that the failure to make a reasonable adjustment was not centrally the failure to think about it, but the failure to make it (or at least provide it, in the sense of making it available, since the Claimant did not return to work because the adjustment was not there for him to take advantage of). It is sometimes appropriate to take sentences in isolation, where it is clear that they encapsulate what the Tribunal has to say about an issue. This is not one of those cases.[53]Mr Scott, in his argument, had to meet the difficulty that the Tribunal here did not, as Mr Basu (in our view, rightly) identified, set out what it was about the disability of the Claimant which gave rise to the problems or effects which put him at the substantial disadvantage identified. There may be many cases in which it is obvious what the nature of the substantial disadvantage is, and why someone with the disability in question would inevitably suffer it. It is not difficult to think of examples, such as that of a man who has one arm, who is plainly at a significant disadvantage caused by his lack of two handedness: there are many others. But there are also cases, of which this is one, in which in our view simply to identify a disability as being a general condition - such as “a knee condition” - does not enable any party, and more particularly a court of review, to identify the process of reasoning which leads from that to the identification of a substantial disadvantage, and an adjustment which it is reasonable to have to make to avoid that disadvantage. The conclusion remains unexplained by any description of what it is that the Claimant can and cannot do in consequence of his disability, and there is therefore no information as to the nature of any step or steps which might be taken in order to prevent that particular disadvantage. The words of Rowan are clear and correct. They may however insufficiently emphasise the need to show, or to understand, what it is about a disability that gives rise to the substantial disadvantage, and therefore what it is that requires to be remedied by adjustment. Without knowing that, no assessment of what is, or is not, reasonable by way of adjustment can properly be made.[54]Mr Scott’s answer, as we have recited, was to argue that the Tribunal were implicitly adopting the Claimant’s own complaint, as he put it, in his letter of 17 October 2007. We have indicated we cannot accept that argument. The Tribunal might have been adopting it, but it did not say so. It is not obvious it was. It is unnecessary in our view to turn to the other arguments which Mr Basu has made. We consider that upon the central argument, he has demonstrated that the Tribunal has failed to show that it has grappled properly with the issue.[55]Mr Scott argues that the appeal is effectively an argument that the decision of the Tribunal was perverse. We cannot accept that any question of perversity arises here. A conclusion that a decision was perverse could be reached only if we were confident that we were in possession of sufficient findings of fact by a Tribunal to reach the view that the conclusion was simply wholly impermissible. To that extent, we accept that if the central argument had been perversity, it could not have succeeded: but that does not meet the principal ground of the appeal.[56]Where the Tribunal has not set out what its conclusions are, upon information which was or probably was before it, we cannot be satisfied that it would necessarily have reached either the same conclusion or some other conclusion. It would seem to us to be open to a Tribunal to come to the conclusion that this Tribunal did, providing it was properly reasoned. But we do have in mind what was said in the case of Meek v City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250 , in the well-known dicta of Bingham LJ, at paragraph 8:
“8. It has on a number of occasions been made plain that the decision of an Industrial Tribunal is not required to be an elaborate formalistic product to refine legal draughtsmanship, but it must contain an outline of the story which is given rise to the complaint and a summary of the Tribunal’s basic factual conclusions, and a statement of the reasons which have led them to reach the conclusion which they do on those basic facts. The parties are entitled to be told why they have won or lost. There should be sufficient account of the facts and of the reasoning to enable the appeal Tribunal or, on further appeal, this court to see whether any question of law arises, and it is highly desirable that the decision of an Industrial Tribunal should give guidance both to employers and trade unions as to practices which should or should not be adopted.”
[57]As was added by Lord Phillips in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] IRLR 2409:
“The issues, the resolution of which were vital to the judge’s conclusion should be identified, and the manner in which he resolved them, explained […] It need not involve a lengthy Judgment. It does require the judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.”
