"(1) If, on an application made by the Attorney General or the Lord Advocate under this section, the Appeal Tribunal is satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground – (a) instituted vexatious proceedings, whether in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal, and whether against the same person or against different persons, or (b) made vexatious applications in any proceedings, whether in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal the Appeal Tribunal may, after hearing the person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a restriction of proceedings order. (2) A "restriction of proceedings order" is an order that – (a) no proceedings shall without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal be instituted in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal by the person against whom the order is made, (b) any proceedings instituted by him in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal, and (c) no application (other than one for leave under this section) is to be made by him in any proceedings in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal. (3) A restriction of proceedings order may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but otherwise it remains in force indefinitely."
"The procedure at the Tribunals seems to be as follows: Appellant's ET1 will go first to HHJ Prophet (EAT Judge) or Mr. Meeran (president of ET) for adjudication without hearing the evidence although senior counsels after carefully considering evidence have given favourable opinions on the merit of his claims. Then, they will direct the Regional Chairman to pick a Chairman and two lay members, in all likelihood but exception are not ruled out, one moppet and other puppet supporter of Labour Party. The Tribunal will come to hear the case with a preconceived agenda. The Appellant and his lay representatives will be harassed at the hearing and the case will be dismissed after observing some formalities for window dressing … I have yet to see a member of the judiciary at the EAT or ET who came to hear my cases with an open mind."
"Thank you for your letter of21 February 2002 . There is no basis upon which it would be appropriate for me to give evidence on behalf of Mr. Deman to the Employment Tribunal hearing the case of Mr. Deman against Leeds Metropolitan University and others. In the light of your letter, and of other recent cases being brought by Mr. Deman, I am approaching the Attorney General with a view to having Mr. Deman declared a vexatious litigant."
"My past employers, University of Pittsburgh, Queen's University of Belfast, University of Greenwich have been actively involved in disparaging campaign against me and have made my life difficult and have also closed the ranks in the Higher Education Sector in UK."
"The Tribunal noted before it made its decision that there had been no contact with the Applicant since6 November 1998 , that the letter of19 January 1999 was the first indication that the Applicant might be unwell, that the Respondents had sought to contact the Applicant for some time since November 1998 and had received no response, and that the Respondents had attended the Tribunal fully prepared to pursue the case, preparing bundles running to 900 pages. The Tribunal considered the way in which the Applicant had conducted the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious and unreasonable and therefore he could be liable to pay the Respondents' costs of proceedings. These costs are to be taxed on County Court Scale 2."
"Please note that the statement purporting to be made by myself and faxed [by] you is not one which I made. It is the first time I have seen it, and [it] is not signed by me."
"In the light of the history of the attendance of Dr Qureshi, what he has told the Tribunal and the applicant's confirmation on the morning of 18 th March that it was his intention in any event to apply for the witness order to be revoked, the Tribunal does not consider that it is an appropriate exercise of [its] discretion to issue a fresh witness order to Dr Qureshi or, as the applicant puts it, to reinstate the witness order. If, as the applicant maintains, there is now no distance between himself and Dr Qureshi then there should be no difficulty arranging for Dr Qureshi's attendance, if he is able to give evidence which is relevant to the proceedings before this Tribunal. The Tribunal is confident that the university will do everything in its power to facilitate the attendance of Dr Qureshi, its employee."
