"13. There is an issue of control. The respondent, in practice, throughout the period of this contract, did not seek to exercise any control over what leads the claimant rejected, what hours she worked and how she went about the sales job – presumably with the proviso that she must do so lawfully. Over the course of the years the arrangement had become established, not only for the claimant but the other sales consultants, that the respondent would provide leads when it had them to provide, the claimant would in general undertake those offered to her and the respondent would reward her success by paying commission. This was not only the minimum in the contract between the two, which was oral and not in writing and partly implied, but it was very near the maximum of the contract. Both parties, for the working of the contract, relied upon the mutual benefit which they would derive from it. "14. There was incentive to the claimant to do the work offered to her and thereby earn commission – or at least thereby to have a prospect of earning commission – and there was incentive upon the respondent to provide leads to a trained sales consultant and it had trained the claimant. If there were insufficient leads to satisfy the claimant and provide sufficient incentive for her she would complain. She and others did so at one point when business was very low and the respondent made adjustments, such as the rota for allocating work, which Mr Latimer started to operate. There was an understanding that the respondent would provide what work it could to the claimant and to the sales consultants."
"21. For the claimant, Mr Prior has contained his submissions in a written argument, for which I am obliged. I annex it to these Reasons and I do not rehearse it in them. I have studied them carefully and in particular have read carefully the judgment of the EAT in Cotswold Developments. It is interesting indeed, in that last authority, to read the words of Langstaffe J as they appear in paragraphs 53 onwards and he emphasises the need to focus upon the mutual obligations which may exist between the parties. The biggest threat, if not the only threat to this suggestion of mutuality of obligation in this case, is the right of the claimant to refuse work and the right of the employer not to offer it. Langstaffe J says, in paragraph 55: 'That it is that it does not deprive an overriding contract of such mutual obligations that the employee has the right to refuse work. Nor does it do so where the employer may exercise a choice to withhold work. The focus must be upon whether or not there is some obligation upon an individual to work and some obligation upon the other party to provide or pay for it. Stephenson LJ in Nethermere put it as 'an irreducible minimum of obligation.' "22. As I have already said, that was the minimum which applied here. This was an ongoing relationship of some three years' duration between the parties in which it functioned to their mutual benefit and by their mutual agreement on the minimum basis that the respondent would provide to the claimant what leads it could to enable here to make sales and earn commission, the claimant would follow up such of those leads as she reasonably could and the respondent would pay her for her success. Taking into account the principles which are established and reiterated by Langstaffe J in Cotswold Developments, I conclude – though not, I must confess, without some difficulty – that this arrangement between the parties was one which satisfies the definition of employment inSection 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 . It follows from that that the claimant's claims of unfair dismissal, breach ofPart II Employment Rights Act 1996 and sex discrimination shall proceed. Case Management Orders in respect of them will be sent to the parties in standard written form."
"The Chairman apologies if the whole of his reasoning was not apparent from the Judgment and its Reasons. The reasons for his finding were, put fairly briefly, as follows: 1. As the reasons do make clear, there was a mutuality of obligation. 2. Further than that and transcending the face of the contractual documents, there had grown between the parties a commercial interdependence which had the flavour of an employment relationship rather than one of independent contractor. 3. The claimant was not able to use a substitute, she was not in business on her own account, and she was not able to trade with anyone else. 4. The claimant was dependent upon the respondent for the supply of work dependent exclusively upon the respondent for the supply of work and was, in reality, obliged to perform it when given it. 5. In practical terms, there was an obligation on the Company to provide work. 6. The fact that remuneration was on a commission-only basis did not so dominate the relationship as to keep the parties sufficiently at arms length for it to be a contract for services. 7. While there was flexibility as to times of work and a degree of choice as to "contract leads" to be accepted by the claimant, this was in reality a flexibility that suited both parties for the performance of the contract and did not significantly dilute the mutuality of their obligations. 8. As was submitted, in closing, on behalf of the claimant, the test was what the relationship had grown to be over a period of time. This was not an easy case to resolve. It was a borderline one but on balance I concluded that the overriding flavour of the relationship was one that was characteristic of an employment relationship rather than of a contract for services."
"230 Employees, workers etc (1) In this Act "employee" means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment. (2) In this Act "contract of employment" means a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing."
"A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled. (i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master. (ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master. (iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service."
"As to (i). There must be a wage or other remuneration. Otherwise there will be no consideration, and without consideration no contract of any kind. The servant must be obliged to provide his own work and skill. Freedom to do a job either by one's own hands or by another's is inconsistent with a contract of service, though a limited or occasional power of delegation may not be: see Atiyah's Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) pp. 59 to 61 and the cases cited by him. As to (ii). Control includes he power of deciding the thing to be done, the way in which it shall be done, the means to be employed in doing it, the time when and the place where it shall be done. All these aspects of control must be considered in deciding whether the right exists in a sufficient degree to make one party the master and the other his servant. The right need not be unrestricted. "
"The mere facts that the outworkers could fix their own hours of work, could take holidays and time off when they wished and could vary how many garments they were willing to take on any day or even to take none on a particular day, while undoubtedly factors for the industrial tribunal to consider in deciding whether or not there was a contract of service, do not as a matter of law negative the existence of such a contract."