[58]We cannot accept the submission made by Mr Scott, that because the case of Meek was not identified as such in the grounds of appeal, Mr Basu is not entitled to argue that the Tribunal here have not adequately set out their reasoning. The “reasons” challenge is, in any event, implicit in his submission that the Tribunal simply assumed that the adjustment was, in the circumstances, reasonable. Conclusions as to liability[59]It follows, by way of conclusion, that in this case the Tribunal, though it carefully dealt with many of the issues before it and made unassailable conclusions as to direct discrimination and victimisation, did in our view commit an error of law in its approach to the question of reasonable adjustment. That error was a failure to set out why and on what basis the adjustment of remote working (whatever precisely that might have meant) would or might have had the effect of preventing the provision, criterion or practice, that is the requirement to work at a site in the West Midlands (or some feature of the premises, which is not apparently relied on here, though we cannot be absolutely sure there was no relevant feature of the premises) having the effect of putting the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with those who were not disabled.[60]On the appeal, therefore, as to liability, we have concluded that the appeal must be allowed. Rejecting as we do the argument that the decision was perverse, we have concluded that the appeal must be remitted to a Tribunal for determination. That remission will deal only with the question of whether home working, or a mixture of home and office working, was a reasonable adjustment, given the particular disability of the Claimant and the substantial disadvantage caused by that disability, such that the police force was under a duty to ensure that that reasonable adjustment had to be made for the Claimant for when he was able to return to work.[61]No other issue, of the several which were canvassed in the hearing before the Employment Tribunal, seems to us to be open for further argument. Those aspects of the Employment Tribunal decision, which have not been challenged on this appeal, stand. The remedy appeal[62]The remedy appeal, therefore, becomes academic and anything we have to say about this part of the case is necessarily obiter. However for two reasons we have acceded to the request of the parties that we rule on the appeal. The first is that it indicates to any appeal court, which may consider this Judgment, what our views have been and, secondly, it may assist the parties to know our views because ultimately, if the Claimant should succeed on remission and succeed to the same extent as he did before the present Tribunal, the parties may then be better able to avoid by agreement what would otherwise be an expensive remedies hearing.[63]The problem which arises is in respect of the calculation of pension. There is no challenge to the decision on the remedies hearing except in respect of an order that the police should pay the Claimant the sum of £33,662.70 in compensation for loss of pension. That sum was a sum agreed between counsel, but it was agreed upon a basis which is in dispute. If the Tribunal was entitled to adopt the basis which it indicated to the parties and upon which they calculated that sum, then the appeal fails. If it was not so entitled and was in error of law in taking that approach, then the appeal succeeds.[64]The Tribunal on 17 August recorded that the Claimant had a final salary scheme with the police, accepted that he would not find further employment with an equivalent final salary scheme, and acknowledged that the Claimant accepted that he must give credit for the pension he was already receiving from the police.[65]The Claimant was born on 23 November 1960. He is thus, though 50, now very close to the age of 51. He was a little over 48 when he left the force. He would otherwise have retired at the age of 60.[66]The Tribunal recorded at paragraph 9 that the argument of Mr Basu was that the police had no quarrel with the Tribunal adopting, as it proposed to do, the “substantial approach” to pension loss calculation, as identified in the booklet headed “Compensation for Loss of Pension Rights Employment Tribunals: Third Edition” prepared in 2003 by a committee including the Government Actuary and experienced Chairmen of Employment Tribunals, published by the Treasury Solicitors (which we shall call the “2003 booklet”).[67]That booklet identifies two approaches to pension loss which are termed a “simplified approach” and the “substantial loss approach”. The booklet does not deal with the methods of calculation habitually used in the civil courts in claims of tort. The method of calculation used in such claims, such as personal injury claims, is sometimes referred to as an Auty calculation, that being a reference to the case of Auty v National Coal Board [1985] 1 WLR 784. Sometimes it is referred to as the “Ogden” approach, the approach being similar to that adopted in Auty but by reference to actuarial tables appended to a publication most recently headed “Actuarial Tables with Explanatory Notes for use in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases prepared by a Multi-Disciplinary Working Party of Actuaries, Lawyers, Accountants and other Interested Parties: Sixth Edition” (the seventh is pending) and again published by the Treasury Solicitors’ Office, known as “The Ogden Tables” in respect for Sir Michael Ogden QC who chaired the working party which produced the first few editions of the tables.. The edition before the Tribunal was the 2007 (sixth) edition.[68]Here, the Claimant’s position was that the Tribunal, having concluded that the substantial approach should be adopted, should then adopt the relevant tables attached to the 2003 booklet. It should apply the appropriate multipliers from those tables and award the Claimant the resulting figures. The Respondent’s approach was that the Tribunal should not use the tables annexed to those guidelines, but should instead adopt the tables which came from the Ogden Tables, sixth edition. The difference is said to us to amount to some £44,000 in favour of the police, if one were to adopt that latter course.[69]The Tribunal noted that the parties had agreed a lot of the relevant figures and noted that the amount to be awarded depended upon its decision as to which set of tables it should adopt. The Tribunal had before it the report of John Frenkel FCA, which was specifically compiled upon the substantial loss basis using the multipliers and figures coming from the appendices in the 2003 booklet.[70]The Tribunal were referred to some case law, and identified other cases, but all were cases of unfair dismissal. That may be important because, so far as unfair dismissal claims are concerned, calculation of compensation is governed by s.123 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 :
“123 […] The amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the Tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.”