"Put bluntly, on the second day of the hearing of this case, the claimant lied to this Tribunal. The effect of his lie was to cause us to issue Witness Orders against witnesses who, we were given to believe, were going to give evidence in accordance with statements which had been provided by the claimant to the respondent… We were further expressly led to understand that four of those witnesses were ready to attend on the third day of this hearing but had had to make sudden rearrangements to their personal and business plans and commitments because the Tribunal were not able to sit on the third day. Four witness statements were issued – for Mrs Mayo-Deman, Dr Qureshi, Mr James McCue and Mr Albert Titterington. These last two witnesses were in Northern Ireland but we were told by the claimant that they required our witness orders merely in order to satisfy their employers and so that they could make themselves available. Witness orders were issued in good faith and it became immediately apparent, from their reaction, that Dr Qureshi knew nothing of the case, had not made and disavowed the witness statement which had been tendered as his proposed evidence and that he had never been asked to attend and that Mr Titterington was not expecting to attend." (c) Mr. Deman, notwithstanding those points and the stance which he had adopted on 16 th March, applied to the Tribunal for witness orders in relation to all his witnesses, i.e. including Mr. Graham and Judge Prophet. The Tribunal – plainly correctly – observed that in all the circumstances the application now for a witness order for Judge Prophet was an abuse of the process. (d) Mr. Deman asked the Tribunal to make arrangements for its proceedings to be video recorded so that there could be no dispute as to what had been said and "because the Chairman is making his notes on a laptop and if the matter comes before the Employment Appeal Tribunal those notes are amendable"
"We are unanimously at a complete loss to understand the various ploys which have been used by the applicant, on a daily basis, to obstruct this course. As counsel for the respondent has said, we have not, or have barely, had a full day of simply hearing evidence in the case. The entire progress over its six days so far – and its seventh day is no exception – has been punctuated by points raised by the applicant, objections by him, applications made by him, criticism made by him to the Tribunal and at times, it must be said, provocations of the Tribunal by him." (9) It appears that on 7 th April 2004 Mr. Deman lodged appeals with the Employment Appeal Tribunal against the first three interlocutory decisions identified above. We do not have the grounds of appeal but Mr. Deman in a subsequent document described the grounds as being "errors of law, perversity and bias"
"The Tribunal does not disavow one word of its previous Reasons. It believes that the request for a witness order was in the circumstances an abuse of process and founded upon the Tribunal being misled. The witness order was properly revoked, the applicant's case is now closed, Dr Qureshi does indeed (from the information before the Tribunal) have nothing to say which is probative of any issue in this case and it would be improper to issue a witness order against him now."
"To the applicant's certain knowledge – because he has on more than one occasion referred to the correspondence which he had at the time with the previous Regional Chairman of this region, Mr Beaumont – Judge Prophet has strongly disavowed that witness statement. It is not his and it is nothing short of scandalous in the view of this Tribunal that it was maintained to be his witness statement. Even were the statement correct, it is, again, not probative of any of the issues before this Tribunal in this case; it contains nothing which bears upon the facts of these two complaints and the matters which have to be decided by this Tribunal in determining the applicant's two complaints before us. It is not relevant and it is nothing but potentially prejudicial. The request for a witness order is again an abuse of the process of the Tribunals…"
"On several occasions statements made on behalf of this Tribunal by its Chairman had been misconstrued by the applicant and fed back to the Tribunal incorrectly and inaccurately. The Tribunal's reasons given so far make plain what the true facts are. We remain an impartial judicial body and we will not have our statements mis-recalled, misinterpreted or misrepresented." (10) With regard to the application for an adjournment, the Tribunal was not prepared to give credence to Mr. Deman's unsubstantiated allegations about difficulties with child-care, having regard to the fact that the hearing had been fixed for some time and the matter had only now been raised at the last minute: as the Tribunal pointed out, Mr. Deman had been able to attend throughout the first tranche of the hearing and was indeed present to argue matters on 15 th April. As for the requirement for Mr. Deman to give evidence in the Camberwell Youth Court, it was unclear whether this would in fact overlap with any part of the proposed hearing dates; but the Chairman said that he would write to the police and the clerk to the Court so as to ensure that if there were a difficulty it could be resolved so as to lose the minimum amount of hearing time. As regards the appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the Tribunal did not believe that that was a reason for not continuing with the hearing. In particular, it did not believe that it was obliged to recuse itself because allegations of bias had been made. In this connection it noted: "
"(i) The applicant knows that the Tribunal is concerned about the delays and interruptions that have prevented the respondent from presenting its case. (ii) This is the eleventh day of the hearing. In the previous ten days the Tribunal has had to give no fewer than eight Decisions on interlocutory matters raised by the applicant. (iii) In the time that the hearing has been running so far, the applicant has taken just over 20¼ hours in presenting his case and evidence. Of that his own evidence (as oppose to that of his witnesses) took just short of 18 hours and the only interruptions to it were of the applicant's making. (iv) A further twelve hours and 16 minutes have been spent by the Tribunal in dealing with the applicant's various applications, requests and interruptions. (v) In contrast, in the four and a half days since the applicant's case closed the respondent has been able to adduce oral evidence for no more than four hours and 45 minutes. This rate of progress is denying the respondent a fair hearing of its case and for this last reason alone the Tribunal requires the applicant to provide independent medical evidence of his incapacity today." (14) The following day the Tribunal was supplied with a letter from Mr. Deman claiming to be suffering from "vertigo, dizziness and nausea and heartburn and pain" and a letter from an SHO at the Manchester Royal Infirmary saying "this gentleman attended A&E with medical problems. I have advised him to rest and remain off work for the next few days (this included Tribunal work)."
