"… That the Applicant had sent his letter of 1 July to various Parties outside the school; That the Applicant had challenged Sister Bernadette's leadership; That the Applicant had made malicious statements; That the Applicant had behaved in an unprofessional manner in approaching Dr Sodhi about his doctorate in a corridor in the presence of another member of staff; That the Applicant had spoken inappropriately to children about his suspension; That the Applicant had acted in an intimidating manner towards the Head Teacher in the presence of a priest."
"having regard to the infringement complained of and…"
'The amount of the compensation awarded shall be such as the Tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to – (a) the infringement to which the complaint relates, and (b) any loss which is attributable to the act, or failure to act, which infringed the complainant's right.'
"…concern as to whether some recent tribunal awards in discrimination cases are in line with general levels of compensation recovered in other cases of non-pecuniary loss, such as general damages for personal injuries, malicious prosecution and defamation."
'Moreover, it is very well established that in cases where the damages are at large the jury (or the judge if the award is left to him) can take into account the motives or conduct of the defendant where they aggravate the injury done to the plaintiff. There may be malevolence or spite or the manner of committing the wrong may be such as to injure the plaintiff's proper feelings of dignity or pride. These are matters which the jury can take into account in assessing the appropriate compensation.'
"As regards the meaning of the particular categories, I have come to the conclusion that what Lord Devlin said was never intended to be treated as if his words were verbally inspired, and much of the criticism of them which has succeeded reports of the case has been based on interpretations which are false to the whole context and unduly literal even when taken in isolation from it. The only category exhaustively discussed before us was the second, since the first could obviously have no application to the instant case. But I desire to say of the first that I would be surprised if it included only servants of the government: in the strict: sense of the word. It would, in my view, obviously apply to the police, despite A-G for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd , and almost as certainly to local and other officials exercising improperly rights of search or arrest without warrant and it may be that in the future it will be held to include other abuses of power without warrant by persons purporting to exercise legal authority. What it will not include is the simple bully, not because the bully ought not to be punished in damages, for he manifestly ought, but because an adequate award of compensatory damages by way of solatium will necessarily have punished him. I am not prepared to say without further consideration that a private individual misusing legal powers of private prosecution or arrest as in Leith v Pope , where the defendant had the plaintiff arrested and tried on a capital charge, might not at some future date be assimilated into the first category. I am not prepared to make an exhaustive list of the emanations of government which might or might not be included. But I see no reason to extend it beyond this field, to simple outrage, malice or contumelious behaviour. In such cases a properly directed jury will not find it necessary to differentiate between what the plaintiff ought to receive and the defendant ought to pay, since the former will always include the latter to the extent necessary to vindicate the strength of the law."
"Lord Devlin's first category is set out in the passage where he said: 'The first category is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government. I should not extend this category,-I say this with particular reference to the facts of this case,-to oppressive action by private corporations or individuals.' This distinction has been attacked on two grounds; first. that it only includes Crown servants and excludes others like the police who exercise governmental functions but are not Crown servants and, secondly, that it is illogical since both the harm to the plaintiff and the blameworthiness of the defendant may be at least equally great where the offender is a powerful private individual. With regard to the first I think that the context shows that the category was never intended to be limited to Crown servants. The contrast is between 'the government' and private individuals. Local government is as much government as national government, and the police and many other persons are exercising governmental functions. It was unnecessary in Rookes v Barnard to define the exact limits of the category. I should certainly read it as extending to all those who by common law or statute are exercising functions of a governmental character."