[71]Under the Disability Discrimination Act , however, the starting point is that at s.17A(2), headed “Enforcement Remedies and Procedure”:
"17A (2) Where an employment tribunal finds that a complaint presented to it under this section is well-founded, it shall take such of the following steps as it considers just and equitable - (b) ordering the respondent to pay compensation to the complainant; (3) Where a tribunal orders compensation under subsection (2)(b), the amount of the compensation shall be calculated by applying the principles applicable to the calculation of damages in claims in tort [...]"
What is “just and equitable” here relates not to the calculation of compensation, as it does under s.123, but to the preliminary decision as to whether to award any compensation at all. Once that threshold question is answered positively, calculation is as in a case of tort before the civil courts. The approach in tort is to assess that sum which represents full and fair compensation for the loss which the tort has caused the Claimant.[72]It is common ground before us that the authorities, in respect of unfair dismissal cases, provide for the Tribunal to make a choice as to whether it should adopt the simplified or the substantial approach. It will not necessarily be in error should it adopt one, rather than the other, though see the case of Sibbit v Governing Body of St Cuthbert’s Catholic Primary School [2010] UKEAT/70/10, 20 May 2010, a decision of this Tribunal presided over by HHJ McMullen QC, in which it was regarded as an error of law for the Tribunal to adopt the simplified approach where it was clear that the substantial loss approach ought to have been adopted on the facts. Otherwise the cases make it plain that the Tribunal has a choice.[73]The parties identified for us in respect of tort the case of the Ministry of Defence v Hunt [1996] ICR 554. The Tribunal itself raised with the parties that of Ministry of Defence v Mutton [1996] ICR 590. The report at [1996] ICR 554 not only covers the appeal of Hunt , but also an appeal in the case of one Wheeler, which was linked with the appeal of Hunt, in which page 579, C to F was said to be of assistance. In Mutton , the following passage may be of relevance (605, C to F). “(Counsel) submitted that the task for the Industrial Tribunal was to award a sum which, when invested, would fully compensate Mrs Mutton for the value of the pension rights she had lost. The appropriate rate of return in investments, which she might reasonably achieve, was a question of fact which the Tribunal properly determined on the evidence before it. He submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that a real rate of return of 4.5 per cent was unrealistic. The Tribunal took into account Mrs Mutton’s loss of a completely secure index-linked pension underwritten by the government, and the fact that Mr Ballantyne was unable to point to any investment which would yield a real rate of return of 4.5 per cent. He further observed that the rate of return adopted by the Industrial Tribunal (3.5 per cent) was in fact higher than the net rate of return index-linked on Gilts, which was only 3 per cent. He described the Tribunal’s approach as involving careful reasoning and a conclusion which was neither perverse nor wrong in law.”[74]The Tribunal, chaired by Mr Justice Maurice Kay as he was, considered that those submissions were well founded. The Tribunal had been entitled to take an approach open to it on the evidence.[75]The upshot of those authorities is summarised in the submissions before us as being that, as Mr Scott would put it, the Tribunal is entitled to adopt the simplified approach where appropriate. Here it was entitled to adopt the substantial loss approach, or it could have adopted the approach used in personal injury cases known as the Ogden approach or the Auty approach. Or for that matter it would not be an error of law for the Tribunal to adopt a bespoke approach, as in Mutton . What it could not do, he submitted, was “pick and mix”; take aspects of one approach and annex them to aspects of another approach. That is what he submits the Tribunal did here. The Tribunal, having set out the nature of the disagreement upon which it had to rule, had said explicitly that there was agreement between the parties that the substantial approach was the correct approach. It should have adopted it.[76]What guidance can be gleaned from the 2003 booklet itself concerning the use of appropriate tables? Clearly, when the 2003 edition was published the authors required that the tables annexed be used. However, the authors refer in paragraph 4.8 to the Ogden tables being prepared by the government’s actuary department, to enable courts to convert a total loss of employment continuing to retirement into a lump sum. The authors continue:
“In a case where Ogden tables were being used to assess future loss of earnings, there is a clear need for a comparable approach to pensions using similar assumptions.”