"He has suffered with these conditions for a very long time and as such I am unable to say when he is able to attend to his affairs in general."
"…address the apparent inconsistency as to the prognosis and expressly address the question of how it should be that the applicant, in May, is considered unfit to prosecute his case at this stage when he was perfectly fit to do so and did so vigorously in March and on 15/16 April; in April he attended a four day hearing at Camberwell Youth Court as late as 14 May he was seeking to have this case adjourned in part because he was committed to a three day hearing at the Croydon Employment Tribunal on 19, 20 & 21 May (the last half of this week) in his correspondence with the Tribunal he makes frequent references to a multiplicity of other court appearances and litigation deadlines which he has to meet and shows all the signs of being fully able to continue to conduct widespread litigation in other matters."
"We have considered carefully all the other matters of which the Claimant has complained. In particular, he objects to the Chairman questioning witnesses and suggest – as in each instance he did at the time, without hesitation – that the Chairman was prompting the witness or was leading the witness to give evidence which was supportive of the Respondent's case. We note at this instance that this Chairman has found it a rare event indeed to be able, as is otherwise normal in such proceedings, to ask the witness a question for the purpose of clarification without being the subject of a loud and aggressive objection by the Claimant followed by and incorporating an attack on the Chairman's independence and impartiality. In many instances questions have not been asked which would normally routinely be asked simply because it has been anticipated by the Chairman and his colleagues that it would serve only to provoke another outburst from the Claimant and that would further delay matters. We refer to reasons given in our previous decisions, in which we have emphasised the need to progress with this case and to hear the evidence so that we can come to a decision based on the facts and the law in which we can have confidence on the basis that we have heard all the relevant evidence. We refer also to our stated determination to proceed with this hearing not withstanding what has been at times a perplexing approach to the progress of this case on the part of the claimant. Indeed there have been a significant number of occasions when it had seemed that the claimant's main intent was to destroy the possibility of a fair hearing of this case and he has been more than once warned about his conduct in this regard. We note also that, up to the resumption of this hearing on 4 th October after a long break, the claimant in the presentation of his own case had consumed 20 hours and 7 minutes of our time. The Respondent to that stage, in 4½ days had been able to produce its evidence for only a period of 9 hours and 35 minutes and the Tribunal and the Respondent's time had been occupied by the claimant's various interruptions, protest and applications for 12 hours and 46 minutes. At that stage we were in grave danger of reaching the point where the hearing would have to be abandoned on the basis that a fair hearing was being rendered impossible by the claimant's conduct. We did not, mercifully, have to take that step although the whole of last Monday morning was effectively wasted in the Claimant's pursuit of a vexatious application for a review of the refusal by this Chairman of a Witness Order for a witness, Mr Titterington who, it appeared, was present through most of the morning in this very Tribunal. We nevertheless proceeded with the case from Monday lunchtime and, as Counsel for the Respondent today has pointed out, we were successful and were for the first time throughout this hearing, in having 4½ days consecutively observed in hearing evidence."
"Since then, there have been innumerable further instances of deliberate misconstruction and misrepresentation by the Claimant of, in particular, the actions and words of this Tribunal and of its Chairman in particular. The Claimant has vehemently and aggressively resisted any intervention by or ruling of our Chairman and has repeatedly unjustifiably accused him and the Tribunal of bias. The Claimant has sought to permit of no other opinion than his own. In the earlier part of the hearing, over the space of nine days the Claimant consumed more than sixteen hours in vexatious arguments and in criticism of the Tribunal."
"…was part of a highly disruptive approach by the Claimant to the conduct of this hearing and, as he was warned on more than two occasions, it brought this Tribunal to the very brink of considering whether or not his claim should be struck out. His conduct was, indeed, scandalous and the only issue was whether or not his behaviour was such as to deprive the respondent and the Tribunal of the prospect of a fair hearing."
"Very poor publications in recent past. None since 1996. Not good enough publication record for Senior Lecturer. Accept for short-list for Lecturer."
"[Mr. Deman's] argument that there was sex discrimination ignores the fact that a total of four male persons were appointed as Lecturers at the same time as Ms Richardson and one other female person. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in accepting [the] suggestion [of counsel for the University] that this particular complaint is entirely without merit. For those reasons, it is simply rejected."
"…consists of 15 pages and some 45 paragraphs of complaints of bias on the part of various Chairmen of the Employment Tribunal, including Mr. Grazin, and on a wider basis and makes many criticisms of the procedures adopted by the Tribunal which heard the complaints now the subject of this appeal."
"…[T]he withdrawal by Mr Kumar was not brought to the attention of the EAT and the first that the respondent were aware of this state of affairs was this morning. We find the assertion by Mr Kumar to be incredible."
"This matter was listed for hearing in June at a directions hearing. Since then the applicant has applied on four occasions for it to be adjourned on different and changing grounds."
"We were satisfied that the difficulty… related to the Claimant insisting that the whole of the bundle of documents relating to a previous hearing between the parties should be included in this bundle. Quite apart from the Claimant's extensive experience before these Tribunals, there had been lengthy directions appointment when such matters had been discussed. His insistence that the whole of the previous bundle should be included in our bundle was unreasonable. It became clear the Claimant had in fact received the Respondents' set of documents at least two weeks prior to the commencement of our hearing, whereas the Respondents had not seen the Claimant's bundle or witness statements until the morning of the hearing." (b) Another ground, or grounds, for Mr. Deman seeking an adjournment was his involvement in a number of other proceedings. The Tribunal held that these did not justify an adjournment of the instant proceedings, which had been listed for some time. Mr. Deman knew of the timetable and should have been able to work around it. (c) Mr. Deman, as in other proceedings to which we have already referred, sought to support his application for an adjournment on other grounds by reference to problems with his health. The Tribunal recorded that he submitted four separate medical reports from the previous year which described him as then suffering from "severe depression and anxiety", although the most recent also described him as being physically fit to attend a hearing. The Tribunal pointed out: "
"There is no evidence to suggest that the Claimant's race, ethnicity, nationality or colour may have affected his non-selection… [S]ince there are no facts found from which we could conclude that colour or nationality played a part, there is nothing for the Respondents to explain or for us to draw inferences from."
"…did not establish a recent history in teaching Economics at that level, or indeed that he had been in academia for the last few years, but in fact left a gap as to what sort of consultancy work he had been occupied with over that period of time." (It also referred to the fact that Mr. Deman had given evidence that he had not in fact engaged in consultancy work because he had been too ill.) (2) The Tribunal accepted that the question of victimisation was more difficult. This was not surprising since the University was inevitably aware of the previous claims brought by Mr. Deman. But it concluded that Mr. Deman had not established that that knowledge influenced the University's decision. It pointed out: "
"What is one to make of all this confused and contradictory medical information ? There is no reference in the medical reports written while Mr. Deman was in India of a bacterial viral infection and treatment with antibiotics. Although there is reference to anxiety, depression and vertigo in the [CEM] letter, there is no medical evidence to suggest any psychiatric component to the Claimant's difficulties. It appears to be safe to say in this case that the Claimant has produced material referring to injuries to his hand; anxiety and depression; bacterial, viral infection; wheezing and spastic bronchitis. He has been able, in a period immediately prior to his Tribunal appointment, to travel from India to the UK and to produce a lengthy witness statement. I am forced to the conclusion that the Claimant has been aware of the obligation to produce satisfactory medical evidence at this hearing, to be cross-examined by the Respondent. The Claimant has failed to produce that evidence, and has failed to produce consistent and substantial evidence of an incapacity which would be sufficient to justify an adjournment of the Pre-Hearing Review."