[77]In explaining their approach the authors say this:
“The substantial loss of approach …. uses actuarial tables comparable to the Ogden tables to assess the current capitalised value of the pension rights which would accrue up to retirement.”
[78]And in paragraph 8, the booklet said:
“The loss of pension rights can be calculated using factors similar to those available in the Ogden tables for personal injury and fatal accident cases.”
[79]The Tribunal drew attention to the fact that some of the financial assumptions which underlay the 2003 booklet appeared to it to be out of date. They included the assumption that money could be invested to earn an average of 6.5 per cent per year. It went on in its conclusions to say this:
“20. It would have much easier [sic] for this Tribunal had the authors of the booklet chosen to adopt the then Ogden tables which the Tribunal is told would have been edition 4 and indicated that subsequent editions could then be adopted when appropriate. Instead, the government actuary prepared tables which were similar to but did not mirror the then Ogden tables and the difficulty which this Tribunal faces is that the book that was published at a time of economic plenty, when they are being applied at time of the economic penury. The tables in the booklet no longer reflect the economic realities. 21. The Tribunal is required to compensate the Claimant on just and equitable principles, but the difficulty is that to award compensation based on financial assumptions which are no longer correct would not be fair. The most up-to-date tables available are the sixth edition Ogden tables and the Tribunal would only have refrained from adopting those had it been required by higher authority so to do. In fact, the balance of the authorities appears to favour the Tribunal using the Ogden tables where to use the guidelines would produce an inequitable result. 22. It follows that the Tribunal has decided to adopt the appropriate Ogden table in calculating pension loss. This is table 19 and the multiplier to be used is 13.54 for calculating both A and B of the substantial loss calculation, where A = the value of prospective final pension rights up to normal retirement age in former employment if the Claimant had not been dismissed and B = value of accrued final salary pension rights to date of dismissal from former employment.”
[80]The reasoning was thus that the current edition of the Ogden tables represented a more up-to-date reflection of the economic realities, and that times economically had changed since 2003. The consequence, as it has been explained to us by counsel, is that although the Tribunal did not perhaps realise it was doing so, it in fact adopted a calculation which was indistinguishable from the calculation which would be performed using the Ogden tables. That is because it took the amount of the pension loss annually from age 60, multiplied that by the Ogden multiplier, and deducted a sum to represent the amount paid to date for which the Claimant had accepted he would pay credit.[81]By their Judgment the Tribunal showed that it did not necessarily understand that was the practical effect of what it was doing. We have to ask whether the Tribunal here was in error of law in its approach; whether it was, in the words of Mr Scott, entitled to “pick and mix” for the reasons which it did.[82]We note that in Bingham v Holborn Engineering Ltd [1992] IRLR 298, Knox J stated, at page 300, in reference to an earlier edition of a booklet designed for the same purpose as the 2003 booklet, as follows:
“The booklet is indeed a valuable guide to Industrial Tribunals who frequently are faced with the invidious task of grappling with what are difficult and complex questions, raising problems of actuarial calculations without the benefit of actuarial evidence. In those circumstances it is indeed very helpful to Industrial Tribunals to have some actuarial guidance, necessarily of a generalised and therefore somewhat rough and ready form, to guide them through the thickets, without having an actuary as a witness to guide them through. But there is no doubt that the booklet is not a bible which has to be followed in every detail. Indeed, the booklet itself takes pains to point out that this is indeed so, and recognises that it is not an infallible guide […] In this case it is in our view abundantly clear that in relation to this particular case the actuarial assumptions which are set out in […] the booklet, were in fact in several important respects shown to be inaccurate. That of course is not a criticism of the booklet, which […] has necessarily to be generalised.”