"The Claimant would have been aware from the terms of the Regional Chairman's Order … that he faced a serious question regarding the veracity of the information supplied to the Tribunal. The Regional Chairman, faced with the irreconcilable claims of the Claimant to a postponement and the Respondent to avoid unnecessary expenditure of costs, granted the postponement on condition that the Claimant, on 18 January, provide the requested oral testimony regarding his medical condition, including the report of an expert medical practitioner. The Claimant did not attend, and did not provide the medical evidence requested. My conclusion is that the Claimant obtained the adjournment of the substantive hearing on the basis of unsubstantiated information. I conclude that the Claimant set out to mislead the Tribunal. He then provided the Tribunal with material regarding his medical difficulties in order to procure an adjournment which, upon critical analysis, is unjustified by the material provided. The Claimant was ordered to attend with a medical practitioner to be cross-examined by the Respondent. However, he chose not to take that step and subject himself to the cross-examination of the Respondent. I am left with the conclusion that the correct conclusion is that the medical documentation supplied is incapable of substantiation and the Claimant misled the Tribunal by his action in obtaining an adjournment."
"In all cases, racial discrimination is claimed to be direct. Most, but not quite all, of these claims rest upon inference, and in view of that, we feel that it is necessary at this early stage to point out as a fact the readiness of the Applicant to draw such an inference. It appears to the Tribunal that in respect of all the incidents within its jurisdiction and most of the background incidents, the Applicant is ready to infer racial discrimination whenever the incident appears to him to be prejudicial to him … This desire to draw an inference of racial discrimination from every prejudicial act has not made the Tribunal's task of drawing inferences any easier … We should also draw attention to the fact that the Applicant's account of complaints is frequently lacking in specific detail. It was characteristic of his evidence in chief that he rarely identified individuals. Most of the details of his complaints was actually derived in cross-examination and almost all references to people by name derived from his response to that cross-examination. It is also to be observed that there is little, if any, reference to comparative treatment of others. This is because the Applicant very seldom drew such comparisons. Almost all his complaints are made on the assumption that he has been singled out for detrimental treatment and that it followed, therefore, that others would not be subject to the treatment complained of. There is some indication that the Applicant considered it sufficient that identification of the detriment be established and inevitable indicator of discrimination."
"It is the unanimous decision of the Tribunal not to strike out the Applicant's Originating Application for scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious behaviour. However, the Tribunal does express its concern that the Applicant appears to be providing the Tribunal with information relating to matters that do not concern this case with a sole purpose of seeking to raise a conflict of interest. If this was the case it would in the view of the Tribunal be unreasonable and vexatious conduct. The Tribunal is also concerned that the Applicant is making applications raising issues already dealt with by the Tribunal. The Tribunal considers this to be potentially unreasonable and vexatious conduct. The Tribunal is dealing with events which are now some two years old. Words to the parties confirm that the hearing on 8 May that they had no further applications to make and at this hearing was set down for the three days 20, 21 and 22 October to deal with the merits of the Applicant's case. The Tribunal is concerned that we must get on with the merits of the Applicant's case and it will not accept unreasonable or vexatious conduct designed to delay the proceedings."
"It is a matter of record that Mr Leahy at Manchester Tribunal, Respondents, EAT, Croydon Tribunal and the Roman Catholic Private Limited Company of Irish and Zionist origin were colluded with each other to resume the hearing from17 May 2004 in Mr. Deman's absence … . It appears to us under Sharon-Bush-Blair Regimes Iraqis are abused and under Zionist-Irish Roman Catholic Regimes of the Employment Tribunals and EAT Mr. Deman is being abused on a regular basis."
"For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs of this decision I have decided to refuse the Applicant's application for a review of the Tribunal's decision which was promulgated and sent to the parties on23rd April 1999 because, in my opinion, it has no reasonable prospect of success and it was made after the expiry of the statutory time limit for seeking leave to apply for a review of the decision."
"The grounds of appeal to this court are that the EAT erred in law in not ruling on its application for an adjournment, that they erred by refusing him leave to appeal without providing copies of documents to the lay members, that they erred in refusing him leave to appeal without hearing the application properly, that threats were made to the applicant, that the tribunal then erred in law by refusing the request for any review and then for permission to appeal to this court and that the tribunal had shown a lack of regard for the Human Rights Act. I still fail to understand why this matter has come before this court at all. This court is now asked to give permission to appeal against an order which is of limited duration and has long since expired. In any event, I see no merit in the application."
"We conclude that either these claims were misconceived from the outset, as the Applicant knew they were out of time and had insufficient reasons for bring them earlier; or the continuation of these claims to the door of the Tribunal and then their effective abandonment was unreasonable."