[83]That reasoning was expressly adopted in the Mutton case to which we have referred. It relates of course to a booklet which preceded the 2003 booklet, but it does assist. A Tribunal is not as it seems to us bound as a matter of law to adopt the methodology set out in either the Ogden approach or, more particularly, the substantial or simplified approach from the 2003 booklet.[84]If it does depart from such an approach, however, it must do so for good reason and must say what its reasons are. Any such reasons require to be cogent and intelligible and appropriate. A Tribunal will only ever stray from such recognised approaches for such carefully articulated good reasons, and will do so at potential peril to the acceptability of its decision. It is not a course which we would recommend, except where it is plain that the interests of justice require it.[85]But, here, the Tribunal did set out reasons for adopting what was, in practice, the Ogden approach. That was simply that economic times had changed, and those tables better reflected modern economic reality.[86]We spent much of the time in the discussion of the case in examining and identifying why it should be that there was such a difference in result, applying the substantial loss approach on the one hand as against the tort personal injury approach on the other. It seems to be that the only difference is in the multipliers used. The substantial loss approach based on the 2003 Booklet seems to us to adopt multipliers which allow for the continuing enhancement of earnings, upon which final salary schemes are based to the age of retirement, after the date of dismissal or leaving. That is on the assumption that wages outstrip prices. The Ogden approach does not.[87]Although the Tribunal did not say in terms that it had in mind that that was an assumption underlying the difference in multiplier, its wording reflecting the contrast between economic plenty when the booklet was written and application at a time of economic penury makes exactly that point. Economic circumstances have changed.[88]That is demonstrated again by the Tribunal’s view that the tables were based upon, in part, the ability of invested money to earn a return of 6.5 per cent a year at least, gross, which in its view no longer applied.[89]Given that there was, in our view, articulated, cogent and good reasons for this Tribunal to choose to depart from the substantial approach, by adopting actuarial tables from Ogden in substitution for those in the 2003 booklet, we cannot see that it was an error of law for the Tribunal to do as it did.[90]If it had been suggested that it was an error of law, and if we had so found, we would have nonetheless to determine whether the decision of the Tribunal was plainly and obviously right. As we have said, a result of what they did, though perhaps unknowingly, was that the Tribunal adopted the Auty calculation. It would not be wrong to do so. It could not therefore be said that the result to which it came was necessarily wrong.[91]This is not to say, we hasten to add, that Tribunals must in modern economic circumstances adopt the approach urged by the Ogden working party. A Tribunal is entitled to address the question of what is full and fair compensation such as would be awarded in a claim in tort in a way which properly answers that question. Whatever the precise methodology will be, a Tribunal will find very considerable assistance from the 2003 booklet. That is what it is designed for. It may find also such assistance from personal injury case law. It is ill advised to “pick and mix”: but in this particular case, on its own particular facts, and without (we emphasise) laying down any guidelines more generally (because we do not feel that the argument before us, in particular lacking as it does any detailed help from actuarial expert evidence, allows us to lay down any specific guidelines for Tribunals to follow) we hold the Tribunal was entitled to take the approach it did.[92]It follows that for those reasons, we would not have thought that there is any merit in the remedies appeal, independently of the result of the liability appeal.[93]It follows, in the event, that the only outstanding issue is whether we should remit the case on liability on the limited ground that still remains to the same or to a fresh Tribunal.[94]We have had regard to the principles expressed in Sinclair Roche & Temperley v Heard [2004] IRLR 763 . It is unnecessary to set them out as a checklist, but we have come to the conclusion in this case that the matter should be remitted to a fresh Tribunal. There are two principal reasons for this.[95]The first is that, although we have every confidence in the balance and professionalism of the Tribunal, it can be particularly difficult when the Tribunal has indicated a finding not to be influenced one way or the other by that finding, and we think there is, given all the circumstances, such a risk here.[96]Secondly, we are impressed by the point made by Mr Basu that as a matter of simple practical convenience, it is always likely to be easier to arrange a Tribunal of three people to deal with a matter which needs to be heard as soon as possible because of the age of the case, rather than reassemble a Tribunal which has been together in the past, and that it cannot be assembled in part.[97]We do not think this will give rise to any corresponding practical disadvantage because of the relatively limited nature of the inquiry upon which the Tribunal will be engaged and the findings of fact which are undisturbed from the first Tribunal which will inform their discussion.